AN INTRODUCTION
TO
BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION OF THE
TARKABHĀṢĀ OF MOKṢĀKARAGUPTA

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INTRODUCTION

1 The Tarkabhāṣā (The Language of Logic): The present work is an annotated translation of the Tarkabhāṣā (TBh) of Mokṣākaragupta who wrote it some time between 1050-1202 A.D. This TBh should be distinguished from two other works bearing the same name, viz. the Tarkabhāṣā of Kesavamisra and the Jaina-tarkabhāṣā of Yaśovijaya, though these three share the same character of being a compendium of the system of a particular Indian philosophical school. While the latter two texts are devoted to the Naiyāyika and the Jaina philosophy respectively, Mokṣākaragupta's TBh forms a brief but excellent introduction to Buddhist philosophy including epistemology and logic. This is the earliest of the three texts and seems to have set an example for the other two.

Apart from great works on Buddhist logic and epistemology such as those by Dharmakīrti, Prajñākaragupta, Jñānaśrimitra etc., we know, so far as Sanskrit originals are available, three compendiums which systematically describe bauddhanyāya, dividing it into the three chapters of pratyakṣa, svārthānumāna, and parārthānumāna: Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu (NB) with Dharmottara's Tīkā (NBT), Vidyākaraśānti's Tarkasopāna (TSop), and our TBh. The latter two works of course owe much to NB and NBT, but they have their own merits of incorporating later developments of Buddhist philosophy which were not known to Dharmottara. Most parts of NBT are concerned with the explanation of formal logic and epistemology viewed from the standpoint of the Sautrāntika, omitting elucidations of other topics which are very important in Buddhist philosophy in general. TSop is a small book which is so much indebted to Dharmottara that it looks like a digest of NBT, and in places where it goes beyond the latter it probably owes much to TBh. Compared with these two works, TBh is far richer in information, a large portion of which has remained unknown to the scholarly world.

This quality of TBh is due to the fact that Mokṣākara based his work on many texts which were not utilized by Dharmottara or Vidyākaraśānti.
He refers to most of the important works of Dharmakirti and their commentaries, and cites many passages from Prajñākaragupta, Jñānaśrimitra and Ratnakīrti. The third chapter of his work may be called an abridgement of the theories of Jñānaśrimitra and Ratnakīrti, and this fact is valuable to us, since TBh forms a good introduction to the works of the said two scholars which have not been well studied as yet.

To illustrate the said character of our text, it may not be irrelevant here to refer to some of the important theories discussed by Mokṣākara-gupta. In § 4 where he establishes the Buddhist theory that valid cognition is of two kinds, indeterminate (pratyakṣa) and determinate knowledge (anumāna), he enters into the criticism of other means of knowledge maintained by different schools of Indian philosophy, i.e. sabda, upamāna, arthāpatti and abhāva, and criticises also the Carvaka’s view that pratyakṣa alone is the means of valid knowledge. In this discussion his main source is Ratnakīrti’s Pramāṇāntarbhāvaprakaraṇa. For the refutation of the connection of the word and the thing meant by it, Mokṣākara adopts the same criticism of connection which was put forward by Dharmakīrti in his Sambandhaparikṣā (§ 4.2). When he discusses the Buddhist attitude towards the vexed problem of whether the validity of knowledge is known by itself independently, or dependently on another proof attesting it (svaḷaḥ prāmāṇyaṁ or pāraḷaḥ), he follows Śāntiraksita and Manorathanandin in saying that neither of the two principles should be applied to knowledge in general, some kinds of knowledge being known to be valid by themselves and others by another proof (§ 2.4). Special importance is attached by Mokṣākara-gupta to the theory of self-consciousness (svaśaṁvedana), which he discusses in detail, quoting from Dharmakīrti, Prajñākaragupta, and Śāntiraksita and criticising the objections of Kumārilabhaṭṭa and Trilocana (§ 6.2).

A traditional doctrine of Buddhist logic says that the object of indeterminate knowledge is the extreme particular (svaḷaṅkṣaṇa). But this theory entailed a difficult problem as to how universal concomitance or pervasion (vyāpti), which forms the basis of inference and which is the relationship between two universals, can be grasped by pratyakṣa.

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1) The following illustrations are taken out of the content of the present work, and for a detailed discussion and information the reader is referred to the section indicated by § 4, etc.
Following Jñānaśrimitra and Ratnakīrti, our author answers the question by saying that a universal can (also) be an object of *pratyakṣa*. For this new interpretation, he takes advantage of the theory of two kinds of exclusion (*vyavaccheda*), which was originally expounded by Dharmakīrti in relation to another problem. An affirmative proposition ' *x* is *y* ' may be interpreted in two ways by putting on either *x* or *y* a restriction or stress which is expressed in Sanskrit by the particle *eva*. When the proposition ' A particular is the object of *pratyakṣa* ' is construed by *anyavyavaccheda*, it means ' A particular alone is the object of *pratyakṣa* '; but when construed by *ayogavyavaccheda* the same sentence means ' A particular is rightly included among the objects of *pratyakṣa* '. Once a universal was permitted to be grasped by indeterminate knowledge, it came to be classified under a universal of an individual which is produced by the accumulation of many moments of the momentary stream of a thing and which may be exemplified by the idea of ' this ', and a universal of a class which denotes all the members of a class, say, jar. These two universals are respectively named *ūrdhvatalākṣaṇa-* and *tiryaglakṣaṇa-sāmānya*. This classification is made by Jñānaśrimitra as well as Ratnakīrti, but seems to have originated from Māṇikyanandin, the Jaina author of the *Parikṣāmukhasūtra*, if he can be dated in the 9th century A. D. (§ 7.1).

Just as an affirmative proposition is construed in two ways, a negative proposition is also interpreted in two ways, this time by understanding the negation as of a term ( *paryudāsa-*) and as of a proposition ( *prasajya-pratīṣedha*) (cf. n. 62). A proposition ' *x* is not *y* ' means ' *x* is a non-*y* or *z* ' when the negation is understood as *paryudāsapratiṣedha* ; but if it is construed as *prasajya-pratīṣedha*, the same proposition means only ' It is false that *x* is *y* ' without allowing a positive interpretation. Among Buddhists, this theory of two kinds of negation was applied to philosophy first by Mādhyamikas such as Bhāvaviveka. Buddhist logicians followed them in adopting it for the explanation of their particular doctrines. According to Buddhist logic the non-cognition of a thing is nothing but the cognition of the other things contained in the range of one and the same cognition. That we do not see a jar here means that we see here things other than the jar. This is an example of *paryudāsapratiṣedha* being applied to the explanation of non-cognition (§ 13). The
theory of *apoha* (discrimination) which was propounded by Dignāga and Dharmakirti had found various interpretations by the time of Mokṣākara-gupta, who mentions three: *nivṛttya-apohavāda, vidhivāda* and *apohaviśiṣṭa-vidhivāda*. The latter two were made possible by applying wholly or partly *paryudāsapratiṣedha* to *anyāpoha* (negation of other things) (§ 26).

In the second chapter dealing with formal logic, Mokṣākara-gupta follows mainly NB and NBT, though not without new information. The most important of the latter may be his classification of negative inference into 16 formulae. Dharmakirti himself classified negative inference into 4 kinds with 4 subordinate forms in PV, 3 kinds in HB and 11 kinds in NB. The classification into 16 is found in the works of Durvekamiśra, Mokṣākara-gupta and Vidyākaraśānti. Durveka, the Brāhmaṇa commentator on NBT, did know the classification into 16, but it is unlikely that he borrowed it from our author, since he is usually supposed to have been contemporary with Jñānaśrimitra who was older than Mokṣākara-gupta by more than two generations. Vidyākaraśānti, the author of TSop probably owes the same to our author. We are not informed of the person who first proposed this classification, although we have a vague clue through which we might be permitted to ascribe it to Jñānaśrimitra (§ 13.5).

Another important piece of information we get from TBh II consists of two theories of how to determine a causal relation (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*). Jñānaśrimitra was of the opinion that a causal relation is ascertained by three cognitions - one perception and two non-perceptions or one non-perception and two perceptions - and criticised Dharmottara who proclaimed that at least five cognitions are necessary for the determination of a causal relation. Mokṣākara refers to these two theories without showing a bias towards either of them (§ 11.3).

In the third chapter Mokṣākara-gupta discusses various topics which form important problems of Buddhist philosophy: the proof of universal momentariness (*kṣaṇabhaṅga*) (§ 16.1); the refutation of the existence of God (*iśvarasādhanadūsana*) (§ 20. 1-2; § 28-28.1); the problem of solipsism (*saṁtāṇāntara*) (§ 20. 2. 4); the problem of how to ascertain the universal concomitance of two terms and two theories about it, viz. *antarvyāpti* and *bahirvyāpti* which are respectively represented by Ratnākaraśānti and Jñānaśrimitra (§ 22); the definitions and illustrations
of prasaṅga, prasaṅgaviparyaya and viparyayabuddhatkapramāṇa, the
syllogistic forms which played important roles in Buddhist polemics in
the later period (§ 24); the problem of the import of the word (apoha),
of which our author clearly distinguishes between three interpretations
held by Dignāga and Dharmakirti, Śāntiraksita, and Jñānaśrimitra
(§ 26); the refutation of recognition (pratyabhijñā) (§ 28.2); the proof
of two kinds of omniscient beings (sarvajña and sarvasarvajña)(§ 29-29.1);
the proof of succession of lives (§ 29.2) and so forth. Vācaspatimisra, as
well as his teacher Trilocana, appears often as an opponent in these
discussions. Following the method of Dharmakirti in PV, Mokṣākaragupta
inserted these topics as illustrations of particular logical rules, fallacies
and confutations, and he bases his opinions mostly on Jñānaśrimitra
and Ratnakirti.

At the end of the third chapter, our author briefly reproduces the
main theories of the four Buddhist schools, Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika,
Yogācārin and Mādhya-mādhyamika (§ 30-33). This portion is particularly
interesting and important, since we do not have many descriptions of the
same kind in other Buddhist texts and since it became a model when
Guṇaratna (and probably Mādhava) wrote a summary of Buddhist doc-
trines in the Tarkarahasyadipikā (and the Sarvadarśanasamgraha).
Mokṣākaragupta’s representation of the theories of the four schools are
closely related also to the same kind of summary in the Jñānasārasamuc-
caya, falsely ascribed to Āryadeva, and its commentary by Bodhibhadra.
The verses 21, 22a-b, 23, 25, 26a-b and 27 of the Jñānasārasamuccaya
are found in TBh too. And Bodhibhadra’s review of sākāravāda and
nirākāravāda of the Yogācārins finds a counterpart in TBh § 32.1. Though
our author does not enter into a detailed discussion of the important
schisms among Yogācārins, he seems to have been well aware of the
sākāravāda of Jñānaśrimitra and the nirākāravāda of Ratnakarasaṃśānti
(§ 32.1).

TBh was counted among ten great works of Buddhist philosophy
enumerated by Guṇaratna¹¹ who evidently owed much to Mokṣākaragupta
when writing the portion of the Bauddhadarśana in the Tarkarahasya-
dipikā. R. Iyengar points out another reference to our text in an un-
published Jaina work, the Nyāyamañḍipikā, a commentary on the Pra-

¹¹) TRD 47, 20; Iyengar’s preface to M. iv.
meyaralnamālā of Anantarīya. Malliśeṇa quotes the passages of TBh on universal momentariness, the succession of lives and other problems in his Śyāvdāmaṇḍari. As stated above, TSop and the Jñānasāra-samuccayānibandhana of Bodhibhadra have much to do with our text, though we are not sure if these two Buddhist authors are posterior to Mokṣākara-gupta.

2 Date of the Author: In the colophon of TBh Mokṣākara-gupta is mentioned as a resident of the Mahājagadhāla-vihāra. We know from substantial evidence that the Jagaddhāla (or Jagaddala) Vihāra existed in Varendrī, the paternal land of the Pāla dynasty, which might be placed so as to include the junction of the present Rājshāhi, Bogra and Malda of Bengal and an unknown amount of territory to the north. But the implication of the colophon is only this, further presumptions read in it being uncertain. The Vihāra is sometimes said to have

iii) M Preface iv.
iv) See n. 235, 374, 382 and 383.
v) śrimanmahājagaddhālavihārāya māhāpāṇḍitabhikṣumokṣākara-guptavaivaśitāyāṁ tarkabhāṣāyaṁ parārthānāmānaparichedeśa samāptaḥ. G has -rājajagaddhāla- for mahājagaddhāla.
vi) RC III, 7: mandrāṇāṁ sthitimūḍhāṁ jagaddalamahāvihārarāgām, dadhatiṁ lokēsam api mahātātararitorumahāmānām, which Majumdar translates: "(Varendrī) -which had elephants of the Mandra type imported (into its forests) -where in the great monastery at Jagaddala kindly love for all was found accumulated -which country bore (in its heart) the image of (Bodhisattva) Lokesā -and whose great glory was still more increased (or pronounced) by (the presence of) the great (heads of monasteries) and the (images of) Tārā (the Buddhist goddess)". This is among 27 verses (III, 2–28) in which the poet gives a glowing account of Varendra (cf. Intro. xxxi).

vii) SR Intro. xxxvii. n. 6.
viii) Cf. SR Intro. xxxviii. n. 8. Haraprasād Sāstrī, R. D. Banerjee, Rāhula Sāṃkṛtyāyana, etc. ascribe the construction of the Jagaddala to Rāmapāla. E. Krishnamacharya, following Haraprasād Sāstrī, states (G Bhūmikā, 1): ayaṁ hi rājajagaddalavihārāḥ uttaravañgeṣu varendrāde gaṅgākaraṇolāyasaṁkamaṇapautrīte rāmāvatinagare rāmapālenā rājñā pratiśṭhapitaḥ. As Majumdar points out (RC xxxi), H. Sāstrī confounded the verses of RC describing Varendrī and those describing Rāmapāta and the capital founded by Rāmapāla. This seems to have led many scholars to think that Rāmapāta constructed the Jagaddala-vihāra in Rāmapāta. In fact, however, RC says that the Vihāra was in Varendrī and not that it was in Rāmapāta, nor that it was founded by Rāmapāla.

Another source which led Rāhula Sāṃkṛtyāyana to make the reference to Jagaddala having been built in the seventh year of Rāmapāla's reign is the colophon of Jāgaddal-nivāsi's Bhagavatāyānāmarāṣṭri vyākhya (Cordier Cat. Mdo, XV) which runs in Peking Reprint Edition no. 5209: mi yi dbag po rāmapālas sa skyȫḥ mdzad pañi' gnas kyi mu tig phreng pa ni. dpal ldan rgyal po dsaṅgṭul 'gnaš par byed pa dbag gis rnam bdad ḍi byas so... dpal ldan ha rgyal skyȫḥ gis rgyal spis mdzad pañi' to lta lung pa la dbun lsa ḍhring pañi tshes bzi la dpal byaḥ chub chen pañi' tha khaṅ dwi bris pañi. This may be rendered: This
been established by Rāmapāla (c. 1100 A. D.), the 14th king of the Pala dynasty, after his recovery of Varendri which had been once lost. This information, however, is not trustworthy, though a possibility of the construction of the Vihāra by Rāmapāla may not be totally excluded. Varendri was existent long before and after this king, and there is no positive evidence for the theory mentioned above. Such being the case, we are not certain of the termini of the Vihāra, and hence of the date of Mokṣākaragupta.

In the absence of external evidence, we have to rely on internal data for determining the date of our author. Considering the many scholars to whom Mokṣākaragupta refers and who cite from him, we can safely place him between Ratnakaraśānti, Ṣaṇāśrimitra and Ratnakirti on the one hand and Malliśena on the other. In 1292 A. D. Malliśena wrote his Syādvādanaṁjāri, in which he cites several times passages from TBh, referring twice to our author by name. The three Buddhist logicians named above from whom our author quotes passages so profusely are more or less associated with Dipamkaraśrijñāna (Atiśa) who left the Vikramaśila Vihāra in 1040 A. D. and entered Tibet in 1042 A. D.

To begin with, Ṣaṇāśrimitra seems to have been a younger contemporary of Ratnakaraśānti, since he cites passages from the latter’s

vyākhyā was made by me, a resident of Srirajajagattala, which is the necklace of the land protected by King Rāmapāla... It was transcribed at the Sri-Mahābodhi temple on the fourth day of the month of Pauṣa in the seventh year of the coronation of Sri-Manapāla. I think it is impossible to derive from this colophon the conclusion that the Jagaddala Vihāra was built by Rāmapāla. After all, what we know from these sources is no more than this: The Jagaddala Vihāra was existent in Varendri, and flourished under Rāmapāla too. Rāmapāla’s date is also a vexed problem, on which R. D. Banerjee and R. C. Majumdar had exchanged a long series of discussions. But for our present purpose, it is enough if we follow Kosambi and Gokhale in taking A. D. 1100 as a fair date in Rāmapāla’s reign.

ix) Vidyabhushana (A History of Indian Logic) places Mokṣākaragupta at 1100 A. D., Krishnamacharya between c. 1100-1200, and Iyengar at 1110. None of these datings is based on evidence, though they seem to have been inferred from the date of Rāmapāla. Among other scholars who are close in time to Mokṣākaragupta, we may mention Sucaritamiśra who is criticized by Jñānaśrī and Ratnakirti. Manorathanandin whom our author seems to follow in a few discussions and who completed his com. on PV before 1200 A. D., Durvekamiśra to whom Mokṣākaragupta seems to owe a few theories, Bodhibhadra, and Vidyākaraśānti who was probably indebted to our author. But the dates of all these scholars are not fixed beyond doubt, and cannot be taken into account for determining the date of our author.

x) Malliśena states in the colophon of SVM that he completed the work in 1214 Śaka = 1292 A. D. (cf. SVM Intro. xiii).
Prajñāpāramitopadeśa in his Sākārasiddhiśāstra\textsuperscript{xii}. Both are enumerated among the teachers of Atiśa. Ratnakīrti made the summaries of Jñānaśrīmitra's works and was refuted by Udayana in the Ātmatattvaviveka (ATV) together with his master\textsuperscript{xii}. Ratnakīrti is, therefore, most probably a direct disciple of Jñānaśrīmitra, and may have been younger than the latter at least by one generation. About these three Buddhists and their contemporaries, we may collect a good amount of information from Tibetan sources; but the Tibetan tradition is such that the more we learn from it, the more we become confused. Therefore, we should be satisfied with the unanimous opinion that Jñānaśrīmitra was an elder contemporary of Atiśa\textsuperscript{xi}.

Almost all the works of Jñānaśrīmitra contain abundant citations from Vācaspatimiśra, especially from his Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā (NVT)\textsuperscript{xiv}. S. Dasgupta, E. Frauwallner and A. Thakur argued from different materials to the same conclusion that Vācaspatimiśra should be placed after Jayantabhaṭṭa, not before as had been so long believed\textsuperscript{xv}. P. Hacker established the date of Jayanta's Nyāyamāṇjari as about 890 A.D. on the basis of substantial evidence that he was in the court of Śaṅkaravar-

\textsuperscript{xii} JNA Intro. 34-36 ; RNA Intro. 21-22.

\textsuperscript{xiii} Cf. Bhattacharya 53. When Tibetan monks came to Vikramaśila to invite Atiśa to their country, they found that Ratnakīrti was among the eminent pandits under Atiśa. Atiśa, receiving the invitation, acted according to the instruction of Jñānaśrī. Sometime later when Naropa came on his last visit to Vikramaśila, “he leaned on the right arm of Atiśa while Jñānaśrīmitra helped him with his left arm”. This information is derived from S. C. Das's Indian Pandits in the Land of Snow (Journal of Buddhist Text Society, I. i., 1893, 7 ff.) But some other pieces of information contradict the last story; the biographer of Naropa, for instance, dates him in 1016-1100 A.D. which means that Naropa was younger than Atiśa, let alone Jñānaśrīmitra (cf. H. V. Guenther, The Life and Teaching of Naropa, Intro.). So far as Jñānaśrīmitra is concerned, however, Blue Annals, Tārānātha and other sources agree in enumerating him together with Ratnakarasānti among the teachers of Atiśa. SR lxxviii introduces Jñānaśrīmitra, a poet whose two verses are included in SR as “perhaps identical with the younger contemporary of Atiśa, Dipamkara (Tār. p. 241)". But this is a mistake on the part of the editor of SR, since Tārānātha says in the page referred to by him: Jñānaśrīmitra ist... der Lehrer, dem Sri Atiśa zu grossen Dank verpflichtet war. Now it is almost certain that the poet is the same as Jñānaśrīmitra, the philosopher.

\textsuperscript{xiv} Cf. JNA Intro. 21 ; Index. Vācaspati. Tātparyaṭikākāra.

\textsuperscript{xv} Dasgupta. II. 107 (1932) ; Frauwallner. Beiträge zur Geschichte des Nyāya. WZKM. 43. S. 266-277 (1937) ; RNA Intro. 21.
man of Kaśmir who ruled 883-902 A. D.xvi Thakur holds the same, though he seems not to have seen Hacker’s article.xvii This discovery, however, entailed another problem, the date of Vācaspatimiśra himself who had been usually placed around 841 A. D. on the basis of the date 898 which is given in the manuscripts of his Nyāyasūcinibandha (NSN) and which is construed as referring to Viśrava Saṅvat. Hacker, D. Bhattacharya and Thakur solve this question by taking the date 898 as of Śaka Saṅvat and accordingly placing Vācaspati at 976 A. D.xviii Considering this date of Vācaspatimiśra and the Tibetan information that Jñānaśrimitra was an elder contemporary of Atiśa (982-1055 A. D.) we may place the activity of Jñānaśrimitra in c. 980-1030 A. D. and that of Ratnakirti in c. 1000-1050 A. D.

There is, however, information which might contradict the date of Jñānaśrimitra as given just above. As is well known, one of the manuscripts of Udayana’s Lakṣaṇāvali bears the date 906 Śaka (984 A. D.). ATV in which Udayana criticises most of the works of Jñānaśrimitra and some of Ratnakirti’s is certainly the oldest of his major works, though we are not sure if it was written before his two smaller tracts, Lakṣaṇāvali and Lakṣaṇamālā.19 Thus, ATV must be placed before 984 A. D. or at latest at a date soon after it. It then follows that Jñānaśrimitra wrote most of his works in a very short period between 976 or 980 and c. 984, which is very unlikely. This assumption becomes absolutely impossible when we trust the tradition that in ATV Udayana referred to Ratnakirti, who must have made the summaries of his master’s works at least a generation after his master wrote them.xx

xvii) RNA Intro. 21.
xviii) Hacker, op. cit., 163; Bhattacharya, op. cit. 29, 54 etc. (1958); RNA Intro. 2, 3 with n. 2.
xix) Bhattacharya 4-5; Frauwaller, Jñānaśrī, WZKM Bd. 38, 231 with A. 1 (1931): Chronological order of Udayana’s works is: ATV, Kusumāṅjali, Nyāyapariśiṣṭa, Tatparyapariśuddhi, Kiranāvali. Two small works, Lakṣaṇāvali and Lakṣaṇamālā were, according to Bhattacharya, written after Tatparyapariśuddhi, from which they borrow benedictive verses. In the above mentioned work, Frauwaller placed Ratnakirti at c. 950 and his master Jñānaśrī in the first half of 10th cent. A. D. For an argument against this see n. 333 below.
xx) According to Saṅkaraśrī, a commentator on ATV, Udayana refuted in ATV Ratnakirti’s Citrāvataśāsidhi (cf. Bhattacharya 18); Thakur says on the basis of a passage in ATV that Udayana seems to have been aware of the relationship between Jñānaśrimitra and Ratnakirti (JNA Intro. 31).
We may suppose that Vacaspatimiśra had already written his masterpiece, NVT, and the Nyāyakaṇṭikā, both of which were the objects of Jñānaśrīmitra’s refutation, earlier than 976 A.D., say, by about 950 A.D. This may push back the beginning of the activity of Jñānaśrīmitra by 30 years and make it possible to insert him and Ratnakirti in between Vācaspati and Udayana. But we can assume with equal weight that Vācaspati must have written NVT together with NSN, which is a supplement to the former.\textsuperscript{xxi} Bhattacharya enumerates many factors which are inconsistent with the supposition which places the activity of Vācaspati and Jñānaśrī at so early a date as 950 A.D. Is the date 984 A.D. in which Udayana is said to have written the \textit{Lakṣaṇāvali} so certain as to disprove the Tibetan tradition that Jñānaśrīmitra was an older contemporary of Atiśa?

Hacker does not touch the date of Udayana, appreciating that the latter gives the date 906 Śaka with a clear reference to the era. But Bhattacharya and Thakur are of the opinion that the date, which is written only in a single manuscript dated so late as 1708 Śaṅvat, should be reconsidered as the date of Vācaspati was. And Bhattacharya actually proposes 1025-1100 A.D. for Udayana’s life.\textsuperscript{xxii} Bhattacharya’s proposal is based mainly on two traditions: the Tibetan one relating to Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakirti to which we have referred above, and the other concerning the debate between Udayana and the father of Śrīharṣa whose date can be known with a fair certainty.\textsuperscript{xxiii} Bhattacharya’s prolonged argument seems to lack incontestable evidence, but it is persuasive enough at least to make us doubt the date given in the manuscript of the \textit{Lakṣaṇāvali}. And when Udayana’s date is in the balance, we should derive the most natural conclusion from the date of Vācaspatimiśra, which is now agreed to by many scholars, and we may return to our former suggestion in assessing Jñānaśrīmitra’s activity as 980-1030 and that of Ratnakirti as 1,000-1050 A.D.

To come back to Moksākara-gupta, he may thus be placed between

\textsuperscript{xxi}) This is maintained by Bhattacharya, 29.
\textsuperscript{xxii}) Bhattacharya 54.
\textsuperscript{xxiii}) Bhattacharya, 49-50. This event is stated by Bhagiratha, a commentator of the 18th century on the \textit{Naśadha}. Śrīharṣa’s father Śrīhira had an academic contest with Udayana. In other words Udayana was older than Śrīharṣa by only one generation. Bhattacharya thinks that the debate took place probably in the decade 1075-85 A.D.
1050 and 1292 A.D. It is almost certain that the Jagaddhala Vihāra was finally destroyed by the sack of the Muslims in 1202 A.D. when Śākyaśrībhadra of Kaśmir is said to have fled, on seeing the devastation of the Vikramaśila, to Jagaddala of Oḍivīṣa, at last entering Tibet in 1204 A.D. We are not absolutely sure if this Jagaddala of Oḍivīṣa is in reality identical with the Jagaddhala Vihāra of Bengal, as is supposed by scholars. Apart from it, however, Cordier Catalogue, Rgyud XXVI, 50 and Mdo XXVII, 8 mention Dānaśila and Vibhūticandra, who entered Tibet also at the very beginning of the 13th century, as of Varendra-jagaddala and Jagaddalavihāra respectively, both of which must be understood as our Jagaddhala Vihāra itself. Hence we have to assume that the Vihāra existed until it was destroyed in 1202 A.D. Although it is very natural to think that Buddhist activities dwindled rapidly under the Senaśas, who had overwhelmed the Pālas by about 1150 A.D., we are not sure that the Senaśas did persecute Buddhists or that the Vihāra perished with the Pālas. Until the Tibetan information mentioned immediately above is disproved, therefore, we should not put back the date of the Vihāra or that of Mokṣākaragupta. Nor can the fact that he does not refer to Udayana indicate with certainty that he lived before Udayana. Thus, until we get other evidence, we cannot narrow the duration of time 1050-1202 A.D. within which Mokṣākaragupta’s activity must fall.

3 The Text: The Sanskrit text of TBh was edited twice: once by Embar Krishnamacharya as Vol. XCIV of the Gaekwad’s Oriental Series (G), and secondly by H. R. Rangaswami Iyengar as a part of the Tarkabhāṣā and Vādasthāna published in Mysore in 1952 (M). The manuscripts used by both the editors are not perfect. G omits many passages found in M, and especially in the first few pages it is unreliable owing to the corruption of the Mss. utilised. According to Iyengar, three leaves are missing out of the Mss. of the Mysore Oriental Library on which M is based. In general, however, M is a far better edition than G, and agrees well with the Tibetan translation except in some details. The Tibetan translation Rtog geşi skad is listed in the Tohoku Catalogue

xxv) Cf. e.g. SR xxxvii, n. 7. But we are not absolutely sure that the Jagaddalavihāra and Jagaddala of Oḍivīṣa are the same. B. B. Basu, for example, refers to a place named Jagaddala in Orissa which is different from the Jagaddalavihāra of Bengal (Basu. Archaeological Survey Reports of Mayurbhanj).
as no. 4246, in the Catalogue of Peking Reprint Edition as no. 5762, and in Cordier Catalogue as Mdo CXII, 28. This is the largest and complete text, complementing the lacunae of the Sanskrit text.

The following translation is made from M in principle; but whenever the better reading is found in G or T, it is adopted with the necessary notification; the lacunae in the Sanskrit text are filled up by translating the corresponding portions of the Tibetan. Sectioning and titling of the sections are made by the translator; in order to make the context of the translation clearer, supplementary words are inserted in brackets; Sanskrit words equivalent to the preceding English translation or English words corresponding to the Sanskrit words used in the translation are given in parentheses when necessary; in footnotes, numbers refer to the pages and lines of the texts concerned in principle, but with s., k., or v. they refer to the number of sūtra or verse; in the footnote, when a citation from another text is marked by the preceding =, it is exactly identical with the concerned passage in TBh, and when not so marked, the reader is asked to compare both. The translator believes that TBh, presenting rich information in brief and lucid language, could be used at least as the basis of a dictionary of Buddhist logical terminology which he is attempting. In view of this, he has tried in footnotes to trace back the citation in TBh to the original and to supply the theory discussed by Mokṣākara-gupta with a brief survey of the tradition behind it, though the range of his search is limited mainly to Sanskrit editions. Although he does not imagine that he has fully succeeded, it is hoped that the present work with detailed notes and commentaries could serve as a handbook of Buddhist philosophy.

During his stay in London in 1962, the translator read and discussed some portions of Chap. III of TBh with Professor John Brough of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, many of whose valuable suggestions are incorporated into the present work. Especially when reading § 20.2.4 in which our text, Sanskrit as well as Tibetan, is far from perfect, his analysis and partial rendering proved to be extremely helpful. The translator expresses his sincere gratitude. Of the Pramāṇasamuccaya of Dignāga, the translator has derived information from the works of Professor M. Hattori of Kyoto University (the part on epistemology) and Professor H. Kitagawa of Nagoya University (the
part on logic). Prof. Kitagawa's work in its final form was published just as the present work was completed for the press; Prof. Hattori's work is to be published in the *Harvard Oriental Series*, but the translator could refer to the typescripts which were made available to him by the kindness of the author. Professor Y. Ojihara has been ready to help the translator whenever the latter approached him with questions, especially those concerning Sanskrit grammar. The translator acknowledges his indebtedness to all these scholars. Thanks are also due to Mr. Peter Challis, who read through the English translation and helped the translator revise it.
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>AK</td>
<td>L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, tr. L. de la Vallée Poussin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AYV</td>
<td>Hemacandra's Anyayogavaccheda-dvātramīśākā, included in SVM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhattacharya</td>
<td>D. Bhattacharya. History of Navya-Nyāya in Mithilā.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhattaputra-Jayamīra</td>
<td>Ślokavārttikaṭākā (Śarkarikā) of Bhaṭṭaputra-Jayamīra, ed. Kunhan Rāja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Annals</td>
<td>G. N. Roerich. The Blue Annals (Deb-ther shon-po).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dasgupta</td>
<td>S. Dasgupta. A History of Indian Philosophy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragment</td>
<td>H. N. Randle. Fragments from Diānīgā.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākaragupta, ed. Embar Krishnamacharya, with a Skt. commentary by the editor, GOS no. XCIV.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gnoli</td>
<td>PV Chap. I. with Dharmakirti’s Sva-vṛtti.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HB</td>
<td>Hetubindu of Dharmakirti, a Skt. reconstruction included in HBT &amp; the Tib. edition (Peking Reprint ed. no. 5712).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HBT</td>
<td>Hetubindūṭikā of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa, ed. Sukhlalji Sanghavi, GOS CXIII.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBK</td>
<td>Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyū or Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitagawa</td>
<td>CHidenori Kitagawa. A Study of Indian Classical Logic-Dignāga’s System.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIK</td>
<td>Miscellanea Indologia Kiotiensia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mookerjee</td>
<td>Satkari Mookerjee. The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NB &amp; NBT</td>
<td>Nyāyabindu of Dharmakirti with Nyāyabinduṭikā of Dharmottara, ed. T. Stcherbatsky. Bibliotheca Buddhica VII.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBh</td>
<td>Nyāyabhāṣya, See NS.</td>
</tr>
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(SOR IX).
Viṁśatīka = Viṁśatīka Viśnāptimātratāsid-
dhiḥ, ed. S. Lévi.
Viśālāmalavati = Viśālāmalavati nāma Pramo-
ṇasamuccayaṭīkā by Jinendra-buddhi.
VP = The Vākyapadiya by Bhartrihari

(Brahmakāṇḍa), ed. Sūryanārāyaṇa Śukla.
Kashi Skt. Series. 124.
WZKM = Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde
des Morgenlandes.
WZKSO = Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde
Süd- und Ostasiens.
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THE LANGUAGE OF LOGIC

Chapter 1. Indeterminate knowledge (pratyakṣa)

1. Prefatory verse. (1.2) Having done reverence to the master, the lord of the world, I [here begin to] elucidate the language of logic in order that [even] students of little intelligence may learn the thought of Dharmakirti.

2. Valid cognition defined. (1.4) Since those who act with deliberation in the world, desirous [for some object], follow the means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) which are able to make us attain all human aims, the means of valid knowledge is to be first discussed.

(1.6) The means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) is true knowledge (saṃyagjñāna) referring to an object not known before. [It is called] pramāṇa since by means of it an object is measured. However, it is not different from true knowledge itself, because it is free from the fault of uncertainty (saṃdeha) and erroneousness (viparyāsa). In the world, knowledge not disagreeing [with experience] (avisamvāda) is called true knowledge. And this non-disagreement is not found in uncertain know-
ledge as e.g. the knowledge [which cannot determine its object] to be either a man or a post, nor in erroneous knowledge as the knowledge of water seen in a desert. ‘Referring to an object [not yet known] (apūrvagocara)\(^8\) means that the object of it [=valid knowledge] has not been experienced before, gocara (range) denoting an object (viśaya) such as a jar. Knowledge which has been produced by it [=an object] and which is capable of making us attain\(^9\) the object is the means of valid knowledge.

2.1. Function of valid cognition. (1.13) [The following objection may be raised:] “Knowledge is the maker (karty) [of an action], a person [possessing the knowledge] the agent (prayojya), and a thing the object (karman). But how can you call knowledge a pramāṇa if sometimes it does not [actually] make a man reach [an object] and thus is unable to cause him to attain it”

[The author:] We reply. We do not mean that a person is forcibly caused to act by knowledge as in the way of trampling on the neck,\(^10\) but that determination in the form ‘the essential quality of this thing is such and not otherwise’ is to be produced [by knowledge]; and if it is produced by knowledge, this much [of function] is called the validity of cognition, compatible [with experience]. As for a person possessing knowledge, he may actually take action towards the object because of a particular need (prayojana), or may not act owing to the lack of the need. And the object may also be snatched away by a yogin or a devil [who makes it unattainable]. But how is knowledge affected [through such

7. NBT 3, 18: abhyām pramāṇābhīyām anyena jñānena pradarśito'ṛthaḥ kaścid atyantratipāryastat, yathā maricikāsa jalam, sa cāsaattvā prāptum asakyaḥ, kaścid aniyato bhāvābhāvayoh yathā sāmśayārthaḥ.

8. Apūrvagocaram or anadhigatārthagantr is the qualification given to the pramāṇa by the Mimāṃsaka and the Buddhist. Scherbatsky, II, 372, n. 6; PS I, k. 2d–3 b; na ca punah punar abhiñāne'astiḥsakteḥ sṛṣṭiḥ =PVBh 242, 29 (Hattori, II. 1. n. 20 : 22); PV II, v. 3: gṛhitagrhaṇān neṣṭaṁ sāhaṛtam; v. 5 a: ajñātāṁṣaḥprakāśo vā; PVBh 21, 12 f. b.: tatrābhavārthavijñānāṁ nāśitaṁ bādhavarjitaṁ, adviṣṭakāraṇārobdhah pramāṇāḥ lokasammanatam. Dharmottara explains the theory in NBT 3, 10 ff.: ata evanadhitavijayāṁ pramāṇam... tato'dhitavijayām apramāṇam. Ratnakirti defines pramāṇa (RNA 90, 7): pramāṇaṁ ca pramāṇāntaravṛtiṣṭvijaṁśaja ca patrāṇāṁ saḥ. Cf. n. 4 above.

9. For the expression prāṇayoga see PVBh 22, 8-7 f. b.: prāpanavāt pramāṇam iti cet. na. prāṇayogyavat pramāṇasya; Tṣop 275, 10-12: prāṇayam api prāpanvat tad-yogatā ca.

10. T mgra pa nas bkug pa (Td pañ) tshul du (in the way of pulling a person by the neck.
The validity of cognition is testified by its agreeing with experience \((avi\text{-}svādakatva)\), and the agreement with experience is proved by the attainment of the object seen. We cannot, however, attain the same thing which we have seen, because of its momentariness \((kṣanikatva)\) \(\text{[i.e. the thing seen is different from the thing reached]}\). Furthermore, what is seen is the colour-form \((rūpa)\) \(\text{[of an object]}\), but what is reached is the tangibility \((spra\text{-}śtavya)\) \(\text{[of the object]}\). Thus, one thing is seen and another is reached. Accordingly what you reach is not the thing that you have seen. How then does this cognition become valid?"

"The author: This argument is untenable. For even if we reach what is in reality different \(\text{[from the thing we have seen]}\), we still get the logical imagination \((adhyavasāya)\) of identity ‘I reach the very same object which I have seen’; and this is meant by the expression ‘attainment of what has been apprehended’ \((pralītaprāpāna)\). On the other hand, the knowledge of water derived from a mirage etc. is definitely invalid because it cannot make us attain this \((adhyavasāya)\)."

"The opponent: ‘Is it not that apart from the attainment of efficient operation \(\text{(arthakriyā)}\) we cannot ascertain that this \([knowledge]\) is capable of causing to reach and that \([knowledge]\) is not? And the difference between a valid and an invalid knowledge cannot be determined by \[perceiving\] the mere origination of knowledge. Therefore, how can it \(\text{[i.e. knowledge determining the essential quality of an object]}\) be valid knowledge? ’"

"The author: There is not this fault \([in our theory]\). It is true that such a distinction cannot be determined by the origination of knowledge in general; yet we can point out how one is distinguished \([from the other]\)

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11. For a similar argument cf. NBT 3, 8: \(pravartakatvam api pravṛttiniśayaapraddrāśakam eva, na hi puruśaḥ hādhāt pravartayituh śakoti vijñānam. \) See also E. Frauwallner, Dharmottaras Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi, WZKM 42, 251.

12. NBT 4, 8–11: \(nānu deśaniyatam ākāraniyatam ca prāpasyatuh śakyam, yatkālaṁ tu paricchinnaṁ tathāyāṁ na śakyam prāpasyātum. nōcyate yasmin eva kāle paricchidyate tasmīn eva kāle prāpasyatvam iti. anyo hi dārānākālo 'nyaś ca prāptikālaḥ, kim tu yatkālaṁ paricchinnah tad eva prāpṇyām, abheśādhyavasyāya ca saṁtānaṅgam etatvaṁ draṣṭavyam iti. \)

13. PV II, v. 1 b-c: \(arthakriyāśhitir avisahvādanam. \)
when we get the knowledge specific\textsuperscript{14} to an object. For instance, one who gets a dull cognition may be unable to determine the validity of knowledge at the moment of its origination, but he determines the validity of his knowledge of fire or water through perceiving efficient operation such as burning, cooking, immersion in water, \textsuperscript{14} bathing, drinking, \textsuperscript{14} emergence, etc. when he sees them afar, or through perceiving rising smoke etc. One who gets a sharp cognition, on the other hand, determines it not through the attainment of efficient operation, but only by the sharper perception (\textit{patutarapratyakṣa}).

2.3. The meaning of \textit{arthakriyāsthiti} explained (2.20) [The opponent may raise another question:] “If the validity of cognition is defined to be agreement with actual experience, then how can an auditory knowledge (\textit{svarūpa}), which by its nature does not cause the hearer actually to reach the object he understands, be valid?”\textsuperscript{15}

[The author:] This is untenable. For we mean that the validity of cognition is the apprehension of the essential quality (\textit{svarūpa}) of an object; and this is possible without the actual attainment of efficient operation referring to an external object. This is expressed [by Dharماkirti in PV 1.1 reading:] “Non-disagreeing knowledge is valid cognition; non-disagreement [here] means the existence of efficient operation.” [and the subsequent verse].\textsuperscript{16} In the case of the sound [of a word], hearing is the existence of efficient operation, since the purpose of sound is fulfilled if it is simply heard, just as the existence of efficient operation consists in the simple act of seeing in the cases of the perceptions of the sun, moon, cloud and sky. [This is meant by a Buddhist logician] when he says:

“The apprehension of the essential quality of an object is here

\textsuperscript{14} Tp, n, and a Skt. Mss (cf. G 2, n. 2) have, instead of \textit{jñānaviśeṣa}, \textit{snānapāṇajñāna-viśeṣa} = śes \textit{paḥi} khrus \textit{daḥ} \textit{bhuṇa} (Read \textit{bhuṇa}) \textit{pa} \textit{daḥ} (Read \textit{paḥi}) \textit{khyad} \textit{par}..., and omit \textit{snānapāṇa} out of the enumeration of the examples in the next line.

\textsuperscript{15} The problem is treated as a \textit{purvapakṣa} of PV II, v. 1 c-d (see n. 16 below) by almost all commentators on PV. See e.g. PVBh 4, 17-18: \textit{śabdanaśayi tu jñāne na dāha-pādāyartha-kriyā, svataḥ parataś cārtha-kriyā'bhavat}...

\textsuperscript{16} PV II, v. 1-2: \textit{prāmāṇya} avisāhāvādi jñānam artha-kriyāsthiti, avisāhāvādananām śabde 'py abhidhyāyate \textit{buddhau} prakāśate, \textit{prāmāṇya} tatra śabdasya nārtha-bhavatvanibandhanam.
admitted as the existence of [efficient] operation."

2.4. Is the validity of knowledge dependent on other knowledge or not? (3.7) However, when cognizing fire, water, etc. for the first time, a reasonable person wishing for effective operation proceeds to them, starting from the mere uncertain knowledge about the efficiency [of the object].

Even if he is not clearly conscious that he has the doubt, [the situation is not different.] since the uncertainty which is attached [to his undertaking] can be by no means removed owing to the absence of a positive (sādhaka) or negative proof (bādhaka)...

Therefore [the problem] has been settled: one acts for an object by virtue of his obtaining only sharper perception, which, as soon as it is obtained, apprehends [by intuition] the customary efficiency [of the object]. But one who gets merely the dull cognition [of an object] begins to act after he has inferred the same [efficiency]. Thus, the validity of indeterminate knowledge [or direct perception] is established by itself (svataḥ prāmāṇyam) [in the case of sharper one], but by another cognition (parataḥ) in some cases [in which the cognizer is unable to confirm the efficiency of an object at the first moment of the cognition]. As for the knowledge of a yogin (yogiṇāna) and self-consciousness (svasainvedana), the validity is established by themselves. As for inference which is by nature certain, its validity is confirmed by itself.19

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17. Probably this is a verse by Prajñākaragupta. PVBh 5, 21 (v. 9): jñeyasvarūpaśaś-siddhir eva tatra kriyā matā, citre'pi āṛṣṭamātreyā phalam parisamāptimat.

18. T gal te de la ḍhi lta buḥi the tshom med par ḍjug (par ḍjug omitted in d) du chug kyaṅ. ḍon kyaṅ sgrub par byed pa đan gnod par byed paṅ tshad ma med paṅ phyir ro gaṅ sguhs pa, the tshom ḍbyuṅ (ḥgyur, d. n.) ba gaṅ gis bslob (zlog d. n) par byed, ces so. My tr. follows M. I am reluctant to regard samsayo bhavan kena vāryate as a citation as T and G do. nor have I so far identified it.

19. Contextually the discussion in § 2.4 directly follows that in § 2.2 (Our text in § 2.2-2.4 may have some confusion). Both the sections deal with the problem of whether the validity of cognition is intrinsically proved or not (svataḥ prāmāṇyam or parataḥ prā-). Buddhist attitude towards the problem is most clearly stated by Kamalaśīla: He enumerates under TS v. 2811 four possible theories regarding the problem, viz. 1) both validity and non-validity are established intrinsically; 2) they are both proved through external cognition; 3) validity is proved intrinsically and non-validity by external cognition; 4) validity is proved by external cognition and non-validity intrinsically (TSP 745, 3-5). After a detailed examination he concludes: The Buddhist does not follow any one of these four theories, but holds that the validity of a cognition is proved sometimes intrinsically and another time by another cognition, there being no definite principle (TSP 811, 17-18: na hi buddhair eṣāṁ catunāṁ ekatamo'pi pakoṣo 'bhīṣṭa 'niyamatpākṣasyāśṭatvāt). The Bud-
2.5. Apūrvagocara explained. (3.16) The following is implied in the [discussion made above]: Knowledge which occurs of an object for the first time is alone a valid cognition, all other knowledge which occurs later regarding the same object being excluded. For the latter is not valid because it grasps what has been once grasped as e.g. in the case of the determinate knowledge (savikalpakaṁ jñānam) in the form 'This is a jar', which we, having seen a jar by means of indeterminate knowledge (nirvikalpakaṁ jñānam), get later with regard to the very same object, and which is accordingly of the nature of remembrance; or again, if we, having once obtained inferential knowledge 'Here there is fire' through the perception of smoke, get again, a moment later, the inferential knowledge 'Here there is fire' regarding the same place, [this latter knowledge is not valid because it is not probative].

2.6. Sense-organs are not the means of valid knowledge. (4.5) When it is said that the means of valid knowledge is true knowledge, things such as sense-organs which are by nature insentient are by implication (sāmartyāt) denied to be the means of valid knowledge, because they are incapable of ascertaining [the object]. Determining operation (paricchedakatva) is the function of a knower (bodhītya), and this is innate only in knowledge. How then can it be the nature of such things as sense-organs which are by nature deprived of consciousness?

dhist logician divides sense-perception into two kinds: 1) perception of which the object has been repeatedly cognized by us, and of which the particular nature, i.e. the efficiency, is discerned as soon as we get it. The validity of perception is in this case proved by itself. 2) But when we are not accustomed to an object, we get perception of which the validity is uncertain; then we need another cognition, perception representing the effective action of the object or inference, in order to determine the validity of the first perception; then its validity is proved by external cognition. The problem is easily solved in the case of mānasa-pratyakṣa, yogy-jñāna, svasahvedana or inference, since these kinds of knowledge do not depend on an external object and are by nature intrinsically determinate. This problem is also treated by all the commentators on PV II, 1. For a brief but useful explanation see PV 3, 3f. b. 8 to which the description in TBh is very similar. See also TS v. 2966, 2974-2976, with TSP.

n. 8 above.

21. PV II. v. 3: ...dhi pramāṇatā, prātyeṣe tatpradhānate dheyopādeyavastumi. Mokṣā-kara interprets this verse in § 2.5 and 2.6. TS v. 2029; TSop 281, 6-19 refutes the Vaibhāṣika who asserts the sense-organ to be the knower as follows: The Vaibhāṣika considers the sense-organ as knower (dṛṣṭya), thinking that if knowledge—which is not a resisting substance—were the knower, it would grasp even a concealed object. But this is untenable, you could say that knowledge would grasp even a concealed thing since nothing would hinder its movement, only if we asserted that knowledge travels to an object to grasp it.
3. Classification of the valid knowledge. (4.9) This [valid cognition] is twofold: indeterminate (pratyakṣa) and determinate cognition (anumāna). Pratyakṣa is [a tatpurusa compound which can be analysed into] ākṣam pratigata- i.e. ‘connected with or depending on the sense-organ’, ākṣa here standing for indriya (sense-organs) called eyes, ears, nose, tongue and skin. Knowledge brought about by them is named indeterminate cognition [or direct perception].

[The opponent:] “If indeterminate knowledge is that depending on sense-organs, the three kinds of knowledge, mental perception (mānasa-pratyakṣa), [self-consciousness (sva-samvedana) and the knowledge of a seer (yogipratyakṣa)], which are to be soon dealt with, would not be indeterminate, since they are not produced from sense-organs.”

[The author:] We reply to this. When we say ‘connected with the sense-organ’, it is simply the etymological definition (vyutpattinimitta) of the word pratyakṣa. The definition of the usage of the word pratyakṣa

But we say that knowledge grasps an image with which it is endowed. Moreover, an object at an inaccessible place has no resemblance with knowledge. How then can it be grasped by knowledge? Again, if the sense-organ were the knower, an object separated by glass etc. could not be grasped, since your doctrine tells that ten kinds of material dhātus [to which the sense-organ belongs] are resisting substances [cf. AK I, v. 29]. You may contend: “Why is it said in the scripture that colour-form is grasped by the eyes?” We reply to this: This teaching is a metaphorical one.

22. PS I, k. 2 a-b (=PVBh 169. 3): pratyakṣam anumāṇam ca pramāṇe (Hattori, II. 1. n. 11); NB s. 2-3: dvividham sāhyagjñānam, pratyakṣam anumāṇam ca.

23. NBT 6, 2-4: pratyakṣam iti, pratigatam āsritam ākṣam. atyādayaḥ krāntādyarthe dvitiyayetī samāsāḥ. prātypannālapongātisamāscean paravaṁgalaphrātisēdāh abhidheya valiṅge sati sarvaśiṅgāḥ pratyakṣaśabdaḥ siddhaḥ. This explanation is almost verbally quoted in TSop 276. 2-6. Mokṣākara presupposes this grammatical interpretation given by Dharmottara, though he does not cite it. ‘Pratyakṣa- is a compound word which may be analysed into ākṣam (Paññā. sū. 3. 4. 223) pratigata-, pratigata- meaning āśrita-, i.e. ‘connected with or depending on the senses’. [That is to say, it is a tatpurua belonging to the group gati-samāsa taught in sü 2. 2. 18]. However, it is formed according to the rule [in Bh. ad 2. 2. 18 vt. 4]: atyādayaḥ krāntādyarthe dvitiyayā (prefixes like ati- etc. in the sense of (ati-) krānte- etc. can enter into composition with [their complement] in the accusative case). [If it is a tatpurua, pratyakṣa would agree in gender with that of the last member, ākṣam, as taught in sü 2. 2. 26, and would be always of the neuter gender. But it is not so, for the agreement of the gender of a tatpurua with its last member is denied [by 2. 4. 26 vt.] in compounds whose first members are prāpta- āpanna-, or alam- and ‘gati samāsa’. Thus, the gender of the word pratyakṣa [as described at the beginning of Bh. ad 2. 2. 29] agrees with the subject to be related, and it is established as an adjective taking all the three genders.

24. NBT 6, 6-7.
[in its particular signification] (pravrttinimitta) is to be understood as 'direct apprehension' (sāksāthkāritva) according to its conventional sense (rūdhivaśāt), just as [we understand not only 'mud-born' but also a species of lotus when we hear the word] pañkaja. Thus it is established that self-consciousness and the others are also denoted by the term praty-akṣa, because they directly apprehend knowledge as the content of self-consciousness and the others.25

(4.18) By māna [of anumāna] is meant that an object is measured by this means. The [prefix] anu- is in the sense of 'later' (paścāt). Thus, determinate knowledge or inference (anumāna) means 'subsequent measure'. That is to say, 'after' having grasped a logical mark (liṅga or probans) and having remembered the connection between the mark and that which possesses the mark (liṅgin, probandum), we get, regarding the concerned locus (dharmin) such as a mountain, knowledge which refers to an object not directly perceived. This knowledge is meant by the term 'inference'.26 Such [usage of the word in its particular signification] is to be understood according to the conventional sense [of the word].

4. Valid knowledge is of only two kinds. (5.3) By the word 'two-fold' are refuted the different opinions which [classify valid knowledge into] one, three, four, five, and six kinds. That is to say, the Cārvāka recognizes only one valid cognition, i.e. perception; the Śāṅkhya perception, inference and verbal testimony (śābda); the Naiyāyika perception, inference, identification (uṭpamāna), and verbal testimony; thePrabhākara perception, inference, verbal testimony, identification and presumption or postulation (arthāpatī); the [Bhāṭṭa-]Mīmāṁsaka perception, inference, verbal testimony, identification, presumption and non-existence (abhāva).27

We have enumerated indeterminate and determinate knowledge when it has been already understood that there are two valid cognitions by the

25. NBT 6, 4-6; TSop 276, 6-8.
26. NBT 6, 10-13.
27. This description of various theories on the classification of pramāṇa is quoted with slight variations in TSop 277, 4-10. TSop 277, 9-10 abhāvo hi pratyakṣaṁ śabdaś ca pramāṇam iti vaiyākaranāṁ seems to be confused, and it can be bettered by emending into abhāvo'pi mīmāṁsakānāṁ. pratyakṣaṁ śabdaś ca pramāṇam iti vaiyākaranāṁ (cf. the following passage in TBh). In this connection a verse in Mānameyodaya 8 is interesting: cārvākāś tavād ekāṁ dvitayaṁ api punar buddhavaśekhāṁ dvau bhasarviśaṁ ca śāṅkhyaś tritayaṁ udayanādyāṁ catuṣṭhaṁ vadanti. prāhuḥ prabhākaraḥ pañcakam api ca vayāṁ te'pi vedāntaviṇāḥ śaṭkaṁ purāṇikāṁ tu aṣṭakam abhidhāhir sambhavaitihayogāt.
word ‘twofold’. The reason for this is to reject [the theory of] twofold cognition with different members. For the Vaiyākaraṇa says that twofold valid knowledge consists of perception and verbal testimony.28

4.1. Refutation of the Čārvāka’s view of pramāṇa. (5.12) First of all, we assert that the Čārvāka has necessarily to admit the validity of inference. For he (1) advances the definition of perception [which is the same as inference proving the identity of pratyakṣa and pramāṇa] in order to teach others [the characteristic common to valid perceptions and that common to false perceptions]. (2) Other people’s thought is not perceptible but is to be inferred through its effect such as the operation of their body and words. From this, it follows that when he [says he] understands another person’s thought, he is forced to admit the inference based on the logical mark of an effect. Again, (3) when he denies the existence of another world, he actually has resort to a proof called negation (anupalambha) [which is inferential knowledge]. Therefore, how can the Čārvāka be sane when he argues by means of inferential knowledge, while saying that inference is not valid knowledge.29

[From the fact that you, the Čārvākas, establish the common nature of valid knowledge and that of invalid knowledge, that you understand the thought of another person, and that you negate something, it follows that [inference which is] a pramāṇa other than perception exists.]30

28. For the Vaiyākaraṇa’s refutation of inference as valid knowledge see Vākyapadīya. I. v. 32-34. They are cited for criticism’s sake in TS v. 1460-1462. Cf. Mookerjee 366-367. G adds here an oft quoted verse of Dharmakirti: pramāṇetarasaṁśayasthitih anyadhiyo gateḥ, pramāṇāntarasadbhiśvāvaḥ pratiśedhāca ca kasayacit. This verse, originally found in PVn Peking ed. Ce 251, b 6 ff., is quoted in Ratnakirti’s Pramāṇāntarābhāvaprakāraṇa (RNA 90, 2-3). It is also cited in SDS II. 19. 38-39; PKM 180. 5; 324. 4; NVV 1. 386. 2 etc. In § 4 Mokṣākara follows the argument of Ratnakirti; so it is quite possible that as in G he actually quoted this verse from Ratnakirti. But G misplaces the verse, since it is meant for proving the existence of inference against the Čārvāka who admits only perception as valid cognition and accordingly should be brought under § 4. 1.

29. Our author closely follows the argument of Ratnakirti. RNA 89, 25-29: na ca cārvāko’py anumānam anavasthāpya sthātuḥ prabhavatī, vyāparatrayakaraṇāt, tacchāstre hi pratyakṣatarasāṁśayayoḥ pramāṇetaravidhānāḥ laksanapraṇayaṇato vidhātavyam. tac ca laksāṇāḥ pratyakṣe dharminī laksye prāmāṇye pratyetavaye svabhāvo hetuḥ. parabuddhipratiṣedhau ca kāyādityāpyāraḥ kāryaḥ hetuḥ. paralokapratīṣedhe ca dṛṣṭyanupalambhaḥ 'ḥgikartavya iti katham anumānapalāpyaḥ. ... See also SDS 18. 25-19. 40; TS v. 1456-1459 gives the Čārvāka’s criticism of inference which is refuted in the following verses by Śāntirakṣita. But this refutation is made in a way different from that in our text.

30. n. 28 above.
4.2. Refutation of verbal testimony. (6.1) Knowledge derived from verbal testimony could be admitted as valid only if it agreed with the external object; and this agreement (avisānivādakatva) is not possible without a relationship (sambandha). There is not, however, any relation between the word and the external object. The reason is as follows: If there were a relationship between the word and the thing-meant, it would be either identity (tādātmya) or causality (tadutpatti). Of these, an identical relationship does not anyhow exist between the word and the thing-meant, since the two are manifested as completely different [from each other]. For unity (ekatva) is called identity. And if unity were to be admitted even between two differently manifested things, a cow and a horse would be one thing. Nor is a causal relationship [possible between the word and the thing-meant], since neither concomitance in agreement (anvaya) nor in difference (vyatireka) is observed [between them]. You cannot, therefore, assert that there is a causal connection between the two. For we see a jar, etc. being produced out of a lump of clay, a stick, water, a potter, and a wheel without [depending on] the operation of words, and a word for its part is produced only through the palate, etc. operated by the mere will of a man, even when there is no external object.

(6.12) If there were, apart from identity and causality, another real relationship marked by the verbal expression and its meaning between the word and the thing-meant, then it would follow that when a word is spoken, even one who does not know the verbal convention can under-
stand the definite meaning by virtue of the natural capacity \( (yogyatā) \)\(^{35}\) [of a word], just as he apprehends a jar, etc.\(^{36}\) when it is lighted up by a lamp. But such is not the case, since, for example, a man who has newly arrived from the Nālikera (Nicobar) islands does not understand any meaning from the word \( agni \) when he hears it.\(^{37}\)

(6.17) [The opponent may contend:] “The word is born\(^{38}\) with such a nature that it is able to denote such and such an object according to such and such an agreement.” But this is untenable, because there is no evidence for this argument, for any agreement (\( samketa \)) can be applied to anything, and accordingly we do not know if someone really means what he says or another thing.\(^{39}\)

(7.2) Or, admitting that there is a connection other [than identity and causality], we should ask by what connection this [connection] is connected with the two [i.e. the word and the thing-meant]. If you propose that it is by another connection which is the fourth [entity], we should ask by what connection the fourth is connected with the [other three] entities. If you produce the fifth, the same question would be asked again with regard to the fifth. Thus, there being an infinite regress (\( anavasthā \)), the last is never established, which makes all the preceding ones illegitimate.\(^{40}\)

(7.6) Or if\(^{41}\) you say that the connection of the word and the thing-

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35. RNA 92, 20-23: \( nanu yogyatayaiva kimcit pratibaddhawabhāvam upalabhyaṁ, yathā caṣurindriyāṁ ṛupe, caṣuḥ khalu vyāpāryamāṇaṁ ṛupaṁ evāpalamabhāyaṁ, tathāvaiṣe va-di-kāḥ śabdās tādāṁyatadadpattiveyuktaṁ yogyatāṁāitreṇāṁśindriyāṁ arthaṁ bodhayīṣyanti.....\)
36. M. Ghaṭādi--; G Ghaṭaṇaṭaṭi indeed.
37. RNA 93, 24-27: \( tariḥ vācyavācakalakṣaṇaḥ śabdārthayaḥ sambandho bhaviṣyaṁ.....iti cet, nanu tasya vāstavate 'saṁketavidyo' arthaprātiḥpattir bhaved ity uktam.....\)
38. M Jāyaṭe; G Jātah.
39. RNA 93, 21-24: \( atha tattatsaṁketaṭekṣas tadartha-pratyaśyanayogya evāyaṁ jāta ity ucyate, tad api na prastutopayogi, na hy evaṁ asya prāmāṇyaṁ avatiṣṭhate. yadā hi saṁketenāpuraṇārthapratiḥpādanam api sambhavyata eva, tadda na śakyaṁ upakalpayītaṁ kim ayam abhimataṣayāvārthasya dyotako na vāti.\)
40. The following argument seems to originate from Dharmakīrti’s Sambandha-parikṣā v. 4: \( dvayor ekāḥ bhāṣaṁ sambandhit sambhandho yadi taddvayaḥ, kaḥ sambandho 'navasthā ca na sambandhamatis tathāḥ (Frauwallner translates: Wenn die beiden (verbundenen Dinge) durch die Verbindung mit einem einzigen (Ding) verbunden sind, welche Verbindung besteht dann bei den beiden? Ferner (ergibt sich) eine endlose Reihe. Auf diese Weise kann es keine Erkenntnis einer Verbindung geben.) Frauwallner, Dharmakirti’s Sambandha-parikṣā. WZKM Bd. 41, 264, 270 and 280.\)
41. \( M=T \) (ci ste) \( atha; G \) artha.“
meant is possible without being connected [by another connection], this is not correct. How can a thing which is not connected [with another] be a connecting link itself, as in the case of a piece of cloth with regard to a jar. [The opponent may contend:] “It should be said that a connection is by nature such that it connects others without requiring another connection.”\(^42\) [The author:] This is untenable. No objection (uttara) may be raised when the nature [of a thing] is established by a proof as when a nature such as burning is [established by a proof] as belonging only to fire and not to other things such as ether. On the contrary, we, in spite of our scrutiny, do not find any justification for the establishment of a connection. You should not contend that the word, having by nature an expressive capacity (śabdaśakti), never deviates from the thing-meant determined by it. For if the word ‘jar’ denotes by nature the category (padārtha) which, having a conch-shaped neck, is able to hold water, then how can it denote a horse and other things when depending on another agreement and the particular will of a speaker. It will indeed be impossible for a seed of rice, which is produced by its own causes with the nature of yielding its shoot, to give birth to an ass, even if it is understood according to another agreement.\(^43\)

4.2.1 (7.19) It is also not acceptable that the words spoken by trustworthy persons\(^44\) are a means of valid knowledge, since trustworthiness is impossible to be ascertained. The state of being emancipated from all faults (kṣīnaḍoṣatva) is called trustworthiness (āptatva). Emancipation from all faults refers to a certain state belonging to another person's mind. And this is hardly visible [i.e. determinable], since we see [sometimes] that physical and lingual actions [supposed] to be the logical mark\(^45\) [through which we infer the trustworthiness of the concerned person] occur\(^46\) in persons who are not [really trustworthy]. When it is usual that a man

\(^{42}\) M. sambaddhāntī; G=T sambadhnātīti.

\(^{43}\) RNA 93, 16-20: atha svahetubhir evāyaṃ idyāṣa teṣāṃ svabhāvo datto yena te saṁketaṁpiśaṭahāvayā eva kam api artham avabodhayanti. na tarhi saṁketaṁpiśaṭahāvayā padārthāntaravṛttayo bhavevyah, yadi hy ayam agnihotrasabdhāḥ saṁketaṁpiśaṭo yugaviśeṣapratisādhakaṁ, kathāṁ saṁketaṁpiśaṭḥaṁvṛtthāntaram pratisādhakayati. na hi kṣīnaḍyāpekeṣeṇa bijena svahetor akṣaraṇānasaṁvabhāṣeṇtpamna rā sabhāḥ ṣakyo janayitum, tathā sabdo'py yado rathaprasātiprādananiyatas tam eva prakāśayet.

\(^{44}\) NS 1. 1. 7: āptopadesāḥ śabdaḥ.

\(^{45}\) M kāyavyāgvaśāpādikāryaliṅgasya; G kāyavyāgvaśāpārasya kāryaliṅgasya tu.

\(^{46}\) M=T vṛttidarśanāḥ; G saṁdarśanāt.
having passions pretends to be free from passions, how can you ascertain trustworthiness? 47

4.2.2 (8.4) Since the validity of the words of the Veda is negated through our refutation of a connection [between the word and the thing-meant], we do not deal with it separately. [The opponent may ask:] ‘If so, how about all verbal usage in the world which is not to be doubted?’ [The author:] It is not hurt at all, because [the words convey their meaning] by virtue of the desire of a speaker [who expresses himself] according to such and such an agreement. It is said:

The words are to refer to the mere intention of a speaker [and not to the external object meant by it].48

4.3. Refutation of identification. (8.9) The Naiyāyika explains identification (upamāṇa) as follows: ‘Suppose that there is a man, operator of identification, who knows a cow but not a gavaya, and that he is directed by his master to go to a forest to bring a gavaya. Not acquainted with the object denoted by the word gavaya, he asks an inhabitant of a forest or another man who knows it: My friend, what is a gavaya like? And the latter answers: A gavaya is like a cow. Now the servant, when he is in a forest, gets the knowledge of the resemblance (sārūpyajñāna) of a gavaya [to a cow] which, being assisted by the remembrance of the object suggested by the analogical expression (atidēśavyākhyātra-smaraṇasahakārī),51 produces the comprehension (pratipatti) that this is the very object designated by the word gavaya; here the knowledge of resemblance, being the agent (karta), is a means of knowledge, and the

47. RNA 94. 11-13: dūtrapraṇītasya punar vacanasya... na prāmāṇyaṃ upagantuḥ śakyate, paracittavṛttinām aśakyanīścayatvenātpravāpārijñānāti.


49. NBh, NV and NVT ad NS 1.1.6. There is difference of opinion on what is the means of knowledge in the case of upamāṇa between NBh and NV-NVT (cf. Jhā’s note 2 in NS 28). Mokṣākara, as well as Ratnakirti, reproduces here the view of Vācaspatimīśra that in identification sārūpyajñāna (the knowledge of the similarity, say, of a gavaya with a cow) is the pramāṇa, which being aided by the atidēśavyākhyātra produces the pratipati in the form ‘This object is what is named gavaya’ (cf. NVT 169, 5ff.: piṇḍasya hi gavaya-śabdāvaṇyutāṁ pravāpaḥ atidēśavyākhyātrasahakārīṇāḥ pratayakṣād gavayagatād gosādyāyaḥ pratijñānān tena prajñāparyaya iti pramāṇavyāpāraḥ prajñāpāyam uktam iti.)

50. Insert va between anyam and tajjñām (cf. n. 52 below).

51. M atidēśa; G ēśātideśa; T bstan pa =ādeśa.
comprehension [produced by it] is its effect (*phala*)."

[The author:] This is untenable. For the validity of any kind of knowledge must be pervaded (*vyāpta*) by the state of having its object. But in this case, in spite of a careful investigation, we do not find the object. For it is said [by you] that the connection of the designation [with the thing designated] (*samākhya-sambandha*) is the object (*viṣaya*) of this [identification]. But such a connection is not existent in reality. For if it is [by nature] visible, its [presence] is negated by the actual non-perception of it, and if, on the contrary, it is invisible, we do not see any justification for establishing its existence.

(9.3) Furthermore, is this connection existent separately from the two terms which are connected or not? If it is separate, it should be explained by what connection the two terms are connected [with the connection itself]. If you here imagine another connection, then an infinite regress would follow. Or, if it is not separate [from the two connected terms], then you should admit the existence of the two connected things alone, but not anything which is called a designating connection (*samākhya*). If you again say that the connection [here] means [a separate entity which] produces the idea of the connected, it is not reasonable. For the idea that these two are connected originates from the two connected things by virtue of their own causes, and is not able to win over a relationship

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52. RNA 91, 20-25: ayam asya praṇāṇāḥ, yaḥ pratipattā gām jānāti na gavyam, ādiśā ca svāminā gacchāraṇyaṃ gavyam abhayāmād iti, gavyaśādavācyam artham ajānāno vacacaram anyam vā taijñām prtyāvān. bhrātāḥ kidṛśo gavya iti, tena cādiśām yathā gauḥ tathā gavya iti. tasya śrutiśādavākyasya kasyāścic aranyāṃ upagatasyādīśavākyārthah smanarṣaṣahākāri yad gavyaśārūpyajñānaṁ tat prathamata evāvau gavyaśādavācyo 'ṛtha iti pratipattih prastuvānam upamānaḥ pramāṇam iti.

53. M saṃpāṣāyānaḥ; G paśyāmaḥ.

54. NBh 20, 3: samākhyaśāmbandhapratipattā upamānārthaḥ ity āha; NVT 169. 15: samākhyaśāmbandhapratipattā upamānārthaḥ phalam. RNA 95, 25: athā hi samākhyaśāmbandhaḥ tasya viṣayo varṇyate, ca ca paramārthato nāsti. The meaning of the Buddhist criticism here is as follows: sārūpyajñāna is, as Vācaspati himself says, none other than *pratyakṣa*, atidesasmaraṇa is the same as āptopadeśa or *śabda*, and the last characteristic particular to *upamāna, samākhyaśāmbandha*, is not existent in reality, because as already refuted in § 4.2. *sambandha* in general is not admitted. For a similar criticism by Dignāga see Randle, 317.

55. RNA 95, 26-27: sa hi sambandhaḥ sambandhibhyaṃ bhinnam 'bhinnam vā. yadi bhinnas taddā tayor iti kutāḥ, na ca sambandhāntarād iti vaktavayam, tad api kathāḥ teṣām iti cintāyam anavasthāprasaṅghaḥ (cf. n. 40 above too). RNA 96, 1-2: athābhinnāḥ, taddā sambandhinav eva kevalav iti na samākhyaśāmbandho nāma, yaḥ kaścid upamānasya viṣayaḥ syāt.
which is another entity.\textsuperscript{56}

4.3.1 (9.11) In the same way, the validity of [identification] described by the Mimāṃsaka is also to be repudiated. For an object qualified by resemblance (sādṛṣyaviśiṣṭaḥ pindaḥ) or resemblance qualified by object-ness (pindaḥviśiṣṭam sādṛṣyaṁ) is proposed by them as the object of identification. However, resemblance separate from the things similar cannot be established, just because there is no proof for knowing it. That is to say, if resemblance which is separate from the similar things is visible, then [the existence of] it is eclipsed by the non-perception of a perceptible object (drśyaṇupalambhagṛasta). And if it is an invisible entity, how then\textsuperscript{57} can it be established even by inference, since we do not find any logical mark which is necessarily connected with it? On the other hand, the idea of resemblance can be produced by an object resembling [another] which is so produced by its own causes as to give rise to the idea. You are unable to establish [an entity called resemblance] through the idea of [resemblance].

The opponent may contend that resemblance is established by means of identification, [but not vice versa]. But this is untenable, because the opponent school speculates that the relation of qualifier (viśeṣaṇa) and qualificand (viśeṣya) found only between two similar bodily objects which have been established by a proof other [than identification] holds good as the object of identification. How then can resemblance alone be established by identification? \textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{56} RNA 95, 31-98, 1: ayam anyah sambandhaḥ sambaddhav etav iti tu buddhiḥ svahetubalat sambaddhavastudvayād api sambhavyamānā na sambandham ākṣeptaḥ prabhasati. tasman na bhinnasambandhasiddhiḥ. (Read samākhyaśambandho nāma instead of samākhya nāma sambandhaḥ in M 9, 6-7).

\textsuperscript{57} M=T tadā; G tad api.

\textsuperscript{58} RNA 95, 1-17: tathā hi sādṛṣyaviśiṣṭaḥ pindaḥ pindaḥviśiṣṭaḥ vā sādṛṣya upamānasya viṣayo varṇyate, na sādṛṣavastuvatiriktāḥ sādṛṣyaṁ vyavasthāpayitum śakyaṁ pramāṇenā pratitatvat. nantu sādṛṣyaṁ vastu dūrvarām eva, yad āha, sādṛṣyaśa ca vastutvaṁ na śakyaṁ apabādhitum, bhūyo 'vyavasāmānyayo go jātyantarasya tat. (cf. SV Upamāna, v. 18) iti, otrācyate, yadi sādṛṣvastuvatiriktāḥ sādṛṣyaṁ vastu dṛṣyaṁ syāt, taddā dṛṣyaṇupalambhagṛastam eva... athādṛṣyaṁ tat sādṛṣyaṁ upayate, tathāpi tatra prasiddhahābhāvād asiiddham eva...sādṛṣya-pratyayasya tu svahetos tathotpannena sādṛṣavastuvatām kriyāmaṇo ghaṭaṁ evāt sādṛṣyaṁ utthāpayitum prabhasati. upamānapramāṇabādād eva sādṛṣyasiddhir iti cet, na, pramāṇaṁtaraśiddhyāv eva sādṛṣyaṁ papiṣṭaḥ vīśeṣyaviśeṣyabhāvāsvopamāṇavijñayatvat, kathāḥ sādṛṣyamātrasyo-pamānāt siddhiḥ, tatāt ca sādṛṣyasaddhau nā tadaviśiṣṭaḥ pindaḥ pindaḥviśiṣṭaḥ vā sādṛṣyaṁ upamānasya viṣayaḥ.

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4.4. Refutation of presumption. (10.5) Presumption or postulation (arthāpatti) is not accepted as a separate means of valid knowledge. Presumption is defined⁵⁹: Presumption is the supposition of a thing without which another thing apprehended by a proof, perception or else, would become unintelligible.

The following should be considered here: If the thing perceived by a means of valid knowledge is connected with the unseen, supposed thing through either the relation characterised by identity or that characterised by causality, then this is knowledge produced either from a logical mark of identity or from a logical mark of causality; it follows that the [so-called] presumption is none other than inference. Or, if there is no such connection, then presumption cannot be a means of valid knowledge, just because there is no necessary connection as in the case of understanding a piece of cloth from a jar.⁶⁰

4.5. Refutation of non-existence. (10.13) By no means do we cognize the essential quality of the [so-called] non-existence (abhiiva). How then can it be a pramāṇa? [Defining non-existence] the Mimāṃsaka says: “The non-production of [the five] means of valid knowledge beginning with perception is [itself] a means of valid knowledge called non-existence.”⁶¹

What do you here mean by ‘non-production’? Is it 1) the mere negation of the proposition ‘knowledge is produced’ (prasajyaavṛtti)? Or 2) does it mean something positive, being construed as the negation of a term (paryudāśavṛtti)?⁶² If something positive is meant, is it 2. a) an

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⁵⁹. Mimāṃsābhāṣya, 12, 4-5: arthāpattir api drṣṭaḥ śruto vārtho ‘nyathā nāpapadyata ity arthakalpanā; NBh ad NS 2.2.1.: yatrābhidhiyamāne’rthe yo’nyo’rthaḥ prasajyate so ‘ṛthāpattīḥ; SV Arthāpatti, v. 1: pramāṇapraṇapāḥvijñāto yatrārtho nānyathā bhavevat, adṛṣṭaṁ kalpyed anyaṁ sārthāpattīr udāḥṛtā. RNA 91, 27-29: pratyakṣādibhi saṅbhikī pramāṇaiḥ prasiddho yo’rthaḥ sa yena vinā na yujyate tasyārthasya kalpanām arthāpattīr iti....

⁶⁰. RNA 96, 16-25: atra vicāryate, yasyārthasya darśanād yo’rthaḥ pariḥpyate tayor yadi pratibandho’sti tadārthāpattīr anumāṇam eva...anyāthā tena vinā nāpapadyata ity ahṛkikād anya na brāyāt, ghaṭaṇaṇaṭaḥ...tatra svabhāva-pratibandhe svabhāvaḥetu-jaiva sārthā-pattīḥ. īdutpattiḥ-pratibandhe kārya-āśaṃgajaiva.


⁶². J. F. Staal gives an excellent logistic interpretation of the two kinds of negation, paryudāśa- and prasajya-pratिषेदha as classified by the Mimāṃsakas and grammarians (cf.
insentient thing (jaḍarūpa) or 2. b) a form of knowledge? If it is a form of knowledge, 2. b. 1) is it knowledge in general (jñānamātra) or 2. b. 2) the knowledge of a positive thing related to one and the same knowledge [which grasps non-existence] (ekajñanasamsargavastuno jñānam)?

Among these, 1) the negation of a proposition (prasajyarūpo bhāvaḥ) is not appropriate. How can the mere negation devoid of [further] function possess the ability of discrimination (paricchedakatva) or of producing

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Negation and the law of contradiction in Indian thought: a comparative study, BSOAS xxv, 1. 1962). A verse in the Mimāṃsāyāyaprakāśa expresses their main doctrine: paryudāsas sa viṣṇeyo yatṛttarapadena naḥ, pratiśedhāḥ sa viṣṇeyo kriyayā saha yatra naḥ. Staal’s tr. (ibid. 58): ‘Exclusion (paryudāsa) is to be understood where the negative (is connected) with the next word; prohibition (pratiśedha) is to be understood where the negative (is connected) with the verb(al ending)’. An almost identical verse (having prasajyapratiśedhas tu for pratiśedhāḥ sa viṣṇeyo) is quoted in grammar (ibid. 59). In the field of Buddhist philosophy, it is Bhāvaviveka (-570 A. D.) who first made the distinction between the two kinds of negation in order to clarify the absolutist standpoint of the Mādhyamika philosophy. Cf. My Bhāvaviveka’s Prajñāpāramitāpāda (1. Kapitel) WZKSO Bd. VII. S. 48. Avalokitavrata, a commentator on the Prajñāpāramitā, quotes an interesting verse explaining this distinction (ibid. 48, n. 11): ḏag ṁ don gyis bstan pa dān, tshig geig sgrub par byed pa dān. de ldan raṅ tshig mi ston pa, ma yin gzan pa gzan yin no. Dr. E. Steinkellner of Vienna was kind enough to inform me of the existence of Arcāta’s elucidation of the two kinds of negation in HBT; and on examining it. I found in HBT 171. 4 ff. a Sanskrit passage which is in sense parallel to the Tibetan verse cited above. This reads: yatra viḍheḥ prādhānyaḥ pratiśedhāḥ ‘ṛthagrhitaḥ viḍhibhyḥ svapadena nācayate ekāvikaṭā ca tatra paryudāsavyātītāḥ... prasajyapratiśedhāḥ punar etadviparito mantavyaḥ, tatra hi pratiśedhāsāya prādhānyāḥ viḍhir arthād gamyate vākyabhedoḥ svapadena naḥ pratiśedhābhyḥ sambhadyate. ‘In a compound word or proposition where the mode of paryudāsa (the negation of a term) is applied the main motive is affirmation, negation is understood by implication alone, the object to be affirmed is not expressed by its own word, and the negation means the same sense as the affirmative proposition derived from it, [e.g. ‘He is a non-brāhmaṇ’ is the same in sense as ‘He is a kṣatriya’]... prasajyapratiśedhā (the negation of a proposition) is to be considered as opposite to this, i.e. in the case of (prasajyapratiśedha) the main motive is negation, affirmation is understood by implication, [the negation] conveys a different sense from the affirmative proposition related to it. [e.g. ‘They do not look at the sun’ conveys a different meaning from ‘They look at the sun’] and the object to be negated, being expressed by its own word, is connected with the negative’. In his exposition Arcāta refers also to the fact that in paryudāsa the negative is related only to subanta or nominal inflected forms, whereas in prasajya it is related to tiṇanta or verbal inflected forms. For a detailed exposition see my article ‘仏教哲学における命題解釈—evaの意味制限機能’ (Analysis of a propotion by Buddhist philosophers with special reference to the particle eva restricting the meaning of a sentence) in Dr. Ensho Kanakura Commemoration Volume. This distinction is applied by Arcāta to the Buddhist theory of non-cognition (anupalabdhi), which should be understood as the cognition of other things (anyopalabdhi), the negation being construed as paryudāsa. Mokṣākara discusses the same in § 13.
knowledge (jnānajanakata)? Thus, no one will have resort to it.\textsuperscript{63} Panḍita Cakracūḍāmāni says in this connection:\textsuperscript{64}

Non-existence is not apprehension of any object, nor a cause of knowledge; How can it be known [as a means of knowledge]?

2. a) [What is meant by non-existence] cannot be an insentient thing, because an insentient thing has no discriminating function. We have not anywhere seen nor heard that insentient things such as a cart discriminate a jar.

2.b.1) Nor can it be knowledge in general, for in this case it would follow that Mt. Sumeru, Śāṅkha, the future emperor, and a demon, though inaccessible in space, time and essence, are [known to be] absent by means of the proof of non-existence as knowledge in general [when in reality these things cannot be judged to be either existent or non-existent].

2.b.2) If again non-existence here means the knowledge of a positive thing such as a piece of ground forming a part of the same knowledge [which grasps the non-existence of a jar], then it is in essence a particular kind of perception (pratyakṣaṇaśīśa), though given another name ‘non-existence’. Then there should be no difference of opinion [between you and us].\textsuperscript{65}

Thus it has been established that the means of valid knowledge is twofold and only twofold, viz. indeterminate and determinate knowledge.

5. \textbf{Indeterminate knowledge defined and discussed.} (11.15) Among these, indeterminate knowledge is devoid of fictional constructs or deter-

\textsuperscript{63} M=T (de sgrub par byed pa ma yin no): na tat pratipadyate; G tat pratipadyate.

\textsuperscript{64} The words of Cakracūḍāmāni are cited also in the passage of Ratnakirti (see l. 7 in n. 65 below), though he does not mention him by name. So far I have not identified the words. nor do I know who Cakracūḍāmāni is.

\textsuperscript{65} RNA 97, 20-98, 1 : atha vābhāvapramāṇaṣvaṣvarūṇa eva nirūpyatām. kaḥ punaḥ pramāṇabhāvātanābhikāta bhavatām, kim prasajyāvṛṣṭā pramāṇanātupatīmataram. atha vā par-yuddāvyṛṣṭā bhāvāntaram. vastvantaram api jaḍarūpaṁ jñāṇarūpaṁ vā. jñāṇarūpaṁ api jñāṇamātrakam ekajñānasaṁsargavastujñānaṁ vēti saṁ vikalpāḥ. tatra na tāvān nīcāṭīrūpān 'bhāvo yuṣyaṁ. sa khalu nikhiṣaṅaktivikalataya na kūrtīc. yac ca na kūrtīc tat katham abhāvaṁ paricchedīyāt. tavīṣāyāṁ vā jñāṇāṁ janayet. pratītām vā tat kathau iti savam andhakāranar-tanam, yād āhyā: "na hy abhāvaṁ kasyācīrī pratipattiḥ pratiṭipattiḥetvār vasyāṁ kathāṁ pratiṭipattī" iti, nāpi vastvantarastāpākeja jaḍarūpaḥ 'bhuṁ saṁgacchate, tasyābhāvavalkṣyaṇaprameyāḥ paricchedābhaṁ, paricchedāsyāṃ jñānaṁdhamānāt, nāpi jñānamātravabhāvo bhāvo vaktavyaḥ, desakālāvaṃbhāvavikṣyāṃsyāṁ tato bhāvaśravāgat, tadapekṣyāṁ jñānamātravat tasya. atakājñānasaṁsargavastujñānaṁabhāvānuśrayatvāya. pratiṣṭhānaṁyāte taddastam abhāvaṇaṃpratijātyāya, pratyakṣaṇaśīśaṣyaivaṃbhāvanāmākaranat, tasya cāsīmbhir dhīyāṇupalambhābhūkhyābhaveṇeṣa vissiṣṭatvāt.

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mining factors (kalpanā) and unerring (abhrānta). The determining factor consists of comprehending [an object] in association with a word-sound (śabda) or internal notion (or inarticulate representation, antarjalpa), while linking together the preceding and subsequent moments [of the momentary object]. This may be illustrated by a clever man’s comprehension in the form ‘This is a jar’, the comprehension of a baby, dumb person or animal in the form of internal notion or reflection (parāmarśa). In this connection the following is said [by Dharmakirti]:

Determination is the cognition of a representation which is capable of being associated with words.

(12.3) [It may be asked:] ‘How do you ascertain that a baby, a dumb person etc. have determinate knowledge (kalpanājñāna) in the form of inarticulate representation?’ [We infer it] from the effects of determining factors such as taking what is desired and avoiding what is not desired. And such effects are perceived in a baby and a dumb person, who indeed claim what they want and abandon what they do not.

By pointing out that the knowledge of a baby, dumb person etc. contains fictional constructs it is taught that even simple perception (ālocaṇajñāna) said by Kumārilabhaṭṭa (to be indeterminate knowledge) is determinate.

(12.8) [The opponent:] ‘Why is knowledge associated with constructs or by nature erring not indeterminate knowledge?’ [The author:] It is not, because it is well known to all scholars that indeterminate know-

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66. PS I, k. 3c: pratyakṣam kalpanāpōṣham (Hattori, II. 1, n. 25); NB I, s. 4: tatra pratyakṣam kalpanāpōṣham abhṛantam; PV III, v. 123 a-b: pratyakṣam kalpanāpōṣham pratyaṃsenaiva sidhyati.

67. PS I, k. 3d: nāmajātyādiyojanā (Hattori, II. 1, n. 26); =NB I, s. 5: abhilāpasaṁ-sargayogasaptibhāsasaptitīḥ kalpanā. NBT under this sūtra interprets the word yogya as denoting not only explicit connection with a name but also a baby’s notion which is not connected with a clear name.

68. M=T; G vikalpa-kāravyāśātaniśṭopādana-parihārasyādāyāt.

69. The present argument is followed by Vidyākaraśānti in TSop 278, 6 ff.

70. SV Pratyakṣa, v. 112: asti hy ālocaṇajñānaḥ prathamaḥ nirvikalpakam, bālamū-kādiśīṇaṣadīyaḥ mugdha-vastujam. Cf. Randle, 120, n. 2: There is a primary intuitive apprehension, an unqualified perception, arising from the mere real, –like the apprehension of infants and the dumb. See also Dasgupta, I, 378. The verse is cited also in TSop 280, 1-2.

71. M=T pratyakṣaḥ na syād iti cen na; G na pramāṇam iti cet.

72. M=T prasiddham; G sammatam.
ledge is knowledge directly intuiting the real nature\(^{73}\) of an object. For knowledge grasping an object is the effect of the object, and the object which is grasped is the cause of the knowledge, as is said [by Dharmakirti]\(^{74}\):

> How can a [momentary] thing which is at a different time [from that of the indeterminate cognition grasping it] be an object of the indeterminate cognition? We reply: Philosophers recognize that the essence of a sense-object consists in its being a cause capable of leaving its image in the knowledge.

[On the contrary], determinate knowledge is produced from the past impression alone even when there is no [corresponding] object. Being neither positively nor negatively concomitant with the external object (anwayavyatirekābhāvāt), how can it be an effect of an object? For if \(x\) can exist without \(y\), then \(x\) is not the effect of \(y\). Otherwise the unwarrantable consequences (atiprasaṅga) would follow. If determinate knowledge were produced out of an object, then an object such as a jar could be seen just because of that knowledge; it would mean that even a blind person could see a colour-form. But such is not the case. Therefore it is said:

> Determinate knowledge has no function of intuiting an object, since the object is not manifested in verbal knowledge as in indeterminate perception.\(^{75}\)

The present argument serves to repudiate the following opinion stated by another scholar\(^{76}\) [i.e. Bhartrhari]:\(^{77}\)

> “There is in this world no cognition which is not followed by a word; All knowledge appears as if penetrated by words.”

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73. G artham; M artharūpam; but T don gi raṅ gi ho bo=arthasvarūpam, which is best.

74. =PV III, v. 248 =PVn Derge ed. 158, b 1: bhinnakālaṁ kathaṁ grāhyam iti cet grāhyatāṁ viduḥ, hetutvam eva yuktījñā jñānākārārpaṇākṣamam. Cf. Stcherbatsky, II. 360; Mookerjee, 338. G and T of our present text omit the part bhinnakālaṁ kathaṁ grāhyam iti.

75. sābdyāṁ buddhāv arthasya pratyaśaiva pratibhāsābhāvāt nāsti kalpanāya artha-sākṣātśārān. Not identified.

76. M 13, n. 2 and G yad uktāṁ sāmkhyena, but T yad uktāṁ pareṇa.

77. =VP I, v. 123: na sośti pratyaśita yāṁ sābdānugamād te, anuviddham iva jñānaṁ sarvaṁ sābdena bhāsate. The verse is often quoted by Buddhist logicians for criticism’s sake (cf. TSP 68, 8; 70, 13; TSoap 279, etc). bhāsate being sometimes replaced by jāyate or vidyate.
For example, while [the word ‘jar’] is pronounced with regard to a jar placed before us, other knowledge concerning a piece of ground etc. close to the jar is experienced as well, though they are not referred to by the pronounced word. In such a case we do not find the association with a word. This is [testified by the rule that] two concepts (vikapa) cannot occur at the same time.

5.1. Abhránta explained. (13.13) Erring knowledge (bhrántam jñānam) is also unable to intuit [the reality of] its object. For ‘erring’ means to be opposite to the real thing capable of effective operation. The nature of a real thing capable of effective operation is determined in space, time and form. Then, how can it be intuited by erring knowledge whose content is falsely presented? As Ācārya [Dharmakirti] says:

Indeterminate perception is knowledge which is not affected by illusion produced through the darkness of the eyes, rapid motion, travelling on a boat, a violent blow or other causes.

By this, the following are referred to: One suffering from jaundice, seeing a white shell, gets the knowledge presenting itself as yellow; One gets the knowledge presenting itself as a circle while seeing a fire-brand being swung in a circular motion; one who is sitting on a boat in motion gets the erroneous knowledge of running trees; when one is severely hit in vulnerable parts of the body, we get the knowledge presenting itself as a flaming post; all [the erroneous knowledge referred to] is not [valid indeterminate] perception.

[The following objection may be raised:] “If such [erroneous] cognition is not valid indeterminate knowledge, how do you explain the fact that we [sometimes] reach a real object even through erroneous knowledge

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78. TSop 278, 15-16: avyāptendriyaṣya darśananavat buddhau ṣabdenāpratibhāsanād artharūpasya. (Since the form of an object is not manifested in consciousness in association with the word as when we see unconsciously objects for which our sense-organ is not operating with attention.)

79. G=T ṣabdānugamo; M ṣabdānugato; M 13. n. 3 tadanugamo.

80. =NB I, s. 6: (tāy rahitaṁ) timirāsubhramaṇanauyānasamkṣobhādayāhitaviḥbra-man jñānam pratyakṣam. NBT explains each of the instances mentioned here and Mokṣakara reproduces it.

81. G omits jñānam.

82. G=T (bshor ba) bhramad-alātādau; M bhramād.

83. M caladvyākṣādbhṛantiḥjñānam; T šiṅ la sogs pa g’yo bar ḍaṣin paḥi ies pa = caladvyākṣādhāriḥjñānam; G bhramadyākṣādigrāhi.

84. M jvalat-; G prajvalat.-

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of it?" [The author:] Some scholars [such as Dharmottara, Śāntiraksīta etc.] replying to this question, say that we do not reach the [corresponding] object through erroneous cognition, but only through another [valid cognition].

6. **Classification of indeterminate knowledge: sense-perception.**

This is fourfold, viz., sense-perception (*indriyajñāna*), mental perception (*mānasa*), self-consciousness (*svasaṃvedana*) and the cognition of a yogin (*yogijñāna*).

Sense-perception is [cognition] which, being produced depending on the five senses beginning with the eyes, has as its object the five external things such as colour and so on. Among them, visual perception has as its object a colour-form; auditory perception has as its object a sound; olfactory perception has as its object smell; gustatory perception has as its object taste; tactual perception has as its object a tangible thing. The designation ‘sense-perception’ is made after the specific cause (*asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa*) [of this perception] as in the cases of `the sound of a kettle-drum (bherisabda)’ and ‘the shoot of barley (yavāṅkura).’

This kind of indeterminate cognition is regarded as a means of valid knowledge only as to the object of which it produces [a moment later] the determinate knowledge corresponding to the sensation, for the validity...

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85. Our author makes a mere mention of a difficult problem regarding the qualifier *abhṛṇantam* in Dharmakīrti’s definition of *pratyakṣa*, without going further into a detailed discussion. The qualifier is added by Dharmakīrti to the definition of Dignāga *pratyakṣaḥ kalpanāpoṭham*. It is known from TS k. 1324 and TSP that there were some Buddhist logicians who regarded the qualifier redundant and misleading. They argued that erroneous perception sometimes makes us reach the object, as the knowledge of a yellow shell does, and that this is the reason why Dignāga did not qualify perception by *abhṛṇantam*. The argument is presupposed when Dharmottara says (NBT 7,5 ff.):

> tato (= gacchadvṛkṣaḍarśanād) hi pravṛttena vṛkṣamātram avāpyata iti saṃvādakatvāt saṃyagyijñānāḥ kalpanāpoṭhavāc ca pratyakṣam iti syād āśākā, tanniveśṭyartham abhrāntagrahaṇam... yadi mityājñānāṁ kathaṁ tato vṛkṣāvāptir iti cet. na tato vṛkṣāvāptiḥ, nānādēśagāmi hi vṛkṣas tena paricchinnah, ekadeśaniyataś ca vṛkṣo'vāpyate. tato yaddēso gacchadvṛkṣo ḍṛṣṭas taddēso nāvāpyate, yaddēśaś cāvāpyate sa na ḍṛṣṭa iti. na tasmāt kāścid artho 'vāpyate, jñānāntarād eva tu vṛkṣādir artho 'vāpyate, ity evam abhrāntagrahaṇāḥ vipratipatitirāśārtham. Vinidādeva tried to understand abhṛṇanta as meaning *avisamvādakam*: and Dharmottara and Śāntiraksīta (TS v. 1325-1327) repudiate this view. For a useful and interesting exposition of the problem see Mookerjee, 276-281. See also Stcherbatsky, II. 17. n. 3.

86. =NB I, s. 7: tac catvaridham.

87. M utpadyamāṇa ; G utpanna-

87a. NBT 10, 4: indriyasya jñānam indriyajñānam, indriyāśritoḥ yat tat pratyakṣam; PS I. k. 4a-b: asādhāraṇaḥhetutvād akṣais tad vyapadiṣyate (Hattori, II. 1. n. 32).
in the sense of the empirical truth (sāṁvyavahārikapramāṇa) is here referred to.88

6.1. Mental perception. (14.14) Mānase89 or mental perception is the product of a sense-perception which forms its immediately preceding homogeneous cause, and which cooperates with the immediately succeeding facsimile [i.e. the second moment] of its proper object.90

The words ‘its proper (sva)’ refers to a sense-perception, ‘its proper object’ referring to an external object such as a jar. [The compound word] svaviṣayānantara is construed as svaviṣayānantaraḥ [viṣayah], i.e., the immediately succeeding facsimile of its proper object, and refers to the second moment of a jar etc. which is different from the original object of the sense-perception. ‘Cooperating with it’ (tena sahaśāriṇā) means [the sense-perception] concurs with it [i.e. the second moment of the object]. This sense-perception is the material cause (upādāna) [of the mental perception] and called samanantarapratyaya (the cause which immediately precedes, and is similar to, its effect, i.e. the next moment of the cause). What is produced from this is called mental perception.

(15.1) By this [definition of mental perception] are refuted the objections raised by others, viz. 1) that [mental perception is not valid knowledge, since] it cognizes what has already been cognized [by sense-perception]91; 2) that [if, on the other hand, it is supposed to cognize the external object without the mediacy of sense-perception] the blind, the deaf etc. could not exist; 3) that the knowledge of a yogin would also be a mental perception; and 4) that it is not commonly recognized (avyava-
For, since [mental perception] cognizes the second moment [which is different from the first moment of the object cognized by the sense-perception, the first objection] that mental perception grasps what has been once grasped is rejected.

A mental perception is produced by virtue of sense-perception, while the blind etc. do not have the respective sense-perception which is cognizant of the object such as colour etc. How then can they have a mental perception produced by it [i.e. sense-perception]? Therefore, our theory is not liable to the fault that the blind and others would not exist.

By putting [into the definition] the determinant ‘[produced from]’ the immediately preceding homogeneous cause (samanantarapratyaya), the possibility of the false conclusion that the knowledge of a yogin would be identical with mental perception is removed. It is well known that the word samanantarapratyaya in the sense of its conventional usage (rūḍhyā) means [the immediately preceding knowledge as] the material cause [of the succeeding], when both of them occur in the same personality (saṁtāna). Thus, when [the mental perception belonging to] the mind of an ordinary person is supposed to be identical with the knowledge of a yogin, the content of which belongs to a personality different from that of the cognizer [the yogin himself], the designation samanantarapratyaya could not be used here.

Neither is it tenable that [mental perception] is not commonly recognized, for mental perception, pertaining to extremely subtle duration of time, cannot be observed by ordinary people. Moreover, we do not in fact recognize it as part of the convention (vyavahāra). Mental perception is indeed testified by the sacred text of Buddhism (āgama), but there is no [logical] justification for it. The Blessed One said:

\[\text{\textit{hāritva}}.\]

92. The first two of the four kinds of criticisms are ascribed to Kumārilabhaṭṭa by the author of NBTT (26, 12-27, 2): tat paraḥ kumārilāddhibhir lakṣaṇam ajānadbhir dāṣṭam. tan manojavānām yadindriyaviṇṇānaviṣaye pravartate tadā gṛhitāgraḥitiyā 'pramaṇām. athāvyāviṣaye pravartate. vyavahite pratyakṣaḥ bhavat kiṁ tānmanoviṇṇānam indriyasavyapēkṣaḥ syāṁ nirāpekṣaḥ vā. indriyasavyapēkṣate satindriyaviṇṇānam eva. nirapekṣate vānindriyasyāpi manoviṇṇānam pratyakṣaḥ syād ity andhabadhirādyabhāvavacodyaṁ kṛtam. See also TSop 281, 19-28: yad api kumārilāddhibhir uktam... Our author follows fairly faithfully the discussion of Dhamottara, who enumerates and answers the first three objections explicitly and the fourth implicitly.

93. Insert yogijnāṇasya between M 15. 7. -viṣeṣaṇena and mānasā.

94. Read mānasā- instead of M 15. 12 gānasā-.
Colour-form is cognized, Oh monks, by twofold cognition, the visual perception and the mental perception induced by it.95

[The opponent:] “What is the use of explaining what is not applicable to common discourse?” [The author:] If mental perception fits in with such a definition as made above, there is no [logical] fault found. Thus the testimony of the sacred text is shown to be impeccable. This is the purpose [of admitting mental perception] as a species of indeterminate knowledge.

6.2. Self-consciousness. (15.18) All cognitions (citta) and feelings (caitta) are self-cognizant;96 this is called self-consciousness (svasamvedana).97 Cognition [or consciousness in general] is knowledge grasping the object in its general aspect. Feeling or mental activity stands for what occurs in the mind; it cognizes specific aspects of the object and is characterised by pleasure, pain or indifference.98

Self-consciousness is that form [of cognition] by which the self of all cognitions and feelings is cognized; it is called [a kind of] indeterminate knowledge free from fictional constructs and unerring, because its nature consists in direct intuition of the nature of itself.

(16.4) Against this, some opponents raise the objection: “[The theory of] self-consciousness of cognitions and feelings is not tenable, because the action [of a thing] towards its own self is a contradiction. For instance, a dancing boy, no matter how well-trained he may be, cannot climb up his own shoulder; the blade of a sword, however sharp it may be, does not cut itself; a body of fire, though vehemently burning, cannot burn itself. Likewise, how can the cognition or feeling feel itself? The relation of the feeler and the felt (vedyavedakabhava) is none other than the relation of the agent and the object (karmakaribhava). And the object and the

95. M gṛhyate; G gṛhyate; kadacit is omitted in G. T. Cf. NBTT 26. 10-11: dvābhyām bhikṣavo rūpam dṛṣyate caṣṭuvijñānena tādākrṣṭena manovijñānenāti tadāgamasidhāṁ manovijñānam...
96. = NB I. s. 10: sarvacittacaittānām utmasahvedanam. See n. 90 above.
97. T omits svasamvedanam.
98. Read -upekṣā instead of -apekṣā in M. This passage of Mokṣakara is verbally cited in TRD 40. 2-3. Cf. NB T 11. 5: cītaṁ arthamātragrāhi caitā viṣeṣāvasthāgṛāḥīnāṁ sukhdāyāḥ; Prasannapadā 65. 2-3: arthamātradarśanaṁ cītatasya vyāpāro rthaviśeṣadarśanaṁ caītasānāṁ; tatrārvadharmaśīr vijñānam taduvāçe tu caītasaḥ, ity abhyupagamā. For details see AK i, 30, n. 3; Siddhi, I, 296; Prasannapadā, 65, n. 3; Stcherbatsky II, 29; Mookerjee 319-320, etc.
agent in it are well established by common sense to be always distinct from each other as e.g. a tree and a carpenter."

[The author:] We reply to this: The relation of the feeler and the felt in consciousness is not considered as object-agent relation, but as the relation of the determinant and the determinable (vyavasthāpya-vyavasthā-paka-bhāva). As a lamp illuminates itself, so is also knowledge considered to know itself, since it is, quite differently from insentient things (jaḍapadārtha), produced by its own cause with the nature of self-luminosity. In this connection [Śāntirākṣita] says:99

Knowledge is by nature opposed to insentient matter; this immateriality is nothing but the self-consciousness of knowledge.101

The self-consciousness of knowledge is not to be analysed into action and its agent, since knowledge, being a single unity without compartments, cannot be divided into the three parts [viz. the knower, the known and the knowing].102

The Alamkārakāra [Prajñākaragupta] also says:

The agent, the object [and the means] are mere fictional constructs and not [existent in] reality; it is explained that the self touches itself by means of itself.103

(17.4) On the other hand, it is not possible for cognition and feelings to be illuminated by another cognition. For firstly it cannot be said that cognition and feelings are illuminated by another cognition which occurs

99. NBT 15, 18-21: na cātra janyajananakabhāvanibandhanah sādhyaśādhanabhāvo yenaikasmin vastuni virodhaḥ syāt, api tu vyavasthāpyavyavasthāpakaḥvāhava. tata ekasya vastunah kiṃcid rūpaḥ pramāṇaḥ kiṃcit pramāṇaphalaḥ na virudhyate. This passage is concerned with the problem of the identity of the pramāṇa and the pramāṇaphala, which is soon dealt with by our author as well. Udayana in his Pariṣuddhi reproduces the Sautrāntika theory that there are cases of cognition in which the logical antecedent and its consequence are included in the same concrete entity, examples being: svapprakāṣajñāna or svasamvedana in which the subject and the object are the same entity, and the judgment that an aśoka is a tree, in which the tree is not different from the aśoka (cf. Stcherbatsky, II, 375-376).

100. G yathāktam nyāyāvādinā instead of tathā cōktam in M. G places this verse at the very end of § 6.2.


102. =TS v. 2001: kriyākārakabhāvena na svasāmkavittir asya tu, ekasyāmanyārūpasya traināpyānupapattitaḥ. This verse is given only in T.

103. =PVBh III. 369, 19 (v. 757): kalpiṭaḥ karmakartrādiḥ paramārtho na vidyate, ātmānam ātmanāivaṁtiṁ niḥantiti nirucyate.
at the same time as they do, because [between them] there is no relation of the benefitting and the benefitted (upakāryopakārabhāva) just as in the case of the right and the left horns of a cow. Nor [can they be illumined] by another cognition existing at a different time, because the former or that which is to be illumined, has disappeared [when the latter takes place] because of the momentariness [of all things].

Furthermore, if knowledge were not self-cognizant, then we would not be able to state the judgment that the object is known, because of the accepted principle that cognition the qualifier of which is not cognized does not occur in an object, which is the qualificand. For [in cognition] the object is the qualificand; the state of being known is the qualifier. And ‘known’ means ‘qualified by knowledge’. If knowledge itself is not apprehended through its self-luminosity, how then can the object qualified by the knowledge be apprehended? It is logically impossible that we cognize a stick-holder without cognizing the stick.

(17.13) Trilocana raised the following objection:

“Just as colour-form as the object of the visual sense is cognized even when the visual organ itself is not cognized, just so will it be possible for the object to be known even if the knowledge is not perceived itself.”

104. G places here the Alāmikarākāra’s verse parokṣāṁ yadi tat... which appears in M 18, 15-16. This argument of Mokṣikara is cited almost verbatim in TSop 282, 15-20. The Mimāṃsaka theory that knowledge is cognized by another cognition is refuted in almost all the logical works of Buddhists. see e.g. : PS I. k. 12: jñānāntareṇaḥabhave niṣṭhā tatrāpi hi sṁtiḥ, viṣayāntarasāhasāras tathā na syāt sa cēṣyate (Hattori. II. 1, n. 77-80); PV III, v. 513-521, which is followed by TS k. 2023-2028 and TSP on them. But the argument of our author here is in a different way

105. G has vyāpadeśe after iti (M 17.6).

106. nāgṛhitaviśeṣaṇaḥ buddhir viśeṣe vartate. Not identified, but the verse or its variant is often quoted in various texts with regard to discussions of various subjects. E.g. SV Apoha., v. 88c-d: viṣeyabuddhir iṣṭēha na cājñāte viśeṣe, on which Bhaṭṭaputrajayamāśa comments: na cāpratītyamāne 'bhāvarūpe'pohe tadvishinavastuprattir yuktā, nāgṛhitaviśeṣanā viśiṣte buddhir utpadyate... This verse of SV is concerned with the refutation of the Buddhist theory of apoha, in which the negation of the opposite of the meaning of a word is considered to be the qualifier, the qualificand being the object of the word; SVK II, 122, 2-3: jñānaviṣṭā hi jñātata, śa katham ajñāte viśeṣeṇa jñāyate; PKM 210, 6-7: 473, 13-14. etc.: nāgṛhitaviśeṣanā viśeṣe buddhijī; NVV I, 503, 27; PVV 211, n. 3 etc. Mokṣikara cites this verse considering it to mean the same as the famous verse of Dharmakirti: apratyakṣopalambhasya nārthadṛṣṭijī prasiddhyati (cf. M 18, 13).

107. Trilocana, the teacher of Vācaspatimisrā is one of the important opponents of Jānāśrimitra, Ratnakirti and our author. For detailed information of him see JNA Intro. 20; A. Thakur, The Nyāyamañjari of Gurn Trilocana. JBRs XLI. 4. 507 ff.; Mookerjee, 15.
[The author:] This is also not well-founded because [the example] is not applicable to the present subject. For the qualifier of colour is not the eyes, but visual knowledge (cakṣuṣvijñāna). When visual knowledge is not cognized itself, how can colour be cognized? Thus our criticism is not nullified.\textsuperscript{108}

(18.1)\textsuperscript{109}Kumārila-bhaṭṭa, in order to teach the imperceptibility (par-okaṣatva) of knowledge, says as follows: “The existence of the senses is established since otherwise [i.e. without their existence] the manifestation (prakāśa) of colour and other [objects] remains inexplicable; in the same way, the existence of knowledge is established [as the cause of the cognizedness in the object (jnātātā) through inference]. The Mimāṃsābhāṣya relevant to this problem runs: No one [directly] cognizes his own knowledge when an object is not cognized; the existence of knowledge is inferred when an object is cognized. [Therefore, knowledge is not directly perceived.]\textsuperscript{110} And the [Śloka-] vārttika says on this point:

The existence of knowledge [is inferred] by virtue of the cogni-

\textsuperscript{108} TS v. 2007-2008 with TSP; Mookerjee (321) writes on them: “The proposition of the realistic philosophers, i.e., the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas, that cognition makes known the object by keeping itself in the background like the sense-organ, has, therefore, no sense in it and contains a contradiction in terms. The analogy of the sense-organ is absolutely out of place, because, it ignores a fundamental difference between cognition and the sense-organ. The sense-organ is the efficient cause, the \textit{causa essendi}, of cognition, whereas cognition only reveals the object already in existence. It has no generative efficiency, it is what is termed a \textit{causa cognoscendi} in regard to the object”. According to SV Śūnya. v. 65-67, the Mīmāṃsaka position in this problem is as follows: Fire which is the illuminator of a jar etc. is not illuminated itself. When fire is cognized, it is only a sense-organ which is the cognizer. The sense-organ is cognized by an idea, and this idea is cognized by another idea.SVK in the introductory commentary to these verses says (II. 120. 20 ff.): ajñāte jñāpakahaṇaḥ kathāṁ jñāpayattī dviḥ dviḥ, ajñātasyāpya caṣuṣa jñānajanopalabdhaḥ nam caṣuṣ aṅkurasya bījam jñānasya kāraṇam eveti yuktam ajñātasyāpya janakatvam...

\textsuperscript{109} M 18.1-19.7 missing in G.

\textsuperscript{110} Mīmāṃsābhāṣya 11, 5-6: na hy ajñāte 'ṛthe kaścid buddhim upalabhate, jñāte tu anumāṇād avagacchati, tatra yaugapadyam anupapannam. SV Śūnya., v. 184-186a-b: vyāpyṛtaṁ cāṭhāsauvittau jñānaṁ nātmānaṁ yechati, tena prakāśakate’pi bodhāyayat pratiyate, ādiyāṁ u prakāśatvāṁ tasyārthaṁubhavātmakam, na cātmānubhaṅgaḥ asyāty atmano na prakāṣakam, sati prakāśakate ca vyavasthā drṣṭaye yathā, rūpādau caṣuṣrādināṁ tathātṛpi bhaviṣyat. prakāśastvāṁ bhāyave’ṛthe śaktyaḥbavatū tu nātmāni. These are cited in TS v. 2013-2016. See also Śāstradipikā 157, 13-15: jñānākriyā hi sakarmikā karMaḥbhaṭṭe ‘ṛthe phalaṁ janayati pākādīvat... tad eva ca phalaṁ kāryabhātāṁ kāraṇabhūtaṁ viñānam upa- kalpayatīḷi sidhyaty apratyaṅkṣaṁ api jñānam.
zedness (ज्ञातता) [of the object]."\[111]

(18.5) \[The author:] Cognizedness here means the manifestation (प्राकात्या) of an object.\[112] But this theory [of the Mimāṃsakas] is not correct. For, 1. a) if this manifestation, being [an independent entity] distinct from the knowledge, becomes visible in the form of the object, it would be insentient (जाला) and [your theory then would fall to the ground] since an insentient thing cannot become visible. 1. b) Or, if it exists as a thing different from the object, it would again be insentient, [and your theory would be untenable] since such a thing would not become visible by itself. 1. c) Thirdly, if it is made visible by another manifestation, an infinite regress would follow, [since the second manifestation would also require the third, and so forth to infinity]. 2) If, on the contrary, manifestation is the essential quality of knowledge, it would also\[113] be imperceptible [just like knowledge]. [In either case cognizedness is unintelligible]. Therefore it is necessary to state that knowledge is by nature self-cognizing.

Moreover, self-consciousness is established by our own experience. How then can it be denied?\[114] In connection with this [Dharmakirti] says:

If cognition were itself not perceived, perception of an object is never possible.\[115]

The author of the [Pramāṇavārttika]- Alamkāra [Prajñākaragupta] also

\[111] tasya jñānam tu jñātatāvāsat. Despite of our author’s mention by name, this is not found in SV Śūnyā. But see SVK ad SV Śūnyā. v. 32 (II. 107, 18-20): ye tu viṣayavitti-purassárīḥ buddhisthānvidam atīṣṭhante teṣām asiddhaḥ saḥpalambhaniyamāḥ. sadaiva hi viṣayasaṁvedanottarakālau eva saṁvid upalabhya. yathāh: pūrvaṁ saṁgyhyate paścāj jñānaṁ taj jñātatāvāsat. Cf. Śābara in n. 110 above. The knowledge of an object and of the cognition do not occur simultaneously. The object is always known before, and the cognition is inferred afterwards from the cognizedness, which, being a separate entity produced by the activity of the cognition, inheres in the object. See also Stcherbatsky II. 355. n. 1.

\[112] NK, 302,7: bhaṭṭamimāṁśakās tu jñāta iti pratitissidho jñānajanyo viṣayasaṁavetaḥ prākātyāparanāmā atiriktapadārthaviśeṣaḥ... ity āhuḥ. This is taken from the Mūlamatthatarāṅgī tattvacintāmaṇiñyākyāḥ, but well corresponds to our author’s argument.

\[113] Read prākātyasyāpyā instead of M 18, 10 prākātyasyāpyā.


\[115] This half-verse originally occurs in PVn. Td. 166 a7: dmigs pa mhon sum ma yin na, de (Read. don) mhoṅ rab tu ḥgrub mi ḥgyur. Being one of the most famous verses of Dharmakirti, it is quoted in many texts. Buddhist, Brāhmanical as well as Jaina. See e.g., TSP 401. 4: apratya[kopalam]bhasya nārthadyṣṭiḥ prasidhyati; JNA. 478, 7; TS v. 2074: aprasiddhopalambhasya nārthavittiḥ prasidhyati is an apparent modification.
If knowledge is imperceptible, how can it be possible for an object to be known? Who can define the nature of what is imperceptible?

(18.17) [The opponent:] “If all knowledge is aware of itself by self-consciousness, determinate knowledge such as ‘This is a jar’, etc. would become indeterminate. Again, how cannot [erroneous] knowledge such as [the cognition of] a yellow shell, etc. be correct knowledge?”

[The author:] We reply. Even determinate knowledge is indeterminate as such. The judgment ‘This is a jar’ is determinative of the external object alone, but not of itself. [Regarding this point, Dharma-kirti] said:

The knowledge which apprehends the thing meant by a word is determinative of the thing alone; but the nature [of the knowledge itself] is not identical with the object of the word. In its nature all [knowledge] is [not conceptual, but] intuitive.

Likewise, erroneous knowledge is in itself non-erroneous, since it is manifested in the form of self-illumination (svaprajabarupena). It is said to be erring simply because it has a wrong object, as is said as follows:

Every knowledge is correct in itself, but it may be erring in relation to [the external object which is] another.

Thus it is to be maintained that whatever is manifested is manifested because it is so produced out of its own causes; otherwise manifestation

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116. =PVBh 345, 4 f. b. (v. 619): paroksha yadi taj jñanam ity eva tat kutaḥ, parokṣasya svarūpam kas tasya lakṣayitum kṣamāḥ. M changes jñanam in Pada a into jñātām.
117. =PV III, v. 288: sábdárthagrāhi yad yatra taj jñānam tatra kalpanā, svarūpaḥ ca na sábdártvā tatrādhyakṣaṃ ata’khitam. artham and abhilaśam in M should be accordingly corrected into -arthas and akhilam. Cf. PVBh 331, 19-20: kalpanāpi svasākhyātaś iśā nārthe vikalpanāt, svarūpaṣyāvikalpatvāḥ parokṣatvaśāsiddhīḥ. The first half of this verse is identical with PS I, k. 7a-b (Hattori, II. 1. n. 51). M. reads jñānam tat for taj jñānam.
118. svarūpe sarvam abhrāntam pararūpe viparyayaḥ. Not identified, but see PVBh 331, 13-14: svarūpaḥ tad eva sapastākāram arthas tu nā tathā. tataḥ svarūpe tān nirvikalpakam, arthe tat savikalpakam iti smaraṇam, arthasmarānaṁ svarūpe pratyakṣaṁ, kuta etat, svarūpe tād abhrāntam arthe bhrāntam iti. G resumes its course here (cf. n. 109) with the following passage, at the end of which the verse of Śāntiraksita that appeared in M 16, 15-16 is placed: prakaśakātavāsidhēr yady ami prakāśante tadā svahetor eva prakāśasvabhāva utpannāḥ santa iti suvirātyeyam. In M prakāśasiddher and prakāśasvabhāva are found instead of the underlined words respectively and prakāśanta is inserted between santa and iti. G seems better in these respects.
would remain inexplicable.  

6.3. Mystic intuition of a seer. (19.10) The mystic intuition of a seer (yogijñāna) is the knowledge that is produced on the termination of intensive meditation on a true object. This is also a species of indeterminate knowledge. Yoga (meditation) here is samādhi (concentration) and it is characterised by intent attention of the mind on one object (cittaikāgratā). This is the same as wisdom (prajñā) discerning the truth of all things. Yogin (a seer) is so called because he is possessed of yoga. The knowledge of a yogin is indeterminate knowledge. What kind of knowledge is it? It is explained as what is produced after the termination of intensive meditation (bhāvanāprakāsa) on a true object (bhūtārtha). ‘True object’ is an object compatible with valid knowledge. Meditation practice (bhāvanā) means to imagine (samāropā) repeatedly in the mind. The knowledge which is produced on the termination of the intensive meditation on the truth is devoid of determining factors (kalpana-podha) and non-erroneous. The true object is the fourfold noble truth (caturārya-satya) named pain, the causes (of pain), the extinction (of pain) and the way to the extinction (duḥkha-samudaya-nirodha-mārga). We should understand the five groups (pañca-skandha) in the manner that they are by nature momentary (kṣaṇika), void (śūnya), soulless (mirātmaka), painful, and so forth. And this truth

119. =NB I, s. 11: bhūtārthabhūvanāprakāsa pratyakṣam yogijñānam cēti, PS I, k. 6c-d: yoginām gurunirdesa-sa-vyabhināmātā mahatmyaḥ (Hattori. II. 1. n. 48); PV III. v. 282: prāguktaṁ yogināṁ jñānam teṣāṁ tad bhūvanāmayam, vidhūta-kalpanājālam spaṭām eva-vābhāsate. NBT 12, 1-3 divides the meditation process into three stages: bhūvanāprakāša in which a yogin’s vision begins to be clear; prakāśa-paryantāvasthā, in which the yogin contemplates the object as though it were veiled by a thin cloud; yogināḥ pratyakṣam in which the object is perceived just as clearly as though it were a small grain on the palm of his hand. Mokṣākara follows this theory: Yogijñāna realized in the third stage is produced immediately after the second. prakāśa-paryantā, which in its turn follows the first. bhūvanāprakāśa. See Stcherbatsky, II, 31, n. 2: “According to Vinitadeva, p. 47, the bhūvanāprakāśa comprises 4 degrees, śmṛty-upasthāna, uṣmagata, mūrdhan and kṣānti, the prakāśa-paryantā is the same as laukikāgradharma. About these so called nirvedhabhāgīya stages and the śmṛty-upasthānas cp. AK VI. 14 ff. and VI 20 ff. After that comes the decisive moment, the meditating man suddenly acquires the faculty of transcendental intuition (yogipratyakṣa), he changes completely, it is another pudgala, a saint, an ārya, a bodhisattva...

120. M, G yogaḥ samādhiḥ. T has rnal ḡbyor ni tīṅ he ḡdsin daṅ śes rab bo (=yogaḥ samādhiḥ prajñā ca).

120a. G omits kidṛṣṭāṁ tad iti cet.

121. M 19. n. 1 aṣūci. but G. T śūnya.
should be known to be compatible with inferential knowledge such as ‘Whatever is existent is momentary’ and others [which are to be fully discussed in Chapter III].

6.3.1. Questions regarding meditation and emancipation answered.\(^{122}\)

(20.1) [The opponent] raises the following questions: 1) Meditation is [concerned with] fictional constructs (vikalpa); fictional constructs refer to unreal objects. How then can a real thing vividly manifest itself [in the meditation]? 2) How can \(^{13}yo^\text{gi}jī\text{nāna} which is by nature] conceptual attain indeterminateness? 3) How can the mind which is momentary be fixed upon one object? 4) [When the mind is momentary] by whom and how is the superiority (viśeṣa) [of the seer in comparison with common people] attained? 5) How can a man who has a body be emancipated (mukta) through detachment from passions (rāga) and so forth? [Thus, your theory of yogic intuition] is not intelligible in all these respects.”

(20.5) [The author:] Our reply is this: 1) Although fictional constructs are [primarily] concerned with an imaginary object (avastuviśayā), it indirectly envisages (adhyavasyati)\(^{123}\) [the form of] an actual object. This is the reason why actual things are manifested vividly in this [yogic intuition] because of meditation.

2) We do not say that a fictional construct [or determinate knowledge] is identical with indeterminate knowledge, but that indeterminate knowledge is produced from determinate knowledge [through adhyavasāya]. Furthermore, it is well established by direct experience (anubhavasiddha) that the non-conceptual vision manifests itself to one who constantly meditates [on the object], as in the case of love, sorrow\(^{124}\), etc. Indeed there is no irrelevance whatsoever in such an experience (drṣṭa).

\(^{122}\) G omits the whole section corresponding to M 20.1-21.7 (§ 6.3.1).

\(^{123}\) The author deals with the Buddhist theory of adhyavasāya in § 7.1.1.

\(^{124}\) T omits kämaśokādivat. Cf. PV III, v. 283: kämaśokabhayonmādacaurasvapnādyupāplaṭṭuḥ, abhūtān api paśyanti purato'vasthātān iva. The simile of a lover to whom the figure of his beloved is clearly manifested is a favourite corroborative example of yogijñāna. Jīnā Sarasvīt (JNA 323.3-5) formulates the following syllogism to prove the possibility of yogijñāna: yad yad bhāvyate tat tad bhāvanāprakāśparyante sphutābhauḥ saṁbhavati, yathā kämukasya käminiyākāraḥ; bhāvyante ca paramapuruṣārthino kṣanikatve nairātmyādayo vastu-dharmāḥ (Whatever is meditated on possibly manifests itself clearly at the end of intensive meditation, as the figure of a beloved girl appears to her lover; real teachings such as the non-existence of the soul proved from universal momentariness are meditated upon by one who seeks for the supreme good of human being.) The theory is applied also to the proof of a Buddha’s omniscience. which is a kind of yogijñāna (cf. §29).
3) Momentary as the mind may be, it is called 'fixed on one object' when it is intent on grasping [the object] during all the period consisting of a series of homogeneous [mental] moments (sajātiyakṣanesu).

4) As for the superiority [of the seer, we must say that] it can be produced just because of the momentariness [of the mind] and not because of permanency [i.e. non-momentariness], since it is not feasible that a permanent thing is increased with additional qualities (atiśaya). Regarding this [Dharmakīrti] says:

A thing whose essential nature never perishes is called 'permanent' by the wise.125 Who can destroy the [permanent] capacity or non-capacity abiding by nature as such in a thing, which, due to its eternalness, is incurable [i.e. unchangeable]?126

5) You have said: “A man who has a body is liable to happiness and unhappiness due to favour and disfavour shown to him. It is therefore not possible that he is emancipated by virtue of renouncing passions, etc. while he still has a body.” But this is untenable. For it is not the body, but nescience (avidyā) which is the cause of passions, etc., this nescience being wrong conception, the nature of which consists of the four kinds of delusions (viparyāsa), viz., imagining what is impermanent as permanent, what is not the self as the self, what is painful as pleasant, and what is impure as pure. From this [nescience] originates thirst (ṭṛṣnā) for pleasurable objects. To him who regards the self (ātman) as eternal, the causes of longings for pleasure will be his own belongings (ātmiya).127 Attachment to these [belongings] is passion, and with the latter are connected hatred (dveṣa) and other [defilements]. Thus, it is nescience, but not the body that is the root of passion etc. How is one who has got rid of nescience bound to passion etc. even if he has a body? Therefore, even while living with a body those who have no passion can accomplish emancipation—which is characterised by the abandonment of all the attachment—when he is freed from nescience. Thus it has been

125. =PV II. v. 205 a-b: nityam tām āhur vidvāhso yāḥ svabhāvo na naśyati. M reads yatsvabhāvo instead of yāḥ svabhāvo.
126. =PV III. v. 22: tasya śaktir āsaktir vā yā svabhāvāna saṁsthitā. nityatvād acikitsya- syā cas tām kṣapayatāṁ kṣamaḥ. M has acikitsasya for acikitsasya.
127. T bdag rtag par mthoṅ ba khy naḥo. bde ba mthon par ḡdol pa la sogs pañi rgyu yah bdag gi bar ḡyar ro (=ātmānāṁ nityāṁ paśyati. sukhābhikāṅkṣaṇādiḥetur ātmiyāḥ syāt). Tr. follows M. but omits sukha of sukhaḥetur.

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fully established.

7. Object of indeterminate knowledge. (21.8) Its object is the extremely particular characteristic.\footnote{128} It is to be known that the fourfold indeterminate knowledge has as its object the particular (svalakṣaṇa). The particular here means the unique characteristic of a reality which is determined in space, time and form (deśa-kālā-kāraṇiyata). The following is meant by this statement: [To take the example of] a jar, its particular characteristics may be described as follows: it is capable of containing water etc.; is manifested before us as particularly determined in space, time and form; is free from ideas (dharma), impermanence and others; and, as object of our purposive action (pravṛtti), is distinct from things both of the same and of a different class (sajātiyavijātiyavyāvṛtta).\footnote{129}

7.1. Ayogavyavaccheda and anyayogavyavaccheda. (21.13)\footnote{130} [The opponent:] If only the particular can be the object of indeterminate knowledge, and not the universal (sāmānyya), how then can you grasp by indeterminate knowledge the pervasion (vyāpti) between the two universals of smoke and fire?"\footnote{131}

[The author:] There is no fault of this kind, because what we mean is that the particular is really one of the objects of that [indeterminate

\footnote{128} =NB I. s. 12: tasya viṣayaḥ svalakṣaṇam. PS I. k. 2a-c: pratyakṣam anumānaḥ ca pramāṇe lakṣaṇadīnayaṃ. prameyaṃ... (Hattori. II. I. n. 11. 13); PSV on it: svalakṣaṇavisa-yāh (hi) pratyakṣaṁ sāmānyalakṣaṇa-viṣayam anumānam iti prātipūdayiṣyāmaḥ (=PVBh 169. 9–10) (Hattori. II. 2. n. 14).

\footnote{129} NBT, 12. 14ff.: tasya caturvidhāpratyakṣaṣya viṣayo bodhavyāḥ svalakṣaṇaṃ. svam asādhaṁyaḥ lakṣaṇaḥ tattvaḥ svalakṣaṇaṃ. vastuno hy asādhaṁyaḥ ca tattvam asti sāmānyyaḥ ca. yad asādhaṁyaḥ pratyakṣaṣagṛhyam....

\footnote{130} G omits § 7.1 (M 21. 13–22. 7).

\footnote{131} This criticism is reproduced as of Trilocana in JNA 161. 17–23: trilocanas tv aha, pratyakṣāne-palambhayor viṣeṣa-niṣaya-tvōt kathaṁ tābhyām sāmānyayoḥ sambandhāpratitiḥ. Trilocana’s argument is in brief as follows: Perception and non-cognition, having by nature only the particular as their object, cannot comprehend the relation between two universals. The Buddhist contention that the relation of the absence of fire with the absence of smoke is understood does not hold good. Because such a relation is not an object of perception which cognizes only the particular; nor is it understood by inference, because inference presupposes perception. Moreover, there is no relation between two concepts which are merely discrimination from the opposite (Read vyāptiyoḥ). Buddhists may contend that a concept occurring just after perception envisages by logical imagination the determinate form of the object, though actually every moment of the object is different from another. But this is untenable, since, according to Buddhists, a reality never becomes an object of conceptual knowledge, always remaining imperceptible to it. The criticism is cited verbatim also in RNA 99. 13–23.

\begin{center}{\bf - 56 -}\end{center}
knowledge] (svalakṣaṇam tasya viṣaya eva), the non-connection [of the former with the latter] being negated (ayogavyavaccheda), and not that the particular alone is its object (svalakṣaṇam eva tasya viṣayāḥ), all other [than the particular] being excluded (anyayogavyavaccheda)\textsuperscript{132}. What

\textsuperscript{132} The theory of two or three kinds of vyavaccheda was first propounded by Dharma-kirti, and maintained throughout the subsequent development of Buddhist logic. It was applied to various problems of logic as often as the theory of prasajya- and paryudāsa-pratiṣedha. In fact, the theory of vyavaccheda is concerned with the restriction of the meaning of an affirmative proposition, or more precisely, the affirmative relation of two terms, while the theory of two kinds of pratiṣedha is for the purpose of restricting the meaning of a negative proposition. (About the latter see n. 62 above.) The original verses stating the theory of vyavaccheda occur in PV IV, v. 190-192 and PVn II (Peking ed. 266, b3-5), and are cited verbatim in TRD 35, 11-17: ayogam yogam aparair atyantīyogam eva ca, vyavacchinatti dhammasya nīpāto vyatirekaḥ. viśeṣaṃviśeṣyābhyaṃ kriyāḥ ca saḥdītāḥ, vivakṣāto 'prataya'pi tasyārtho'yam pratiyate. vyavacchedaphalaṃ vāyānya yatāt caitro dharmadharaḥ, pārtha dhanurdharaḥ nilāṃ sarojam iti vā yathā. The particle eva, which implies the significance of separation, restricts the relation of two terms [or of a proposition] in three ways: (1) When it is stated with the qualifier, the non-connection of the qualifier [with the qualificand] is negated; (2) when it is stated with the qualificand, the connection of all qualities other [than the stated qualifier] with the qualificand is negated; (3) when it is stated with the verb, the absolute non-connection of two terms is negated, i.e. the possibility of the connection of the two terms in some cases is admitted. The examples are: (1) caitro dhanurdhara eva (Caitra is an archer), meaning that Caitra is surely one of the many archers—this is called ayogavyavaccheda, since the force of the particle negates simply the disconnection of Caitra and archery; (2) pārtha eva dhanurdharaḥ (Pārtha alone is the archer), meaning that only Pārtha is worthy of being called an archer, all the others being unworthy of the appellation—this is anyayogavyavaccheda; (3) nilāṃ sarojāṃ saṁbhavaty eva (There are some lotus blooms which are blue), showing the possibility of the existence of blue lotus—this is atyantīyogavyavaccheda. Any of these meanings is understood in any proposition through the intention of the speaker even if the particle is not actually applied. For the expression of a sentence is the effect of separation [intended by the speaker].

Dharmottara in PVnT (Peking ed. 216, b8 ff.) gives another example which is adopted by Jānāśrimitra (JNA 206, 6 ff.) as well as Ratnakirti (RNA 55, 6-9): ēṣa panthāḥ śrūghnaṁ uṇātiṣṭhate. This may be restricted by any of the three vyavacchedas according as we put ēva with ēṣa panthāḥ, śrūghnaṁ and uṇātiṣṭhate respectively: This way alone leads to Śrūghna; this way surely, i.e. without break, leads to Śrūghna; it is possible that this way also leads to Śrūghna. Dharmakirti's discussion on vyavaccheda cited above is made regarding the relation of p and h (pakṣādharma), while Jānāsri and Ratnakirti give the example of a way to Śrūghna with regard to the theory of apoha. Ratnakirti interprets also the theory of vyāpti by means of vyavaccheda (RNA 70, 7-10; Mookerjee, 10-12). Jānāśrimitra makes use of the same for solving a difficulty in establishing a causal relation in his Kāryakāraṇābhiśāsiddhi (JNA 321, 12-13): sāmagrapekṣyāṇasya cchede dṛavya-vyāpektayaḥ, yogatāyām ayoṣyāya śiddho'tyantāḥ ca karmo'ṇi. On this verse he comments: When by the word 'fire' we mean as a whole the entire things [fire, fuel, moisture etc.] (sāmagri) implied by it. that much alone is [the cause of smoke] (sa eva kāraṇam) and
then follows is that the universal can be its object as well.\(^{133}\)

7.1.1 Grāhya and adhyavaseya. (21.18) The object of valid cognition is indeed twofold: the directly apprehended (grāhya) and the indirectly determined (adhyavaseya). Of these, the directly apprehended object of indeterminate knowledge is the single moment of the individual characteristic that is seen.\(^{134}\) The indirectly determined [or envisaged] object is the universal which is manifested when the determining factor (vikalpa) occurs following indeterminate cognition.\(^{135}\)

7.1.2 ūrdhvatālaksanām and tiryaglakṣanānām sāmāṇyam. (22.2) This universal is again twofold: the concept of an individual (ūrdhvatālaksanām, lit. vertical universal) and the concept of a class (tiryaglakṣanām, lit. horizontal universal). Of these, the universal of an individual is constructed through the accumulation of a series of moments of an individual

in this case the relation involved is *anyayogavyaccheda*. When only the substance of fire is meant and also when cause-ness means fitness or latent force (*yogātā*). then [fire] is fit to be [one of] the causes [of smoke] (*dahanaḥ karaṇam eva*). This is *ayogavyaccheda*. When furthermore an actual action is meant, [it means that fire] actually can be [a cause] (*dahanaḥ karaṇam bhavaty eva*). In this case the relation of *atyantāyogavyaccheda* is admitted. (For details see my *Trikāpaścakācintā*– Development of the Buddhist theory on the determination of causality, MIK Nos. 4-5. 1 ff. and the additional note in 15). From these explanations it is clear that 1) in *anyayogavyaccheda* the qualificand and the qualifier completely pervade each other or are coextensive, 2) that in *ayogavyaccheda* the qualifier pervades the qualificand, or the qualifier is of wider extension than the qualificand, and 3) that in *atyantāyogavyaccheda* only some part of the qualificand is pervaded by some part of the qualifier. The theory appears in various texts of other Indian schools as well, though they are probably indebted to Buddhist logicians for it. See e.g. *Saptabhaṅgitarāṅgini*, ed. Thākuraprasādaśarma. 25, 8–12; 26, 3-5; 26, 15-20 etc. NK s. v. *eva*.

133. Ratnakirti, following JNA 166, 11-21, replies to the criticism by Trilocana referred to in n. 131 above as follows: *trilocanacodye'pi brūmaḥ, yadi pratyaṣṭaṁ svalakṣaṇavishayam ity ayogavyacchadenedocyate tadā siddhasādhanam. anyayogavyacchadas tv asiddhaḥ, pratyaṣṭānamānādiśarva-vajñanāṁ grāhyāvasayabhedena viṣayadvaśīdhyāntikramat. yad dhi yatra jñāne pratibhāsate tad grāhyam, yatra yataḥ pravartate tad adhyavaseyam. tatra pratyaṣṭaṁ svalakṣaṇam grāhyam, adhyavaseyaḥ tu sāmāṇyam atadṛśpaparāśīt vsvalakṣaṇamātriṃcakam. anumāṇaḥ tu viparyayaḥ* (*RNA* 102, 8–13). Mokṣākara argues after this passage of Ratnakirti here and in §7.1.3. below.

134. T de la mōn sum gyi gzuḥ bya ni snan bzin poḥi skad cug cig go (=tatra pratyaṣṭaṁ svalakṣaṇasya pratibhāsamanāṁ kṣaṇa eko grāhyaḥ). eko grāhyaḥ in M should be kṣaṇa eko grāhyaḥ. Cf. also NBT 12, 18: *pratyakṣasya hi kṣaṇa eko grāhyaḥ*. 135. NBT 12, 16 ff.: *devideho hi viṣayah pramāṇasya, grāhyaḥ ca yad ākāram utpadaye, prapāyitaḥ ca yam adhyavaseyati. anyo hi grāhya ’nyaś cādhyavaseyaḥ. pratyakṣasya hi kṣaṇa eko grāhyaḥ. adhyavaseyas tu pratyakṣharolotpannam naścayena sāhānena eva. sāhānena eva ca pratyakṣasya prapāyitaḥ. kṣaṇasya prāpayitum aśakyate. See also Intro. of the *Pramāṇā- vārttikā*, ed. Malvaniya.*
object, say a jar, which is distinguished from the others of the same class;¹³⁶ and this universal is the object of the perception ascertaining [an object] (sādhanapratyakṣa). The universal of a class comprises [as the members] all the individuals [belonging to one class] which are distinguished from [those of] other classes; this universal is the object of the perception grasping pervasion (vyāptigrāhakapratyakṣa).¹³⁷

7.1.3 Object of determinate knowledge is also twofold. (22.6) [The opposite process is taken by] determinate knowledge, to which the universal (sāmānya) is the directly apprehended object (grāhya) and the indirectly apprehended object (adhyavasāya) is the particular (svalakṣaṇa).

7.2. Refutation of the six categories. (22.7)¹³⁸ By the instruction that the object of indeterminate knowledge is the particular, it is implied that the six categories (padārtha)¹³⁹ maintained by other schools [viz. the Naiyāyika and the Vaiśeṣika] are not its objects. [The six kinds of categories, viz.,] substance as the composite whole of an individual object (avayavidravya), quality (guṇa), motion (karma), universal (sāmānya), ultimate specifier (viśeṣa) and inherence (samavāya), are not manifested (pratibhiṣa) in indeterminate cognition. What is not manifested cannot be its object, because otherwise unwarrantable consequences would follow (atiprasangat). For, while perceiving a jar, etc. we do not cognize a single substance as the ‘whole’ apart from parts such as the front, the

¹³⁶. T rigs mthun pa (daḥ rigs mi mthun pa la sogs pa gcig kho na) la skad cig ma du ma tshogs paḥi spyi ni.... The parenthesized portion must be omitted.
¹³⁷. JNA 166, 16 ff.: tatra sādhanapratyakṣaṁ tadaivārthakriyārthinaḥ kṣaṇavikṣane 'pi saṃtānāpekṣaya sāmānyaviṣayam. vyāptigrahaṇaṇaṇaprakaraṇe punar ekavyaktidārśane 'pi sarvasaṣajātiyaaktivātyayatan eva sāmānyaviṣayam. See also RNA 102, 13-17. In another place Ratnakirti gives the name īrdhva and tiryag (RNA 136. 2-3): yathōrdhvaṁ indriyapratyakṣaṁtaḥ kṣaṇabhṛde pratiḥ 'py avidyāvaśād ekatvādhyavasāyaḥ. tathā tiryaksasaṁvedanaṇaṇaṇapratyakṣaṇaśāṭārābhode 'dhigate'py avidyāvaśād eva bhedāvaśāyaḥ.... Our author inherits the designations from Ratnakirti. However, the same designations appear in Maṇikyanandin’s Parikṣāmukhasūtra (Chap. IV, s. 3: sāmānyam dvedhā, tiryagūrdhvataḥbhedā) as well as PKM 466, 20 ff. If Maṇikyanandin is, as generally accepted, dated in 9th cent. it follows that Ratnakirti is indebted to him for the classification. Prabhacandra is dated by Mahendur Kumar in 980-1065, which almost coincides with the date of Ratnakirti.
¹³⁸. G resumes its discourse here with a slightly different statement: etena yad uktah pareṇa śatpadārthah pratyakṣaṇa paricchediyante te ca pratyakṣasya viṣayā iti tan nirastam.
¹³⁹. As for the problem of a suitable English tr. of the word padārtha, see K. H. Potter. The Padārthatattvaviniṣṭapāṇam. Intro. and the counter-argument by J. Brough in BSOAS. XXII, 1, 161

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back etc. The supreme lord of logic (Nyāya-parameśvara, i.e. Dharma-kirti?) says in this connection:

Only parts placed closely [together] are seen as they are, but another entity which is their possessor and which itself consists of no parts [i.e. a composite whole] is not apprehended. 140

It should be understood that a similar criticism may be directed towards [the other categories], quality, motion, etc. 141

8. Identity of the cause and the effect of cognition. (22.17) 142 [The opponent:] It is well known that pramāṇa [the instrument of knowledge]
is knowing (jñāna) which brings about as its effect (phalabhūta) the act (kriyā) in the form of knowledge (pramitirūpa). What is in your theory to be regarded as [the resultant content of] knowledge (pramiti) in relation to which the knowing as the cause (janayaj jñānam) is called the instrument of knowledge? 143

The right answer to this question is as follows: From an object such as blue is produced twofold [determinate] knowledge: one is the image or concept of blue (nilākāra), the other consists of the consciousness of blue (nilabodhasvabhāva). The knowledge consisting of the image of blue is [determined as] distinct (vyārvṛtyā) from the image of non-blue, and is regarded as the instrument of knowledge. The knowledge consisting in the consciousness of blue is also [determined as] distinct from the consciousness of non-blue, and is the knowledge as resultant (pramiti). This is the same as the effect [of cognition]. 144

Concerning this, [Dharmakīrti] says:

This resemblance (sārūpya) [of the mental image] to its [external] object is the instrument of knowledge; the understanding (adhigati) of the object is the effect of cognition. 145

However, the distinction as such has been set up by conceptual analysis (vikalpa/pratīyaya). In reality (paramārthas) there is no distinction, as is said [by Dharmakīrti]:

The indeterminate knowing is none other than the effect of cognition. 146

8.1. Knowledge is necessarily endowed with an image (sākārajñāna). (23.7) 147

Knowledge must be considered as endowed with the image of

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143. NBT 15. 11-12: nanu ca jñānād avyatiriktaḥ sādṛśyam. tathā ca sati tād eva jñānam pramāṇaḥ tād eva pramāṇaphalam. na caikām vastu sādhyām sādhanām cōpa[padyate....

144. For an excellent exposition of this theory see Mookerjee 337-354. NBT 16. 3ff.: tasmād asārūpyavyārvṛtyā sārūpyām jñānasya vyavasthāpanahetūḥ, anilabodhayārvṛtyā ca nilabodharupatvaḥ vyavasthāpyam. vyavasthāpakaś ca vikalpaprathyayaḥ pratyakṣabalaḥpanno draṣṭavyaḥ....

145. =NB I. s. 20: arthaśārūpyam asya pramāṇam. The passage arthaḥdigatīḥ pramāṇaphalam which our Author ascribes to Dharmakīrti is not found in NB, but NB I. s. 18-19 expresses the same meaning: ... pramāṇaphalam arthaḥpratīyeyapate).

146. =NB I. s. 18: tād eva ca pratīkṣaḥ jñānaḥ pramāṇaphalam; PS I, k. 8c-d: savyāpārapiṣṭatiḥ pramāṇaḥ phalam eva sat (Hattori. II. 1, n. 55). PV III. v. 308a-b: sā (=arthaḥdigatīḥ) ca tasya (=jñānasya) ātmabhūtaiva tena nārthāntaraḥ phalam.

147. Missing in G. T.
If knowledge is not admitted as having an image, it is not possible to establish objects separately from one another, since such knowledge without the imprint [left by each object] would remain the same on cognizing all objects. 148

8.2. (23.9) Again, some scholars hold that the preceding knowledge is the cognitive instrument (pramāṇa) while the subsequent knowledge is

The sākāra-vāda is maintained by the Śāṅkhya, Vedānta as well as the Sautrāntika-buddha. The theory, in Mookerjee’s words (77), “holds that knowledge of external reality is made possible by virtue of the objective reality leaving an impress of its likeness on the mirror of consciousness.” Refer to the verse bhinnakiilai katham grihyam iti eet ... in n. 74 above. The niriikiiraviidā is maintained by the Nyāyavaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsaka, Jaina, and the Vaibhāṣikabuddha, and “the theory maintains that our consciousness is clear like a clean slate and does not depart an inch from its intrinsic purity even when it apprehends the external reality. Consciousness is an amorphous substance and remains so in all its activities. It is like light and reveals the object with its form and qualities without undergoing any morphological articulation in its constitution.” Cf. TSP 564, 8-9: ..anākāra-vādanāḥ, yasyedaṁ darśanam, ākāra-vān bāhyo ’rtha nirākāra buddhir iti. TS v. 1999, as well as TSP, enumerates for criticism’s sake three kinds of epistemological attitudes regarding the relation of knowledge and its object: Nirākāra-vāda (anirbhāṣajñāna-vāda) according to which an object is cognized by knowledge not endowed with the image of the object: Nirākāra-vāda (samirbhāṣajñāna-vāda)—the object is cognized by the knowledge having its image; anyanirbhāṣajñāna-vāda—the object is cognized by knowledge which is endowed with an image different from that of the object.

All the four schools of Buddhism can be classified from the perspective of ākāra-vāda. The Vaibhāṣika is regarded as nirākāra-vāda while the Sautrāntika and the Vijnānavādin are sākāra-vādin. When the knowledge of a Buddha or emancipated person is concerned, the Vijnānavādin as well as the Mādhyamika are again divided into both parties. Our author comes to deal with this division of the Vijnānavādin in § 32.1 (M 69, 11 ff.) and I will give a detailed note on that occasion. For the general classification of the Buddhist schools into either of the two parties see TRD 46-47, where the Vaibhāṣika is represented as saying: nirākāra bodho’rthasahabhdvy ekasāmagra vyadhinā tatātṛthe pramāṇaḥ; the Sautrāntika and Vijnānavādin: sākāra bodhaḥ pramāṇaḥ; and the Mādhyamika: svapnopamaḥ pramāṇaprameyayyah pratiḥkhyāḥ, muktiś tu ūnantādyātyāḥ... kecit tu mādhyamikāḥ svastham jñānām āhūḥ. SDS 46, 368-371: artho jñānānivita vaibhāṣikena bahu manyate, sautrāntikeṇa pratyakṣaghṛatydṛtho na bahir mataḥ. ākārasahitā buddhir yogācārasya sammatā, kevalāṁ saheīdaṁ svastham manyante madhyamāḥ pūnaḥ. Similar verses are found also in TRD 47. Here, a group of the Mādhyamikas who maintain pure consciousness independent of ākāra seems to represent nirākāra-vāda.
the effect of the cognition (pramāṇaphala). But this is untenable. For the preceding knowledge cannot be a pramāṇa149 because the subsequent knowledge which is supposed to be the pramāṇaphala is then not yet produced. When the [so-called] resultant knowledge is produced, the preceding knowledge, being momentary, has already disappeared. How can it be a pramāṇa, even if it has an object such as a jar? Nor can the one of [two cognitions existing at the same time be called the effect [of the other], since between them is not found the relation of the benefitting and the benefitted (upakāryopakārarakatva) as in the case of the right and left horns of a cow.

8.3. 150···Therefore, there is in the level of the highest truth (paramārthatas) no difference between the instrumental cognition and the resultant cognition; the difference which, being brought about by conceptual distinction [from their opposite] (vyāvṛtītikṛta), is established in determinate knowledge as simply imaginary (kālpanika).··150

Here ends the chapter on indeterminate knowledge of the Tarkabhāṣā.

Chapter II. Inference for oneself (svārthānumāna).

9. Classification of determinate knowledge. (24.2) Determinate knowledge or inference is twofold: that for oneself and that for others.151 [Inference] which is made for one’s own sake is inference for oneself (svārtham anumānam); this consists in [inferential] knowledge [of a person who infers]. Having seen [a logical mark] smoke, etc. in its locus (dharmin), say a mountain, a person who infers gets the knowledge of fire [existing on the mountain]. By means of this knowledge he himself comes to comprehend the object which is not directly perceived (parokṣa), but nothing more is aimed at. This is why it is called inference for one’s own sake.

[Inference] which is made for others is inference for others. This inference for others (parārthānumāna) consists of words. Since the statement expressing a logical mark satisfying the three characteristics (tri-
rupaliṅga) leads others to, i.e. causes others to know [what is not directly perceived], the statement is also meant by the word anumāna through the metaphorical use (upacāra) of the word152, just as the expression ‘Clarified butter is life’ (āyur ghṛtam).

9.1. Function of inference. (24.8) Of these, the knowledge which is, in reference to the object of inference (anumeya), produced by the logical mark having the triple characteristic is the inference for oneself. 153[The following is meant:] From the logical mark (ḥ) which has the triple characteristic, knowledge is obtained by the inferring person in regard to the object of inference [i.e. the fact that locus ṗ is qualified by s]154 which is not directly perceived. This knowledge is the inference for oneself.

However, some are of the opinion that [inference is] to determine the necessary concomitance (āvinābhāva) of the probandum (ṣ) [with the probans (ḥ)] as connected (also) with the particular locus (ḥ. dharmaviseṣa).155

Others are of the opinion that [inference is] to determine indirectly the existence of [the probandum (ṣ) such as] fire.156

152. NBT 17.6: parārthānumānāṁ sabdātmakam, svārthānumānāṁ tu jñānātmakam; 
      NB III, s. 1-2: trirūpaliṅgākhyānam parārtha-numānam, kāraṇe kāryopacārat; 
      TSop 296.6-7: anumānakāraṇe trirūpaliṅge kāryasyānumānasyopacārat samāropāt yathā nañvalodakam pādaroga iti.

153. NB II, s. 3: tatra trirūpālī liṅgād yad anumeyē jñānāṁ tad anumāṇam. Cf. n. 151.

154. Anumeya here means the conclusion to be proved, the collection of pakṣadharmin (ḥ) and sādhyadharma (s), or to be more precise, ṗ qualified by s. Cf. DP 90.22: anumeyā dharmadharmīsamudāyaḥ. Hereafter I use the sign ṗ for pakṣadharmin=sādhyadharmin, the locus or substratum of inference, illustrated here by a mountain; s for sādhyadharma, the quality to be inferred or probandum, illustrated here by fire; ḍ for hetu=liṅga=sādhana-dharma=पक्षधर्मा, the logical mark or the probans, illustrated here by smoke. It is necessary because the Skt. terms for them are multivalent and must be determined in one sense according to the context. The word anumeya is used in three senses: 1) It means ṗ when used in relation to the definition of the probans; 2) the collection of ṗ and s, or ṗ qualified by s when used in relation to the understanding of the subject-matter of inference; 3) and s when a vyāpti (pervasion between the probans and the probandum) is to be determined. Cf. NBT 20, 16-17: hetulakṣaṇe niścetave dharmy anumeyaḥ, anyatra tu sādhyapratipattikāle samudāyo'numeyāḥ, vyāptiniścayakāle tu dharmo'numeya iti. The present passage in our text is concerned with the understanding of the object or the subject-matter of inference, so anumeya is here used in the second sense of the word.

155. M dharmaviśeṣa, but G. T read dharmaviśeṣa, which is supported by the context. See n. 156.

156. Dignāga introduces and refutes two theories regarding the problem of what is the subject-matter of an inference in PS II, k. 8-11. The Skt. text is preserved in NVT 152. 11 ff. which is cited here together with Vācaspati’s introducing remark: atra dignāgena
10. Three characteristics of the logical mark: paksādharmatā. (24. 13) Now the triple characteristic possessed by the logical mark is to be explained.157

1) Its \([h's]\) definite (niścitam) presence in all [the members of the class of] the locus \((p)\) of inference [as well as in other classes].158

Anumeya159 here means the locus of inference (dharmin) such as a

dhūmād agnirūpadharmāntarānumānam agnidaśayōḥ sambandhānumānam ca duṣayitvāgni-
viśiṣṭadeśānumānaṁ samarthitam, taṁhā cāhā, kecid dharmāntaraṁ meyaṁ līghasyāvyabhī-
cāraṁ, saṁbhandhaṁ kecid iĉchanti siddhatvād dharmadharṁoḥ (k. 8). līghaṁ dharme
prasiddhāṁ cet kiṁ anyat tena miyate, atha dharminī, tasyaiva kiṁ arthaṁ nānumeyatā (k. 9).
saṁbhandhe 'pi duṣyaṁ nāsti, saśtiḥ śrūyeta tadvati, avācyo, 'nugṛhitatvān. na cāsau līghasam-
gataḥ (k. 10). līghasyāvyabhīcarās tu dharmatvānyatra dṛṣyate, tatra prasiddhāṁ tadyuktaṁ
dharmāṁ gamayati (k. 11). These verses are translated and interpreted by several
modern scholars, among whom are: Randle, Fragment F (l8-21); Mookerjee, 349-355; Kita-
gawa, 103-110. It is clear that the two views reproduced by our author correspond to the
two views criticised by Dignāga. Uddyotakara as well as Vācaspatimisra in their turn
criticise Dignāga’s view that anumeya is \(p\) qualified by \(s\). But our author does not go
farther into a detailed controversy.

157. Dignāga states the three characteristics of the logical mark in PS II, k. 5c-d: anumeya 'tha tattulye sadbhāvo nāṣitaśatī (Fragment H; Kitagawa, 96). Dharmakīrti’s
definition of the logical mark in PV I. v. 1 is paksādharmas tadaṁśena vyāpto hetuḥ. This
is borrowed from Dignāga’s stanza: grāhyadharmas tadaṁśena vyāpto hetuḥ, which was
probably contained in his lost work Hetumakha (cf. Frauwallner. Dignāga, sein Werk und
seine Entwicklung, WZKSO III, 164; Gnoli, 1, n. 10). In this verse of Dharmakīrti, paksā-
dharmatva represent the first characteristic, and vyāpti between \(h\) and \(s\) (=tadaṁśa) both
the second and the third. But Mokṣākara follows Dharmakīrti’s statement in NB.

158. NB II. s. 5: līghasyānumeye sattvam eva (niścitam). In NB the word niścitam is
stated at the end of II, s. 7, and Dharmottara says that it must be read with II, s. 5 and
6 as well. \(p\) here stands for all the members of the class of \(p\). When \(p\) is a proper name
or a definite individual, it may be regarded as a unit class.

159. Anumeya in this context means \(p\). Cf. NB II, s. 8: anumeya 'tra jīhāṣitaviśeṣo
dharmi. (Anumeya here stands for the dharmin whose determinant or property it is wanted
to know.) When he explained the first characteristic of the liṅga, anumeya’stitā, in PSV
ad PS II. k. 5c-d (n. 157 above), Dignāga defined anumeya as dharmaśīṣṭo dharmaṁ anumeyaḥ
(Fragment 4: Kitagawa, 96). This definition was rather confusing, since anumeya here
must be in its first sense, i.e. \(p\), while Dignāga’s definition is more suggestive of the
second, \(p\) qualified by \(s\). Commentators on PS were conscious of this difficulty. Jinendra-
buddhi (Viśālāmalavati, Peking, 106, a5-7), for instance, introduces a criticism of some
people, who, classifying the usage of the word anumeya into the above three, say that the
existence of \(s\) is not yet known when a logical mark is perceived, and that \(p\) therefore
cannot be qualified by \(s\) at that time. Jinendrabuddhi, therefore, interprets Dignāga’s
definition as meaning jīhāṣitadharmaviśeṣo dharmaṁ, as Dharmakīrti does. However, it is
not that Dignāga was unconscious of this problem, for he answers it, not in Chap. II, but
in Chap. III. PSV, just before PS III, k. 10 (Kitagawa, 151) introduces an opponent who
contends that sādhana should not be called paksādharma (the property of \(p\)) as Dignāga

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mountain etc. A logical mark must really (eva) subsist in it. This is one of the three characteristics [of a logical mark] and is named *pakṣa-dharmatā* [*h's being a property of s*]. The word *sattvam* (presence) is employed to guard against the fallacy of an illegitimate h (*asiddha*). For instance, in the inference ‘Sound is impermanent because of visibility’, visibility (*h*) which means to be an object of the visual organ, does not truly exist in *p* or sound.

By the particle *eva* the fallacy of *h's* non-existence in part [i.e. some members] of *p* is rejected. For instance, the Digambara Jaina formulates the syllogism ‘Trees have consciousness because they sleep’. By sleeping here is meant the state of shrivelled leaves; but this is not found in all trees.

The word *nisćitam* (definitely) is employed in order to reject the fallacy of *h's* dubious reality (*samidgadhāsiddha*). For instance, [the following inference is to be rejected :] ‘Here there is fire because of the existence of a mass of [smoke-like] elements which, however, is suspected to be vapour’.161

The significance of the word *eva* being placed [not before] but after

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160. NB III, s. 60: *yathāhitīyāḥ śādā iti sādhya cākṣusātват ṣādhuṣidhām.

161. NB III, s. 64: *yathā bāṣpādhībhāvena samādiḥyo mo bhūtasaṅghāto 'gnisiddhāv upadīṣyamānaḥ samidgadhāsiddhaḥ.*
the word *sattvam*\(^{162}\) is to reject the fallacy of *h* subsisting only in *p* (*asādhāraṇa*). For instance, ‘Sound is impermanent because of its audibility’\(^{163}\) [is an inconclusive inference, because the *h*, audibility, is an exclusive property of sound].

10.1. Anvaya. (25.7) [The second characteristic is] defined as follows:

2) Its definite presence only in things similar to *p* [*sapakṣa* i.e. the members of the class of *s*].\(^{164}\)

What is homogeneous to *p* is called the co-members of *p* (*sapakṣa*), that is to say, objects in the examples (*dṛṣṭāntadharmin*) similar to *p* [in respect of being a member of *s*]\(^{165}\). Thus, the second character named anvaya (positive pervasion) is that *h* must be present only in the members of the class of *s*.

In this definition too, the word *sattvam* (presence) aims at precluding

\(^{162}\) Note that *eva* here represents *ayogayavaccheda* (n. 132), i.e. it is not meant that *h* must subsist only in *p*, but that *h* must truly subsist in *p* as in other things. This restriction is to exclude the fallacy of *asādhāraṇahetu*. If the definition is interpreted in the sense of *anyayogayavaccheda*, *p* and *h* would completely pervade each other, i.e. would be coextensive, and this necessitates *asādhāraṇaikāntikatva*. Cf. NBT 19, 9-10: *yadi hy anumeya eva sattvam iti kuryāc chrāvaṇatvam eva hetuḥ syāt*. Inference in such a case is prohibited in the logic of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, though later Buddhist logicians like Ratnākaraśānti remove the prohibition (n. 301 below). But the interpretation by the theory of *vyavaccheda* is inapplicable to the second characteristic of the *hetu*. See n. 169 below.

\(^{163}\) NBT 19, 6-10. The author follows Dharmottara in all the three illustrations. See also NB III, s. 69; 71-73.

\(^{164}\) =NB II, s. 6: *sapakṣa eva sattvam* (niścitam).

\(^{165}\) NB II, s. 9: *sādhyadharmaṃśāṁyena samāno'rthaḥ sapakṣaḥ*. Sapakṣa must be understood as a *karmaḥdharaya*-compound standing for *samānaḥ pakṣaḥ*, *sa*- being the substitute for *samāna* according to Pāṇini sū. 6.3.84 (*samānasya cchandasya amūrdhaḥprabhṛtyudarkeṣu*). For this rule is to be interpreted by *yogavibhaṅga*, i.e. by dividing its wording into two parts. *samānasya* and the rest—the first part, ‘*samānasya saḥ (uttarapade)*’ (under the recurrence of *saḥ* 6. 3. 78 and *uttarapade* 6. 3. 1.) meaning that (in classical Sanskrit *sa* is substituted for the word *samāna*—used as the prior member of a compound). Again, *pakṣa* is used in the metaphorical sense (*upaśāra*) of the word and means *artha* (thing). Thus, *sapakṣa* or *samānaḥ pakṣaḥ* comes to signify a thing which is similar to *p* by the common possession of *s*. Sapakṣa should not be understood as a *bahuṣtri*-compound meaning that which possesses a *samānaḥ pakṣa*. This is, according to DP, just because Dharmakīrti himself defines *sapakṣa* and *asapakṣa* as follows in PVn: *sādhyadharmaṃśāṁyena samānaḥ pakṣaḥ sapakṣas tadbhāvo'sapakṣaḥ*, and according to TSop, because if it is a *bahuṣtri*-compound, not the similarity of *pakṣa* to *sapakṣa*, but only the similarity of *pakṣa* to *sapakṣa* is expressed, which is however untenable, since then *sapakṣa* remains unexplained (cf. DP 97-98; TSop 288. 12-20).
the fallacy of the incompatible hetu as, for instance, in the inference that sound is permanent because of its being a product (kṛtakatva) as a jar.\textsuperscript{166} For product-ness is pervaded (vyāpta) not by permanency but by non-permanency which is incompatible [vipakṣa or anti-pakṣa] with permanency.\textsuperscript{167}

The word eva (only) is to preclude the non-exclusive (sādhāraṇa-) hetu as in the inference ‘Sound is permanent because it is an object of cognition as a jar’.\textsuperscript{168} The words ‘being an object of cognition’ (prameyatva) mean [i.e. is inclusive of] ‘being the content of a fictional construct’ (vikalpaviśayikṛtatva), but this is found in everything, in a member of the class of s (sapakṣa) such as ether as well as in a member of the class of not-s (vipakṣa) such as a jar. This is why the mark is called ‘non-exclusive’.

That the particle eva is placed before the word sattvam means that h pervading not all the members but some of the members of the class of s can be valid [as well]. For instance, the hetu ‘produced immediately after human effort’ (prayatnānantariyatvatva) can be valid in the inference, ‘Sound is impermanent, because it is produced immediately after human effort’. [Sound is] similar to a jar [insofar as both are produced by effort and impermanent], but not totally to lightning [which is impermanent but not produced by effort; but this fact that h is found only in some of the members of s does not prevent h from being valid].\textsuperscript{169}

\textsuperscript{166} NB III, s. 86.

\textsuperscript{167} The term viruddha or virodha denotes the contrary as well as the contradictory. Likewise, vipakṣa means anti-pakṣa; the vipakṣa of ‘permanency’ is ‘non-permanency’ but at the same time it means a member or the members of the class of the non-permanent.

\textsuperscript{168} NB III, s. 69.

\textsuperscript{169} The two terms h and s in a pervasion may be related either by anyayoga-uyavaccheda— in this case h and s pervade each other (samavyāpti)—or by ayogavyavaccheda— in this case s pervades h (asamavyāpti). The definition of the second characteristic of the liṅga, sapakṣa eva sattvam, shows in its expression that the relationship involved is anyayogavyavaccheda. And if the theory of vyavaccheda is to be strictly observed, the definition excludes asamavyāpti. However, this is exactly opposite to the statement of Dharmottara as well as our author that eva placed before sattvam effects the recognition as valid of prayatnānantariyatvatva, an example of asamavyāpti. Dharmottara tries to overcome the difficulty saying: If eva is placed after sattvam, then we would get sapakṣe sattvam eva yasya sa hetuḥ, which would effect the exclusion of prayatnānantariyatvatva from the realm of valid hetu. But this argument is not persuasive, since the changed sentence can also be construed by ayogavyavaccheda, so as to recognize asamavyāpti. A right answer must be to say that sapakṣe sattvam should be construed in two ways, sapakṣa eva sattvam and sapakṣe sattvam eva, since the relationship involved in the second characteristic should not be determined as either of ayoga- and anyayoga-uyavaccheda.
The employment of the word 'definite' is to preclude a dubious anwaya as in the following inference: 'This man is not omniscient because he speaks as any other person does'. For we never know if, in any person as a member of the class of s, speaker-ness is pervaded by non-omniscience or not.

10.2. Vyatireka. (26.1) [The third characteristic of the logical mark is:]

3) Its definite, absolute absence in the anti-pakṣa [vipakṣa i.e. any member of the class incompatible with s].

What is not the co-member of p [i.e. the member of the class incompatible with s] is the vipakṣa. The absolute absence of h in that is definite. This is the third characteristic of the logical mark named vyatireka (negative pervasion).

10.2.1. (26.2) In this definition too, the incompatible (viruddha-) hetu is precluded by the word 'absence' (asattvam), an incompatible hetu being illustrated by the inference 'Sound is permanent because of productness as a jar'. The hetu here is incompatible because it is found [not in the sapakṣa] but in the vipakṣa.

10.2.2. (26.4) The word 'absolute' (eva) aims at precluding the non-exclusive hetu which occurs in part of the vipakṣa as in the inference 'Sound is produced immediately after human effort because of non-permanency as a jar'. In this case s (sādhyā=sādhyadharma) is 'being produced immediately after human effort'. The hetu, non-permanency, however, is found in some of the vipakṣa [i.e. what is not produced by human effort] such as lightning etc., and not found in others of thevipakṣa such as ether etc. Therefore, this mark should necessarily be rejected.

10.2.3. (26.8) If the particle eva were placed before the word asattvam, the passage would mean that a hetu which is absent only in the [totality of the] vipakṣa is valid, with the absurd corollary that 'being produced immediately after human effort' is not a valid hetu because it is not found even in some of the sapakṣa. This is the reason

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170. NB III, s. 71 (and 96.)
171. NB II, s. 7: asapakṣe āsattvam eva niścitam.
172. NB II, s. 10 (first half): na sapakṣo'sapakṣoḥ.
173. NB III, s. 85-86. G. T omit this exemplification.
174. Missing in G. T. The illustration is taken verbatim from NBT 19, 21-20. 1.
why [the particle eva] is not placed [before asattvam].

10.2.4. (26.11) The employment of the word ‘definite’ is to preclude the fallacious hetu whose non-occurrence in the vipakṣa is doubtful (sāndig-dhavipakṣavyāvṛttika). [This fallacy] may be illustrated in the following: ‘This man is not free from desire, because he speaks, as a man on the highway; for all the cases in which ‘being not free from desire’ is absent are the cases in which ‘speaker-ness’ is also absent, like a piece of rock’. [This inference is wrong, because] though both the qualities are excluded from a piece of stone, yet we do not know whether speaker-ness is absent from a piece of stone due to the absence of the state of being free from desire, or it is so simply by nature. Thus, this is a case of inconclusiveness (anātkāntika) due to a dubious negative pervasion.

10.2.5. (26.17) By the particle eva (absolute) placed after the word asattvam (absence) is precluded [a logical mark] which occurs in part of the vipakṣa (vipakṣaikadeśavṛtti). For instance, ‘Sound is produced immediately after human effort because of non-permanency’ [is an invalid inference because the hetu ‘non-permanency’ does not occur in some of] the vipakṣa, say ether, but occurs in [others of the vipakṣa] such as lightning. Thus, it is a fallacious hetu which occurs in part of the vipakṣa.

10.3. Different opinions as to why both anvaya and vyatireka are necessary. (27.1) [The opponent:] “When h's presence only in the sapakṣa is stated, h’s absence in the vipakṣa is understood by implication (sāmarthyāt). Then, why are both [the characteristics] taken up?”

175. Missing in G. T. This is another verbatim citation from NBT 20, 1-3.
176. T śīn rta ūṇa paṭi skyes bu (=rathya-puruṣa), but M. G rathya-puruṣa.
177. NB III, s. 71 (and 96.)
178. NB III, s. 69 with NBT.
179. The exemplifications in §10.2.1 and 10.2.2 and the whole passage of §10.2.3 are missing in G. T. (Cf. n. 173-174 above). The exemplifications in §10.2.2 and 10.2.3 are the verbal quotations from NBT ad NB II, s. 7 while those in 10.2.1 and 10.2.4 are not found in the same place of NBT, although they are mentioned in NB III. The vipakṣaikadeśavṛtti (§10.2.5) and the sādhāraṇa (§10.2.2) are one and the same fallacy; the former name is adopted by Mokṣakara in §10.2.5 and the latter by Dharmottara. The illustration is the same in both. It means either §10.2.2 or 10.2.5 is redundant. §10.2.5 is more succinct than the passage in NBT, while §10.2.2 is the exact citation of the latter. It is therefore likely that §10.2.2 and 10.2.3 are later interpolations. Mokṣakara himself seems not to have given illustrations to all fallacious hetus, as we see in §10.2.1.4. and 5.
180. NBT 20, 5-6: nanu ca sapakṣa eva sattvam ity ukte vipakṣa 'sattvam evōti gamyata eva, tat kimarthām punar ubhayor upādānāṁ kytam....
The logicians of olden times (पुर्ववर्द्धाह) [i.e. Dignāga and others] said that [both the second and third characteristics are stated] in order to determine [the nature of] \( \text{vipakṣa} \). They were in fact of the opinion that the \( \text{vipakṣa} \) is of three kinds, viz., the simple absence of \( s \) (साद्याभावामित्रा), what is just different from \( s \) (साद्याद अन्यां) and what is against \( s \) (साद्यण्या साहा विरुध्दा).  

181. PS III. k. 19-20c (Peking ed. 7, a8-b1):  

del gzan daḥ de ḥgāl ba, gñis ṭaḥā mi mthun phyogs ma yin, glan tshigs med daḥ ḥgāl ba las, rnam par good par thal bar ḥgyur. de phyir mthun phyogs med pa ṭiṅ, de ltar mtshan ṭiṅ la gcig kyaṅ, du māñi don ni rṭogs par rigs. (Neither what is different from \( s \) nor what is against it is \( \text{vipakṣa} \). For if the former were \( \text{vipakṣa} \), nothing could be a \( \text{hetu} \), and if the latter were \( \text{vipakṣa} \) it would follow that it separates [from the probandum] only what is against it. Therefore, \( \text{vipakṣa} \) must be defined as what is not the \( \text{sapakṣa} \). When it is defined in this way, we know various objects (correctly) even [through the third characteristic of the logical mark] alone.) This is explained in PSV on the same kārikās as follows. Productiveness exists not only in what is impermanent, but also in what is different from it, say, the painful. Thus, if \( \text{vipakṣa} \) is defined as what is different (anya) from the \( \text{sapakṣa} \), a valid logical mark like product-ness would be invalid, since it would be found in the \( \text{vipakṣa} \). To avoid this difficulty, one may define \( \text{vipakṣa} \) as what is against (विरुध्द) the \( \text{sapakṣa} \); in this case, however, it may exclude what is incompatible with \( s \), but not what is contrary to \( s \). For example, when fire (ह) proves the existence of heat (स) in a place (प), if the \( \text{vipakṣa} \) is considered to be what is against heat, i.e. cold, \( h \)'s non-existence in \( \text{vipakṣa} \), the third condition of the logical mark, would not exclude the existence of fire in what is neither hot nor cold; this would make the inference inconclusive. Therefore, Dignāga proposes that \( \text{vipakṣa} \) must be defined as what is not (अभाव) the \( \text{sapakṣa} \). I owe the information to Kitagawa, 179-183. Kitagawa calls the reader’s attention to the fact that contradiction is here referred to by the word \( \text{abhāva} \). According to the same author (Kitagawa, 179, n. 321) however, Jinendrabuddhi’s \( \text{Tikā} \) on PSV gives an interpretation different from this original theory on \( \text{vipakṣa} \) held by Dignāga in PSV as well as \( \text{Nīyamukha} \). He changed the order of words in the passage which he commented and complemented words which were not existent in the passage so that Dignāga’s verses may mean what is in effect identical with Dharmakirti’s theory of \( \text{vipakṣa} \) found in NB II, s. 10. Here, Dharmakirti first defines \( \text{vipakṣa} \) as not-\( \text{sapakṣa} \) (n. 172 above), which means that which lacks \( s \) (Cf. DP 98, 18). And then he classifies \( \text{vipakṣa} \) into three kinds, viz. \( \text{tato'anyaḥ} \), \( \text{tadviruddhaḥ} \), and \( \text{tadabhāvaḥ} \). \( \text{tadabhāva} \) is in the form of \( \text{prasajya-pratipāda} \) and constitutes the basic idea of \( \text{vipakṣa} \), representing the absence of \( \text{sapakṣa} \) directly, while other two are those which are affirmed through the negation (पर्युदास्ता) and represent the absence of \( \text{sapakṣa} \) only indirectly. In other words, \( \text{tadabhāva} \) or the contradictory of \( s \) connotes those different from \( s \) and those contrary to it. Thus, all the three kinds are the species of \( \text{vipakṣa} \). This interpretation is fairly different from Dignāga’s theory. Mokṣākaragupta, when he describes that \( \text{vipakṣa} \) is of three kinds, refers to Dharmakirti. Dharmortara and Jinendrabuddhi (or Dignāga as represented by Jinendrabuddhi). The designation \( \text{पुर्ववर्द्धा} \), however, most likely refers to Dignāga. It may be also possible that he refers to all of these logicians, neglecting the difference of opinion between them.
Some people are of the following opinion: It is for determining the appropriate kind of the formal statement of inference (prayoga); that is to say, either the formal statement with a positive pervasion (anvayaprayoga) or that with a negative pervasion (vyatirekaprayoga), so far as it is a pervasion having logical necessity, should be alone made, but not both together.  

Other people are of the opinion that it is for indicating that there are two possible forms of inference: one with a positive example (sādharma-prayoga) and the other with a negative example (vaidharma-p).

11. Logical mark is of only three kinds. (27.8) The logical mark endowed with [the above-named] three characteristics is of three and only three kinds.

Those [logical marks] which have the three characteristics are meant by the words trirūpāṇi liṅgāni. They are of three kinds. 1) The mark as the effect [of s] (kārya) has the threefold characteristic; 2) the mark identical in essence [with s] (svabhāva) has the threefold characteristic; 3) the mark as the non-cognition [of s] (anupalabdhi) has the threefold characteristic.

Sādhana (probans), jñāpaka (what makes known), hetu (logical ground), vyāpya (the pervaded) are all the synonyms of liṅga (logical mark).

11.1. Logical mark as effect. (27.11) [Among these three kinds] a logical mark as effect is illustrated: (vyāpti) Wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in a kitchen; (pakṣadharma-ta) here there is smoke; [therefore, here there is fire].

11.2. The syllogism consists of two members. (27.12) The statement of an inference (sādhana-vikya) of the Buddhists consists of two members, respectively called vyāpti [the pervasion between h and s] and pakṣadhar­matā [h’s presence in p].

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182. NBT 20, 6-7 : anvayo vyatireko vā niyamavān eva prayoktavyo nānyathāti darsayitum dvayor api upādānam kṛtam.... From this we see that one necessary pervasion alone is enough for an inference and that even the two combined together, if not strictly applied, do not lead to a conclusion. NBT gives an illustration of the latter case.

183. =NB II, s. 11 : trirūpāṇi ca triṇy eva liṅgāni.

184. NB II, s. 12 : anupalabdhiḥ svabhāvakāryam cēti ; NBT 21, 18-19 : pratiṣedhyasya sādhyasyaṃ anupalabdhis trirūpāḥ, viḍhyasya sādhyasya svabhāvaṃ trirūpāḥ, kāryaṃ ca.

185. The inference for others or the statement of an inference consists in the statement of a logical mark endowed with the three characteristics. The pakṣa or pratiṣēna (thesis) does not express any of them and is not regarded as a necessary member of the
Other schools, however, assert that the statement of an inference consists of five members, viz., *pratijñā* (thesis), *hetu* (logical ground), *dṛṣṭānta* (corroborative example), *upanayya* (application) and *nigamana* (conclusion), an example brought forward being as follows: Here there is fire; because of smoke; wherever there is smoke there is fire as in a kitchen; the present case is like this; therefore there is fire here. 186

But this is not reasonable. We cannot understand a probandum through the mere statement of a thesis having nothing to do with logical necessity or connection (*sambandha*). As for the non-existence of the connection (*sambandha*), we have already discussed it on the occasion when we refuted the connection between the word and the thing-meant [*§ 4.2*]; 187 so we do not repeat it here. It is of no use to state a ground putting it into the ablative case, when the thesis is refuted as above. Apart from a ground, an explanatory example and an application serve nothing. How can a conclusion, which is no more than the repetition of the thesis, be possible in a case where there is no thesis. Thus, all [the

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186. NS 1.1.32: *pratijñāhetudāharanopanayanigamanāny avayavāḥ.*

187. TS v. 1431: *asambandhān na sākhśād dhī sā yuktārthopapādikāḥ, asaktaśūcānān nāpi pāramparasyaṇa yujyate.* TSP 419.8: *śabdanām artheṇa saha sambandhābhāvān na tāvat sākhśād uṣpayāyate, nāpi hetvacanavat pāramparāyaṇya, saktāsahācākavād iti.* Kamalāśīla here refers to PV IV v. 16-17a-b: *tat pākṣavacanaṁ vaktur abhipryāṇivedane....* (cakrur in GOS ed. must be corrected into vaktur-.)
11.3. **How to establish a causal relation.** (28.2) This logical mark as effect (*kāryahetu*) is classified into three kinds because of the variety of the term related to it (*viśaya*): 1) When fire and the like are the object to be proved, smoke and the like are to be determined [as the effect] by means of the three kinds of cognition consisting of perception and non-perception (*trividhapratyaksānupalambha*). 189 2) When [the function of] the visual organ etc. is the object to be proved, knowledge [visual and other] is to be determined [as the effect] through the fact that the effect occurs occasionally [i.e. only when the organ functions] (*kādācitkakāryotpāda*). 3) When the colour etc. [of a citron etc.] is the object to be proved, the taste etc. is to be determined [as the logical mark as effect] through both being dependent [for their production] on one and the same set of causes, as [we infer] the colour of a citron from its taste. 190 In this last case, the preceding colour is the material cause in relation to the colour to be produced, and the [preceding] taste [which is the material cause of the subsequent taste, necessarily cooperates with the preceding colour] as the auxiliary cause (*sahakārikāraṇa*) [for the production of the subsequent colour]. This is the logical [relation] involved in the production

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188. M. *sarvam amulaḥ viśirṇam* (All is fundamentally shattered); G *sarvam ālūna-viśirṇam*; T *bead zin pa geod paḥo* (as useless as to cut what has been cut). My tr. follows G. There is partial parallelism between our text and TSP. In TS v. 1434, the opponent questions: How is the establishment of *sapaṅga* etc. possible when the thesis is not formulated? [If *sapaṅga* etc. is not established] there will be no triple characteristic, which depends for its determination on *sapaṅga*. Upon this objection Kamalasīla comments: *asaṭi hi pratijñānirdeṣe tadapekṣānibandhanam... trailokya api nāstīti sarvam ālūnavikīrṇam syād iti*. This is of course the opponent's objection against the Buddhist’s omission of *pratijñā*. Mokṣākara’s expression, however, has something to do with this passage. He seems to take advantage of the expression, making a reverse use of it for attacking the opponent. It is not impossible that the original manuscript reads *ālūnaviśirṇam* for *ālūnavist(ki?)rṇam* in the present edition of TSP. For a detailed exposition of the two-membered syllogism see Mookerjee, 356-365.

189. The theory will be dealt with again in §22 (M 47). See n. 305 too.

190. M 28.7 inserts *na rūpād rasānumānam* after... *rasād rūpānumānam*, but G as well as T omits it. We can infer taste from colour as well as colour from taste. G, T must be followed in this case. But this should not be taken as a universally applicable rule, for although we can infer cinders from smoke, we cannot infer smoke from cinders, because the relation involves the problem of time. The cinders perceived at present does not necessarily lead to the knowledge of the present smoke, since it may have already disappeared. However, so far as the taste and colour of a citron is concerned, we can infer either one from the other.
of the lump [of a citron] at the subsequent moment from that at the preceding moment.\textsuperscript{191} [We infer from the present taste of a citron its material cause, which necessarily cooperates with the material cause of the colour, which in turn has necessarily produced the present colour. The knowledge of the present colour is implied in the process of the inference of the cause of the taste from its effect.]

[The opponent:] “What difference is there between the material cause and the auxiliary cause when both are identical insofar as they equally conform to the concomitance with the effect positively as well as negatively?”

[The author:] The following is the right answer: When \( x \) is produced due to the transformation of \( y \) in one and the same stream of a [momentary] entity, \( y \) is the material cause, prior in time, of \( x \). The conditions which cause a particular quality to arise in the stream [of an entity] different [from those of the conditions] are the auxiliary cause.\textsuperscript{192} In relation to a rice shoot to be produced, for instance, a seed of rice is the material cause, and soil, water etc. are the auxiliary cause of the [shoot].

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[191.] The theory is propounded by Dharmakirti in PV I, v. 9: ekāśāmagryadhinasya rūpāde rasato gatiḥ, hetudharmānumānena dhūmendhanavikāravat. This is an oft quoted verse (TSP 417, 24 quotes it, but GOS ed. reads the first half wrongly. Cf Kunst. 58 with n. 1.; NVV II, 197, 2–3, etc.) TS v. 1424–1425 explains the inference of the proximity of the asterism Rohiṣi from the rise of the Kṛttikā as a case of inference by kāryaḥetu. TSP comments on them reducing the case to ekāśāmagryadhinatva. But the most useful exposition of the theory is Dharmakirti’s own vṛttī on PV I, v. 9 (Gnoli. 7, 16–19; Mookerjee and Nagasaki 36). Inferring colour from taste when both are the co-products of the selfsame set of causes, we actually infer a cause endowed with the causal efficiency (hetudharma) from the effect. The cause of taste which produces the next moment of taste is at the same time the auxiliary condition cooperating with the material cause of colour; this material cause, being actually exercising its causal efficiency, is surely to produce colour. Thus, while we infer the cause of taste from its effect, i.e. the present taste, we come to determine the present colour, with whose cause the cause of taste must have been cooperating. When we infer cinders from smoke, the procedure is the same. Cinders are produced by their material cause, fuel; fire is the auxiliary cause which cooperates with fuel for the production of cinders. We infer fire from smoke, and it involves the knowledge of fuel; the fuel, being actually exercising its causal efficiency, leads to the knowledge of cinders.

\item[192.] HBT 94, 26–95. 9: syād etat. saraṣṭām anuvayatyāreṇāv anuvibhāyate tadā... kuto ‘yaṁ bhedaḥ–ihotpādābhaṅgavānādāḥ uṣayasyate, anyatra tu saha-kārihihavēntenī?... tasmād ava-sthāḥ bhede’pi yad ekākāra-parāmarśāsanaprayayanibandhana-dhāvatāva svasaṁtiḥivaśitahkāryapraśūṣiti-mittāṁ tad uṣadānakaśānaṁ, yat saṁtāntare prāgavasthiḥ-paśवiṣeṣodayanibandhanaṁ tat saha-kārikaśaṁ.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Thus, the logical mark as effect has been established to be a probans (gamaka) because of the causal relation.

12. Logical mark of essential identity. (28.16) [The logical mark representing] essential identity is [defined] as follows: The nature [of s] itself is said [by Dharmakirti to be] the h of the quality to be proved (s) when the latter depends for its existence on the existence of that (h) alone; the probans thus defined is to be understood as the essential nature of the quality to be proved. For example, in the inference ‘This can be called a tree, because it can be called a simśapā’, ‘this’ stands for p, i.e. a thing being seen in front [of the inferring person]; ‘because it can be called a simśapā’ refers to h. What is the meaning of ‘because it can be called a simśapā’? It means the applicability of the designation [simśapā which connotes] particular branches, leaves, colour and form. The applicability of the designation ‘tree’ is s.

[The opponent:] “If two things are identical, they cannot be [related to each other by] the relation of probans and probandum, because [in this case both of them] would be [one and the same] part of the thesis.”

[The author:] The objection is untenable. It is true that both are not different in reality. But there may be a person who, seeing a certain thing, applies the name simśapā which he learnt once, but does not identify it with the name ‘tree’, since he imagines [through the name simśapā not the essential qualities of the tree, but] something else [say, tallness] owing to confusion. Such a person may be now persuaded by means of this inference based on identity. Therefore, even if they are one in reality, they appear distinct when they occur in conceptual knowledge which depends on distinction from others (vyāvṛtti). This is the reason why [this kind of inference] is not incompatible with the relation of probans and probandum.

193. svabhāvo yathā is omitted in G, T. The definition is repeated twice in T, the whole passage running as follows: svabhāvāḥ svasattāmātṛabhāvīṇī sādhyadharmṛ hetuḥ, hetusattāmātṛabhāvīṇī sādhyadharme yo hetur ucyate sa tasya sādhyasya dharmasya svabhāvo boddhavyaḥ.
194. NB II, s. 16 : svabhāvāḥ svasattāmātṛabhāvīṇī sādhyadharmṛ hetuḥ.
195. This example is explained more lucidly by Dhammadattā in NBT on NB II, s. 17.
196. T rnam par rorig paṅ tshad la grub pa... (= vyavahārasiddhavikalpabuddha ...) for vikalpabuddha in M.
197. This refers to the Buddhist theory of apoha (discrimination) which is discussed in § 26.
13. Logical mark of non-cognition. (29.10) [The logical mark of non-cognition is illustrated: In this place there is no jar, because it is not
cognized though it is by nature perceptible.198 ‘Perceptible by nature (upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpta)’ means ‘to be seen’ (drśya). [Question:] How can a non-existent thing be perceptible? [Answer:] When a place and other things are being cognized by one and the same sense-perception, if a jar were present, it would be necessarily perceived.199 That is to say, it is hypothetically supposed as perceptible on the ground that all the other conditions for [its] perception are present.200 But we do not mean [a jar is] actually perceived.

‘Because it is not cognized’ is h. And this is ascertained by means of the [actually present] objects comprised in one and the same cognition [by which a jar, if it existed, would be also perceived] (ekajñānasamsargipadārtha) or the knowledge of the objects comprised in one and the same cognition (ekajñānasamsargipadārthopalambha);201 thus, these two, standing in the relation of agent and object (karmakartr bhava), are each called non-cognition in the mode of [the affirmation of what is excluded through] the negation of a term (paryudāsavr̥tti). But [this non-cognition] should not be understood in the mode of the negation of a proposition (prasajya-vṛtti). But this non-cognition] should no more than the privation of perception.202 For if

198. NB II, s. 13: tatānupalabdhir yathā, na pradaśamiṣe kecid ghaṭa upalabdhi-lakṣaṇaprāptasyadupalabdther iti. See also NBT on it.
199. HB (Reconstruction), 64,27-65,2 : yatra yasminn upalabhyamāne niyamena yasyōbalabdhī sa tataṁśrītaḥ, ekajñānasamsargāt tayoḥ sator naikarupaniyataḥ pratipattir, asambhavāt.
200. NB II, s. 14 ; upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptir upalambhapratyayāntarasākalyam svabhavaviśeṣa ca. See also NBT on it.
201. NBT 22, 15 ff. : tasmāt sa eva ghaṭaviviktapradeśas tadānambanah ca jñānanāṁ drśyānupalambhamiśayayaḥ utvādād rśyānupalambhā uyate... tato vastv ahy anupalambhā uyate tajjñānah ca. darśananiyitātām tu svaṃ anisciitavāt agamam; HB (Reconstruction), 65, 7-9 : ...uktam atra yathā paryudāsavr̥ttya’peśāt āhaviktor arthes tajjñānah vabhāvo ‘napalabdhīḥ cocsata iti, na pratijñedhamātram, tasya sādhanaśiddher abhāvavahārāsiddhi-pra-sahgāt, tasyasamsṛṣṭarūpasya bhāvasiddhir evāparasyabhāvasiddhir iti anyabhāvo’phi tadabhāvo iti vyāpadiitvate.
202. For the general usage of paryudāsa- and prasajya-pratiṣedha see n. 62 above. Regarding the passage that concerns us now cf. HBT 171, 1-4 : ...tadvad upalabdhir evanupalabdhir mantavyā. naḥaḥ pratiṣedhamayatvāt katham bhāvavayatvāti ca, aha, paryudāsavr̥ttēti. paryudāsaṇa pratiṣedhāyārthasya varjanena yā viśiṣṭe ‘rihe vṛttis tasya, naḥa āyuktapratijñedhasya bhāvavayatā...... The non-cognition of a pot must not be understood as the simple absence of cognition, the negation being construed by prasajya-pratiṣedha, but as the cognition of things other than the pot, esp. the cognition of the locus, the
so, it is itself not anything whatsoever; and how can it become a pro-
bans? Nor is it the knowledge of other things in general which are
different from the object to be denied, for in this case [the absurdity]
would follow that the perception of the colour of an orange means the
negation of its taste. Therefore, it is settled that either of the two things
distinguished in the way characterised above from what is to be negated,
i.e. its locus or the knowledge of the locus, is called non-cognition [though
it is in fact a positive cognition].

13.1. Non-cognition establishes not absence itself, but practical ac-
tivities concerning absence. (30.1) This is the reason why absence (abhāva)
itself is not proved [by a negative inference], for the absence [of a
jar] can be established by the mere perception cognizing the place without
a jar. But [the logical mark of] non-cognition is aimed at establishing
practical activities concerning absence (abhāvavyavahāra) [in order to
convince] a stupefied person [of the absence of a certain thing]. For
example, it is well known in the Sāṅkhya [thought] that the three pri-
mordial qualities beginning with rajas are [permanently] existent; a cer-
tain follower [of the school] actually makes ordinary activities concerning
absent things owing to their non-cognition; he, however, is so much in-
culcated in the doctrine of his own school proclaiming the existence of
everything at every place that he confusedly does not now judge the

negation being construed by paryudāsapratīṣedha. But this affirmation of the locus can
be divided into two modes: when it is understood in relation to the subject of the cogni-
tion (kārtṛdharmāpakṣe) it means the knowledge of the locus; when it is understood in
relation to the object (karmadharmāpakṣe) it means the locus itself. According to HBT
174, 6 ff.; 176, 3 ff., the former is meant for refuting the view of Īśvarasena who regards
anupalabdhi as the mere absence of cognition, while the latter is aimed at criticising
Kumārila-bhaṭṭa, who thinks that a negative judgment is formed in the mind when the
locus is cognized and the object to be negated is remembered, and that this knowledge of
absence is purely due to a mental activity without being conditioned by a sense-organ.
Cf. SV Abhāva., v. 11 & 27; Mookerjee, 415. Though not concerning non-cognition, but
cognition, PV 1, 4, 9, 11 teaches the same: tathā hi sattvam upalabdhi eva vastuvyogatāla-
kaṇṇā tadāśrayā vā jñānapravṛttiḥ (cf. Mookerjee & Nagasaki, 23); PVV 505, 26–27: yadi
hy upalabdhiḥ karmadharmas tadāpalabdhyamānatāstivām, atha kārtṛdharmo jñānam...; HB
(Reconstruction), 64, 24–26: atra upalabdheḥ upalabdhamānadharmatve tajjñānam upalabd-
hiḥ... upalabdhyamānadharmatve svavijayājñānājanaanayogatālakṣaṇo viśayavasbhāvo bhavati
; PVBh, 633, 4–6; HBT 171, 16ff.; HBT 174, 19–21; TSoP 289, 18–21. However, the distinc-
tion takes place only in our constructive thought, and in reality what is perceived and its
cognition are one and the same thing.

203. NBT 28, 18 ff.: atvābhāvo na sādhyaḥ svabhāvāmuupalabdheḥ siddhatvāt.
absence [of a jar] in one particular place or another even though the jar is not actually perceived. To this man three kinds of convincing activities (vyavahāra) are to be demonstrated by means of non-cognition: the physical activity consists in moving about the place without hesitation; the verbal activity consists in [the statement] that there is no jar; the mental activity is the internal thought (antarjalpa) of the same judgment.

13.2. Non-cognition is of the nature either of identity or of causality. (30.9) When considered from its objective mode (karmadharma-pakṣe) [i.e. as the locus without a jar], non-cognition [he] should be understood to stand in the relation of identity with s. However, when

204. According to Dharmakirti the non-existence of the object of negation is established by perception alone, but the inferential function of negation consists in persuading an ignorant person who will not recognize the absence of an object. PV I, v. 3, Svavṛtti (4, 18-5, 1) : ...āthādnyopalabdhīyā'upalabdhīstidhīh iti pratyakṣaśiddhā 'upalabdhīh, tathān- yasattayā 'sattā kiṁ na sidhyatī. yadā pūnar evaṃvidhānapalabdhī evaṃtām asattā, taḍā siddhe 'pi viśaye moḥād viśaṅgo 'sajjñānasaabdavyavahārān apratipadyāmāno viṣaya- pradarśanena samaye pravartyate .... ; PV IV, v. 263 c-d : ity ajñajñāpanāyaikānapākhyo-dārṣṭīr matā : PVV on it : tasmad abhāvaḥ paśyato 'py avayavaharo 'jñasya muñḍhyaśa jñānapāyabbhāvyayavahārāyaikā svabhāvanupalabdhodārṣṭīr matā. PVBh gives the example of a foolish follower of the Sāṅkhya (633, 16-17) : yo vā sāṃkhya 'tyantavimuciḥ sarvān sarvatra vidyata ity āgraḥavān, tasyājñasya pratītyartham ekā svabhāvanupalabdhī .... According to Dharmakirti, therefore, what is negated by the inference of negation is the subjective function, i.e. knowledge, verbal expression, or doubt regarding an object falsely imagined as existent. Cf. PV IV, v. 264 : viṣaṅgaśattvavas tatra viṣayi pratiśīdhya, jñānābhidhiṇasaṃdhekaḥ yathā 'dādā āpāvakāḥ. These arguments are made regarding svabhāvanupalabdhī, the principal form of negation. But when negation is classified into three, i.e. svabhāvanupalabdhī, kāraṇānapalabdhī and vyāpārānapalabdhī, the latter two are said to prove either abhāva itself or the abhāvavyavahāra, while the first is concerned only with abhāvavyavahāra, and not with abhāva itself. Cf. HBT, 174, 26-28 : kāraṇa-vyāpārānapalabdhī abhāvam abhāvavyavahārah ca sādhyataḥ, svabhāvānapalabdhī tu abhāva- vyavahārah eva. This is because when we infer the absence of smoke (effect) and a simśapā (the pervaded) from the non-cognition of fire (its cause) and that of trees (the pervader) respectively, we prove not only the negative activities concerning them but also in the case of the direct negation of a perceptible object, its absence itself is proved by perception alone without needing inference.

205. PV I, v. 3a-b and Svavṛtti : apravṛttiḥ pramāṇānam apravṛttiplahāsati (v. 3a-b). anupalabdhīḥ sajjñānasaabdavyavahārapratidhihā, upalabdhīparyavakatvat teṣām iti .... ; NBT 29, 22-23 : vyāpāraṁ darśayati. abhāvasya vyavahāro nastīty evamākāraṁ jñānam, śabdaś caivamākāro, niḥśaṅkāh gamanaṃgamanalakṣaṇa ca pravṛttiḥ kāyoḥbhāvyavahārāḥ ; HBT 174, 28-30 : abhāvavyavahārā ca jñānābhiddhibhāvyavahārā ca jñānābhiddhaapravṛttilakṣaṇaḥ, tatra nāṣy atra ghaṭa ity evamākāraṁ jñānam, evaṃvidhāvastuvabhidhiyakāṁ cābhidhārnam niḥśaṅkasya ca tatra pra-deśe gamanaṃgamanalakṣaṇaḥ apravṛttir iti.

seen from the subjective mode (*kārtṛdharmapakṣe*) [i.e. as the knowledge of the locus without a jar, the relation between non-cognition and *s*] is that of causality. For it has been said above that the locus without a jar or the knowledge of the locus is non-cognition. [The *s*] ‘a jar’s fitness to be judged as non-existent’ (*asadṛyavahārayogya*), is the essential nature (*svabhāva*) of it [i.e. the locus without a jar]. But the knowledge [of the locus without a jar] is an effect of the locus itself, [and in the case where *h* is the knowledge, we infer from an effect to the cause].

(30.14) [The opponent:] ‘If there are in non-cognition two kinds of relationship, identical and causal, how is [the probans of] non-cognition differentiated from those of identity and causality?’

[The author:] The difference is made purely because of [the difference between] negation and affirmation, but not in reality. This is declared by Ācārya [Dharmakirti] as follows:

Among [the three kinds of logical marks] the two [i.e. the identical and causal marks] are for establishing the existence of real entities, the other one [i.e. the mark of non-cognition] is the probans for negation.²⁰⁸

13.3. Significance of *upalabdhilaksanaprāpta*. (30.7) The qualifier of non-cognition ‘being by nature perceptible’ means, [besides that all conditions for perception must be present] that the mere non-occurrence of cognition regarding objects which are inaccessible in space, time and essence, does not establish practical activities referring to the negation [of the object concerned]; such objects are illustrated by Mt. Sumeru [which is spatially inaccessible], the future emperor Śaṅkha [who is inaccessible in time] and a ghost [which is inaccessible in essence].²⁰⁹

²⁰⁷. M inserts *na kāryam* after *svabhāvaḥ*.
²⁰⁸. =NB II, 19: *atra dvau vastusādhanau, ekaḥ pratīṣṭhahetuḥ*.
²⁰⁹. NB II, s. 14 (see n. 200 above); NBT on NB II, s. 15; NB II, s. 28: *anyathā cānupalabdhilaksanaprāptaḥ dasaśālasvabhāvaviprakṛṣṭeḥ atmapratyakṣaṇīvaḥ abhavaniścayābhāvāt*: see NBT on it too. In PV I, v. 3 Dharmakirti classifies non-cognition into two kinds, viz. the non-cognition of an imperceptible thing or the mere non-operation of cognitive means and the non-cognition of a perceptible object. In the *Svavṛtti* on it he states that these two non-cognitions have the same effect of negating the practical activities referring to an object wrongly supposed to be existent, although the former leads to the result through the absence of the proof, while the latter through the presence of the counter-proof; i.e. the former through doubt while the latter through the definite knowledge of absence. One cannot be sure of the existence of an imperceptible object, say, a ghost, so its existence is neither denied nor asserted. And owing to this doubt one negates the posi-
13.4. **Non-cognition refers only to present and past experience.** (30.20)

This non-cognition can be a means of valid knowledge with regard to a present experience as well as to a past experience the details of which are still vivid in our memory. With regard to a future experience, however, non-cognition is itself doubtful and accordingly cannot be a means of valid knowledge.

210...[We have before said that this non-cognition proves activities referring to the absence of an object, but not absence itself, because the latter is established by perception [without requiring inference].]...210

Regarding [these two problems] the Nyāyavādin [Dharmakīrti] says as follows:211

Non-cognition, i.e. the fact that perception does not occur to an observer with regard to a past object which he keeps in clear memory-impression or a present object, establishes practical activities referring to the absence of the object.

13.5. **Classification of negative inference.** (31.7) [Sometimes, however,] we are to negate a thing which is situated at a remote place and inaccessible and to which the non-cognition of an *ex hypothesi* perceptible object is not directly applicable. Then, the non-perception of an effect and other [indirect forms of negative inference] are applied. Thus we get sixteen forms [of non-cognition as probans] because of the variety of applied formulae.212

(1) Firstly the non-cognition of an entity itself (*svabhāvānupalabdhi*) is illustrated: ‘Here there is no smoke, because it, being by nature perceptible, is not perceived.’ In this formula its own existence (*svabhāva*) of smoke, the thing to be denied, is not perceived.213

(2) Non-cognition of an effect (*kāryānupalabdhi*): ‘The actually

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210. This passage is found only in M and seems to be out of place. The same content is already stated in M 29, 21–30, 2.

211. =NB II, s. 29: *amūḍhasmytisāṃskārasādhiśrīnāsaṃ vartamānasasā ca pratipattipratya-kṣasya niyṛtir abhāvavayavahārasadhiṇi.*

212. See Appendix I.

213. *svabhāvānupalabdhir yathā, nāsty atra dhūmaḥ. upalabdhiḥkāḷaṇaprāptasyānupalabd-dheḥ = NB II. s. 32; TSop 290, No. 1.*

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efficient (apratibaddhasāmarthya, lit., whose efficiency is not impeded) causes producing smoke do not occur here, because there is no smoke. The presence of the causes of smoke [i.e., fire combined with wet fuel] is to be negated, and their effect is smoke which is not perceived here.214

(3) Non-cognition of a cause (kāraṇānupalabdhi): ‘There is no smoke here, because there is no fire.’ The presence of smoke is to be negated; its cause is fire which is here not perceived.215

(4) Non-cognition of a pervader (vyāpakānupalabdhi): ‘There is no asoka tree here, because there are no trees here.’ The presence of an asoka tree is to be negated: the tree is its pervader which is here not perceived.216

(5) Perception of something incompatible with the presence [of what is to be negated] (svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi): ‘Here there is no sensation of cold, because there is fire here.’ Fire is incompatible with the essence of the sensation of cold which is to be negated; fire is here perceived.217

(6) Perception of what is incompatible with an effect (kāryaviruddhopalabdhi): ‘Here there are no actually efficient causes of the sensation of cold, because there is fire here.’ A cause, only when it has reached

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214. kāryānupalabdhir yatha, nēḍapratibaddhasāmarthyāni dhūmakāraṇāni saanti. dhūmābhāvāti.—NB II. s. 33; TSop 290, No. 4. As said above, this formula appears for the first time in NB. But Dharmakirti already gave a hint for its possibility in PV when he said that the production of an effect is inferred from the totality of its causes, and that in this case the probans and the probandum stand in the relation of essential identity and not in that of causality; since the production of the effect in this case does not need any other condition (PV I. v. 7; hetunā yaḥ samagreṇa kāryatpādo 'numiyate, arthāntarānapekṣatvōt sa svabhāvo 'navarṇitaḥ). If we can infer an effect from the totality of its causes on the ground of essential identity, we are permitted also to infer the absence of the causes from the absence of their effect, under the following two conditions: 1) we infer from the absence of an effect only the absence of its causes existing at the last moment of their momentary stream, since they alone are ascertained to be unimpeded in their efficiency and thus may be called the totality of causes. All the other preceding moments of the causes may have been impeded in efficiency and may not bring about the effect. Thus we cannot infer the former’s absence from the latter’s absence. We are not sure that there was no fire yesterday, even if we do not see smoke today. 2) This formula is applied only when the cause is not visible itself. If seen, it can be negated by the first form of anupalabdhi. Cf. NBT 31, 10–13.

215. kāraṇānupalabdhir yatha, nāsty atrā dhamah dahanābhāvāti.—NB II. s. 40; TSop 290, No. 2.

216. vyāpakānupalabdhir yatha, nātra śīṁśapā vyēkṣābhāvāti.—NB II. s. 34; TSop 290, No. 3.

217. svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhir yathā, nātra śītasparśah. vahneḥ=NB II. 35; TSop 290 No. 5.
the last situation (antyadāsāprāpta) [of its own flux, i.e. the moment immediately preceding the production of the effect], produces its effect, but not a cause unconditioned. This is the reason why the qualifier ['actually efficient' (apratibaddhasāmarthya)] is stated. [The existence of] the causes of cold are to be denied; their effect is cold; what is incompatible with it is [the presence of] fire, which is here perceived.218

(7) Perception of something incompatible with a cause (kāraṇaviruddh+dhopalabdhi): 'He betrays no symptoms such as the bristling of the hair of the body specially [caused by cold], because he is near fire of a particular kind [i.e. efficient enough to dispel cold]. Symptoms such as the bristling of the hair of the body specially [caused by cold] are to be negated; their cause is cold; what is incompatible with this is efficient fire which is here perceived.219

(8) Perception of what is incompatible with a pervader (vyāpakaviruddh+dhopalabdhi): 'Here there is no sensation of freezing, because there is fire here.' The sensation of freezing is to be negated; its pervader is cold; what is incompatible with this is efficient fire which is here perceived.220

(9) Perception of the effect of something incompatible with the essence [of what is to be negated] (svabhāvaviruddhakāryopala+bdhi): 'Here there is no sensation of cold, because there is smoke here.' The sensation of cold is to be negated; what is incompatible with the essence of it is fire; smoke is the latter's effect and is here perceived.221

(10) Perception of the effect of something incompatible with the effect [of what is negated] (kāravyāviruddhakāryopala+bdhi): 'Here there are no actually efficient causes of cold, because here there is smoke. 'The causes of cold are to be negated; their effect is cold; with this fire is incompatible; fire's effect is smoke, which is here perceived.222

(11) Perception of an effect of something incompatible with the causes

218. kāravyāviruddh+dhopalabdhir yathā, nēhāpratibaddha+sāmarthya+ni šītakāra+ṇāni santi, vahneḥ =NB II, s. 38; TSop 290, No. 8.
219. kāraṇaviruddh+dhopalabdhir yathā, nāsyā romaharṣādvi+sēṣāḥ santi, sannihitadahanavi+sēṣatvāt=NB II, s. 41; TSop 290, No. 6.
220. vyāpakaviruddh+dhopalabdhir yathā, nātra tuṣārasparṣaḥ, dohanāt=NB II, S. 39; TSop 290, No. 7.
221. svabhāvaviruddhakāryopala+bdhir yathā, nātra śīta+parṣaḥ, dhūmat=NB II, s. 36; TSop 291, No. 13.
222. kāravyāviruddhakāryopala+bdhir yathā, nēhāpratibaddha+sāmarthya+ni šītakāra+ṇāni santi dhūmat=TSop 292, No. 16; this form is lacking in NB.
[of what is to be negated] \( (kāraṇaviruddhakāryopalabdhi) \): ‘In this place there is no one who betrays the sensation [of cold] connected with symptoms such as the bristling of the hair of the body \( \text{[caused by cold]} \), because here there is smoke.’ Particular symptoms such as bristling \( \text{[specially caused by cold]} \)\(^{223}\) are to be negated; their cause is cold; what is incompatible with this is fire; fire’s effect is smoke, which is here perceived.\(^{224}\)

(12) Perception of the effect of something incompatible with a pervader \( \text{[of what is to be negated]} \) \( (vyāpakaviruddhakāryopalabdhi) \): ‘Here there is no sensation of freezing because here there is smoke.’ The sensation of freezing is to be negated; its pervader is cold; with this fire is incompatible; fire’s effect is smoke, which is here perceived\(^{225}\)

(13) Perception of what is pervaded by something incompatible with the existence \( \text{[of what is to be negated]} \) \( (śvabhāvaviruddhavyāptopalabdhi) \): ‘Here there is no fire because of the sensation of freezing.’ Fire is to be negated; cold is incompatible with the existence of fire; The sensation of freezing which is here perceived is pervaded by cold.\(^{226}\)

\(^{223}\) G, T \( \text{romaharśādiviśesāṇām} \) instead of M. 32. 19 \( \text{romaharśādisparśaviśesāṇām} \).

\(^{224}\) kāraṇaviruddhakāryopalabdhir yathā, na romaharśādiviśesayuktasparśavān ayaṃ pradeśo. dhūmāt=NB II, s. 42; TSop 291, No. 14.

\(^{225}\) vyāpakaviruddhakāryopalabdhir yathā, nātra tuṣārasparśaḥ, dhūmāt=TSop 292. No. 15; this is lacking in NB.

\(^{226}\) śvabhāvaviruddhavyāptopalabdhir yathā, nātra vahniḥ tuṣārasparśaḥ=NB II, s. 37; TSop 291, No. 9. Dharmakirti’s illustration of this formula in NB, na dhruvabhāvi bhūta-syāpi bhūvasya vināśo. hṛtvantarāpekṣanāt, offers a complication as it is related to the vexed problem of momentariness. Mokṣākara avoids it here, and takes another illustration which is quite easy to understand. The Buddhist theory of universal momentariness, which is hinted here by Dharmakirti, is dealt with in §16 by our author. Stcherbatsky, in II, 92 as well as in I, 378, fails to understands the implication of the above mentioned inference of Dharmakirti, partly because of the vagueness of Dhrmottara’s commentary, and thinks ‘This is the argument of the realists against the Buddhist theory of instantaneous existence or constant evanescence’. He quotes in I, 92, n. 1 Rgyal tshab who correctly interprets this argument as a prasaṅga, but Stcherbatsky seems not to have properly understood Rgyal tshab. Durvekamiāra in DP 133, 5–6 interprets this inference as viruddhavyāptopalabdhiprasaṅga, pointing out that the word \( \text{api} \) in the sūtra means that this must be taken as a prasaṅgadosāhana (reductio ad absurdum, see §24). In fact the inference is Dharmakirti’s own argument in the form of reductio ad absurdum made against the Naiyāyikas, who recognize on the one hand the necessary connection between \( \text{kṛtyakāra} \) and \( \text{anityatā} \), and on the other explain \( \text{anityatā} \) as destruction by means of a special cause other than the own nature of a thing. If a produced thing, say, a jar, depends for its destruction on a special cause such as a shock by a hammer, its destruction
(14) Perception of what is pervaded by a thing incompatible with the

**effect** [of the object of negation] \( (kāryaviruddhavyāptopālabdhi) \): ‘Here

there are no actually efficient causes of fire because of the sensation of

freezing.’ The causes of fire are to be negated; fire is their effect; cold

is incompatible with fire; the sensation of freezing which is here perceived

is pervaded by cold.\(^{227}\)

(15) Perception of what is pervaded by a thing incompatible with the

**cause** [of the object of negation] \( (kāraṇaviruddhavyāptopālabdhi) \): ‘Here

there is no smoke because of the sensation of freezing.’ Smoke is to be

negated; its cause is fire; what is incompatible with fire is cold; the sensa­
tion of freezing, which is perceived here, is pervaded by cold.\(^{228}\)

(16) Perception of what is pervaded by a thing incompatible with the

**pervader** [of the object of negation] \( (vyāpakaviruddhavyāptopālabdhi) \):

‘This is not permanent because it produces the effect only occasionally

\( (kadācitkāryakāritva) \).’ Permanency is to be negated; changelessness

\( (niratīsatva) \) is the pervader of permanency; changeableness \( (sātiśatva) \)
is incompatible with it; ‘occasionally producing the effect’ which is here

perceived, is pervaded by changeableness.\(^{229}\)

(33.16) It is to be understood that these fifteen formulae beginning

with the [second] \( kāryānupalabdhi \) are essentially identical with the [first]

\( svabhāvānupalabdhi \) [and are derived from the latter]. Further subordinate

forms may be enumerated according to the various circumstances of applica­
tion (prayuktibhedā).

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\(^{227}\) kāryaviruddhavyāptopālabdhir yathā, nēhāpratibaddhāsāmarthyāni vahnikāraṇāni

santi, tuṣārasparśat=TSop 291, No. 12 ; NB lacks this.

\(^{228}\) kāraṇaviruddhavyāptopālabdhir yathā, nātra dhūmas tuṣārasparśat=TSop 291, No.

10 ; NB lacks this.

\(^{229}\) vyāpakaviruddhavyāptopālabdhir yathā, nāyaṁ nityaḥ, kadācitkāryakāritvāt=TSop

291, No. 11 ; NB lacks this.

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\( \text{cannot be due to the inherent nature of a jar; therefore destruction is not of neces­} \)

\( \text{sity or constant. Thus, anityatā is not the essential nature of produced things, i.e. there} \)

\( \text{is no identical, necessary connection between anityatā and kṛtakatva. This inconsist­} \)

\( \text{ency in the theory of the Naiyāyika is criticised by this prasākga. It is also untena­} \)

\( \text{ble that non-produced or permanent things the destruction of which is not admitted have the charac­} \)

\( \text{ter of anityatā; this is also meant by the word api in the sūtra.} \)

Dharmakirti discusses this criticism of the Naiyāyika in PV I, v. 194-195 and HB

(cf. Peking, 339, b6 ff ; Reconstruction 55, 2-7); Arcaṭa minutely and precisely interprets

it in HBT 57-61. Dharmakirti and probably Dharmottara either did not enter into
detailed explanation of the implication of the inference in question, since they are here
concerned with the formula of negative inference.

\(^{227}\) kāryaviruddhavyāptopālabdhir yathā, nēhāpratibaddhāsāmarthyāni vahnikāraṇāni

santi, tuṣārasparśat=TSop 291, No. 12 ; NB lacks this.

\(^{228}\) kāraṇaviruddhavyāptopālabdhir yathā, nātra dhūmas tuṣārasparśat=TSop 291, No.

10 ; NB lacks this.

\(^{229}\) vyāpakaviruddhavyāptopālabdhir yathā, nāyaṁ nityaḥ, kadācitkāryakāritvāt=TSop

291, No. 11 ; NB lacks this.
Of these, the svabhāvānapalambha, [the first and principal form of negation] establishes not the absence of an object, but the applicability of negative activities (asadvyavahārayogyatva) because the absence is proved by the perception itself. All the others establish the applicability of negative activity as well as the absence of an object, since they have as their object things not directly perceived [but indirectly inferred] (parokṣa).\textsuperscript{230}

Here ends the chapter on inference for oneself of the Tarkabhāṣā.

Chapter III. Inference for others (parārthānumāna)

14. Inference for others defined. (34.6) Inference for others (parārthānumāna) is the statement of a logical mark having the [above mentioned] three characteristics. A formal argument stating the three characteristics, which are respectively called anvaya (positive pervasion), vyatireka (negative pervasion) and pakṣadharmaṭā (the fact that ħ is a property of s) is metaphorically (upacārāt) called inference [for others or syllogism].\textsuperscript{231}

15. Two kinds of syllogism. (34.9) This [inference for others] is of two kinds: syllogism formulated by the method of agreement (sādharmyavat) and that formulated by the method of difference (vaidharmyavat). Agreement [or homogeneity] here is the similarity between the locus of a probandum (sādhyadharmin=p) and the locus of its instance (dṛṣṭāntadharmin=dp) with regard to the presence of the logical mark [in them]. A syllogism comprising this agreement is called 'formal proof by the method of agreement' (sādharmyavat sādhanavākyam). Difference [or heterogeneity] is the dissimilarity between p and dp with regard to the presence of ħ [i.e., ħ is present in p while it is not present in dp]. A syllogism comprising this difference is called 'formal proof by the method of difference' (vaidharmyavat sādhanavākyam).\textsuperscript{232}

16. Illustration of svabhāvahetoḥ sādharmyavān prayogah. (34.13)

\textsuperscript{230} Cf. n. 204 above.

\textsuperscript{231} NB III, s. 1–2, cited in n. 152 above. A set of propositions is the cause of an inference which another person acquires by hearing it. Thus a verbal statement is called inference, not directly, but only metaphorically. For the three characteristics of a logical mark, see §10 above.

\textsuperscript{232} NB III, s. 3–5: taddvividham, prayogahṛdayat, sādharmyavad vaidharmyavac ēti; NBT on it: dṛṣṭāntadharmināḥ saha sādhyadharmināḥ sādṛṣyāḥ hetukṛtaḥ sādharmyam ucyate, asādṛṣyāḥ ca hetukṛtaḥ vaidharmyam ucyate....
Of these, a syllogism by the method of agreement formulated with a logical mark of identity (svabhāvahetūḥ sādharmyavān prayogah) may be illustrated by interpreting the Buddha's teaching 'All that is produced is momentary' in view of the Sautrāntika doctrine. What is produced (sāṃskṛta) means all things that have originated as results of the causes and conditions aggregated together. They are said to be momentary (kṣanika) as they exist only for the moment in which they are produced.

16.1 Proof of universal momentariness. (34.18) Now we see that all things such as a jar etc. are destroyed by conjunction with a hammer etc. If the essential nature (svāraṇā), by which a jar etc. in its last moment perishes, is existent in the [same thing] when it is just produced, then it should perish immediately after its production because of that [essential nature]. Therefore all things are evidently momentary.

(35.2) It may be contended that a thing is given by its own causes such an essential nature that it perishes after staying for a certain period of time. [But it is not reasonable, because] if so, a thing would not perish even when it is hit by a hammer, but continue to exist again for the given period of time, since such is its essential nature; again this may be the case [when it receives another shock of a hammer, and thus it follows that] it would never perish. Therefore, if a thing were produced so as to stay for two moments, it would, at the second moment just as at the first, stay for another two moments due to its being durable for two moments. In this way it would not cease to exist at the third moment because it has even then the same nature.

(35.9) [Another opponent] may contend: "A thing is so made by its own cause as to be durable; but it may be forcibly destroyed by an incompatible thing such as a hammer and the rest". This is not correct. How is it reasonable that the destruction of a thing is caused by an incompatible power, while the same thing does not perish because of its being permanent. For this is as unreasonable as to say that Devadatta is dead while he is living. In other words, if it perishes, how can you say that it is produced by its causes so as to be imperishable? For you cannot say that an immortal quality dies. We hold, therefore, that a thing is produced by its own cause to be perishable, because perishing can be by no means connected with an imperishable thing, while the disappearance of a thing is actually experienced. Thus, it perishes at the
very moment of its birth. In this way the theory of momentary destruction [of every thing] (kṣaṇakṣaṇayitvā) has been proved. We may formulate [the discussion made above] into the following syllogism:

Whatever is by nature perishable perishes immediately [after its birth as e.g. a jar at the last moment of its existence];
Material objects etc. are by nature perishable at the time of their birth;
[Therefore, material] objects etc. perish immediately after their birth;

[This syllogism is] formulated with a logical mark of identity.

16.2 Recognition is merely constructive imagination. (36.1) "If things are perishing at every moment, how is our recognition (pratyabhijñā) in the form "This is the very same as that" possible?" To this our reply is this: [This is said] because every moment [of the flux of a thing] is produced so as to be very similar to the immediately preceding moment and because our nescience (avidyā) continues to exist. At the very moment when a thing perishes, another at the next moment which is similar to it is born. In this way the difference in form [between the two moments] is neglected; and the flux of moments is not interrupted by non-existence. Consequently an ordinary person gets, by means of constructive imagination (adhyāvāśaya), the idea of identity (abheda) that this is the same as that in spite of the actual difference [of the two moments]. We know by experience that one easily gets an idea of this being the same as that regarding completely different things such as grass, hair etc. which, having been once cut off, grow again (lūnapunarjātakūśakeśādi)234. Why cannot the same kind of imagination occur in the present case? We have thus proved that what is produced is all momentary235.

233. Ta sbyor ba yāḥ śar itar bya ste=prayogah punar pūrvavat kartavyah. G ayam instead of punar in M.

234. This is a stock-example of Buddhist logicians meant for the refutation of recognition. See for example, PVBh 144. 3; RNA 84. 3. The refutation of recognition is dealt with by our author in § 28.2. Ratnakirti gives a systematic exposition of the problem (RNA 106-112).

235. Our author's argument in §16, 1-2 is a brief extract from the highly developed Buddhist theory of the momentary destruction of all things (kṣaṇabhākṣa). He seems to owe his argument here, directly or indirectly, to Kānaka-gomin who demonstrates a similar discussion commenting on PV I. v. 195 (v. 197 in Kitab Mahal ed) and Svāvṛtti (cf. Kārpa-
16.3 Nirviśeṣaṇa-prayoga. (36.9) The syllogism set forth above is of the formula with a simple, identical logical mark (nirviśeṣaṇasya svabhāvaḥ svabhāvaḥ prayogah)\(^{236}\). The [same] formula with a simple, identical logical mark is illustrated by another syllogism:

All that exists is impermanent (yat sat tat sarvam anityam) as e.g. a jar;

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\(^{236}\) PV I. v. 186; upādhiḥbhedāpekośa vā svabhāvaḥ kevalaḥ 'tha vā ucye sādhyaśaśdyārthāṁ naśe kāryavatvato vavat. Here Dharmakirti classifies svabhāvaḥsvetuh into two kinds, a) kevala- (illustrated by sat) and b) upādhiḥbhedāpekoṣa- (ill. by kārya=kṛtyaka); but he mentions c) svabhāvabhūtadharmanviseṣa- (ill. utpattimā) in his Sivavṛtti. In NB III. s. 11 -15 too, the above-named three kinds are enumerated. The idea of this classification is clear: The logical identity of the probandum and the probans does not mean the total sameness of both, but the sameness in essence. And this sameness in essence may be sometimes pure and simple as in the case of existence and impermanence, which do not permit the interference of any third entity; and another time it is understood together with a contingent, third entity which the probans necessarily presupposes, as in the case of product-ness and impermanence. Product-ness presupposes a cause. Dharmakirti regards this third thing as a upādhi (contingent condition). But once this main classification is stated, one is tempted to subdivide. From existence we derive the idea of origination (utpatti) which Dharmakirti considers a particular property belonging to the existent itself (svabhāvabhūtadharmanviseṣa), i.e. this origination is not the third thing separate from the existent, but a part of it. According to Dharmottara and other commentators this particular property, origination, is obtained through logical imagination in which one contrasts it to non-origination. Thus, this case is added in the list as a subdivision of a) (corresponding to No. 2 of NB & TBh). Concerning b) Dharmakirti says
These things cognized by valid knowledge all exist;
[Therefore these things are all impermanent].
Another syllogism proving that the Vedas are human products can be formulated with [the same] identical mark:

Any verbal statement is a human product as e.g. the verbal statement of a passer-by;
The Vedic injunction ‘One who wants rebirth in heaven should perform the fire-sacrifice’ is a verbal statement;
[Therefore the Vedic injunction is a human product.]

16.3.1 Saviseṣaṇa-prayoga. (36.16) A syllogism of the formula with a qualified identical mark (saviṣeṣaṇa-prayoga) is next shown:

All that have origin is impermanent (yaḍ yaḍ utpattimat tat sarvam anityam) as e.g. a jar;
Sound has origin;
[Therefore sound is impermanent.]

Those things which are excluded from [the class of] what has no origin are called having origin. When we, saying ‘the origination of a thing’, mean that this distinct [aspect] (vyāvṛtti) is a different thing [from ‘existence’] since it excludes other distinct [aspects incompatible with it] (vyāvṛttyantararavyavaccheda), then the identical mark [i.e. existence] is qualified by a property [having origin] which, though actually identical

that the idea of product necessarily presupposes the idea of cause, though the cause is not manifestly expressed. Dharmottara thinks in NBT on NB III, s. 15 that this presupposed third entity, cause, may be expressed by its own word as in the case of pratyayabhedadhitva or may not be so expressed as in the case of kṛtyakatva, and that the presence and the absence of the actual usage of the word ‘cause’ do not change the significance. Therefore he concludes that the syllogistic form of svabhāvahetutu is threefold, viz. 1) śuddha=a) = nirviṣeṣaṇa of TBh. 2) avyayiṇktaviṣeṣaṇa or saviṣeṣaṇa and 3) vyayiṇktaviṣeṣaṇa or bhinnaviṣeṣaṇa. Manorathanandin, commenting on PV I. v. 186 (III. v. 185 in Patna ed.) gives a similar exposition and classifies into śuddha, abhinnaviṣeṣaṇa and bhinnaviṣeṣaṇa. TSop follows Dharmottara. It seems to be Mokṣākara-gupta alone who enumerates as the fourth the case of pratyayabhedadhitva, giving to this the name prayuktabhinnaviṣeṣaṇa. This cannot be a merit of his, because he gave only a separate name to what was actually recognized by Dharmakirti and his commentators.

237. G pramāṇapratiṣṭhā paḍārthāḥ instead of pramāṇapratiṣṭhā in M; T. agreeing with G. reads ishad mas rtogs paṁi dhos po.
238. NB III, s. 11: yat sat tat sarvam anityaṁ yathā ghaṭādir iti śuddhasya svabhāva-hetoḥ prayogāḥ ; and NBT.
239. The Tibetan translator may have had in his manuscript rathyā-puruṣa instead of rathyā-puruṣa in M. G. as T reads: sīṁ ṛṣa ḷon pa or one who rides a cart.
[with existence], is differentiated from it by imagination (kalpiṭena bhedena).240

16.3.2 Bhinnaviśeṣaṇa-prayoga. (36.20) The formula with an identical mark qualified by an contingent property (bhinnaviśeṣaṇasya [svabhāvaḥetoh] prayogaḥ) is next illustrated:

Whatever is produced is impermanent (yat kṛtakam tad anityam)
as a jar;
Sound is a product;

[Therefore sound is impermanent.]241

One may object: “You may call an expression such as ‘one who possesses a brindled cow’ a usage of a contingent property. However, in the word ‘product’ we do not recognize any such word signifying a contingent property as we find in the word ‘a brindled cow’ [possessed by a person]. Thus, how can you call [the probans kṛtaka] an example of contingent property?” We reply: A thing which depends for its own origination on the operation of other things [i.e. its causes] is called a product. Therefore, the word ‘product’ connotes the nature of depending on the operation of others; this is why we call it ‘qualified

240. NB III, s. 12: yad utpattimat tad anityam iti svabhāvabhūtiḥadharmabhedena svabhāvasya prayogaḥ. Mokṣākara follows Dharmottara in explaining the formula, but perhaps with a misunderstanding. Commenting on the word bheda, Dharmottara says: anutpannebhyo hi vyāvṛttiḥ āśrityātpanno bhāva ucyate saiva vyāvṛttir yadda vyāvṛttyantarāmadīptēkṣā vaktaṁ iṣyate tadda vyatīrīkṣive nirdīṣyate bhāvasyaḥtattīr iti. According to Durvekamīśra (DP 158, 6-8), the probans, what is originated, is so judged in view of the distinction from, or the exclusion of, what is not originated such as ether. But the question may be put forward: if a thing is called what is originated in contrast to what is not originated, why do you use the expression ‘it has origination’ (utpattir asya=utpattimat)?

Answer: When we express this distinction without regard to other distinctions such as magnitude (mahattva), [i.e. when we limit our contrast only to that of origination and non-origination], we must say ‘it has origination’. This is the meaning of the passage of NBT. However, Mokṣākara’s interpretation runs (36. 17 ff.): anutpannebhyo vyāvṛtto bhāva utpanna ucyate, yadda saiva vyāvṛttir vyāvṛttyantarāvavacchedena vyatīrīkācyate bhāvasyaḥtattīr iti tadda kalpiṭena bhedena svabhāvabhūtiḥadharmena viśiṣṭāḥ.... In this passage vyāvṛttyantarā is used in a sense different from that in NBT. It is neither a misprint nor a mistake on the part of the editor since T is quite parallel. Our author uses the term as denoting anutpanna, and if it is made unconsciously, he misinterprets Dharmottara.

241. NB III, s. 13: yat kṛtakaḥ tad anityam ity upādhibhedena. NBT 45, 17–19 illustrates the differences between the three kinds of expressions, śuddha, avyatiriktena viśeṣaṇena viśiṣṭaḥ and vyatiriktena viśeṣaṇena viśiṣṭaḥ by the example of Devadatta: Devadatta may be referred to by the name Devadatta itself; he may be called the long-eared; he may be called the owner of a brindled cow.

242. Read bhinnaviśeṣaṇa for bhinnaseṣaṇa in M.
by a contingent property.\textsuperscript{243}

16.3.3 Prayuktabhinnaviśeṣaṇa-prayoga. (37.7) The formula with an identical mark manifestly expressing a contingent qualifier (\textit{prayuktabhinnaviśeṣaṇasya svabhāvasya prayogaḥ}) is illustrated lastly.\textsuperscript{244}

Whatever is variable according to a change in its cause is a product (\textit{yāḥ prayayabhedabhedi sa kṛtakaḥ}) as smoke;

Sound is variable according to a change in its cause;

[Therefore, sound is a product.]

\textit{Pratyaya} means \textit{kāraṇa} (cause). A thing which is subject to change according as its cause varies, is here meant by the word \textit{pratyayabheda-bhedin}. It means that an effect is big when its cause is big, and is small if the cause is small. The word \textit{pratyayabhedabhedin} which manifestly expresses a contingent qualifier is here used; this is why the formula is called \textit{prayuktabhinnaviśeṣaṇa}.

Various kinds of the identical mark have been shown above in order to remove misunderstanding [about the logical mark of identity], that is to say, in order to teach that if different properties are imagined [of a logical mark], the fact of an identical mark being used remains the same.

17. Illustration of \textit{svabhāvahetor vaidharmyavān prayogāḥ}. (37.16)

A syllogism by the method of difference formulated with a logical mark of identity (\textit{svabhāvahetor vaidharmyavān prayogāḥ}) is next illustrated:

1. Whatever is not immediately destructible at a given time is not of a perishable nature at that time as e. g. ether\textsuperscript{245};

Those things beginning with matter are, however, perishable at the time of their birth;

[Therefore, those beginning with matter are immediately destructible at the time of their birth.]

In a syllogism with a negative \textit{vyāpī}, [i. e. that by the method of difference] (\textit{vyatirekaprayoga= vaidharmyavān prayogāḥ}) the negation of

\textsuperscript{243} The same objection is raised in NBT 45, 20-21 and the reply forms NB III, s. 14 : \textit{apekṣitaparavaśāpyāri ki bhāvaḥ svabhāvanipattau kṛtaka iti}.

\textsuperscript{244} NB III, s. 15 : \textit{evaṃ praṃtyayabhedabhediteśato draśṭavyāḥ}. As said in n. 236, NBT as well as NB regards this as a special case of the third formula (\textit{bhinnaviśeṣaṇa}), while our author takes it out as the fourth.

\textsuperscript{245} T : \textit{gaḥ daḥ gaḥ... de daḥ de... (=yad yad...tat tad...)} instead of \textit{yad yadā...tat tadā...} in M.
the probandum is pervaded by the negation of the probans, and accord-
ingly the absence of the probandum is definitely known in the absence
of the probans. In the same way we can formulate [the remaining forms
of svabhāvahetu] by the method of difference.

2. Wherever there is no momentariness there is also no existence
   (yatra kṣaṇikatvāṁ nāsti tatra sattvam api nāsti) as e. g. in a
   flower in the sky;
   However, sound is existent;
   [Therefore sound is momentary].

2.a Wherever there is no impermanence recognized, there is no ori-
gination as in the hair of a tortoise;
   Sound has origination;
   [Therefore, sound is impermanent.]

3. Wherever there is no impermanence there is no product-ness as
   in a rabbit's horns;
   Sound is a product;
   [Therefore sound is impermanent.]

4. Wherever there is no product-ness there is no variation con-
comitant with the variation in its cause as in ether;
   Sound is variable together with the change in its cause;
   [Therefore, sound is a product.]²⁴⁶

18. Illustration of kāryahetūḥ sādharmyavān prayogah. (38.8) A
   syllogism by the method of agreement formulated with a logical mark of
   causality is next illustrated.

   Wherever there is smoke there is fire as in a kitchen;
   Here there is smoke;
   [Therefore, here there is fire.]²⁴⁷

An effect should be applied as a probans for proving its cause, the
probandum, only when the relation of a cause and an effect has been
[beforehand] established through perception and non-perception (praty-a-

²⁴⁶. These illustrations of vaidharmyavatprayoga correspond, as I number, to those
four forms discussed in §16.3 in relation to sādharmyavatprayoga of svabhāvahetu. NB III,
s. 26 : asaty anityate nāsti satvam utpattimatvāṁ kṛtakatvāṁ vā, saṁś ca śabda utpattimān
kṛtako vēti svabhāvahetōḥ prayogāḥ.

²⁴⁷. NB III. s. 23 : kāryahetor api prayogah, yatra dhūmas tatrāgnir yathā mahānasādau,
asti cēha dhūma iti.
kṣānupalambha)\textsuperscript{248}.

18.1 Illustration of vaidharmya-prayoga. (38.11) A syllogism by the method of difference (vaidharmya-prayoga) [formulated with a logical mark of causality]:

Where there is no fire, there is no smoke as in a great tank;
However, here there is smoke;
[Therefore, here there is fire.]\textsuperscript{249}

19. Illustration of a syllogism of negation by the method of agreement. (38.12) A syllogism of negation formulated by the method of agreement (anupalabdheḥ sādharmaṇvān prayogaḥ), which is aimed at denying the existence of a composite whole (avayāvin):

A thing which, being by nature perceptible, is not perceived in a place, is to be judged as not existing in that place as the horns on the head of a man;
The composite whole [of a jar] which is asserted by the opponent to be perceptible is not perceived in the aggregated parts meant by the word ‘jar’;
[Therefore, a composite whole does not exist in a jar.]\textsuperscript{250}

19.1 Illustration of a syllogism of negation by the method of difference. (38.12) A syllogism of negation formulated by the method of difference (anupalabdheḥ vaidharmyaṇvān prayogaḥ):

A thing existent as perceptible by nature is necessarily perceived as a particular object of blue etc. which is admitted as perceptible\textsuperscript{251};

In this particular place\textsuperscript{252} we do not perceive a jar, although it is existent as perceptible by nature;

\textsuperscript{248} NBT 49, 11–12: yathā mahānāsādāv iti, mahānāsādau hi pratyakṣānupalamhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhābhाप्रयोगाः.

\textsuperscript{249} NB III, s. 27: asaty agnau na bhavaty eva dhūmaḥ, atra cāsti dhūma iti kāryaḥetoh prayogah.

\textsuperscript{250} NB III, s. 9: yad upalabhahilakṣaṇapṛāptah san nāpalabhaye so 'sadyavahāraviṣayāḥ siddhāḥ, yathānyah kāścid drśṭāḥ sāsaviśānādiḥ. nāpalabhaye ca kucait pradeśaviśeṣa upalabhahilakṣaṇapṛāpto ghaṭa iti.

\textsuperscript{251} T snon po la sogs paşi khyad par mhon sum niid du mhon par ḫod=ḍṛṣṭevendbhimataniidviśeṣāḥ instead of nālādiviśeṣāḥ of M.

\textsuperscript{252} T phyogs kyi khyad par ḫdi na =iha pradeśaviśeṣe as we read in G.
Therefore, there is no jar in this place.  

20. Pervasion explained in relation to the two syllogistic forms.

(38.20) It should be understood that while the probans (sādhana) is pervaded by the probandum (sādhyā) in all the syllogism (sādhanavākyā) formulated by the method of agreement, the non-existence of the probandum (sādhyābhāva) is pervaded by the non-existence of the probans (sādhanābhāva) in the syllogism by the method of difference. Either the statement of the necessary existence (niyatatva) of the probans in the probandum or that of the necessary non-existence of the probandum in the non-existence of the probans is called 'pervasion' (vyāpti). Therefore when the pervasion [between the two terms] is established by means of valid knowledge, there should be no shade of doubt that the probandum might not exist in the same locus (dharmin) in which the probans exists.

20.1. The Naiyāyika's proof of the existence of God as an illustration of untrue vyāpti. (39.6) However, doubt arises inevitably when a universal (sarvpasāṁhāra-vāti) vyāpti is not established by means of valid knowledge as, for instance, in the case of the inference from an effect which is aimed at proving the existence of God (īśvara). That is to say, they [i.e. the Naiyāyikas] state the following proof:

253. NB III, s. 25: vaidharmavataḥ prayogaḥ, yat sad upalabdhi-lakṣaṇapraṇaptam tad upalabdhyata eva, yathā nilādīviśeṣaḥ, na caivam ihopalabdhi-lakṣaṇapraṇaptasya satā upalabdhir ghaṭasyetti anupalabdhiprayogah.

254. G. T have ca. which is dropped in M.

255. The Buddhist campaign against the theism of the Naiyāyika was started by Dharmakirti in PV II v. 10–29; commentators on PV including Prajñākara-gupta further developed their criticism of theirism. Śāntirākṣita and Kamalaśila devoted a chapter for the refutation of God in TS and TSP (TS v. 46–93). Śāntideva and Prajñākaramati deal with the problem in BCA and BCAP IX, v. 119–126. The theistic argument of the Naiyāyika which forms the object of criticism for these Buddhists seems to be set forth by Aviddhakarṇa, Uddyotakara, Praṣastamati etc. as named in TSP. In the latest period of Indian Buddhism, Jñānaśrimitra wrote a lengthy dissertation Īśvaravādādhihāra (JNA 233–322), which consisted of Pūrvapakṣasaṁkṣepa, Īśvaradūṣaṇa and Vārttikasaptaslokavyākhyāna. The last chapter consists of three sections and is an elaborate commentary on the seven verses of Dharmakirti, viz. PV II, v. 10–16. Ratnakirti made a résumé of Jñānaśrī's Īśvaravādādhihāra. It is incorporated in RNA 29–52 under the title Īśvarasādhana-dūṣaṇa. Mokṣākara, as usual, follows the latter two authors when he criticises the Naiyāyika's theism in the following text. The opponents of these three Buddhists are mainly Śaṅkara, Narasiṃha, Trilocana, Vācaspatimiśra, Vittoka, etc. (RNA 35–36). Vācaspatimiśra demonstrates his own theistic argument in NVT 953. 1 ff. (ad NS 4, 1, 21). Following Ratnakirti, Mokṣākara introduces Vācaspati's theory of the classification of the existent things in the world into three kinds, his syllogism proving the existence of God, etc. But Buddhist criticism is logical and centers around Vācaspati's theory of vyāpti, which is found mainly in NVT 138. 25–140. 15 (see n. 270).
We are able to prove the existence of the omniscient God, whether or not an omniscient lord [i.e. Buddha] really exists. For the existent in the world is of three kinds:1) Some things such as a jar etc. which have been definitely produced by an agent (*niścitakartrka*); 2) some things such as ether (*vyoman*) etc. which definitely have no agent (*niścitakartrnivrtti*); 3) and the third group of things such as the earth etc. the existence of whose agents is doubted. There is no class of things other than the above [three]. [Thus, our syllogism may be formulated as follows :]

Those which are classified as things the existence of whose agents is uncertain, trees in a forest whose origination we can actually see or the earth etc. which have remained very long since their creation, and so on, must all considered to have an intelligent agent as their creator (*buddhimatkartrka*);

Because they are effects (*kāryatvāt*);

For example a jar.258

The probans [of this inference] is not illegitimate (*asiddha*), because the

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1. JNA 233, 15-16: *trayo hi bhāvarāsayah, buddhimatkartrkās ca ghaṭādāyah; akarti-kās cākāśādāyah; saṃdigdha-kartrkās ca bhūdharādāyah.*
2. RNA 29, 13-17: *nānun tyakṣadāyāḥ pakṣādāyāḥ pakṣikṛtāḥ, kathāṁ tair vyabhicāraḥ. trividho hi bhāvarāśiḥ, saṃdigdha-kartrkā yathā vyakṣādīḥ; prasiddha-kartrkā yathā ghaṭādīḥ; akarti-kā yathākāśādīḥ, tatra prasiddha-kartrkā ghaṭādau pratyakṣaṇapalambhābhivyāṁ vyāptīm ādāya saṃdeha pade kṣāmyahāyānu kāryavatam upasamihṛtya buddhimān anumīyatet.... This latter passage is parallel to that in JNA 284, 21-24. Cf. NVT 953, 1 ff. : *etāvad abhīpretam acāryasya, trayo hi khalu bhavā jagati bhavantī, prasiddhacetanakartrkāḥ yathā prāśādāṭṭālagopuratayādāyah, prasiddhatatadviparyayāḥ yathā paramāṇavākāsādāyah, saṃdigdha-cetanakartrkāḥ yathā tanutarumahatdarādāyah.*
3. JNA 233, 6-10: *iha pratyavasthānam anyeṣāṃ, viveādāśpaditabhaṅgaḥ bhūdharāḍī buddhimatkartrpurvakam, kāryatvāt; yad yat kāryāṁ lad buddhimatkartrpurvakam ādhūtām yathā ghaṭāḥ; kāryaṁ cedām bhūdharāḍī; tasmād buddhimatpurvakam iti, na cedām asiddām, bauddhasaṁpi vindhyagandhamadadānāṁ kāryate viveādābhavāt, nāpi viruddham, saṃpākte bhāvāt, na cānaiṁkāntikam, kvacī api kārye buddhimad adhiṣṭhānāvyabhicārasya darśayitum asākyaṁvāt....*
effect-ness of all [these] things is established by valid knowledge. Nor is it incompatible (viruddha), since it is present in the sapakṣa. Nor is it inconclusive (anaikāntika), because there is a proof contradicting the opposite of the assertion to be proved (sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapra-
mānasadbhāvāt) [i. e. we can argue by the following reductio ad absurdum to prove the vyāpī]:

We cognize by a mental perception accompanied by repeated past experience (bhūyodarśanasahāyena mānasapratyakṣena)\textsuperscript{259} [the pervasion] that an effect (kārya) [say, a jar] is always produced through the agency of a potter who is endowed with intelligence (buddhimat). If [on the contrary] a thing could come into existence without [being mediated by some] intelligent [agent], then it [e. g. a jar] might sometimes not be produced even when the intelligent agent [e. g. a potter] intends [to make it]. [But this is absurd], because an effect cannot even once arise without its cause. Therefore, we should in no case suppose that a thing can

\textsuperscript{259} T man du mthon ba'i rgyu can gyi yid da'h mhaps sum gyis....=bhūyodarśananibanda
hāmanānasena pratyakṣena ca.... T seems to understand mānasapratyakṣa- as a dvandva compound, which is wrong. Krishnamacharya condemned the same word as a mistake on the part of Mokṣākara, and suggested a correction into alaukikapratyakṣa (G. Tikā, 77, 20 ff.: atra mānaseni viśeṣaṃ pramādikam....). He could be right, if Mokṣākara introduced here the theory of the syncretic school of Nyāyavaiśeṣika. However, Mokṣākara, following Ratnakirti, refers to Trilocana and Vācaspatimīśra of the Naiyāyika and Kumārilā and Sucaritamīśra (Kāśikākāra) of the Mimāṃsaka, who all maintain that a universal concomitance is grasped by perception helped by repeated past experience. RNA 42, 3-5: bhūyodarśanagamyāḥ hi uvyāpīḥ sāmānyadharmayor (SV Anu. v. 12-a-b) iti prasiddham eva. asyāyam arthaḥ kāśikākāreṇa vyākyātaḥ : prācinānekadārśanajatamasāṃkarasa-
hāye ca utaraḥ dhāmasyādgniyatavasbhāvavatvam.... (SVK III, 16, 14-15) : RNA, 42. 10-11: trilocanena punar ayam arthaḥ kathilāḥ, bhūyodarśanasahāyena manasā
tajjatiyānoḥ sambandho gṛhito bhavati. ato dhūmo ‘gnih na vyabhicarati. tadevyabhicāre’py upādhīrāhitāṁ sambandham atikrāmet. hetor vāpakṣaśahkāni pratākṣaṁ pratamāy upalabdhis-
lakṣyaprapātoḥaṅhanāmicayahetur anupalambhākhyāṃ pratyakṣaṁ eva. tataḥ siddhāḥ svā-
bhāvikāḥ sambandhaḥ tathāhāpīti svamataḥ vyavasthāpitam iti (cf. n. 270 below). ; RNA 42, 15: vācaspatināḍīdham uktam, ahjijātamanāhāvedatvavād bhūyodarśanajatamasāṃkārasa-
hāyeḥ indriya eva dhūmānāṁ bāhūyādiḥ bīṣbhāvikasambandhāgrāhīti uktam (NVT 140, 5-6). These three passages are quoted again in RNA (Vyāpītirnīdaya), 99, 11-12 ;
99, 20-21 ; 100, 22-24. Vācapati does not agree with Trilocana and say that svābhāvikas-
sambandhaḥ is grasped either indriyapratyakṣa or other means of valid knowledge according
to circumstances, when it is produced through bhūyodarśana. At least the theory of Trilocana
and Sucaritamīśra completely identical with what Ratnakirti and Mokṣākara say. inasmuch
as they admit that universal concomitance is grasped by mental perception helped by
repeated past experience. Therefore our text in M needs no correction.
be an effect and at the same time not produced by an intelligent agent.”

20.2. Refutation. (40.5) To this the following reply can be made: All philosophers agree that in every case a probans proves its probandum if and only if the pervasive relation (vyāpti) between the probans and the probandum has been established by valid knowledge generalising [all the cases of the probans and probandum] (sarvopasainhāreṇa pramāṇena).

Now, if the vyāpti [in your syllogism] is grasped between [an effect in general and] an intelligent being who is qualified by having a visible body (drṣyaśariraviśiṣṭa- buddhimat-), then this probans, just as the probans prameyatva (being an object of cognition), is inconclusive owing to non-exclusiveness (sādhāraṇānaikāntika), because we find growing grass, which is not endowed with the said probandum [i.e. is not produced by a visible intelligent agent], is also an effect.

(40.10) You cannot contend that [our criticism is irrelevant, as] the very grass etc. is comprised in p [of the above said inference]. For an object clearly deviating from the vyāpti (vyabhicāraviśaya) cannot be put forward as p, since there is a rule [set forth by Dharmakirti]: A

260. Jñānaśrīmitra reproduces five kinds of viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa which the Naiyāyika proposes in order to substantiate the vyāpti ‘an effect is produced by an intelligent agent’. Of these five, the first is parallel to what Mokṣakara refers to here. See JNA 237, 22-238. 3: yathā saugatānāṁ citrabhānōr anumāné yadi citrabhānōm antaraṇa kāraṇāntaraś api dhūmo deśantare kālantare vā jāyeta. dvijayor api deśakālayor na citra-bhānoḥ sakṛd api āṁsataśāṁ labheta, yasmān na tadabhāve bhavatas tālākāryaniyamam yuktaḥ, atīpārasaṅgat; tataḥ ca tādṛśasya sarvāyuvādattadhetuvāṁ na tataḥ sakṛd api jāyeta. bhavati ca, tasmān nātājyanāṁ tādṛśam iti vyāptai bādhakapramāṇanāytya pratibhandhasiddhiḥ. tathādṛśākām api yadi kīcchid buddhīmadādiḥṣāhānām antareṇyanto api kāryam utpajjyeta, hanta na tarki sakṛd api buddhīmatāḥ kumbhakārāde utpadyeta. bhavati ca, tatas tajjyanāṁ ity ekāṁ bādhakāṁ pramāṇām.

261. T bṣgub par bya ba daṅ sgrub par byed pa gaṅ zag gi khyad par thams cad ŋe bar sūs pahi tshad mas grub pa... Gaṅ zag gi khyad par should be read: gaṅ dag gi khyab pa. Tn has khyab for khyad.

262. RNA 39, 21–24, kiṁ drṣyaśariropādhiṁ buddhīmanmaṭreṇa vyāptir ghyate, āko svid drṣyaśariropādhiḥvāreṇa drṣyaśādrāśādhrāṣṭāḥviṣayā vakalpu. yady ādyāḥ pākṣaḥ, tada tādābhātabhāsyāṁ antareṇāpya utpadyamāne viṣavādaḥ kāryavadarśanāṁ pākṣaḥ sā-dhrāṣṭānaiṣāyikāntikas hetuḥ. As for the fallacy of sādhrāṣṭānakāntika illustrated by the probans prameyatva see § 10.1 and n. 168.

263. PV IV v. 91: amśiṣṭāḥḥ pramāṇāḥbhavyaḥ sa cāpamala iṣyate, saṁdigdhe hetuvacananād vyasto hetor anāśrayaḥ. utpamāna in this verse means pākṣa. M has vyakto instead of vyasto. But T bṣal, PV, the same verse cited in JNA (244, 3), that in RNA (39.4 f. b.), etc. agree to vyasto. In the inference in question, the p. grass, is seen by valid perception not to have an intelligent agent with a visible body. Since grass is clearly rejected as belonging to the class of s by perception, it is absurd to try to prove by inference that it has an intelligent agent with a visible body as its cause, i.e. that it belongs to the class of s.
probans is stated only concerning a \( p \) which is not yet ascertained \([\text{to be } s \text{ or non-}s]\); and what has been rejected \([\text{to be } s \text{ by other valid knowledge}]\) should not be \([\text{put forward as}]\) the locus of the probans\(^{264}\).

(40.13) ['The opponent may object:] ‘We see smoke without [seeing] fire on a mountain which is not climiable\(^{265}\). Thus, it is easy to point out the same deviation in the case of [a mountain put forward as the locus of] smoke’’. This is not correct. Such a mountain is qualified to be an object which is doubtful [of having fire] \( (\text{sāmīdhavāṣaya}) \) [and fit to be made a \( p \)], just because fire cannot be seen on the mountain as it is not climable. In the problem under question, however, you want to grasp the \( \text{vyāpti} \) [between an effect and a visible body], [and yet we do not perceive the agent, who, if he existed, would be seen]; therefore, it is rightly said that the existence of an intelligent agent is contradicted by the non-perception of a perceptible object \( (\text{dṛṣṭānupalambha}) \).

(40.18) Or otherwise, if you construe the \( \text{vyāpti} \) as that [between an effect] and an [intelligent agent] whose body is invisible\(^{266}\) or an intelligent agent in general, we cannot ascertain the negative \( \text{vyāpti} \) of such a probandum as an invisible one or an intelligent one in general by means of the non-perception of a perceptible object. Thus, yours is a fallacious probans named \( \text{sāmīdhavāpiṣāvāvyāvttika}^{267} \). For in this case the \( \text{vyāpti} \) between the non-existence of the probandum and the non-existence of the probans is not available\(^{268}\) because [the probandum itself] is not established

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264. RNA 39, 25 ff.: nāma vṛksadāyaḥ pakṣikṛtaḥ, kathaṁ tair vyabhicāraḥ...yad āha, na sādhyaṁiva vyabhicāra ity avyaktam etat. na hi vyabhicāraśīṣya eva pakṣo (Read so instead of pakṣe) bhavāt arhati, sāmīḍgha hetuvaśām iva vyaheti hetor anāśraya iti nyāyāt. vyabhicāraśīṣya tataḥ ca dṛṣṭaśāriropadhaḥ buddhānmaṭrasya tṛṣṭyāyupattau dṛṣṭānupalambhena pratiśiptatvat… This is a citation from JNA 284, 21–285, 1.

265. For asākyārohaṇe parvate T has skyped (p. bskyped) par mi nus pa la la (Even some places which are unable to give rise to [fire]). But here ārohana must be taken in the sense of climbing.

266. Read with G and T adṛṣṭāvāyāreṇa for dṛṣṭa- in M.

267. For this fallacy see § 10.2.4.

268. M has ākāśādau between sādhanaṁvayaśya and asiddhatvena; but better to omit it. Concerning our author’s argument in this paragraph. cf. RNA 40, 2 ff : atka vyabhicāracamatārās trividhābhavārāśīṣyavasthāpāśārthām ca viṭapādau pratyakṣāpratiṣiptena dṛṣṭaḥ vyabhicārasyaḥ dṛṣṭānubhāvānotyaḥ buddhānmaṭrasya vyāptir avagamyata iti dviṣṭaḥ saṃkālaḥ. tadda viṭapādau buddhānmaṭrasya sambhāvānmatetvaḥ na sādhāraṇānāikādhatatām brūmaḥ. kiṁ tarhi vyāptigrhaṇākāle dṛṣṭaḥ vyabhicārasyaḥ buddhānmaṭrasya sādhāraṇātvyātāyā dṛṣṭānupalambhena vyatirekāsiddhāḥ vyāptāḥ abhāvāt sāmīḍgha [-vipakṣa-] vyāvyāttikatvam ācakṣmahe…...
[to be real]. In this connection the revered master Jñānaśrimitra says:

If you, in order to remove [the fallacy that h] effect-ness, is found in the vipakṣa [i.e. in what has not a visible intelligent agent as its cause], imagine an invisible agent, how can you establish the vyāpti, since it is deprived of confirmation by the negative vyāpti? 

Or, if you, hoping to establish the negative vyāpti, rely on a visible agent, then [h, effect-ness] is clearly seen in the vipakṣa, because grass etc. grows without it [i.e. the operation of a visible agent].

20.2.1. Trilocana's objection rejected. (41.7) Trilocana said as follows:270 "Just as smoke etc. is connected with fire etc. by the intrinsic

269. Jñānaśrimitrapādaṇā is found only in M. The first half of this verse can be certainly ascribed to him since it occurs in JNA 285, 7-8, but the second half cannot be traced in JNA. It is Ratnakirti who put these two halves together as the summary of his preceding argument, and it is likely that the second half is a product of Ratnakirti himself. RNA 41, 9-12: kāryatvasya vipakṣavyāptihataye sambhāvyale 'tindriyaḥ kartā ced vyatirekasiddhiḥdurā vyāptih kathākā sidhyati. dyāyo 'tha vyatirekasiddhiḥmanasā kartā samāśriyate tattvāye' pī tadā tirṇādikam iti vyaktān vipakṣekṣaṇam. M has tadyogena vinā instead of tattvāye 'pī tadā in RNA and G. Tc-d: ci ste ldag pa ḫgrub paḥi yid kyis bītar mi ḥi baḥi byed pa po brten par bya ba yin na, de dahn idan pa la yāḥ deṇi riṣṭvā la sogs paḥo ṭes pa bsal bar mi mthun phyogs la mthoḥ baḥo. Mi and deṇi should be omitted; de dahn Idan pa should be read de dahn mi idan pa; gsal bar is better than bsal bar.

270. In § 20.2 the Buddhist criticised the Naiyāyika's argument, pointing out that the vyāpti between 'effect' and 'intelligent agent' does not represent a valid causal relation. But the Naiyāyika contends that it is not only causality but the intrinsic relation of a thing with another which forms valid vyāpti. Vacaspati on NS 1.1.5 refutes the Buddhist theory of vyāpti that invariable concomitance is determined not by mere perception and non-perception but by the principle of causality or essential identity (cf. PV I. v. 31: kāryakāraṇaḥbhāvāḥ vā svabhāvaḥ vā nīyamakaḥ, avināśhāvanīyam'o darṣanān na na darṣanāt). After criticising the Buddhist and the Vaiśeṣika view of vyāpti, he proposes the intrinsic relation (svabhāvikasambandha) as the criterion of vyāpti, and says that this intrinsic relation is grasped by sense-perception or other pramāṇas helped by past repeated experience of perception and non-perception (cf. n. 259 above). In RNA 41, 17 ff. Ratnakirti summarises this argument of Vacaspati and introduces it as a pūrvapakṣa. Mokṣikāra here presupposes the same pūrvapakṣa, though he ascribes it to Trilocana. the guru of Vacaspati.

Vacaspati's argument may be recapitulated as follows: 'effect-ness' is a probans not because it is perceived in the sapakṣa and not in the vipakṣa, but because it possesses a svabhāvika relationship with 'intelligent agent'. This svabhāvika relationship is understood by perception in the sapakṣa and non-perception in the vipakṣa in such a manner as we explain in the following. Thus, mentioning perception and non-perception in connection with the svabhāvika relation is also not irrelevant. If it is ascertained that x is related with y by a svabhāvikasambandha, x is the probans and y the probandum. For instance, the relation of smoke with fire is svabhāvika, but that of fire with smoke is not, because fire without smoke can be seen as in the case of red-hot iron. Fire is connected with smoke
relationship (svābhāvikāḥ sambandhāḥ), just so is ‘being an effect’ related with ‘an intelligent agent’, for in this case no limiting condition (upādhi) [of the relation] is found, nor is any case of deviation [from the relationship] (vyabhicāra) experienced”.

But this is not correct, for by the word upādhi is meant some other thing by the dependence on which [the probans is related to the probandum, i.e. if x needs z in order to be related with y, this z is called upādhi].

This ‘other thing’, however, is not always perceptible; and it may be existent, though invisible owing to its inaccessibility in place, time or nature. Therefore, there may be an upādhi even in the relation of smoke with fire, and yet it may not be seen. Thus, how can it be ascertained as absent just because it is not cognized?

(41.14) The other reason proposed [by Trilocana], ‘because no deviation is experienced’ is not established because it is doubtful. Even if we do not see deviation repeatedly owing to the lack of other conditions only when it is connected with wet fuel. Thus, when fire is related to smoke, the relation is limited by a contingent condition (upādhi), i.e. wet fuel, and it is not by nature. On the other hand, the relation of smoke with fire is intrinsically necessary because no limiting condition is found here, since no case of deviation is seen, and because we cannot harbour doubt about what is not experienced. You cannot suspect the validity of the intrinsic relation by imposing a limiting condition which is imagined simply because there is neither proof nor disproof and which is actually imperceptible by nature. That is nothing but excessive doubt (saṅkāpiśāci). Therefore, if we do not find a limiting condition in spite of our effort to do so, then we come to know that no limiting condition is existent. And we can ascertain the intrinsic nature of the relation.

271. As explained above, svābhāvikasambandha is a term used by Trilocana and Vācaspati as meaning an intrinsic, necessary relation of a thing with another, its antonym being aupādhi- or sopādhika-sambandha. Ratnakirti’s representation corresponding to the passage that concerns us now runs: (RNA 42, 18–19) svābhāvikās tu dhū́mādīnāṁ vahnyādibhiḥ sambandhāḥ tadupādhiḥ anupalalabhyāmānāvatāt, kvacīd vyabhicārayādārśanād iti tvayavāsya lakṣaṇat āktaṁ. This passage is identical with NVT 139, 2–3, where, however, Vācaspati adds as the third reason anupalabhyāmānāsyapii (vyabhicārasya) kalpanānupepatteḥ (cf. n. 270 above, Ratnakirti’s summary of Vācaspati’s argument). Buddhist reply to this reads (RNA 42, 20–23): etac cāsiddhāham, yata upādhiśabdena svato ‘rthāntaram evapecāṣayiṁ abhidhātayām, na cārthāntaram drṣṭātamiyātām, adṛṣṭasyapii deśakalavabhāvaviprakṛṣṭasya sambhavat. tataḥ ca dhū́masyapii hūtāsena saha sambandhe svād upādhiḥ. na cōpalakṣyata iti kathām adārśanāṁ nāsty eva yатаḥ svābhāvikasambandhasiddīḥ....

The traditional definition of upādhi by the Nyāyāyika after Udayana is: sādhyaśaṣṭa-katve sati sādhanāsvaśaṣṭa-sā不舍. (That which is not a pervader of k, while it is a pervader of s.) Vācaspati, however, explains upādhi by the illustration of wet fuel (NVT 138. 2 f.b.–139.2=RNA 41. 20–22. See n. 270 above). The definition of upādhi in RNA and TBh arthāntaram khiṣci evapecāṣayiṁ is based on this explanation of Vācaspati and perhaps his teacher Trilocana, though it is not verbally found in NVT.

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[for its cognition], we cannot negate [the possibility of deviation] in all the cases. This much [of scrutiny] is not to be blamed for transgressing the established custom of logicians (prāmāṇikalokayātra), for the logician enjoins that doubt should be harboured about anything which is lacking a proof (sādhaka) or disproof (bādhaka). And even if we doubt in such a way, we would not fall into [the fault of] abstaining from action in all cases, for action is possible from doubt as much as from valid knowledge.

(42.2) [The opponent says:]275 “Just as Buddhists call a thing an effect and another a cause, but not everything, despite the fact that all things are not different in respect of their individuality, just so we also maintain that a particular thing such as smoke etc. is connected by an intrinsic relation with [another such as] fire, but not everything [with

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272. RNA 42. 27-29 : kvacit 'vyabhicārasyādāraśanād iti tu yad uktam tat pratyukta eva, adṛṣṭasyāpy upādheḥ sambhāvyamānātād, vyabhicārasya ca pratayāntaraavaihyenaḥ śāduryādāraśane 'pi niśedhām aśakyate... The passage recurs with slight differences in RNA 102, 30-33.

273. Vācaspati argues (RNA 38, 11-13 =100, 10-11 =NVT 139, 9-11) : tasmāt prāmāṇikalokayātāṃ anupālayatā yathādāraśanaḥ sākhaniyam, na to adṛṣṭam apī. viśeṣasmya-peko hi saṁśaya nāsmṛty bhavati, na ca smṛty anamabhūhācara bhavati. The Buddhist replies to it (RNA 43, 1 ff.) : na caitavatā prāmāṇikalokayātātikramaḥ. prāmāṇikair eva sādhakabādhaḥkaṃ pramāṇābāvāve nyāyaprāptasya saṁśayaḥsaṃvādāvāvāvāvaḥhitavāt.

274. Vācaspati argues in NVT 139, 6-7=RNA 38, 9-10 : Excessive suspicion, if it is given an opportunity beyond the limit of the world of knowledge, will move about at liberty and will not be checked anywhere. Thus, one will not take action in any matter (nayam kvacit pravarteta), for all things may be somehow thrown into doubt. See also NVT 139, 21-140.1 : dhīmaviśeṣasya tu vinā vahmin anupalambhād, upādhibhadaya cādṛṣṭyamānasya kalpanāyāṁ pramāṇābhāvād. viśeṣasmya-pekoṣaḥ ca saṁśayasyadupalabdāpavāve anutāpādād, utpade cātīprasaṅgaḥ prekṣavat-praṇātvanavacchadēdat saṁbhoivaḥ sambhāvānuvādāyate. Raktakirti replies to this (RNA 43, 2-3) : na ca sarvatāraṭāpṛavātprasāṅgaḥ, pramāṇāḥ artha-saṁśayāc ca pravṛttārūpapateḥ.

275. Replying to Buddhist logicians, Vācaspati argues that kāryatva is a probans only because it is related to its probandum by svābhāvikasambandha (cf. n. 270 above). Buddhist logicians, criticising this theory, argues (NVT 139, 11-14 =RNA 41, 29-31= RNA 100, 16-18) : If one thing is connected by svābhāvikasambanda with another which is not the former's cause, it would follow that everything is by nature (svaḥāvataḥ) connected with any other; and everything would be inferred from everything. Or on the contrary, if one thing is connected with another because the former is an effect of the latter, why is everything not an effect of any other, since all things are similar in their individuality (anyata). Thus, if (i.e. svābhāvikasambandha) necessarily entails the fault of over-application (atīprasaṅga). To this Vācaspati replies : na bhāvasamabhāvāḥ paryay-nuvajjāḥ, tasmād anyataviśeṣo'pi kīcchid eva kāraṇāḥ kāraṇāḥ ca kīcchid. It is this passage that appears in our text 42. 2-5 in a slightly different form. Mokṣākara ascribes it to Trilocana.
any other]’.

(42.5) This is untenable\(^{276}\). Is svabhāvikasambandha established by a proof (pramāṇa) so that your assertion may be correct, just as the causal relation that a thing called smoke is dependent on fire is established through a proof? Again, what is the meaning of svabhāvikasambandha? There may be three alternative interpretations [of the word]: 1) self-born (svato bhūtah); 2) Born out of its cause (svahetor bhūtah); 3) Born without causes (ahetuka). Among them, however, the first alternative is unreasonable, because it is incongruent that a thing acts upon itself. Nor is the second tenable, because [by asserting it,] you would come to accept the causal relation (tadutpattisambandha) [which the Buddhist holds]. If the third is maintained, the theory of svabhāvikasambandha would be extremely irrational\(^{277}\), as it is not determined in place, time, and nature.

(42.12) Again, a vyāpti is not established\(^{278}\) by the mere existence of an example (drṣṭānta), be it that in agreement or in difference, because otherwise such a relationship would be recognized even between a camel and an ass which happen to be together by accident. Therefore, an instance which is called a corroborative example is applied to a probans in order to recall the proof establishing the necessary relation [of two things], which, once cognized, has been forgotten; but you cannot take up a case of mere accidental proximity (svasaṃnīdhiṁātra) [as a corroborative example]. For, returning to ‘ether’ [which is the instance in difference of your syllogism], it is not known in this case that the absence of the probans [i.e. ‘not being an effect’] is necessitated by the absence of the probandum [i.e. ‘not having an intelligent agent as cause’] because we find in ether not only the absence of an intelligent agent but also the

\(^{276}\) In NVT 139, 15-16 as well as RNA 43. 5-6, the reply of Vācaspati cited above is criticised: You cannot say that the essential nature of a thing is not to be questioned. For the same indisputableness of the nature of a thing (Read svabhāvānanyayo) could be maintained even when things other than effects and causes are supposed to be connected by nature.... Ratnakirti continues his criticism and comes to say (43. 16-20): kim ca svabhāvikasambandha iti ko’rthaḥ. kim svato bhūtah, svahetuto bhūto, ahetuko vēti trayaḥ pakṣāḥ, na tāvād adyaḥ pakṣāḥ, svātmani kāritraśrodhat. dvityapakṣe tu tadutpattir eva sambandho mukhāntareṇa visṛṣṭa iti na kaścid vivādaḥ. ahetukave tu deṣaṅkālasvabhāvaniya-mābhāvaprassagād ity asahgataḥ svabhāvikāḥ sambandhaḥ.

\(^{277}\) asahgataḥ in M is a misprint for asahgatatḥ.

\(^{278}\) Read vyāpti asiddhiḥ instead of vyāptisiddhiḥ in M. according to T (khyab pa grub pa ma yin te) and G.
absence of a not-intelligent cause\textsuperscript{279}. What is the thing which necessitates by its own absence the absence of ‘effect-ness’? This is the question to be solved in order to establish the negative vyāpti (vyatireka), viz., the absence of the probans necessitated by the absence of the probandum. [But it is not known from your example.] You may contend: ‘We see\textsuperscript{280} the positive vyāpti between effect-ness and an intelligent agent in the case of a jar; and this makes us know that in the case of ether too the absence of effect-ness is due to the absence of an intelligent agent alone’. But this is not tenable. For the relation between the two [i. e. ‘effect’ and ‘intelligent agent’], be it that of identity (tādātmya), or causality (tadutpatti) or of intrinsic nature (svabhāvika), has not yet been established by a proof beforehand\textsuperscript{281}.

20.2.2. Vyatireka cannot be established by mere non-perception. (43.5) Furthermore, a negative vyāpti is not established only by non-perception (adarśanamātra). For, by saying that \( h \) is not cognized in the vipakṣa, we mean the absence of the knowledge cognizing it [i.e. \( h \) in the vipakṣa]. And a cognition is the effect of its object, since there is a universal rule that what is not a cause is not an object of cognition. However, we cannot infer the absence of a cause from the absence of its effect, since fire without smoke can [sometimes] be perceived. Your argument [that there is no object when there is no cognition] may be valid if the presence of an object were pervaded by the presence of its cognition; but this vyāpti is an utter impossibility, because, otherwise, it would follow that everyone is omniscient (sarvardarśin). Thus, the negative vyāpti cannot be proved only by non-perception. In this connection the following is said:

Non-perception of [\( h \) in] all the sapakṣa means the uncertainty [of the vyāpti]; non-perception of [\( h \) in] one member of the sapakṣa alone [when \( h \) is seen in others of the sapakṣa] means a deviation [from the vyāpti];

For even a seed that is covered by soil or submerged in water is

\textsuperscript{279} M acetanasya kāraṇasya niṣṭitr nasty eva makes no sense here. G and T (sems pa med paḥi rgyu yaḥ idog pa yod pa kho na ste) agree to the reading niṣṭitr asty eva.

\textsuperscript{280} T rjes su ḥgro ba ma mthoḥ ba las (anuyādarśanād)... ma must be omitted. G 24. 4-5 must be read according to the footnote 1.

\textsuperscript{281} G sambandhaḥ pramānato na prasādhita ity uktam. T agrees with M.
apparently seen to be absent 282.

20.2.3. Vācaspatimisra's objection refuted. (43.15) Vācaspatimśra said: 'Doubt is [wavering knowledge] in which the memory of the details [of an object] is lacking. Therefore, it is customary to doubt when we see an object, [but not when we do not see an object at all.]' 283

To this we reply: That principle is not universally applicable. We will argue, however, having hypothetically admitted it. 284 Seen from your point of view, 'cognizability' (prameyata) 'smokiness' (dhūmatva) and 'being an effect' (kāryatva) are all of the same kind, inasmuch as they all have the common quality of 'being deprived of the relations of identity (tādātmya) and causality (tadupatti), [since you do not accept these two relations]. Among these, prameyatva has been shown to have the fault of deviation; and this makes us throw doubt upon the other two. Thus it is that we doubt what we see 285.

(44.3) Thus, [the Naiyāyika's syllogism for proving the existence of

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282. Our author follows RNA 38, 19-26: tad etat pralāpamātram, na hi mahatēpi pratyayatena vipakṣe nīgamyānāsya hetor adarśanamāṁtya vyatirekāḥ sidhyati. tathā hi vipakṣe hetur nōpalambhaya ity anena tadaupalambhakapramāṇaniāvityir ucyate, pramāṇaḥ ca prameyasya kāryam, nākaraṇam vip三亚 iti nyāyāt. na ca kāryanirvita vāraṇaniāvityir upalabdhaḥ. nirduhāsipī vahner upalambhāt. yadi punah pramāṇasattaya prameyasattā vyāptā syāt tādā yuktam etat. kevalam iyaṃ eva vyāptār asambhavini, sarvasya sarvadarśitvaprasaṅgat. tan nādarśanamāṁtya vyatirekasiddhiḥ. yathākām: sarvādyagātaḥ ca saṁdiśghā svādyogīrīṇi; vindhyādṛśīrandhādārvādī adṛśīvā api sattvataḥ. The last half of the verse at the end (Because rocks, holes, Dūrbhā grass, and so forth on the Vindhya range of hills are really existent though not seen [from a distant place]) differs from that in M. where it reads: bhūjalāntargatasyāpi bijasyātadṛśittarānātā. T sbyaḥ (p. rjan) gi nan du son pahi sa bon yaḥ yod pa niid du mthok bhaḥ phiy ro. Yod should be read med if Skt. is to be followed. sbyaḥ = washed off? rjan=rdsan ma=store room. G reads khalavila (granary pit) for bhūjala-.

283. This contention of Vācaspati is often quoted by Ratnakirti. See, for instance, RNA 38, 11-13: 100, 10-12: tasmāt prāmāṇikaloaśyārām anupālayatā yathādarśanam eva śāṅkaniyam. na t va adṛṣṭam api. viśeṣaṃśṛyapāke ha śaṁśeṣa yo nāsmṛt bhavati, na ca śṛṣṭi anamubhūtacare bhavati (cf. n. 273 above). See also NS 1.1.23: samānānukharmarpattaprapattaperupalādyahunupalādbhyaavasthātas ca viśeṣaṃśṛya vimarśaḥ saṁśeṣaḥ. 284. M tathā hi (kāryatvadhūmatavyaḥ) tadātmatadupattisambandhabhavyagitvena sādhāraṇena dharmena prameyavatadhūmatavākāryatvādānāṁ tannamatenāpi sajātiyatvam. The bracketed words are not found in G. T and are certainly redundant. G -tyāgena for viyogitvena; T agrees with M. G sādhāraṇadharmena for sādhāraṇena dharmena. G. M tamaten, but T and RNA (n. 286) have tivanmatena.

285. RNA 39, 7-10: evam ca sats tadātmyatadupatitilakṣaṇapratibandhavyagitvena sādāraṇena dharmena prameyavatadhūmatavākāryatvādānāṁ tivanmatena sajātyatvāt prameyavatavyabhicāradarśanam eva śaṅkīṃ upasthāpayatītī yathādarśanam evadām āsaṅkitam.
God] cannot escape the criticism that the probans has the fallacy of saṃdīgda-havi-pakṣavyā-vṛttikatva (h’s exclusion from the vipakṣa being doubted); and this is a valid confutation (sadduṣaṇa). He [Vācaspāti] however, objected: “Our probans is not fallacious, and is not to be refuted. By pointing out [a fallacy in it], you have fallen into a position of defeat (nigrāhasthāna) called ‘blaming what is not fallacious’ (adoṣodbhāvana’).

But, contending in this way, the disputant [Vācaspāti] has been contradicted by his own doctrine of a position of defeat called ‘refuting what should not be refuted’ (niranu-oyojānyu-yoga). We should not pay any more attention to this pitiable person (devānāṃ priyaḥ).

20.2.4. The problem of solipsism discussed. (44.9) The objection

286. G asaddo-odbhiivana; T skyon ma yin pa brjod pa seems to agree with M.
287. NS 5, 2, 22 : amitraha-thānā nigrāhasthāvāhīniyago niranuyo-jānyu-yoga.
288. RNA 39, 13ff. : tad evaḥ vipakṣe ’darsanamātreyāga hetor vyātiṣedādayēḥ saṃdīgda-havi-pakṣavyā-vṛttikatvaḥ nāma hetudūṣṇaḥ durvāram eva. atav evadoubhāvād ‘doṣodbhāvānaḥ nāma nigrāhasthānam iti yad anēnedvēdām tad api sāvadyaṃ. pratrayāmin hetau saduṣaṇe parihartaye nāyān hetudaśo’ta na parihartavyo ’syā cūpaṇyāso ’doṣodbhāvānaḥ nāma nigrāhasthānam iti brunnam ayam eva tapasvī svamātena niranuyo-jānyu-yogalakṣaṇaḥ nigrāhasthānaṃ nigrhyata iti kṛpām arhati.

289. §20.2.4 is entirely lacking in G and partially preserved in M, in which the meaning is not very clear: only T has maintained the whole section. Whether the existence of the minds of other persons can be inferred or not is a vexed problem in Buddhist philosophy, since the radical idealism of the Vijñānavādin easily leads to solipsism, while the Sautrāntika as bāhyārtha-vādin used to criticise the former for solipsism. However, the Vijñānavādin does not always hold solipsism. In fact, he recognizes the existence of other people’s minds in the sense of saṃ-vārtisaya, i.e. he thinks that the existence of other persons’ minds as representations of one’s own mind is established in the domain of logic; but in his epistemology, which is a radical empiricism, he says that all things are representations of one’s own mind, and that therefore the existence of another personality independent of one’s own cannot be proved in the sense of paramārtha. Thus, it is often found that one and the same Vijñānavādin proves sometimes the existence of saṃ-vārtisaya and another time disproves it. Ratnakirti wrote Saṃ-tānān-taraduṣṇa in which he demolished the opponent’s inference of other people’s minds from the standpoint of paramārtha; but in his Īśvarasādhanaduṣṇa, in which he argues from the standpoint of the Sautrāntika or the saṃ-vārtisaya of the Vijñānavāda, he says that the inference of the existence of saṃ-tānāntara is logically valid, whereas the inference of the existence of God is not. Regarding this double attitude toward the problem, see Introduction to my paper ‘Buddhist solipsism—a free translation of Ratnakirti’s Saṃ-tānān-taraduṣṇa’ (IBK Vol. XIII, no. 1. pp. 9-24). In the Tibetan version of §20.2.4 Mokṣākara follows Ratnakirti as asserting that saṃ-tānāntara exists.

Mokṣākara’s argument found in T is merely a digest of Ratnakirti’s discussion and can be reconstructed by the light of the latter’s passages in RNA. The Tibetan is once restored into Skt. by Iyengar in M Appendix III. But we can better it now that RNA is published. The following are Tibetan text and a Skt. reconstruction. The fragments
may be raised: “If vyāpti—since it is grasped by direct perception and non-perception—were a relation which holds between universals related as cause and effect only when both are perceptible, as in the example of the universals ‘smoke’ and ‘fire’, then one could not infer the existence of other personalities, since the mind of another person, being invisible by

in M are retained so far as they are identical with T. My tr. is based on T in principle.

Tibetan: तो ना बतर रुह बाहि मे दाह दु बा स्पिय दाग गि बाहि दु बतर (प. न. लटर) रुह बाहि बदग निद को नाहि हब्रास बा रुह रुह ग्यु त्य दाग निद की क्हयाब पा मन्न सुम (दाह) (Read so instead of gyis) मि (द. नि) द्मिग्स पा ला यिन ना देि त्से ग्जान ग्यिस (न. ग्यिस) सेंस र्जेस सुंदाग पा लाम्स ते. ग्जान ग्यि सेंस नि बतर मि रुह ना निद की क्हयाब पा ह्द्सिन पाहि दुस ना मन दु ह्दुस पा मा यिन पाहि फ्यिर रो जे से मा मा यिन ते. गाह गि फ्यिर राॅह रिज पा नि देि क्हयाब पा ह्द्सिन पा णो स्ते. राॅह दाह ग्जान ग्यि र्ग्यु दू सून बाहि राह रिज पा त्साम ला लिन्स (द. ल्तोस) णा सा. ग्जान ग्यि सेंस क्याह बतर रुह बा त्साम निद की फ्यिर रो. याह ना बतर रुह बाहि लस दाह द्बेिर मेद पर ह्जुग पा निद क्यि फ्यिर ग्जान ग्यि सेंस क्याह बतर रुह बा निद दो. देि लटर था शहाद बय्द पा नि गाह गिस ह्दी याह बतर रुह बर ह्ग्युर बा द्बाह पाहि म्णो सुम त्साम ग्यि ब्लो दे इण्डा पा त्साम माम. द्सा-था-रा ट्सी-ट्रा ला सोग्स पा थुन मोह पाहि मे त्साम स्प्यो दु दि रिग्स पा याह मा यिन ते. देि ह्फ्यिर बतर रुह बा खो नाहि मेस दु बा ला क्हयाब पा ग्रुि पा खेस ग्नास सो. राॅह दाह ग्जान ग्यि र्ग्यु दू थुन मोह पा बतर मि रुह बाहि सेंस त्साम ग्यि सुम त्साम ग्यु बा ग्यो बा ला सोग्स पा ला क्हयाब पा ह्द्सिन पा (प. इंरेट्स मि ब्येड पा) मि रिग्स पाहि फ्यिर रो खेस क्याह ब्रज्रोद पर [मि] (Inserted by the translator) भ्याहो (न. ग्यिस) डों ग्नास पा ला मि. राॅह दाह (न. द्बाह) ग्जान ग्यि र्ग्यु दू थुन मोह पाहि सेंस त्साम नि ग्यो बा ला सोग्स पा क्हयाब (प. न. द. क्हयाद) पर ब्येड पा रिग्स सो. देि लटर बतर रुह बाहि बदग निद दाम बतर रुह बा दाह न्माम पर भ्येद (द. द्बेि बा) मेद पर ह्जुग पाहि द्बोस पा ग्निस नि था श्नाह पाहि शिन तु ग्जैल पाहि बाहि म्णो सुम त्साम ग्यि पा द्बाह क्हयाब पा ह्द्सिन पा याह स्ते. देि ल्ता बु निद मेद पर ब्यास (प. न. द. मा ब्यास) पा द्बाह इण्डा पा (लटर) (Inserted by the translator) मि रुह बा दाह थुन मोह पाहि सेंस त्साम ग्यि मि मा यिन नो खेस पा र्ग्यु (प. र्ग्यु) ग्जान ग्यि र्जेस सुंदाग पर रिग्स सो. देि ह्फ्यिर गल ते म्णो सुम दाह मि द्मिग्स पा दाग गिस क्हयाब पा ह्द्सिन पा देि त्से बतर रुह बा खो नस बतर रुह बा लाहो खेस रिग्स पाहो. (Td 355. b-356a ; p 384a-b ; n 397b)

Sanskrit restoration: नणु यादी ध्र्यायनिधुहसामययोर इव ध्र्यायनोर्वा कृयाका्रणसामययोऽपथयेकांसुपालंब्हतो योपिस. तदा सांहितान्तारायमानाव् नास्य (T lit. paricitānāmānakṣatāḥ). paracittasyādyātvakhatayā vyāptirgraṇaḥkāle nantarbhāvād iti cen na. svasaṃvedanaḥ hi tatra vīpyātgrassah. svaparacittānagatavasvedavanamārāpe-kṣayā para-cittasyādi dhṛtyavāt. atha dhṛtyāsirīṇa sahāvinirbhāgavartiśvād paracittasyādi dhṛtyēvam. na 'caivaṃ yāvahārikendraiyapratiyōṣamātrasya buddhānāmātṛam jātharacitāna-sādhāraṇāṃ vahnimātraṃ vā gocare yujyate, yenāsdhi dhṛtyā saḥ yāt; tasmād dhṛtyena vahāna vahāna dhūmasa vyāptisiddhir iti sthitam; svaparacittānāsādbhāraṇādyācittamātṛatrayaḥ pratyakṣeṇa dhṛtyacalanaṃdāy vīpyātgrahayā nā yuktam’ ity api vācyam. bāhāyārthasthitah hi svaparacittāna-sādbhāraṇāṣya cinnātāsa svaruṇapādrīvyāto 'pi dhṛtyāsirīṇa sahaikāsāmagraipti-bandhāḥ; avinirbhāgavarti svaparacittānāsādbhāraṇāṃ cinnātāsa kampād yāpākaḥ adhigamyate. tad evaṃ dhṛtyātmano dhṛtyāvinirbhāgavartino vā padarthādyaśya vyaḥārikapā-ṭuprāyakṣetaḥ siddhir vīpyātgrahaḥ ca. na tu tathāvānavināyādvyāsādbhāraṇacinnātāsyāti saṁtāntāntāruṇāmānam ucitam. tasmād yādi pratyakṣānapalambhābhāhāḥ vīpyātgrahas tadā dhṛtyenaiva dhṛtyasyātyā nīyāḥ. (Cf. RNA 40.3 f. b.-1 f. b.; 139. 6-9; 138.8 f. b.-4; 40. 1f. b-41.7).
nature, is not comprised [in the situation] at the time when the vyāpti is [said to be] grasped”.

But this is not acceptable, for in this situation self-consciousness is the factor which brings about the knowledge of the vyāpti; because, on the basis of self-consciousness in general, located in one’s own and in another’s personality, the mind of another person is [in this sense] visible. Or alternatively, the mind of another person is ‘visible’ because it always occurs in conjunction with a visible body.

Nor is the following objection tenable: “If this were so, an intelligent being in general, or fire in general common to the fire of digestion or of a picture, would properly come within the range of normal sensory perception in general, so as to be visible; [and this is obviously not so]. Therefore, vyāpti is established only between visible fire and smoke, and it is not valid to assert by direct perception a vyāpti between the motions [of a body] which are visible and non-visible minds common to one’s own personality and the personalities of others, [since this rests on an illicit extrapolation from data visible to sense-perception]”.

[This argument is not correct] because, although a mind in general common to one’s own personality and the personalities of others is by nature invisible, it is related to a visible body so as to form a single unity, so far as we admit the existence of the external object. And such a mind in general as occurs inseparably [with a visible external object], though common to one’s own personality and the personalities of others, is known to be the pervader of the motions [of a body]. Thus, two objects, when they are by nature visible or occur inseparably with a visible thing, are established by clear normal perception; and the vyāpti between them is also grasped. But this does not hold good when a mind in general common even to invisible persons is concerned, since it is deprived of the said relation [to a visible body]. After all, therefore, another personality can be inferred. It is in this sense that the rule is set forth that a vyāpti, when it is grasped by direct perception and non-perception, holds good only between two visible things.

20.2.5. Other fallacies of the proof of God are pointed out. (45.1) Again, if your reasoning is aimed at proving that [an effect] presupposes [as its cause] an intelligent being in general, the proof is to be criticised for asserting the obvious (siddhasādhanatā). [For we admit that all ef-
fects are produced by actions, which are caused by the mind.)

Alternatively if the precedent existence of the intelligent agent who is qualified by uniqueness, permanence, omniscience and other qualities, is to be proved, the vyāpti between the probans ‘effect’ and the probandum ‘[the intelligent agent] qualified by such special qualities’ cannot be established in the locus of your corroborative instance [e. g. a jar] by means of any valid cognition, [for a potter is not omniscient etc.]. Thus, your reasoning is inconclusive (anaikāntikatva).290

(45.5) You may contend: “We grasp the vyāpti [between h and s] referring to [an intelligent being] in general, and then prove the existence of [the intelligent being qualified by] the particular qualities on the basis of h [effect] being found in p [trees, earth etc.] (pakṣadharma).” But this is not allowed. You may establish by virtue of pakṣadharma the specific qualities belonging to s only when h does not fail to occur in p together with the qualities. For example, from smoke is inferred a general quality of fire, ‘its occurrence on a mountain’291, but not particular qualities [of fire] such as ‘being caused by grass’. For we see smoke [caused by the leaves of trees]292 on a mountain, even if there is no grass. Likewise, if you mean the existence of an intelligent being with a physical body, let it be proved ; but not his omniscience which is absolutely not the case. An effect can be produced without an omniscient being293.

290. RNA 30, 15-16 : nanu buddhimatpūrvakatve sādhye siddhasādanam, abhimataṁ hi paresām api karmajatvaṁ kāryajātasya, karmāṇaṁ ca cetanātmakatvāt cetanāhātukatvād va ; taddhetukatvān ca jagataḥ. At the beginning of his Iśvaraśudhānaṉāya Ratnakirti profusely cites arguments from the Nyāyaśāstra ; for the passage which concerns us now see NKn 212, 14ff. Mokṣākara’s discussion in § 20.2.5 which is closely related to RNA has much to do with NKn too. See also RNA 30, 16-17 : sarvajñāpūrvakatve tu sādhyaśaśīptah svapne'pi nūpalabdhah, drṣṭaṁ ca sādhyahinah, kulādīnām asarvajñatvāt. ; 49, 14ff. : yad etat kāryatvaṁ sādhanaṁ kum anena viśvasya buddhimantrāpūrvakatvaṁ sādhyaṁ, āho svād ekatvaṁbhūtasarvajñatvaniyatvādiguṇaviṣṭaḥbhudhipūrvakatvaṁ. prathama-pakṣe siddhasādanam, doitye tu vyāptar ahāvāv ahānāṃkātva.

291. M parvalaśāṣeṣitvā, but G parvalaikadesāṣeṣitvā and T (n. p) dper na du ba las du baḥi phyogs su Ḥjug pa Ḥnid kyi me bzin no (=dhūmād dhūmādāśeṣiṣṭitvasya...). Tp has la laḥi instead of las du baḥi. but it is misleading.

292. M tāṅtatiṁ antareṇāḥi parvate dhūmaḍarśanaṁ ; G... api pāṛṇaṁ atmahāyasya san-bhavāt ; T śīḥ gi lo ma las byuḥ ba Ḥnid Ḥlas.

293. This paragraph is an abbreviation of RNA 30, 22-31.5 which consists of citations from NKn (sāmānyaśaśeṣiyāḥ aśiḥ antarbhāvālaśeṣaḥ samānyasya pakṣadharma- tāvāsaṇa sādhyadharmaḥ anumaṇād viśeṣaśiṣṭasya anumāṇaḥ bhavaty eva... and The Buddhist reply to it). See also RNA 49, 17ff. : nanu sāmānyena vyāptau pratitāyaiṁ api pakṣa- dharmatābalād viśeṣaśiddhiḥ... and Ratnakirti’s reply to it.
On omniscience cannot be proved even by [supposing the agent’s] being perfectly conversant with [the nature,] materials, [auxiliary causes, recipients, objects to be given etc. of the world] \( \text{upādānādyabhijñātv} \).\(^{294}\)

It might be proved if the uniqueness [of the intelligent being] were beforehand established, which is, however, not the case.\(^{295}\) For ‘effect’ is made possible even by the ‘previous existence of plural agents’ as e. g. an ant-hill is made by a number of insects. If you mean by the probandum that an ant-hill also presupposes the supervision of God, then how can you set forth as the corroborative instance a jar, which according to you would also presuppose the unique, omniscient God [and which would be a part of \( \rho \)]? Or else, how can you deprive a potter of his agent-ness which is actually experienced? How again can you remove the cause-ness of the insects which is also well known? You may not assume that if there are many agents there would be differences of opinion [which may hinder producing an effect], just because we actually see [an ant-hill being made by many insects].\(^{296}\)

Therefore, it is settled that the universal vyāpti between the probans and the probandum must be shown in reference to the locus of the corroborative instance through the means of valid knowledge.\(^{297}\)

Moreover, when the probandum is the intelligent being who is permanent, unique and omniscient, your [probans] is incompatible \( \text{(viruddha)}. \) For ‘effect’ is actually pervaded by ‘having intelligent agents who are impermanent, plural and of imperfect knowledge.’ The kind of probans proving that which is incompatible with the probandum is called ‘incompatible hetu’; and your probans proves what is incompatible with the probandum.\(^{298}\)

So much for our treatise demonstrating the criticisms of...
God which had incidentally become a topic.···299

21. Relation of anvaya and vyatireka. (46.8) [Objection: ] “In the syllogism by the method of agreement the anvaya alone is stated, but not the vyatireka; and in the syllogism by the method of difference the vyatireka alone is stated, but not the anvaya. How then can you say that the three characteristics of the probans are stated by [each of] these two syllogisms?”

[Answer: ] This is not a fault. For even when a syllogism is formulated by the method of agreement, the vyatireka is also understood by implication. And on the other hand, if the vyatireka is not grasped, the error (viparyaya) must be pointed out by supposing that the probans is not absent even when the probandum is absent. If so, even the anvaya would be invalid, because it is implied that the probandum is not present even when the probans is present. In the same way, when a syllogism is formulated by the method of difference the anvaya is also understood by implication. For if the anvaya is not grasped in this case, the error must be pointed out by supposing that the probandum may not be present even when the probans is; and this renders even the vyatireka invalid, since it is implied that the probans is present even in the absence of the probandum. Thus both the syllogisms manifest in effect the three characteristics of the probans; and there is no fault [in our theory]300.

22. Antarvyāpti and bahirvyāpti. (47.1) Now, the following summary is given in order to make two problems easily understood: In what locus is vyāpti between h (sādhanā) and s (sādhyā) grasped? By what proof is it grasped?

Regarding the vyāpti between ‘existence’ (sattva), h as essential nature (svabhāvahetu), and ‘momentariness’ (kṣaṇikatva) some logicians are of the opinion that it is to be grasped in p (sādhyadharmin) itself; they maintain the theory of intrinsic pervasion (antarvyāpti)301.

300. This problem is discussed in NB III s. 28-32 and NBT. (NBT 51. 1-2): nanu ca sādhamyavati vyatireka nāktaḥ, vaidharmyavati cānvayaḥ; tat katham etat trirūpālingākkhyānam ity āhā. (NB III. s. 28) sādhamyēṇāpi hi prayogērthād vaidharmyagatiḥ. tathā vaidharmyēṇāpy anvayagatiḥ; (s. 31) asati tasmin sādhyābhāve hetvabhāvasyāsīdṛdeḥ.

301. So far as I know, Ratnakarasanti is the only Buddhist logician who openly propounded the theory of intrinsic determination of universal concomitance (antarvyāptivāda). He wrote the Antarvyāptisamarthana (SBNT 103-114), maintaining that the vyāpti between ‘existence’ and ‘momentariness’ is grasped in p itself by means of viparyaya-bāḍhakakrapamāya (cf. §24.1). He discarded the necessity of a corroborative example and said
Others hold that the same vyāpti is to be grasped in dp (drṣṭānta-dharmin), say, a jar, by means of reasoning to an undesired conclusion (prasāṅga) and its reduction into a normal syllogism (prasāṅgaviparyaya); they maintain the theory of extrinsic pervasion (bahirvyāpti)\textsuperscript{302}.

As for hetus as essential nature other than that of ‘existence’, hetus as effect and hetus as non-cognition, the vyāpti is to be grasped in d.

[To be more precise] the vyāpti between ‘aśoka tree’ and its propandum ‘to be called a tree’ is grasped in reference to a corroborative instance by means of perception and non-perception (pratyakṣanupalambha); the vyāpti between ‘existence’ and ‘momentariness’ is grasped by two proofs, prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya, or by the proof which refutes the opposite of the assertion to be proved and which is aimed at excluding successive and simultaneous action [the pervader of effective action or existence] from [what is not momentary, i.e. the permanent] (sādhyaviparyayabādhakapramāṇena kramayugapadyānīvīrtiśiṣṭanena)\textsuperscript{303}. This vipakṣa taken as the locus [of the sādhyaviparyayabādhakapramāṇa, i.e. what is not momentary] is not definite as to its reality, and is regarded as real when considered to be established by self-consciousness and as unreal when considered to be just imaginary\textsuperscript{304}.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[302.] Buddhist logicians in general maintain bahirvyāptivāda; at the later stage of Buddhist logic Jánaśrimitra and Ratnakirti asserted it in contrast to antarvyāptivāda held by Ratnakarasānti. The former two logicians recognized the necessity of a corroborative example even in the inference of the Buddhist theory of universal momentariness, though they are not so far from Ratnakarasānti inasmuch as they also rely on viParyayabādhakapramāṇa when determining the vyāpti between existence and momentariness. See Jánaśrimitra, Kṣaṇabhāṅgādhyāya; Ratnakirti’s digest of it, Kṣaṇabhāṅgasiddhi, of which a detailed exposition is supplied by Mookerjee, 1-83. prasaṅga, prasāṅgaviparyaya, and viparyayabādhakapramāṇa are illustrated in § 24.1, where our author again follows Ratnakirti. See § 24.1.

\item[303.] See § 24.1.

\item[304.] The p of the viparyayabādhakapramāṇa formulated by Buddhist logicians (cf. § 24.1), viz. ‘the permanent’, is not real for Buddhists. Thus, the inference necessarily contains the fallacy of asiddhi. The Naiyāyika vehemently attacked this point and Ratnakirti in RNA 78 ff. tries to prove that even the idea of ‘the permanent’ has a kind of reality and can be put forward as the subject of a proposition. The discussion is interpreted in Mookerjee 24 ff. See also my paper ラトナキールチの帰謬論証と内遍充論の生成 (堺本博士頒寿記念仏教学論集 264-270.) But our author here seems to refer also to the theory of the Sākāravijñānavādī yogācārī who admits that every content of self-consciousness is real.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
The *vyāpti* between ‘smoke’, *h* as effect, and ‘fire’ is grasped in a *dp* such as a kitchen; and it is grasped by means of threefold cognition consisting of perception and non-perception (*trividhapratyakṣānupalambha*) [according to some], or by fivefold cognition consisting of perception and non-perception (*pañcavidhapratyakṣānupalambha*) [according to others]\(^{305}\).

The *vyāpti* between ‘non-perception’ and ‘to be called non-existent’ is grasped by the perception [of things other than the denied object].

As for other cases, be they *h* as essential nature or as effect, we should grasp the *vyāpti* by making appropriate deductions according to the nature of a case.

23. **Untrue vyāpti effects the fallacy of anaikāntikatva.** (47.19)

When *vyāpti* is not definite, the probans has the fallacy of inconclusiveness. And this [inconclusive probans] is threefold: inconclusive due to *h* being subsistent only in *p* (*asādhāraṇānaikāntika*); inconclusive due to *h* being non-exclusive (*sādhāraṇānaikāntika*); inconclusive due to *h*’s non-occurrence in the *vipākṣa* being doubtful (*samādghavipākṣavyāvṛttiḥ*)\(^{306}\). Of these, an *asādhāraṇānaikāntika* [-hetu] is illustrated: [This] living body

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305. In the Buddhist logic, causality (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*), which together with identity (*svabhāva*) forms the two principles of valid pervasion (*vyāpti*) between the probans and the probandum, is said to be inductively understood through positive and negative perception (*pratyakṣānupalambha*). *Pratyakṣānupalambha* here means the observation of the concomitance in agreement, as well as in difference, of a cause and an effect. The theory was first propounded by Dharmakirti and was maintained throughout the subsequent development of Indian Buddhist logic. However, Dharmakirti did not definitely prescribe how many times cognitions are required as indispensable for determining a causal relation. Hence, the logicians following him came to hold different opinions on this point. The causal relation of fire and smoke, for instance, can be ascertained if we observe that smoke, which has not been there, occurs when fire has appeared, and that when the fire has gone, the smoke disappears as well. In this illustration we can count one prior non-perception of smoke, two successive perceptions (fire and smoke), and two successive non-perceptions (no fire and no smoke). Thus, some of Buddhist logicians, such as Dharmottara, asserted that all five of these cognitions are indispensable. Others such as Jñānaśrīmitra, however, thought that either 1) one prior non-perception of fire and smoke as a unit, followed by two successive perceptions, or 2) one perception grasping fire and smoke together and followed by two successive non-perceptions can severally determine a causal relation without requiring all five, for either group contains in itself both perception and non-perception which respectively prove the concomitance in agreement and that in difference. Thus, in this theory the number of indispensable cognitions is reduced to three. I discussed the history of this problem in detail with an English translation of Jñānaśrīmitra’s *Kāryakāraṇabhāvasiddhi* in my paper ‘Trikapancakacintā. Development of the Buddhist theory on the determination of causality’. MIK Nos. 4-5. 1-15.

306. See § 10; 10. 2. 4 with notes.
is endowed with a soul, because it has breathing and other characteristics like another living body and unlike a jar. We are not certain if this proban[s] is pervaded by a soul in the case of another living body; and we are also not certain if in the case of a vipakṣa, jar, breathing is not found exactly because it has no soul; however, it is somehow found in p, this living body. For these reasons, it is called an exclusive, inconclusive hetu. Another illustration of asādhāraṇa: Sound is impermanent because it is audible like a jar and unlike ether [where a homologous example is not available, since a jar is not audible]. Sādhāraṇānākaṅṭika [-hetu] is illustrated: Sound is permanent, because it is an object of cognition like a jar and unlike ether. Saṃdiḡdha vipakṣaṇavārāttika [-hetu] is illustrated: He must be black, because he is a son of that man as other sons of that man who are actually seen.

24. Prasaṅga defined. (48.11) We have said before that the vyāpti between ‘existence’ and ‘momentariness’ is to be understood by prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya. What is here meant by prasaṅga? Prasaṅga is reasoning for bringing out an absurd conclusion which is undesirable to the opponent by means of a statement based on a vyāpti established by proof (pramāṇaprasiddhavyāptikena vākyena parasyāṇiṣṭāpādanāya prasaṅjanam prasaṅgaḥ).

24.1. Illustrations of prasaṅga, prasaṅgaviparyaya, and sādhyavipar-
yayābādhakapramāṇa. (Td. 358, a 2) For example, if a jar [(at the present moment)] were admitted to maintain one and the same nature that subsisted in the past and will continue to do so in the future, then we could point out [(the absurdity)] that it is [(at the present moment)] capable of producing the effects belonging to the past and future [(moments of)

dah ma ṣhok paḥi dus kyi ḍhos paḥi don bya ba (d. adds daḥ) da ltar gyi dus su mi byed do ḍesa (p. 387a) khyab par byed pa mi dmigs paḥo. ḍhrel pa las nus pa med paḥi skad cig pa ni ḍhijig go ḍesa pa thal bar ḍgyur ba daḥ that ba las b[zlo g paḥi tshad ma dag gis yod pa ḍiḥ la skad cig pa ḍiḥ kyi(s) khyab pa ḍhgrub po. bsgrub par bya ba las b[zlo g pa (p. la) gnod pa can gyi tshad mas sam ḍesa [da] ḍer pa de brjod par bya ste. gah ḍig rim gyis ḍbras bu byed pa ḍiḥ daḥ rim pa ma yin par ḍbras bu byed pa ḍiḥ du yod pa ma yin pa de ni don bya ba nus pa ma yin te. ḍder na nam mḥaḥi pa-[ma] ḍzin; skad cig ma yin par yah rim gyis ḍbras bu byed pa ḍiḥ daḥ. rim ma yin par ḍbras bu byed pa ḍiḥ dag yod pa ma yin no ḍesa pa khyab byed mi dmigs paḥi mṭshan ḍiḥ can b[zlo g pa la gnod pa can gyi tshad mas, skad cig ma yin pa ḍiḥ las khyab pa (p. omits pa) byed rim dah daḥ cig car b[zlo g ḍzin b[zlo paḥi. don bya ba byed pa ḍiḥ kyi mṭshan ḍiḥ can po bya ma ḍiḥ ni skad cig pa ḍiḥ las ḍa med do
[Read skad cig pa la ḍa baḥo], (Td. 358 b) de nas skad cig pa ḍiḥ kyi khyab po ḍes yod pa ḍiḥ la skad cig pa ḍiḥ kyi khyab pa ḍhgrub po ḍes paḥo.

Sanskrit translation; yathā gaḥṭāḍīnām1 atītānāgatābādhyāyo śvarūpaikāraṇīyaprasaṅgaṁ. tathā hi, yad yādā yathāyāsamārthaṁ tat tādā (tattva)2 karoty eva, yathā (antya)ākaraṇāsāmagri svakāryam; atītānāgatābādhyāvi-

kāryajananasamārthāṁ edyam ghaṇo vartamānākāle 'ṛṭi svabāhavetuprasaṅgaḥ. na karotīti ca viṇaṃśyaḥ, yad yādā yan na karoti na tat tādā tatra samārthaṁ. yathā sāyāṅkūram akurvan krodraḥ śāyaṅkure; na karoti caiṣa ghaṇo vartamānākāle1 atītānāgatābādhyāyāṃ iti śiṣṭaḥ kramaṇaḥ bhaddiḥ, sambandaḥ asamaṃśyaḥ niṃtarta iti3 prasaṅgaḥprasaṅgaviṇaṃśyaḥ bhāyantāṁ sattvasya kṣaṇikavetanāṃ vyāptīs sidhyati.

sāyaṅviṇaṃśyabādhyakapramaṇāṇa vṛṭy uktam tadd ucyatam, yat kramākāryaḥkārakāryaḥ kṣaṇyākāryaḥ ca na bhavati na tadd aṭṭha kramaḥsāmyātmaḥ, yathā vyomapadmaṃ; na vidyete cākṣaṇikasya kramākāryaḥkārakāryaḥ kṣaṇyākārye iti vyāpākūrṇapalabhiḥkāraṇaḥ4viṇaṃśyaḥ-bādhyakapramaṇaḥkṣaṇikācārād5 vyāpakaḥ kramaṇaḥvyapṛtyaḥ śivavāṣya iti śivavāṣyaḥ-kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥkārakṛtyaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥkārakṛtyabhisāmyaḥ/ 'tīti śivavāṣyaḥ kramākāryaḥkārakāryaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥkārakṛtyaḥ sattvaḥ śivaḥ kṣaṇikavetanāṃ vyāptīṃ sattvaḥkṣaṇikavetanāṃ vyāptīṃ siddhānti.

Notes: (1) grub pa la sogs pa rum lit. means siddhaḥśāntām which Iyengar restores. But siddhaḥ or prasiddhaḥ (things well known) is very unlikely though not absolutely impossible. 1 assume this is a mistake for bum pa due to the orthographical similarity, though no Tibetan ed. gives this reading. (2) T drops tat. Cf. RNA 63. 14–17 : yad yādā yaj jananaśyavahārayaḥ tat tādā tat janasyā eva, yathāntyaḥ karaṇāsāmagri svakāryam; atītānāgatākṣaṇabādhyāyāṃ kramaṇaḥ ghaṇo vartamānāḥbhādhyākāryaḥkārakāle sa-
kalaśkriyātikramaṇe 'ṛṭi svabhāvavetuprasaṅgaḥ. (3) T omits antyā, which, however, is very important in this context. (4) RNA 64. 8–11 : yad yādā yan na karoti na tat tādā tatra samārthaḥvyahārayaḥ yātathā sāyāṅkūram akurvan krodraḥ śāyaṅkure; na karoti caiṣa ghaṇo vartamānāḥbhādhyākāryaḥkārakāle sakalaśkriyātikramaṇe 'ṛṭi svabhāvavetuprasaṅgaḥ. (5) RNA 77, 11–12 : yasya kramākramas na vidyete na tasyāṭthaḥsāmyātmaḥ. yathā śāśvati-

sāmyaḥ; na vidyete cākṣaṇikasya kramākramāḥ śivavāṣyaḥ śivavāṣyaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥ śivavāṣyaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥ śivavāṣyaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥ śivavāṣyaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥ śivavāṣyaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥ śivavāṣyaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥ śivavāṣyaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥ śivavāṣyaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥ śivavāṣyaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥ śivavāṣyaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥ śivavāṣyaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥ śivavāṣyaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥ śivavāṣyaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥ śivavāṣyaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥ śivavāṣyaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥ śivavāṣyaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥ śivavāṣyaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥ śivavāṣyaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥ śivavāṣyaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥ śivavāṣyaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥ śivavāṣyaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥ śivavāṣyaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥ śivavāṣyaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥ śivavāṣyaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥ śivavāṣyaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥ śivavāṣyaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥ śivavāṣyaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥ śivavāṣyaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥ śivavāṣyaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥ śivavāṣyaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥ śivavāṣyaḥ kṣaṇikāvṛtiṣaḥ śivavāṣyaḥ
the jar]. For [it is inferred in the following way]:

Whatever is capable of a certain action at a certain time, does make that [action] at that time, as e.g. the totality of cause and conditions at its last moment is capable of producing its own effect;

[According to the Naiyāyika], this jar is capable even at the present moment of producing the effects belonging to the past and future time;

[Therefore, this jar should produce the effects of the past and future, which is absurd].

This is a *prasāṅga* formulated with a logical mark of essential identity.

The (*prasāṅga-*) *viparyaya* can be formulated by adopting ‘not producing’ [as *h*]:

Whatever does not produce a certain effect at a certain moment is incapable of producing that effect at that time as e.g. a grain seed which cannot produce a rice-shoot is incapable of producing a rice [-shoot];

This jar does not produce at the present moment the effects belonging to the past and future;

[Therefore, it is incapable of producing them, i.e. not permanent].

We have said that [the same *vyāpti* is proved] also by the *sādhyaviṇāyaya-bādhakāprāmaṇa*. This is to be stated:

Whatever does not possess causal efficiency in succession or in simultaneity, is not capable of causal action as e.g. the sky-lotus;

What is not momentary does not possess causal efficiency in succession and in simultaneity;

[Therefore, it is not capable of causal action, i.e. not existent].
This is an inference sublating the opposite of the assertion to be proved (sādhya vāpi paryaya bādhaka), formulated according to the formula of vyāpakānupalabdhi. Through this inference is excluded the pervader [of ‘existence’], ‘succession and non-succession’ from the non-momentary: and so ‘existence’ defined as ‘being causally efficient’ (arthakriyākārītva), [the pervaded], which is also excluded from the non-momentary, necessarily rests with the momentary; therefore ‘existence’ is pervaded by ‘momentariness’. Thus, the vyāpti between ‘existence’ and ‘momentariness’ has been established.

24.2. (48.15) [Another example of prasaṅga is seen when] we deduce the plurality of a universal, when it is admitted [by the opponent] that a single universal (sāmānya) abides in many individuals. For the inference is formulated as follows:

Whatever abides in many things [at the same time] must be plural, as e. g. the fruits of the fan-palm contained in many vessels;

A universal is said to abide in many;

[The absurdity that] follows is: Therefore, a universal must be plural. [You have to admit this absurd conclusion], or if you do not admit it, you may not assert the occurrence of a universal in many individuals.

24.3. Function of prasaṅga. (49.1) [objection:] ‘This inference called prasaṅga cannot be a valid means of proof since [h in this case] does not possess the three characteristics [of the valid probans]312. How can you argue by means of it?’313 [Answer:] Prasaṅga is used in the same way as one term of a vyāpti314 is stated in order to recollect

311. For vyāpakānupalabdhi see n. 212 and 216 above.
312. M nanu yady etat prasaṅgākhyām sādhanaṁ pramāṇam na bhavati tairūpyābhāvāt. tairūpyābhāvāt omitted in G, T; prasaṅgākhyām sādhanaṁ omitted in G.
313. In Indian logic the validity of hypothetical inference had long been disapproved both by the Naiyāyika and the earlier Buddhist school of logic. The three characteristics of a logical mark are possible only of catégorical inference or what is called suatantramāna (independent inference). In prasaṅga-anumāna, which is hypothetical destructive inference, h’s subsistence in p is not real to one who formulates the prasaṅga, and breaches the first characteristic, which causes the fallacy of asiddhi. The conclusion deduced is evidently false to one who infers, which is not allowed in the case of independent inference. The Naiyāyika, who called this form of inference tarka, classified it under false knowledge, though they admitted its value as complementary means of an independent inference. Later Buddhist logicians, however, came to recognize prasaṅga as a valid inference.
314. M vyāpy ākadeśa-, but G, T vyāpye kadeśa.
the *vyāpti* itself. It is said [by Dharmakirti]:

*Prasāṅga* may be applied to show that when two terms are necessarily connected, the absence of one of them [viz., the absence of the pervader, necessarily] implies the absence of the other [the pervaded].

The meaning of this half-verse is as follows: When the universal concomitance between the pervaded and the pervader is admitted, if the pervader is not recognized [in a certain locus], the existence of the pervaded is also not allowed there. In other words, when the pervaded is recognized, the pervader is to be necessarily recognized.

25. **Confutation.** (49.7) According to the rule, when a debater has stated a proof, the opponent is to make a confutation (*duśāṇa*) of it. Confutation consists in pointing out the fallacy due to any illegitimate, incompatible or inconclusive *hetu* as defined [by Dharmakirti]:

Confutation is pointing out the defect [of an inference].

[Objection:] “If Confutation consists of pointing out these [three kinds of fallacies] alone, where are others such as useless argument (*vaiyarthya*), inefficient argument (*asāmarthyā*), unwarranted stretch of a rule (*atiprasāṅga*) etc. included?”

[Answer:] They are included in the same three fallacies. Of these, the useless argument can be included in the ‘*asiddha*’. For a probans is said to be a quality of *p* which is not yet determined [as to its relation to the probandum] (*samdigdhasādhyadharma*); and when useless argument is made of a certain thing, the probans fails to conform to the [above mentioned] definition of a probans, ‘being a quality of *p* which is not yet determined [as to its relation to the probandum]’. Thus it can be called [a sort of] *asiddha*, [because the essential characteristic of a probans is not existent in this case].

The following is said [by Dharmakirti in connection with this]:

A probans is stated concerning only a *p* which is not yet ascertained [to be *s* or non-*s*]; and what has been rejected [to be *s* by other

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315. PV IV, v. 12c–d: *prasaṅga dvayasambandhād ekābhāve 'nyahānaye*. Rāhula San-kritiyāyana reads *prasaṅge* for *prasaṅgo*, but the latter is given in a foot-note. *G ekābhāye* for *ekābhāve*, but T, M *ekābhāve*.

316. NB III, s. 138: *duśāṇāni nyūnatādyuktīḥ*. According to III, s. 139 and NBT on it, any of the three kinds of fallacies, viz., *asiddha*, *vīruddha*– and *anaikāntika-hetu* is meant by *nyūnata*.

317. Found only in M.

318. See §20.2 and n. 263.
valid knowledge] should not be [put forward as] the locus of the probans, viz., \( p \).

Inefficient argument, on the other hand, is included in the fallacious probans which is illegitimate by itself (svaṁpurāṇaśiddhi). For the essence of a probans is the efficiency of the probans, and because [the lack of efficiency] means the unreality of the probans (hetor avastutvā).

The Unwarranted stretch of a rule should be included in the ‘an-aikāntika’, since [in it \( h \)] is connected even with the vipākaśa, stretching itself beyond the quality to be proved (sādhyadharma).

25.1. Refutation of ātman. (50.1) The confutation of \( h \) whose locus is unreal (āśrayāśiddhahetut)\textsuperscript{319} takes place when a \( p \), in which [a debater] starts to prove [the existence of] \( s \), turns out to be sublated by another proof, as is the case with [the inference] ‘The soul (ātman) is ubiquitous, because it has the quality to be perceived everywhere’\textsuperscript{320}. [This can be confuted as follows:] Since Buddhists do not admit the reality of the soul itself, how then can it be established that it has the quality to be perceived in every place?

For this is said by the heretic: ‘There exists another substance called ātman, which is separate from things such as a body and which is the actor of good and evil deeds (śubhāśubhakarmakartṛ), the enjoyer of their results (tatphalabhoktṛ), permanent (nitya) and ubiquitous (vyāpiṇ)\textsuperscript{321}. Although it pervades the whole world, it is yet said that a living body, which is admitted\textsuperscript{322} as a receptacle [of the soul’s] experience [of pleasure and pain] (upabhogāyatana), is possessed of the soul’\textsuperscript{323}.

But this is not tenable, since there is no proof for establishing [the existence of] the soul. For the soul is not apprehended by sense-perception, because [the five kinds of sense-] perceptions beginning with the visual have the five kinds of objects, colour etc., which are determined to their

\textsuperscript{319} M. G. āśrayāśiddhir hetor duṣṇaṁ. T gǔi ma grub pa rtags kyi skyon no = āśrayāśiddhir hetor (or āśrayāśiddhahetor) doṣaṅ. Āśrayāśiddhahetor duṣṇaṁ may be better.

\textsuperscript{320} NB III, s. 67 : dharmyasiddhi apy asiddho, yathā sarvagata ātmēti sādhye sarvatrokalabhyanāmaṃ gacchati.

\textsuperscript{321} TS v. 171–172 : anye punar iḥātmānam ichchādīnāṁ samāśrayam. svato 'cidrūpam ichchanti nityāṁ sarvagatāṁ tathā. śubhāśubhāṁ kartārāṁ karmāṇāṁ tatphalasya ca. bhoktārāṁ cetana joyogāv cetanaṁ na svāruṣṭataḥ. This represents the theory of ātman expounded by the Naiyāyika and Vaśeṣīka.

\textsuperscript{322} M inserts pareṇa before parigrhitam, but it should be omitted as in G, T.

\textsuperscript{323} NBh ad NS 1. 1. 9 : tasya (=ātman) bhogāyatanaṁ śariram.
respective [senses, and the soul is not the object of any of these five sense-perceptions]. Nor is the soul the object of ego-consciousness (ahaṁpratīyaya) which is none other than mental perception (mānasa) [as defined by the Naiyāyika]. Since this has as its object the body and others [but not the soul]324, ego-consciousness occurs in the form of ‘I am fair’, ‘I am big’, ‘I go’ and so on; and in this connection the Alarikārakāra [Prajñākaragupta] said325:

The knowledge of ‘I’ pertains to the parts of the body or sense-organs, since [our knowledge in the form of] ‘I am one-eyed’, ‘I am happy’, ‘I am fair’, takes place because of the experience of the receptacle common [to these conditions].

And there cannot be such qualities as fair complexion or bigness apart from the body of a person; nor is the action of going, which is connected with a bodily substance, reasonably ascribed to the ubiquitous and formless soul. Nor can this [idea of soul] be applied [to the body] in the secondary sense of the word (bhākta), just as the idea of a lion is [figuratively] applied to a boy, since [if so,] it follows that this is after all false identification (skhaladvṛtti)326.

(51.1) [The existence of the soul] is not known by inference either, since we do not find a logical mark as effect or essential nature [for the proof]. Firstly, a logical mark as effect is not found because nothing is causally related to the soul, since this, being always beyond our perception, lacks the definite presence in a particular place, time and form327, while a causal relation is to be established by [the clear perception of]

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324. While the Vaiśeṣika holds that ātman is not perceptible, but only inferable, the Naiyāyika thinks that the jivātman is an object of mānasapratyakṣa. Cf. NK s. v. ātmā; TS v. 212: anyaḥ pratyakṣasiddhatvam ātmanāḥ parikalpitam, svasaṃvedyo hy ahaṁkāras tasyātma viṣayo mataḥ. TSP ascribes this theory of the perceptibility of ātman to Uddyotakara, Bhāvivikta, etc. We have to note that mānasapratyakṣa of the Naiyāyika is quite different from that of the Buddhist.

325. =PVBh 368, 20 (III. v. 744) : aham ity api yaj jñānām tac charirendriyātmavit, ahaṁ kāṇaḥ sukhi gaurāḥ samānādhāravedanāt. M reads aṅga-, G and T aṁśa- instead of -ātma-. For a similar argument see TS v. 214 with TSP.

326. TSP 90, 21 ff.: tataś ca yad uktam uddyotakaraḥprabhṛtyabhiḥ, upahbhoḍyatane śarire 'yam ātmapacāraḥ, yathāṅkūle bhṛtye rājā brāte ya evaṁ sa evāṁ sa bhṛtya iti, tad apātaṁ bhavaṁ. tathā hi yady ayaṁ gaurāḥ syat tadā skhaladvṛttī bhavaṁ, na hi loke, sūkṣma-māṇavavahor mukhyakopitayaḥ devar api sītha ity asakhilā buddhir bhavaṁ...

327. M deśākālakāravatirekavikalena; G deśākālavyatirekavikalena; T yul daṅ dus daṅ rnam pa bral bāṅ=deśākālākāravikalena. My tr. here follows T.
the concomitance in agreement as well as in difference [between two terms]. Secondly no logical mark as essential nature is available just because the existence of the entity (dharmin) [which is to be called a soul and to which a logical mark is to belong] is itself not established. And there is no third logical mark [admitted by us] 328.

You may propose another kind of probans to be pervaded by the probandum [or the soul], but how can the probans be pervaded by the latter, when this is not at all existent? Furthermore, we should ask if this soul is a conscious being or an unconscious being. If it is a conscious being and a permanent entity, it would necessarily follow that the eyes and other sense-organs are useless. If, on the other hand, it is an impermanent conscious being, then you have merely given the name ātman to knowledge; and there should be no difference of opinion between us. Or, if the soul is unconscious and invisible 329, then the fact that it is not perceived does not permit its existence. Thus, the non-existence of the soul is proved beyond objection. Therefore, all things that are products are without ātman.

25.2. Confutation of svarūpāsiddha; untrue vyāpti is not different from anaikāntika. (51.13) A probans which is fallacious owing to its own unreality (svarūpāsiddha) is also called illegitimate (asiddha) as in the case of [the inference] ‘sound is impermanent, because it is visible’ 330.

[Objection:] “Why do you not mention [the disclosure of] the illegitimacy (asiddhi) of a vyāpti as a kind of confutation, when it renders what the opponent wants to prove impossible?”

[Answer:] It is not mentioned separately, since it is understood by the confutation of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika). For vyāpti cannot be grasped between two particulars (svalaksana), because a particular, which is determined in place, time and form 331, has no common aspect with other particulars. Instead, vyāpti should be grasped only between a probans and a probandum represented as universals. And in this case too, if the probans is not known as pervaded by the probandum, it is in fact inconclusive since the probandum may not be present when the probans

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328. For a similar discussion see TS v. 207–209 with TSP.
329. G abodhasvarūpo'dṛṣṭa ca, though M as well as T reads abodhasvarūpo dṛṣṭa ca.
330. NB III, s. 60: yathā, anityaḥ śabda iti sādhye cakṣuṣaṁtvam ubhayāsiddham.
331. M deṣakālākāramiyatavatāpy....; api is omitted in G. T.
26. **The theory of apoha.** (52.3) [The following objection may be raised:] “The universals (sāmānyā) are indeed not accepted [by you Buddhists]; how then can you grasp a universally applicable (sarvopasaṁhāravati) vṛtti between a probans and a probandum that are universals?”

[Answer:] There is no such a fault [in our theory]. Buddhists do not admit such a universal as that which others wrongly imagine, since it is sublated by valid knowledge. We do not, however, deny [the universal] called apoha (discrimination) which is defined as the negation of the opposite (anyavyāvṛtti) and which is well known in our verbal usage (vyavahāra).

[Objection:] “What is this apoha? [It may be interpreted in the following three senses:]

1) An external object such as a jar as conceptually determined (yathādhayavasyayam) is called apoha, the term being understood as when we say ‘the other or the dissimilar is discriminated from this’;

2) Or apoha may mean the mental image (buddhyākāra) as it manifests itself (yathāpratibhāsām), the term being understood as in ‘the dissimilar is discriminated or made distinct in this mental image’;

3) Apoha, when taken as the negation of a proposition (prasājya-rūpa), may actually mean the mere absence [without implying the affirmation of the opposite] (nivṛttimātra), apoha being understood as negating (apohana)."
And if \([\text{apoha, i.e. negation}]\) means affirmation \([\text{of a positive entity}]\) \((\text{vidhi})\) as conceptually determined, then it indeed comes to mean the same as an object \((\text{viṣaya})\) \([\text{which renders the designation apoha meaningless ; and the other two interpretations are also untenable}]^{334}\).”

\([\text{Answer : }]\) \([\text{These three interpretations are}]\) not \([\text{acceptable}]. \) \([\text{By apoha}]\) we mean the affirmation \([\text{of a positive entity}]\) qualified by discrimination \((\text{apohavisīśto vidhiḥ})^{335}\). However, those who stress affirmation \((\text{vidhivādin})\) think that after we have known the cow, we consequently determine the discrimination of the essence of the cow from that of the non-cow; those who stress the negative function of \(\text{apoha} \) \((\text{nivṛtty-}

\(334. \) \(\text{JNA 202, 13-14 : tena na kaśicd upayogāḥ, apohāmnāṇā vidhēr eva vivakṣitavāt, na ca nāṁantarakaraṇe vastuṇāḥ svarūpaparāvṛttitāḥ...} \) The other two interpretations are also refuted by the opponent in \(\text{JNA 202-203 and RNA 53, 5-8}. \) The argument is, in brief, as follows: The first two meanings of \(\text{apoha} \) signify affirmation, which renders the use of the name \(\text{apoha} \) \((\text{negation})\) useless; the third is absurd, since in our cognitive experience we get a positive idea, say, fire in a mountain, and not the mere negation ‘there is no non-fire’.

\(335. \) \(\text{RNA 54, 1-2 : atrābhidhiyate, nāṃmābhīr apohaśabdēna vidhēr eva kevalo ‘bhipre-taḥ, nāpyanyavāyāvīttimāram, kim te anyāpohavisīśto vidhiḥ sābdānāṁ arthaḥ, tataś ca na pratyekapakṣopaniśītādīśavakāśaḥ.}\)
*apohavādin*) are of the opinion that we first know the discrimination of the dissimilar thing and then consequently confirm the thing which is discriminated from others, viz. the cow. Thus [both the interpretations] are wrong. For at the time of judgment we do not experience an order of comprehension in which [negation or affirmation] occurs first. In fact it is not the case that one, having understood the affirmation, later confirms the negation by implication (*arthāpattitāḥ*), or that one, having understood the negation, later confirms what is discriminated [from the dissimilar]. Therefore, we say that the very understanding of the cow is the same as the understanding of what is discriminated from the dissimilar.

(53.3) Although it is pointed out that the word denoting discrimination from the dissimilar is not clearly expressed through the word ‘cow’ which is actually pronounced, we do not remain unconscious of the discrimination of the dissimilar which is the qualifier [of the cow]. For the word ‘cow’ is applied by verbal agreement to the thing that is discriminated from the non-cow. Just as on hearing the word *indivara* on which we are agreed to mean the blue lotus, we unavoidably represent blueness at the very moment we understand the lotus, just so on hearing the word ‘cow’ denoting in verbal agreement the thing that is discriminated from the non-cow, we unavoidably represent the negation of the non-cow at the same time as we understand the cow, since the former is the qualifier of the latter. To cite direct perception as another instance, its function of grasping the mere non-existence in the form of *prasajya-pratīṣedha* is none other than its function of generating the concept of non-existence; in the same way, of the affirmative concept, its function representing the likeness [of its object] is said to be the same as the grasping of the non-existence [of the dissimilar]. Otherwise, If the discrimination of other things is not comprehended even when the meaning of the word ‘cow’ is known, how then does a person who so knows begin to look after a cow, leaving aside other animals? It would then follow that a man who has been commanded to tether a cow may tether horses

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336. G, T tatkāla eva; M tulyakālam eva. but the manuscript of M seems to agree with G, T (cf. M 53, n. 2).

337. T rjes su mthun pa rjes su sgrub pa ḡbyin par nus pa = anurūpānuṣṭhānadānāsa-kṛti (cf. RNA 54, 13).
too\textsuperscript{338}. Thus, it has been settled that the external object is placed in \textit{[i.e. superimposed as]} the content of the word through logical construction \textit{(adhyavasāya)}, but not through the manifest perception of the discrete nature \textit{(svalakṣaṇa)} \textit{[of the object]}. This is attested by the fact that the discrete nature of an individual thing as determined in a particular situation, \textit{i.e.} in place, time and form, is not manifested \textit{[in the word]} as it is in direct perception\textsuperscript{339}. Concerning this the supreme lord of logic \textit{(nyāyaparamesvara)} \textit{[Dharmakirti]} said:

Unless one’s visual organ operates, the object \textit{[of a word]} does not become visible in his knowledge \textit{[simply hearing]} the word; it is not as in visual perception\textsuperscript{340}.

\textit{(54.3)} Moreover, if a thing discrete and distinct \textit{(svalakṣaṇātma- vastu-)} formed the content of a word, it would be entirely comprehended \textit{[when the word is heard]}; this renders both the affirmative and negative usage \textit{[of the word]} impossible. For when the object is present, \textit{[the statement]} that it is is useless and \textit{[the statement]} that it is not is incoherent; and when the object is not present, it is useless to say that it is not, and it is incoherent to say that it is. But \textit{[in practice]} we use the words \textit{‘it is’} and so forth. Therefore, it is settled that a word does not signify a

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\textsuperscript{338} RNA 54, 3-15 : yat tu goṁ pratitau na tadātma-parātma-ti sāmarthyaḥ apohaḥ paścān niścyata iti vidhitvādīnāḥ matam; anyāpaṁ pratitau vā sāmarthyaḥ anyāpoṁ ho 'vadhāryata iti pratiśedhavādīnāḥ matam, tad asundaram. prāthamikasya-pi pratipatikramādārśanāt, na hi vidhiṁ pratipadya kaścid arthapattitaḥ paścād apoham avagacchat; apoham vā pratipadya-paṁ poṁham, tasmād goṁ pratiśitī ity anyāpoṁгapatrisiṁpratisiṁ ucyaite... (RNA up to 54, 15 well corresponds to M up to 53, 15). The so-called vidhiśvaṁ may be represented by Śāntirakṣita (cf. TS, TSP 1019-1021), while the pratiśedhavādīn (or nivṛttiśvaṁ) is likely to refer to Dignāga and Dharmakirti (cf. Frauwallner's citation from Śāṅkaramiśra in WZKM Bd. 38, 230 : kirti-dīhnāgādhībrau gaur iyam ityādīvinkalpe vidhisphuratum nāsty evēty uktam, jñānaśriyā tu vidhisphuratum adhyapagamya niśedhasphuratum api tatra bhavati śvīrtam. yad aha ; tatrāpohas tadgvanatvena gamyata iti. The last part of the passage is found in JNA 206, 3). Mookerjee classifies three stages in the development of apoha-theory, represented by 1) Dignāga, 2) Śāntirakṣita, and 3) Ratnakirti (Mookerjee, 132), which seem to correspond to pratiśedhavāda, vidhiśva and the synthetic theory of Jñānaśrimitra respectively. By Ratnakirti referred to by Mookerjee, we have to understand both Jñānaśri and Ratnakirti.

\textsuperscript{339} RNA 55, 16–18 : tatra bhāyo 'rtho' dhyavasāyād eva śabdavāya vyavastḥāpyate, na svalakṣaṇa-parisphurtyā, pratyakṣavad desākālāstvāhāṇyatatraya-vikṣesavālakṣaṇāsphuranaṁ.

\textsuperscript{340} śabdendyaptakṣasya buddhāv apratiḥśasanaḥ, arthasya dhṛṣṭāv eva (=JNA 208, 17–18 =RNA 55, 19–20). JNA as well as RNA ascribes the verse to Śāstra, i.e. Dharmakirti; but it is not found in PV.

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particular entity\textsuperscript{341}.

(54.8) [Objection:] "Just as you, having grasped a jar as a particular, later apply another means of valid knowledge [i.e. inference] to the same object in order to determine [other qualities of it such as] momentariness, just so even if we have by the word 'tree' apprehended an element of it 'tree-ness', we may again use the word 'exist' in order to determine 'existence' as another element [of the tree]."

[Answer:] This is untenable. Since direct perception is indeterminate by nature, we apply another means of knowledge [even after we have perceived] an object with a nature with which we are not well acquainted. In the case of conceptual knowledge (vikalpa) which is itself determinate, however, if the nature [of an object] is once grasped, there remains nothing else to be grasped by another means of knowledge\textsuperscript{342}.

27. Refutation of a universal. (54.15) We do not find any proof to establish the existence of a universal (sāmānya) which is conceived by others as inherent in many individuals (anekavyaktisamaveta), visible (drṣya), single (eka) and permanent (nitya)\textsuperscript{343}. Therefore, it is not correct to maintain the existence [of a universal]. For when we experience an individual (uyakti) such as a cow, no single dependent (anuyāyin) [to be called a universal] other than the characteristics of the individual consisting of a [peculiar] colour and form appears in our perception, just because such a thing is not directly experienced.

Nor is it reasonable to imagine the existence of a universal because it is otherwise inexplicable (anyathānu)papatti) that we get an idea reflecting on one [class-] form immediately after we perceive the particular

\textsuperscript{341} RNA 56, 6-9: kim ca svalaṣṇātmanī vastunī vācye sarvātmānaḥ pratipatteḥ vidhi-
niśedhayor ayogasya, tasya hi sadbhāveśtiti vyartham, nāstīty asamartham; asadbhāve tu nāstīti vyartham, astīty asamartham, astī cāṣṭyādīdipadprayogasya.

\textsuperscript{342} The same kind of objection is quoted as of Kumārila in RNA 56, 20-21=JNA 212. 20-21: vac coktaṁ kaumārilaṁ, sabbāgatavād eva vastunā na sādhrānyaudosāgah, vykṣatvaṁ hy anirdhāritabhāvabhavāṁ śabdād avagamyate, tayor anyataṁeṇa śabdāntaravagatena sambadhyata iti..... But Mokṣākara’s passage is more akin to RNA 56, 28-57, 5: nau vykṣāśabde- na vykṣatvāṁśe codite sattōdyaṁśāniścayanārtham astyādiṇḍaprayoga iti cet, niramāṣaṇēna pralyakṣasamadḥigatasya svalaṣṇāṣya kāvakāsah padāntareṇa dharmāntaravādhiniṣedhayoh pramāṇāntareṇa va, pratyakṣe’pi pramāṇāntarāpekaṁ drṣṭeti cet, bhavatu tasyāniścayanādmatvād anabhāvyastasaruvābhajaye; vikalpas tu suvāṁ niścayaṁmakoh yatra grāhi tatra kim aparāreṇa.... (cf. JNA 212, 25 ff. too).

\textsuperscript{313} NK s. v. sāmānya: sāmānyam nityam ekaṁ syād anekasamanāyī ca; SBNT 94. 3: vyaṅkhaṁ nityam ekaṁ ca sāmānyam yaṁ prakalpitam....
characteristic [of an individual]. For this idea may arise indirectly (paramparayā)\textsuperscript{344} from individuals with generative efficiency effected by their own causes [so as to give rise to an idea]. Though individuals are all different from one another, some alone are capable of generating [a certain class-idea], but not all; in this way, a relation of cause and effect [between individuals and a class-idea] is cognized by perception and non-perception, and cannot be violated. And in fact we experience that such efficiency belongs only to some individuals, though all are equally discrete and distinct (bhedāviśeṣa), as [only] the Cocculus cordifolius (guḍūcī), neemb etc. are effective as anti-febrile [and not others]. Concerning this [Dharmakirti] said:

Some things, though they are distinct and discrete, are determined by nature to bring about one and the same effect such as the same judgment, the cognition of one object and so forth, just as a sense-organ, [an object, light, attention, a soul and their contact bring out one cognition of colour, though they are distinct]\textsuperscript{345}.

Furthermore, we may ask a question: We admit [for the sake of argument] that a universal [say cow-ness] is distinguished from all other dissimilars; but how is it inherent only in individual [members] of [the class of] cow even when they are as much distinct and discrete as other individuals, and how can it generate the same form of mental image

\textsuperscript{344} Mookerjee, 90: "The contention of the Naiyāyika that ideas of universals arise immediately on the operation of the sense-object contact is not true, because such ideas are conceptual in character and conceptual thoughts can emerge only after the name-relations are remembered. First of all, there is the sensuous presentation immediate and direct and divested of all foreign reference. Secondly, a mental energising towards the recalling of the verbal association; thirdly, the remembrance of the name. So the mind has travelled far away from the immediate datum of presentation and the idea of the class-character arises only after a series of psychical operations, which have little bearing on the immediate objective datum".

\textsuperscript{345} The first half of this verse is omitted in G, T. PV I. v. 73-74: ekapratyavamarśārthajñānādyekārthasādhane, bhedē 'pi niyatāḥ kecit svabhāvenāndriyādivat. yathāndriyaviṣayālokamanaskārāātmandriyamanōrthatatsāmnikarṣā vā 'saty api tadbhāvaniyate sāmānaye rūpavijñānām ekāṁ janayanti, evāṁ śīṁśaśādayo'pi bhedāḥ parasparāvanuvyepi prakṛtyai vaikam ekākāraṁ pratyabhijñānāṁ janayanti anyāṁ vā yathāpratyayaṁ dahanagṛhādikāṁ kāśṭhasādhyāṁ arthakriyāṁ, na tu bhedāviśe'pi jalādayāḥ, śrotādvad vāpādiṣāne, jvarādiśāmane kāścit saha pratyekam eva vā; dṛṣṭā yatāḥ vauṣṭhah yonāṁte 'pi na cāparāḥ. yatāḥ vā guṇaviṇavystādayāḥ saha pratyekam vā jvarādiśamanalakṣaṇām ekāṁ kāryāṁ karvanti, na ca tatra sāmānaye apekṣante, bhedē'pi tatprakṛtiitevā, na tadaviśe'pi tadḥiṁprasādayāḥ...

Also see TS v. 723-726; Frauwallner, Beiträge zur Apohalehre, WZKM Bd. 39, S. 264.
(buddhi) in relation to them [i.e. individual cows] and them alone? And the opponent may reply that it happens so by nature (svabhāvena). But this [reply] lacks a proof. On the other hand, when we explain the phenomenon on the basis of their essential nature (svabhāva), it is well established by proof for us and is supported by logic.

(55.17) Similarly, the opponent proposes another syllogism in order to prove [the existence of] a class (jāti):

“A distinct knowledge (vīśiṣṭabuddhi) is invariably connected (nāntariyaka) with the cognition of a qualifier (vīseṣaṇa), as the knowledge of a stick-holder (daṇḍin);

The knowledge ‘This is a cow’ is a distinct knowledge;

[Therefore, it is invariably connected with a qualifier, the class of cow.]”

This syllogism is in sense based on the principle of causality [since distinct knowledge is an effect of the cognition of a qualifier].”

We reply: Is the probandum here the invariable connection of the distinct knowledge with the cognition of a separate qualifier or its invariable connection with the perception of a qualifier in general? If the first alternative is maintained, it is sublated by perception, since neither [the qualified nor the qualifier] is [separately] manifested in indeterminate perception which grasps the total reality as a whole. Moreover, distinct knowledge set forth as the probans of [the existence of] a universal contains the fallacy of inconclusiveness, since distinct knowledge is acquired even without the cognition of a qualifier separate from the qualified, as we know that this jar has its own form or that cowness is a universal. If on the other hand the second alternative is maintained, it only proves what is obvious (siddhasādhana) as one asserts that a jar has its own form, since [even Buddhists] admit the relation of the qualifier and the qualified as derived from the imagined

346. G kim ca sarvato vijātiyād vyāpytta'pi sāmānye kim iti bhedāvīṣe'pi govyaktiṣv eva samavetām tatraiva caikākārām pratitiḥ janayati. M reads sarvagate (which is unfit) for sarvato, inserts tat sāmānyam before tatraiva and has buddhim instead of pratitim. T seems to omit ca after tatraiva; otherwise it agrees with M.
347. Both M and G wrongly have viśiṣṭabuddhitvam ca sāmānyam ity anākāntiko hetuḥ. T khyad par can gyi blo ŋid kyaḥ sphyi la gtan tshigs ma ņes pa yin te=vīśiṣṭabuddhitvam ca sāmānye ‘naikāntiko hetuḥ. See Ratnakirti’s passage in n. 350.
348. Read gotvaṁ for gotva in M 56, 6.
difference, and use such an expression as ‘This thing has the universal of a cow’\textsuperscript{349}. For, in fact, the judgment ‘This is a cow’ is made by virtue of the cognition of what is discriminated from the non-cow. Thus, the universal cannot be established by this inference either\textsuperscript{350}.

Since in this way the universal imagined by others does not withstand scrutiny, the following has been settled: The universal, which is merely an entity distinguished from the dissimilars and which is designated by the word ‘discrimination’ (apoha), forms part of our verbal convention according to our logical construction; this is quite immune from faults.

(56.14) The following syllogism should also be formulated in order to refute the universal:\textsuperscript{351}

When a thing, being by nature perceptible, is not perceived at a given place, it is the object to be judged as absent then and there, as horns on the head of a horse;

The universal, in spite of [your supposition that] it is by nature perceptible, is not perceived in the particulars which are actually seen;

[Therefore, it is not existent.]

This is formulated on the ground of the non-cognition of an entity itself (svabhāvānupaladbhi).

No assumption of the fallacy of illegitimacy (asiddhi) can be made [concerning this inference], since, in spite of a thorough examination, we do not find anywhere [a universal which is] the second entity following

\textsuperscript{349}. T. G vyavahārakārāṇaḥ kṛtva for bhedam upādāya. T spaśṭatvat (gsal ba śid) for -syāṭatvat.

\textsuperscript{350}. Mokṣākara verbally follows RNA 59, 21-60, 3: athēdāṁ jātiprasādahakam anumānam abhidhiyate. yadvisṛṣṭajñānam tadviśeṣaṇagrahaṇāntariyakam, yathā daṇḍijñānam; viṣṭaṁkṣaṇāṁ cēdana gaur ayam ity arthataḥ kāryakrite, viṣeṣāṇumabhāvāryaṁ hi dhṛñante viṣṭaṁkṣaṇaḥ siddhāti. atrānuyogāḥ, viṣṭaṁkṣāṇer bhinnaviśeṣaṇagrahaṇāntariyakatvāṁ vā sādhyaṁ viṣeṣaṇamātriṇubhāvāntariyakatvāṁ vā. prathamaṁpākṣe paścaśya pratyakṣabāḥdhā sādhanaṁvadānī naśavāsayaati. vastṛgpāṁ ṣaṁ pratyakṣasobyāparatāḥṣaśāsābhāvāt. viṣṭaṁkṣāṇer saḥ sāmüyahetur anaikāntīkāḥ, bhinnaviśeṣaṇagrahaṇaṁ antareṇḍriṇē darśanāt, yathā svarūpāvāṁ ghaṭaḥ, gotevaṁ sāmeyam iti vā, dvitiyapākṣe tu siddhāśādhanam. svarūpaṁ ghaṭaṁ iyādīvad gotevaṁjītīmāṁ pinḍa iti parikalpitaṁ bhedam upādāya viṣeṣaṇaviṣeṣābhāvāvastṛgpātvād agonyāvṛtyaṁabhāvābhāvāvad gaur ayam iti vyavahārāsya.

\textsuperscript{351}. Mokṣākara owes this inference to Paṇḍita Āśoka. Cf. Sāmānyaduṣṭadikprasārīta, SBNT 97, 8-11: yay yad upaladbhilakoṣaṇaprayātāṁ san nōpalabhyaṁ tat tad asad iti pṛkṣāvādvih vyavahārasyaṁ yathāmbarāmburumāṁ; nōpalabhyaṁ cōpaladbhilakoṣaṇaprātyaṁ sāmeyam kvacīt apiśaḥ svabhāvānupaladbhiḥ. The same logic, however, is applied by Buddhists to the negation of avayavīn, see e. g. TSP 188, 5 ff.
[a particular], independent of the particular entity characterised by colour and form. Nor is it tenable that it is, in spite of its invisibility, established by perception as in the case of knowledge. For, while knowledge, though not grasped by visual cognition, is established by the proof of self-consciousness (svasaṇāvedana), this universal, being a quality of an object of the senses (arthadharmā), should be grasped by visual cognition. And in fact the opponent admits its perceptibility. Thus the universal fictitiously conceived by the opponent does not withstand scrutiny; only an entity which is [by logical construction] discriminated from others is said to be a universal. And it is settled that all things that are products are void of such a universal as is imagined by others.

28. Refutation of God as the permanent agent. (57.7) It should not be understood that [all produced things] are made by some intelligent being. For if there were an operator of this world, he would be either a permanent being or an impermanent one. Of these, first, he cannot be permanent, because when the operator is active permanently, the creation, preservation and destruction [of the world] would certainly occur simultaneously. The very nature by which he is [said to be] the operator of preservation and destruction should continue to be present in him even at the time of creation, and accordingly he would at the very time [of creation] effect preservation and destruction. It may be contended that he will not act so because he lacks auxiliary causes (sahākārin), but this is not correct. For he is never dissociated from permanent auxiliary causes which are always present with him; and again he is never dissociated from impermanent auxiliary causes, since these must be dependent on him for their origination. Therefore, it would follow that he effects all [the three kinds of operations] at the same time352.

(57.17) [The opponent : ] "There is not such a fault, since God is endowed with intelligence. For an agent deprived of intelligence may effect simultaneously all the works which are caused by its presence alone. An intelligent being, on the other hand, need not work when he does not wish, though he is always capable of doing so. Why then is he criticised?"353

Answer: He is to be criticised in this way: These wishes are also

352. For a similar argument see BCAP 258, 22-30; TSP ad TS v. 87.
353. A similar objection is ascribed to Uddyotakara in TSP 55, 4-8.
caused by his own existence alone; and why does he not work? You may contentd that although he is efficient by his own existence, he has such a nature that he does not work without being given contingent powers which are defined as auxiliary causes. But this objection has no sense at all, since [in the same way] one can show you a conclusion that [a woman], who is by birth a barren woman, is also a mother.

(58.6) [The opponent:] "An effect indeed has such a nature that it is not produced merely by the efficiency [of an operative cause], but comes into existence after having depended on auxiliary causes too; [so, you should not criticise as above]."

[The author.] This is not correct. For efficiency will necessarily produce its effect without expecting the help of auxiliary causes, because otherwise it would be just inefficient.

28.1. **The permanent cannot produce an effect gradually.** (58.9) Again it is not correct that a permanent [agent such as God] produces an effect gradually (*kramena*), since it does not require [anything else for its action]. Regarding this, Dharmakirti whose name is celebrated all over the world said:

Successive [change] cannot occur to the permanent, since this is independent [of other causes], and since this remains the same self at both times whether it is doing an action or not doing it.

By this it is refuted that the permanent such as a soul or momentary things such as a jar etc. produce an effect gradually. And in this argument there is no fault of incompatibility with perception, since we cannot grasp the permanent by indeterminate cognition. For indeterminate cognition that is momentary cannot perceive what is not mo-

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354. G as well as T inserts *na* before *karoti*.

355. TSP ad TS v. 87 (54, 23–25): *syād etat, nēvara eva kevalaṁ kāraṇam api tu dharmādisahakārikāraṇāntaram apekṣya karoti, nimittākāraṇatvād īsvarasya, tena dharmādeḥ kāraṇāntarasya vaikalyād avikalakāraṇatvam asiddham iti*; BCAP ad BCA IX. 125 a (259, 17–23).

356. M dharmakirtih; G and T have only kirtih. PV II. v. 268 b–269 a: *nityasya nīrāpekṣatvāt kramottavāt viruddhyate, kriyāyām akrīyāyāṁ ca kriyā ca sadṛśatmanāḥ. T of TBh agrees with this verse completely; but M and G change viruddhyate into na yujyate and kriyā ca into kālayoh ca.

357. M, T read: *ātmādināṁ akṣanikānāṁ ghaṭādināṁ kṣaṇikānāṁ ca kramena kāraṇāṁ pratyuktam. G nityānāṁ ātmādināṁ akṣanikānāṁ (ca) ghaṭādināṁ... is unintelligible. A momentary thing cannot operates for many moments in order to produce an effect gradually.*
mentary. The non-momentary (or the permanent) indeed means what operates for many moments; and how can it be grasped by indeterminate cognition which lasts only for a moment? What resided in the past or will reside in the future does not manifest itself at the present time, for otherwise it would follow that it belongs to the present. Or it would follow that the termini of the birth and destruction (of the present thing) are manifested. Therefore, indeterminate cognition is not able to grasp a thing which pervades the past and future time\(^{358}\).

28.2. Refutation of recognition. \((59.3)\) The same argument serves to explain that recognition (pratyabhijñāna) is not of the nature of indeterminate cognition. Indeterminate cognition is indeed (defined as) intuitive knowledge (sākṣātkāri jñānam); and what resided in the past is not to be put before the eyes, but only to be remembered. Indeterminate cognition, on the other hand, is not of the nature of remembrance (smṛti).

The following objection may be raised: “While remembrance is that which does not intuit the present state of a thing, how can that [recognition] which is intent upon intuiting it [=the present state] be called remembrance? Regarding this, Kumārilabhaṭṭa said:\(^{359}\)

Remembrance takes place in the form ‘[I remember] that’, pertaining only to what has been cognized before; recognition, on the other hand, is in the form ‘This is the same as that’, and is quite different [from remembrance].’

[The Author:] If so, recognition would have a twofold nature, that of remembrance and that of grasping, and is not of the nature of grasping alone, since what is remembered cannot be grasped and what is grasped cannot be remembered. However, it is impossible that there are remembrance and grasping in one cognition, because these two are incompatible with each other. No sane person can contend that we grasp [a thing] by the same function of [knowledge] by which we remember; \(^{360}\)

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358. M pūrvaparakālayāptam artham, but G-vyāptim, with which T (sha ma dah phy i maḥi dus la khyab paḥi don) agrees.

359. This verse is not found in SV, but in TS v. 453: pūrvapramitamātre hi jāyate sa iti smṛtiḥ, sa evyam ityāṁ tu pratyabhijñātirekīṇi. TSP ascribes the opinion to Kumārila.

360. M yena hi svarūpeṇa (G rūpeṇa) smaraṇaṁ na tena svarūpeṇa (G rūpeṇa) graha-ṇaṁ ity anumattena (G inserts here na) śakyate vaktum. T omits the first na and retains the second, which is most intelligible.
and if you say that grasping is made by a function different \([\text{from that of remembrance}]\), there cannot be both remembrance and grasping in one \([\text{cognition}]\)\(^{361}\). Even if this \([\text{possibility}]\) were admitted, it would mean that \([\text{the knowledge}]\) has at the same time the nature of \(pratyakṣa\) and that of non-\(pratyakṣa\), and not that it is only of the nature of \(pratyakṣa\), for \(pratyakṣa\) cannot occur in an object which is being remembered\(^{362}\). Therefore, the knowledge of \([\text{the so-called}]\) recognition is simply erroneous, because it has no proper object. \([\text{Our argument may be formulated into}]\) the following syllogism:

The knowledge of recognition has in reality not a single object as in the case of grass which, having been once cut, grows again;

‘This blue \([\text{thing}]\) is the same as that’ is the knowledge of recognition;

\([\text{Therefore, it has not a single object}]\).

This is a negative inference derived from the cognition of what is pervaded by a thing incompatible with the denied object \(\text{\textit{viruddhayāpto-palabdhi}}\). Since oneness and plurality are incompatible with each other, two perceptions respectively pertaining to the one and the other are also mutually incompatible. Thus, the knowledge of recognition is pervaded by ‘having plural objects’ which is incompatible with ‘having a single object’, as the logic explained above shows. Accordingly recognition does not sublate our inference of momentariness.

\((60.6)\) Again, it cannot be contended that \([\text{recognition}]\) pertains to a single object because, when hair and other things are recognized, it has the universal \([\text{of hair etc.}]\) as object. For in fact it is only particular hairs that are recognized. If, on the contrary, a universal is recognized, we would \([\text{acquire the knowledge that}]\) this hair-ness is the same as that, and not that this hair is the same as that \([\text{as we actually recognize}]\). Therefore, when one object is concerned, the occurrence of the knowledge of recognition, be it successive or simultaneous, is incongruent; and you

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\(^{361}\text{M rūpāntareṇa caikasya smaraṇagrahaṇe na syātām, but G rūpāntareṇa grahaṇe na ekasya smaraṇagrahaṇe syātām; T seems to read rūpāntareṇa grahaṇena. I follow G.}\)

\(^{362}\text{I follow G : bhāve'pi pratyakṣāpratyakṣatvaṁ syāt, na tu pratyakṣatvaṁ eva, smaryamaṇe pratyakṣāyogyāt. M : bhāve'pi pratyakṣāpratyakṣe syātām, na tu smaryamaṇe pratyakṣam eva, pratyakṣāyogyāt; T agrees with M. though it has pratyakṣāpratyakṣe for pratyakṣāpratyakṣam by mistake. M and T may be understood as meaning'...and not that there is only pratyakṣa when an object is being remembered. since this cannot be pratyakṣa'}.\)
should not suspect the possibility of [the probans of our inference] being
incompatible or inconclusive. Nor can you say that the very recognition
determines the singleness of the object, since it is just the object of the
present examination. Thus, it has been settled that there is no permanent
agent.\footnote{234}

28.3. \textbf{Karman or the mind is the sole cause of the world.} (60.12)

[The Opponent:] ‘If the permanent agent is not the [supreme] cause
of the world, what then is the cause of it?’

[The Author:] Actions of sentient beings, called good or evil, [form
the instrumental cause of the world,] as is said [in the following]\footnote{244}:

The mind alone produces the world of sentient beings as well as
that of inanimate things in all their various aspects;
for all the universe is said to have been produced by actions, and no
actions are possible apart from the mind.

Employing the view of the \textit{Vaibhāṣika} school the omniscient Buddha
said: \footnote{266}

Ether and the two kinds of cessation [i.e. that due to wisdom and
that not due to wisdom], these three are the non-produced which are
 eternal;
all produced things are momentary, devoid of \textit{ātman}, and have no
creator [other than \textit{karman}].

29. \textbf{The existence of an omnicient person proved.} (61.3) ‘It may
be fitting for you to adduce the words of the omniscient one if and only
if the existence of the latter is established. What proof do you put forward

\footnote{234}{See n. 234 above.}
\footnote{244}{sattvalokam atha bhājanalokam cittam eva raceaty aticitram, karmajāṁ hi jagad
uktam aśeṣaṁ karma cittam avadhūya na cásti. Cf. AK IV, v. 1: karmajāṁ lokavāicitryaṁ
 cetanā tatkṛtaṁ ca tat. cetanā mānasāṁ karma tajje vākkhayakarmāṁ.}
\footnote{266}{M Vaibhāṣikam āśṛtya: G=T vaibhāṣikamataṁ āśṛtya. The expression of course
means that the Vaibhāṣika understands the Buddha as teaching the following.

\begin{verbatim}
ākāśāṁ dvau nirodhau ca nityāṁ trayam asaṁskṛtam, saṁskṛtam kṣaṇikaṁ sarvam
ātmaśūnyam akartṛkam. The first half is omitted in G. The verse is identical with JSS v.
21 (Yamaguchi, 292: nam mkhaḥ ḥgog pa gnis dag daṅ, ḡdus ma byas gsum po ni riṅ, ḡdus byas bdag gis kun stoh la. byed pa po med skad cīg ma.) Cf. AK I, v. 5 ff.: anāśrava
mārgasatyam trividhāṁ cāpy asaṁskṛtam. ākāśāṁ dvau nirodhau ca tatrākāśam anāṣṛtyiḥ....
\end{verbatim}
Regarding \textit{akartṛka}, on which Bodhibhadra comments that there is no agent other than
\textit{karman}, see Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ad AK IV, v. 1 (de la Vallée Poussin, IV. 1: Ce n’est
pa Dieu qui la fait intelligemment... La variété du monde naît des actes des être vivants.)
Two kinds of \textit{nirodha} means \textit{pratisaṁkhyā-} and \textit{aprasaṁkhyā-nirodha}.}
for the existence of an omniscient one?"

We answer:

A quality of the mind, when brought about by repeated meditation which is made ardently, incessantly and for a long time, can be manifested clearly, as e.g. the figure of a girl [is clearly manifested] to her lover;

The mental images having the four noble truths as objects are also the qualities of the mind produced by the practice as described above;

[Therefore, they can be manifested clearly.]

This is an inference formulated with a logical mark of essential identity. [Regarding this inference] you may not suspect the fallacy of illegitimacy (asiddha-) either in respect of the locus of h or in respect of h itself. The \( p \) [of this inference, i.e.] the mental images which are brought under conceptual knowledge and which have the four noble truths as their objects, and \( h \), a quality of the mind in general, are [real and legitimate] since they are both the contents of everyone's self-consciousness (pratyātmavedyatva). Nor is this [hetu] incompatible, because it is present in a lover as a sapakṣa. Nor is it inconclusive, for we can establish by means of perception and non-perception a universally applicable causal relation between a mental quality accompanied by repeated meditation, as cause, and its vivid manifestation as effect, just as between a potter and a jar; and once this relation is established, it is also established that the probans 'a mental quality accompanied by repeated meditation' is pervaded by [the probandum] 'fitness for manifesting itself clearly'\(^{367}\).

[The procedure of grasping the causal relation in question is as follows:]

The locus (adhikaraṇa) of the vyāpti in question is the figure of a girl occurring in [the mind of] a man who is in love with her. (1) We do not see the manifestation [of the figure] before it has become a quality of [the lover's] mind through earnest, incessant and prolonged meditation upon it [anupalabdhi No. 1]; (2) later we come to see the meditation [by him] [upalabdhi No. 2]; (3) and then we see the clear manifestation [of her figure] [upalabdhi No. 3]. Thus the causal relation between clear manifestation and the mental image produced by repeated medita-

\(^{367}\) M sphuta-pratibhāsakaraṇavogyatā ; G -karaṇa- ; T gsal bar snaḥ bar byar run ba.

G's reading is better. Cf. Ratnakirti's passage in n. 368 below.
tion is established by three cognitions consisting of perception and non-perception (_trividhāpratyakṣānapalamba_.). And from this we know the universal vyāpti [between the probans and the probandum in question]. Therefore, there being no fallacy of inconclusiveness, our _hetu_ is faultless.

29.1. Proof of the existence of an all-knowing person. (62.4)

[The opponent :] “By the inference stated above you may indeed prove [the possible existence of] an omniscient being (_sarvajña_) who is meant to be a person intuiting the images of the four noble truths, from the fact that he intuit the images of the four noble truths; but you cannot establish one who intuit everything without restriction (_aviseṣṇa sarvadharma śākṣātkārin_). Therefore, to prove this, you have to state another inference”.

[The Author :] We will answer:

368. This section consists of verbatim citations from RNA 1, 16-21 and 3, 12-19: _yo yaḥ sādānirantaradīghakālābhāyāsahāhitacetoṣṭaḥ sa sarvāḥ sputihāvayogeṣṭaḥ, yathā yuvatākāraḥ kāminiḥ pūrṇasya; yathoktābhāyāsahāhitacetoṣṭaḥ cāmi caturārāśatayāvishyāyā ākārā iti svabhāvo hetūḥ_. Tatra na tavad āśrayadvērya hetudvērya vāsiddhisambhāvanā, saṁkalparūḍhāṁ caturārāśatayākāraṇāṁ cetoṣṭaḥamātrasya ca hetōḥ pratyātmavedayutvat_. na caiva niruddha hetuḥ_. sapakṣe kāmini ākāre sambhavat, na cānaikāntikaḥ, abhyāsahāhitacetoṣṭaḥ sputihāvayogeṣṭāya kāryakāraṇayat ghatakumbha kāraṇayat iva sarvopasahāhenā pratyākṣānaṃpalamabhataḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvasiddhānaḥ abhyāsahāhitacetoṣṭaḥ sādhanaṣya sputihāvayogeṣṭāya vyāptisiddheḥ, tathā hi. vyāptiyadhi kāraṇe kāmāturalaṅgini śuvātyaṅkāre sādānirantaradīghakālābhāyāsahāhitacetoṣṭaḥ pūrṇam anupalādhiḥ sputihāvayogeṣṭaḥ, paścāt abhyāsasamvedanaṁ sputihāvayogeṣṭaḥ samvedanaṁ iti, _trividhāpratyakṣānapalambaḥ hasadhiḥ kāryaṅkāraṇabhaṅgaḥ sputihāvayogeṣṭāḥ saḥsāyasaṣacavicīlākāragṛhyatāḥ iyam upāpanna sarvopasākāraṇati vyāptiḥ, ato’naikāntikatāpī asambhavinītā anaradyo hetuḥ_. For _trividhāpratyakṣānapalambaḥ_ see n. 305.

369. At the beginning of _Sarvajñasiddhi_ (RNA 1, 9-14) Ratnakirti quotes PV II, v. 33 in which Dharmakirti declares that he means by the supreme source of knowledge one who knows the truths regarding what are to be abandoned and what are to be acquired together with their means, but not one who merely knows everything (_heyopādayatattvasya sābhyaṇputyasya vedakāḥ, yaḥ pramāṇam asāv iṣṭo na tu sarvasya vedakaḥ_). Ratnakirti calls this supreme source of knowledge _sārva-jñā_ and a knower of everything _sarvasarvajña_. For Buddhists following Dharmakirti _sarvajña_ is more important than _sarvasarvajña_. And Ratnakirti says that his inference beginning with _yo yaḥ sādānirantaradīghakālābhāyāsahāhitacetoṣṭaḥ_... (which Mokṣākara cites in § 29) is meant for proving _sarvajña_. and not _sarvasarvajña_. He continues to say, however, that he will quench the thirsty desire of common people for the proof of the existence of a _sarvasarvajña_. and he formulates an inference proving it in RNA 28, 10 ff. Thus, we have to bear in mind that there are two kinds of omniscient beings. Mokṣākara deals with _sarvajña_ in § 29 and _sarvasarvajña_ in § 29. 1.
Words agreeing with a proof and having a definite object presuppose
directly or indirectly the knowledge intuiting that object, as e.g.
the words ‘fire burns’;
The words ‘all produced things are momentary’ also agree with a
proof and have definite objects;
[Therefore, the words presuppose the knowledge intuiting all things,
i.e. there must be an all-knowing person.]
[This inference] is in content based on the principle of causality.
It has not the fallacy of illegitimacy (asiddhi), since we prove the
momentary destruction of all things and accordingly these words are
true. Nor is [the probans] incompatible, since it is present in the sapaks.
Nor is it inconclusive, since, though words in general may be preceded
by doubt or error, we know by perception and non-perception that the
words agreeing with a proof and having a definite object are directly or
indirectly preceded by the knowledge intuiting that object. If this were
not admitted, all the probans as effect would be annihilated, since even
smoke etc. would not have their cause.

29.2. Proof of the succession of lives. (62.17) The following ob-
jection may be raised: “Conceptual ideas which are meditated upon
would be manifested only after a long time expressible in terms of a
succession of many lives. But what proof do you adduce in order to
establish a succession of lives (bhavaparampara)?”
We answer:
[A moment of] the mind is necessarily joined together with (prat-
saindhatte) another [viz. the next moment of] the mind, as the present moment of mind;

That belonging to the moment of death is also a [moment of the] mind;

(Therefore, it necessarily engenders another moment of the mind)\textsuperscript{374}.

(This is an inference) formulated with a logical mark of essential identity. There is no deviation [from the vyāpti of this inference] even in the case of the last moment of the mind of an arhat (arhaccaramacitta). For it is known only from a Buddhist tradition (āgama) that [an arhat, having destroyed all passions, does not receive another life after his death]; \textsuperscript{375} and [some Buddhists are of the opinion that even the last moment of the mind of an arhat] engenders another mind free from passions\textsuperscript{376}; moreover, the probans [of this inference] implies the qualification ‘so long as [the mind is accompanied by passions]’\textsuperscript{377}. Thus is proved the existence of the future lives. It is commonly said that all people enter into religious practices (abhyāsa) such as austerity, liberality,
learning etc. (because of the impressions caused by) their practices in former lives. And in order to establish this, we will formulate a proof:

Every [moment of the] mind is preceded by another [moment of the] mind, as the present moment of the mind;
That belonging to the time of birth is also a [moment of the] mind;
[Therefore, it is also preceded by another, viz. a past mind].

This inference is based on a logical mark as effect\(^{378}\).

30. The doctrine of the Vaibhāṣika. (60.10) [The opponent:]

"Is emancipation not possible by intuiting the truth? And the truth is unique as [Dharmakirti himself] says:

Emancipation is [accomplished by] seeing emptiness;
all other religious practices are for that purpose\(^{379}\).

How then can there be two kinds of omniscient beings [i.e. \textit{sarvajña} and \textit{sarvasarvajña}] and also different schools among Buddhists?"

[The author:] This is not to be confuted, because the Blessed One [or the Buddha] taught all these [different doctrines] in order to introduce sentient beings [of different capacities] into truths. Thus, the Vaibhāṣika holds:

Ether and two kinds of cessation, these three are the non-produced which are eternal;
All produced things are momentary, devoid of \textit{ätman}, and have no creator [other than \textit{karman}]\(^{380}\).

\(^{381}\) [Although the knowledge born out of sense-organs has not the form [of atoms], the assemblage of atoms appears as an existent.] ...\(^{381}\)

31. The doctrine of the Sautrāntika. (63.17) The Sautrāntika holds the following theory: All that is manifested in the form of blue etc. is knowledge, and not an external object (\textit{bāhyo’ṛthaḥ}), since an insentient

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378. TS v. 1897 : \textit{tasmat tatrddivijñānam svopādānabalodbhavam ; vijñānatavidhetubhyā idānāṁtanacittavat}, and TSP.

379. PV II. v. 254 : \textit{sā (=saṁskāraduḥkhatā) ca naḥ pratayotpatīḥ sā nairātmyadṛg-ārayaḥ, muktis tu śūnyatādṛśīs tadarthāḥ śeṣabhāvanāḥ}. Our text seems to cite the last half of this verse. M as well as G has muktis tu śūnyatādṛśīs tadarthāśeṣabhāvanā, but T \textit{(ston pa ñid lta bas grol bar ṣgyur, bsgom pa lhag ma de don yin)} agrees with PV.

380. See n. 366.

381. This verse which is found only in T is also identical in sense with the first half of JSS v. 22 (Yamaguchi, 292) : \textit{mig las skye blo rnam med cin, mignon sum rig pa rdul gyi tshogs, blo dahn yes bya kha che yi, bye brag smra baḥi gsuṅ du bṣad}. (The last half means: This is said to be the theory of the wise Vaibhāṣikas of Kashmir).
(jaḍa) thing is not able to become visible (prakāśa). Concerning this it is said:

The range of the senses [i.e. the external reality] (indriyagocara) is not perceptible itself, though it gives rise to the knowledge with the form of it [or the objective reality]382.

The author of the [Pramāṇavārttika-] Alāṅkāra, [Prajñākaragupta] says too:

If a blue thing is perceived, how can it be said to be external [to the knowledge]?

If a blue thing is not perceived, how can it be said to be external383?

[The opponent:] “If that which is visible is none other than knowledge, how then do you know that there is an external reality?”

[The author:] The proof of an external reality is made through [the following reasoning] by the method of difference (vyatireka): Indeed, forms such as blue do not become visible at every place and every time; nor are they possible even when we suppose that they occur only because of our own material cause (upādāṇa=samanantarapratyaya)384, since, if so, it remains inexplicable why they occur pertaining only to a definite object. Therefore, we can ascertain that there must be, apart from the immediately preceding moment of our own consciousness (samanantarapratyaya), something which is a cause of these [visible forms] and by virtue of which [the representations of forms] occur only at some place and sometimes. This ‘something’ is the external reality385.

31.1. Refutation of the soul. (64.9) However386, this external reality

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382. svākārajñānajanakā dṛṣṭyā nendriyagocarāḥ. This is identical with JSS v. 23 a-b: mīkoh ba dhn ṭhōj yīl mīn te, śes pa rnam pa bca sp skye (Yamaguchi, 296). T of TBh translates it: rahn rnam can śes skye byed pa. dhaŋ poḥi sbyod yul snaḥ ruṅ min. This verse is quoted in SVM 110. 18, in which -jñāna- is changed into -buddhi-.


384. M. G svopādānamātrabrāhāvāvitve sati; T raṅ gi ṅe bar len pa tsam las ṇes par snaḥ ba ṅid du gyur na yah=svopādānamātrabrāhāvatibhāvitve sati.

385. About the sākṛavāda of the Sautrāntika see n. 148 above. For a similar and more detailed description of the epistemology of this school see SDS 33, 220–38, 271. Jadunatha Sinha gives a good account of it in his Indian Realism Chap. II. Kanakura also collects and translates into Japanese the accounts of the Sautrāntika theory as appear in non-Buddhist works (E. Kanakura. Gekyo no Bunken ni mieru Kyobu-setsu. Studies in Indology and Buddhism, presented in honour of Prof. S. Yamaguchi on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday, pp. 55–68).

386. G kaḥ punaḥ; M=T na punaḥ....
is neither a composite whole (avayavini), nor any of quality (guṇa) and
the other categories conceived by other schools as depending on sub-
stances (dravyāsravī), nor any of the nine kinds of substances including
atoms (paramāṇu).

Of these, neither quality nor the others [i.e. karman, sāmānya, and
vīṣēṣa] are [the external reality], since their existence is negated through
the negation of the substance [which forms their substratum]. And since
[the relation called] inherence (samavāya) cannot possibly exist when there
is no substance in which [quality etc. is said to] be inherent, we do not
care for a separate criticism of this [inherence] here387. Substance is of
nine kinds, i.e., earth (prthivi), water (āpas), fire (tejas), air (vāyu), ether
(ākāsa), time (kāla), direction (diś), soul (ātman) and mind (manas).

(64.14) Firstly, the following inference may be formulated for the
negation of the soul:

Knowledge which occurs occasionally is necessarily preceded by an
occasionally existent cause, as e.g. the knowledge of lightning.
The consciousness of the self (ahamkārajñā) occurs only occasio-
nally,

[Therefore, it is preceded by, or has as its object, an occasionally ex-
istent cause, and not a permanent thing such as a soul].

This inference is in sense based on the principle of causality. The pro-
bans has no fallacy of illegitimacy, since the presence of knowledge-ness
[h] in self-consciousness (ahamkāra), p, is established by perception. Nor
is the qualifier ‘occasionally existent’ illegitimate, because actually we are
not always conscious of ourselves. It is not incompatible, since we see it
in the sapakṣa: nor is it inconclusive, since the vyāpti between the occasio-
nally occurring knowledge and the occasionally occurring cause of it is as
well attested by perception and non-perception as that between smoke and
fire. If otherwise occasional knowledge occurs because of a non-occasional
cause, the absurdity would follow that it does not occur because of an
occasional cause. If [you contend that it has] not a definite cause, it is
tantamount to saying that it has no cause at all. If none the less this
inference is said to be inconclusive, even a well known probans such as
smoke [for the proof of fire] would be inconclusive too, because we see
no difference between them. Or, we may say, if the consciousness of the

387. G dūṣāṇam api. but M. T taddūṣāṇam atra....
self is preceded by a non-occasional cause, it would occur continually,
which is obviously not the case. For a cause must be by nature function-
ing; what is not functioning can be called a cause only figuratively;388
and what is functioning and what is not are not identical. If they were
identical, then even that which is functioning would become that which
is not functioning, since it could have the nature of that [which is not
functioning]389. Moreover, if the consciousness of the self were [constant-
ly] produced by a non-occasional cause, other knowledge would necessarily
occur together with it [which is not permissible to the opponent390], since
[a non-occasional, or a permanent cause is] a self-contained totality [de-
pending on nothing else] (avyagrasāmagrika) [and should occur always].
You may contend that a soul is not the cause, but the object of the con-
sciousness of the self. But we say ‘No’. There cannot be an object [of
knowledge] which is not a cause [of knowledge], since otherwise every-
thing could be its object (atiprasaṅgāt).

31.2. Refutation of ether, time, direction and the mind. (65.13)
As to the problem whether or not391 there is any real entity called ether,
we say there is not. For at a place where there is already a resisting
substance (sapratigham dravyam), ether does not make room [for it];
and at a place where there is nothing, room [for a thing] is made by virtue
of the very absence [without the intervention of ether]. Where then
will ether make room?392 Inasmuch as [the essential function of] ether
is said to consist in making room (avakāsaprada), if ether were existent,
there should be room at all times, at all places and by all means; but
this is not the case. Therefore, we comprehend that there is no ether.
This refutation, however, is made from the standpoint of the Vaibhāṣīka393.

(66.1) Others [like the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas] hold that ether
has sound as its quality; besides, it [=ether] is said to be a single
entity. [But this is untenable, since] if so, no sounds, depending on
the common substratum, could be heard separately. Thus, a sound sup-

388. G=T upacārikakāraṇatvāt; M upacārataḥ kāraṇatvāt.
389. G kuruṭaḥ pāpy utpattiḥ, but M=T kuruṭaḥ pāpy akuruḍrūpāpattiḥ.
390. In connection with this, perhaps we should recall NS 1. 1. 16: yugapajjñānānutt-
pattir manaso liṅgam.
391. M ta nāsti vā. ta must be omitted.
392. vā in M 65. 15 and 16 are omitted in G, T.
393. Read Vaibhāṣīka. instead of vaiṁāṣika.
posed to have occurred at a distant place would be heard as loud as that at a close place; or otherwise there should be the necessary corollary\(^{394}\) that if a distant sound is not heard, a close sound would not be heard either. Again, direction as well as time is also held to be a single unity. This entails that the notion of ‘east’ and ‘before’ (\(pūrva\)) as well as ‘west’ and ‘after’ (\(apara\)) is impossible. The same logic may be applied to [the proof that] the mind (\(manas\)) cannot be permanent. For, the present opponent infers the existence of a mind on the ground that [two or more pieces of] knowledge do not in reality occur simultaneously [and that this fact is due to the existence of a separate entity called mind which mediates between the soul and knowledge]\(^{395}\). [But this is against our experience] for we experience plural knowledge simultaneously as when we see many girls dancing. And if the mind is permanent\(^{396}\), then it is not correct to maintain that plural knowledge [occurs successively]. Therefore there is no mind either.

31.3. Refutation of earth, water, fire and air. (66.10) [The substances of] earth and the rest are still left [to be examined]. They are regarded [by the opponent] to be of two kinds according as they are seen as a composite whole (\(avayavin\)) or as the component atoms (\(paramāṇu\))\(^{397}\). Of these, a composite whole such as a jar is known to have been made up of atoms through a definite process of formation beginning with the combination of two atoms, etc.; but we [have refuted it] saying that the

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394. G anaikāntikāḥ, but M=T ekāntaḥ.
395. See n. 390 above.
396. nityam omitted in G, T. In this case the sentence may be translated: If there will be a mind, then [the simultaneous occurrence of] plural knowledge [which we experience, for instance, when seeing dancing girls] will not be possible. Mokṣākara might mean this, but if so, the permanency of a mind referred to at 66, 5 would remain unrefuted, though the singleness of it could be refuted. TS v. 632 (nītye tu manasi prāptāḥ prayāyā yaugapadāyatāḥ, tena hetur iha proktō bhavatīśavighātaḥ) as well as the verses cited in G 203. 7–11 (of which the source is not mentioned by Krishnamacharya) refutes the permanency of a mind, saying that if a mind is permanent, plural knowledge would occur simultaneously. Thus, if we read nityam of M 66. 7 we must understand the sentence to mean: If a mind is permanent, then plural knowledge would not occur successively; or dropping na in M 66. 8 we should read: If a mind is permanent, then plural knowledge would occur simultaneously, which contradicts your theory.
397. Of the nine substances, the first four, viz. earth, water, fire, and air are permanent when seen as atoms, and impermanent as effects made of atoms; ether, time and direction are single, permanent and ubiquitous; the soul is permanent and ubiquitous; the mind is permanent. Cf. NK 370. 20–23; TS v. 550, etc.
non-perception of that [composite whole] which is [said to be] by nature perceptible does sublate [its existence]. 398 [The following objection may be raised:] "Without the composite whole, how is this [jar] manifested as a single entity?" To this we have already replied [quoting the verse of Dharmakirti]: 399

Only parts placed closely [together] are seen as they are, but another entity which is their possessor and which itself consists of no parts [i.e. a composite whole] is not apprehended.

[The opponent:] "What is meant by the manifestation of parts?"

[The Sautrāntika:] It is simply the manifestation of atoms, which, being placed in different directions are piled together (saṁcitā).

[The opponent:] "If so, why did Dharmottara say that grossness (sthaulya) is the quality of the manifested (pratibhāsadharma) 400 [and not the quality of the real]?"

[The Sautrāntika:] The significance of the words is as follows: An [external] reality (artha) is not known itself, because it is said that the knowledge of an [external] reality is possible only in the secondary sense. 401 Therefore, this manifestation of blue etc. is perceived as pervading different spots; the very manifestation is none other than the manifestation of grossness [and there is no separate, gross entity].

(67.2) To the Vaiśeṣikas it is atoms that make up the composite whole; according to the theory of the Vaibhāṣikas, atoms [when united together] come directly into the range of perception; according to the Sautrāntikas [however, they are not perceptible themselves, but] are just liable to leave an impress of their own forms [in our knowledge]. But these atoms are not existent at all according to the theory of the Yogācāras.

398. See § 7. 2.

399. See § 7. 2 and n. 140. T tha dad pa thag ņe bar gnas pa rnams kyi kho na de lta de ltar snaḥ ste, de daḥ (n. dbaḥ) ldan pa ḍghaḥ ḍig kho na slar yaṅ dbye ha med par rtogs par ḍgyur ro. The Tibetan translator seems not to have realised that this is the same verse as that in M 22, 14 (§ 7. 2) where he gives a different translation. In the present translation he missed out na in the last half.

400. pratibhāsadharmaḥ sthaulyam, not identified. But a similar passage is found in DP 43. 8-10: ekāññagārāhyā tathāvādha bahavaḥ paramāgavaḥ sthūla iti. ekāyaḥ sthula iti tu tathābhūtapratibhāsaśrayaya vyavasthāpyamānatvāt pratibhāsadharma ity ucyate. na vastudharmaḥ, pratyekam aparīsamāpter iti.

401. bhāktaṁ syād arthavedanam. Not identified.
32. The doctrine of the Yogācāra school. (67.5) [The Yogācārin’s argument for the refutation of atoms is as follows:] A single atom can never be established, for when an atom is placed in the middle, surrounded by [other] atoms existing over, below, and on the four sides of it, it would necessarily have six parts [thus the argument for the alleged indivisibility of an atom falls to the ground]. For [if it is an indivisible entity] the same atom in the middle which is in contact with another atom in the front is not able to be in contact with another at the back, since the former two atoms would necessarily occupy one and the same spot. 402 In the same way, if the atom at the back is in the same spot [in which the middle and front atoms are placed], then the middle atom alone could be in contact with it. 402 Even when there is no direct contact [between atoms], if they face each other, it will come to the same thing. Thus, a bodily object would be reduced to the size of an atom [which is absurd].

(67.13) Or we can examine the problem as follows: 403 What is visible cannot consist of one [atom] as is understood by the examination stated immediately above; 403 nor can it consist of many [atoms] since one atom is not united with another. 404 That is to say, if this [atom] has parts, how can it be an atom [which must be indivisible]? Or if it has no parts, all bodily objects, say a mountain or the earth, would be reduced to the size of an atom, because conjoined atoms, being wholly united, all occupy one and the same spot. Therefore it is necessary to admit that two atoms [i.e. that in the front and that at the back] are distinct in existence from each other. And just as they are [distinct], just so are those conjoined atoms at the upper, lower, southern and northern part distinct in existence from one another. Thus, it will be a necessary corollary that an atom is six-sided (ṣadaṁśatā), as is said by [Vasubandhu] as follows:

If an atom were conjoined with six other atoms simultaneously, it would be six-sided; if six atoms occupied the same spot, a bodily

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402. G evam ca sa pūrvaparamāṇusahāvabhāvo'parāḥ paramāṇuḥ pratyāśited yadi so 'pi tatra syāt ; T de itur mi rdur phra rab šar ma daḥ ne bāhi raḥ bzin de rdur phra rab ma rtoṣg pas gal te ḥgyur ma de yaḥ der ḥgyur ro. Both G and T seem to be defective. I follow M.
403. Omitted in G.
404. T rdul phra rab kyi (n. inserts cha) šas la (p. d. las) rdul phra rab mi dmigs paḥi phyir ro. I follow M. G.
object would be of the size of an atom.\textsuperscript{405}

And when an atom is not established, a number [of atoms] are also not established; thus there are no atoms at all.\textsuperscript{406}

(68.6) [The opponent:] “If there is no external object, what is this cognized image (pratibhāsa) related to?”

[The Yogācārin:] The image of our cognition occurs because of our untrue, latent seeds of representation [which have been stored in subconsciousness] since the beginningless past (anādīvitavāsanā),\textsuperscript{407} and is seen\textsuperscript{408} [as if external], though it has nothing [external] as its object. Thus: the image of our cognition will have an object only if there existed an external reality to be referred to. But this [external reality] must be either a composite whole or the accumulated atoms. But both the contentions have been refuted by the proof contradicting them which we have stated just above, and have no more reality than a day-lotus in the sky. Concerning this the following is said:

There is no composite whole, nor are atoms real; the image of cognition has no object, but resembles experiences in a dream.\textsuperscript{409}

Knowledge in a dream is known to have no [external] object; and there is no difference between the experience in a dream and that in a state of waking, since both are seen to be the same in every respect. Knowledge, when it has not acquired a different feature from the knowledge having no [external] object, is not able to experience what is related to an [external] object. [This argument may be formulated into the following

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{405} =Viśṣṭātikā, v. 12: \ṣaṭkena yugapad yogāt paramāṇoḥ \ṣaṭamāṣatā, \ṣeṣeṣāṁ samāna-deśavat vīṇaḥ syād anumātrakaḥ.

\textsuperscript{406} Detailed refutation of paramāṇu by the Yogācārins is found in various texts such as Viśṣṭātikā; Dignāga’s Ālambanaparikṣārtti; TS Bāhyārthaparikṣā v. 1967–1998.

\textsuperscript{407} M=G vitata, but T ji ita ba bīn ma yin pāṛiṣṭi=vitatha.

\textsuperscript{408} G sambhāvyate (made possible); M=T lakṣyate.

\textsuperscript{409} na sann āvayavi nāma na santi paramāṇavaḥ. pratibhāso nirālambāḥ svapnānubhyavasaṁnibhaḥ. The first half is missing in G, T, and M has san naśayaite which must be corrected into sann āvayavi. The source is not identified, but this verse is again identical with JSS v. 25 (Yamaguchi, 302): cha kṣa can kṣa bya med ciṅ. phra rab rdul rnam med pa daṅ. so sar sneḥ ba dmigs med daṅ. ēams su myoṅ ba rmi lam ḫdra. Here, however, the last bāda reads ‘experience resembles a dream’.

\textsuperscript{410} G dvitīyam; M dvitīyam jñānām; T dvitīyam ākāśakeśadarśanam. Ākāśakeśa, a hair in the sky, is the illusion of a hair floating in the sky seen by a man with diseased eyes, and is used as a simile of a cognition which occurs without depending on an external reality.

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syllogism:]
Knowledge, which is not different from the knowledge having no [external] object, has no [external] object, as the second cognition [of a hair in the sky] \(^{410}\) is not different from the first cognition of it.

The knowledge in a state of waking, the present subject of controversy, is not different from the knowledge in a dream [which has no external object].

[Therefore it has no external object].

(69.2) [The opponent:] "If there is no external thing, then what is the ultimate reality?" \(^{411}\)

[The Yogācāra:] The ultimate reality is the pure consciousness without manifoldness which is freed from stains beginning with [the bifurcation of] cognitum and cognizer (grāhyagrāhakādiśeṣaśāntaṁ niśprapañcavijñānamātraṁ), as is expressed in [the following verse:] \(^{412}\)

Consciousness freed from cognitum and cognizer is the ultimate reality.

Again, the following is said [by Dharmakirti:] \(^{413}\)

[Excepting knowledge itself], there is nothing to be experienced by knowledge, and [likewise] it has no experience other [than self-experience]; since knowledge is deprived of cognitum and cognizer, it is illuminated by itself.

The Blessed One said too: \(^{414}\)
External objects are not existent as ignorant people imagine; the mind, urged by the latent seeds of representation, takes the form of the external thing.

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411. M paramārthasat; G. T sat.
412. grāhyagrāhakānirmuktam viññānam paramārthasat. This is identical with JSS v. 26 a-b (Yamaguchi. 302): guṇa ṅaḥ ḍāsīn ṃ āla gṛol ṃaḥi. Rnām śes ṃaḥi don du yod. A very similar verse is found in JNA 435, 9: grāhyagrāhakāvaiduryād viññānam paramārthasat. ekānekaviyogena viññānasādhipi śuniyāṭā.
413. PV III, v. 328: nāṇyo nubhāyaṁ tend (= jñānena) sti tasya nāḥabhavo ṁparaḥ. tasyāt puṭtyocodyavatvāt svayāṁ saiva prakāṣate, which is changed by our author into nāṇyo nubhāyaḥ buddhaviśtī tasyāṁ nāḥabhavo ṁparaḥ, grāhyagrāhakāvaiduryāt svayāṁ saiva prakāṣate. This change is followed by Vādirājāsūri (NVV I. 317, 19). Hemacandra (AYV 111, 1-2), Mādhava (SDS 31, 196-197) and Guṇaratna (TRD 40, 13-14).
414. bāhyo na vidyate hy artha yathā bālair vikāpyate, vāsanaḥūṣhitam cittaṁ artha-abhāsāṁ pravartate. Lāhbhavatārasūtra. Nanjio ed. 285, 4-5, where vāsanaṁ lūṣitam is given for vāsanaḥūṣhitam.
32.1. Sākāravāda and nirākāravāda of the Yogācārins. (69.11) Concerning this point, some [Yogācārins, i.e. Sākārajñānavadins] maintain the following: All this that is commonly known to be existent as the body or the object [of its activity] is none other than knowledge. And since this knowledge is conscious only of itself, we conclude that there is neither cognitum nor cognizer for anyone; through logical construction (kalpanā), however, appears the relation of cognitum and cognizer. Therefore, the truth consists in the knowledge which, though having [various] images (ākāra), is freed from the imaginary relation of cognitum and cognizer.

Others [i.e. Nirākārajñānavadinas Yogācārinah] however, argue as follows: The essence of knowledge is not stained by the specks of any images and resembles a pure crystal [or the clear sky of an autumnal midday]. Those images of cognition (ākāra) are indeed not real and become perceptible by being shown by nescience (avidyā). Therefore the cognized is not existent in reality; and since the cognized is not existent, the quality of cognizer, which is ascribed to knowledge in relation to the [cognized], also does not exist.

33. The doctrine of the Mādhyamikas. (69.19) According to the view of the Mādhyamikas, however, even that knowledge which is admitted as real by the Yogācārins is not in reality existent, since it cannot withstand scrutiny. For in the world they say that what is endowed with independent essence (svabhāva) is ultimately real. But when examined, that [knowledge] cannot have an independent essence, be this single or plural [i.e. uniform or variegated], since it does not withstand the ex-

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amination which is stated above [regarding atoms]. Concerning this, the following is said:

To the wise, that knowledge [which the Vijñānavādins admit as real] is also not ultimately real, since it, as the sky-lotus, is deprived of single or plural essence.

The revered Dharmakirti said too:

An essential form by which things are defined does not in truth exist; because single or plural essence is not present in these things.

In the same way, the following is said by the author of the [Pramāṇa-vārttika-] Alamkāra [Prajñākaragupta]:

When neither conceptual knowledge nor the other [i.e. indeterminate perception] has validity, who is then to blame even if everything is shattered?

In the sense of the highest truth, there is no difference between the fettered and the emancipated, since no difference appears to those who see that all things are equal.

The syllogism [for the proof] also runs as follows:

A thing of which the essential quality is determined neither as single nor as plural is not ultimately real, as e.g. the sky-lotus;

Knowledge has not an essential quality either single or plural;

[Therefore, it is not ultimately real].

single can grasp its object having plural aspects is going on, the Mādhyamika enters into the arena and argues that after all cognition is not ultimately real because we cannot determine cognition to be either single or plural, which means it has no svabhāva, and that therefore the Mādhyamika’s doctrine of universal emptiness is superior to the Vijñānavāda. The same argument is abbreviated by Jñānavādins at the beginning of the Sākārasiddhiśāstra (JNA 367, 22-368, 5).

420. nēṣṭaḥ tad api dhīrāṇāṁ vijñāṇāṁ pāramārthikam, ekānekasvabhāvena viyogād gaganābjavat. This is again identical with JSS v. 27 (Yamaguchi, 315) : rnam ūs dam paḥi don idan pa, de yan brtan rnams mi ḥdod de. gcig daḥ du maḥi raṅ bzin daḥ, bral phyir nam mkhaḥi padma bāṁ.

421. = PV III, v. 360 : bhāvā yena nirūpyante tad rūpaṁ nāsti tattvataḥ, yasmād ekam anekam ca rūpaṁ teṣāṁ na vidyate. In our text ca and teṣāṁ are changed into vā and teṣaḥ respectively.

422. = PVBh 382, 24-25 (III, v. 107) : yadā tu na vikalpaśya na cānyasya pramāṇatā, tadā viśīryamanē ’pi sarvasmin ko’parādhyatu.

423. = PVBh 382,8 (III, v. 902) : baddhamuktādibhede’pi naïvāsti paramārthataḥ, bheda hi nāthabḥīty eva sarvatra samadarśināṁ. Mokṣākara changes naivāsti into na cāsti. For baddhamukta, G has bandhamukta- and T buddhasvapna-(sad daḥ rmi lam sogs).
This inference is based on the principle of the non-perception of the per-vader [of the probans] (vyāpakānuīpalabdhi). Firstly, this is not an illegitimate probans, since it is quite manifest that an essential quality, single or plural, cannot be possessed by knowledge with an image, just as it is not by an external thing. For the object, concerning which ordinary people talk of the external thing, is none other than cognition itself to those who maintain [that the world is merely] knowledge with various images (sākāravādīn). Therefore, the [argument], which, against [the view of ordinary] people, contradicts externally existent things plays the same role of a contradictor also concerning the internally existent. A gross object is not admitted as consisting of one atom or many atoms.424 And this image which [according to you] consists of knowledge425 may be a single gross image or plural images divisible into many atoms [of knowledge]; but in either case you cannot avoid the [same kind of] criticism [as was] made against the assertion of [the reality of] external objects.

426···The distinguished Bodhisattva [Śāntiraksita] said in the Madhyamakālaṁkāra:

If knowledge were admitted [by you to consist of parts] as many as the number of [its variegated] forms, then it would be difficult [for you] to avert the same kind of criticism which is made regarding [the reality of] atoms...426

424. M=T...tato yat tasya bahirbhāve bādhakaṁ tad evāntarbhāve'pi bādhakam. na hi sthūlam ekam anekāṁ ca paramāṇurūpāṁ apiṣyate. G tato yat tasya bahirbhāve bhāva bādhakaṁ tad evāntarbhāve'ptī bādhakena hi...paramāṇurūpām apiṣyate. I follow M, but G is not different from it in sense.

425. M vijñānātmaṁ añāyam ākāro, but G, T (rnam paḥ śes paḥi bdag ṇid du gur paḥi rnam paḥi ṇdi...) vijñānātmaṁ caīyam ākāro.... The latter reading is definitely better. About vijñānātmaṁ- paramāṇu- and sthūla see for instance RNA 123, 4ff.

426. This is inserted between bhimaḥ and ubhayathāpi (M 91, 3) only in T: dbu ma rgyan du bdag ᇧid chen po bo-dhi-sa-tua yis, ci ste rnam paḥi graḥs bāṁ du rnam paḥ śes paḥ khas len na, de tshe rdul phra ni ḍrār gur paḥi dpyad paḥi ṇdi las bslog par dkaḥ. śes gsums so. Iyengar gives his own restoration into Skt. in M 93. 13-16, which is not very faithful to the Tibetan especially in the last half of the verse. The verse is a verbatim quotation from Madhyamakālaṁkāraṁkāra v. 47 (Peking ed. 50, b4). Śāntiraksita’s own interpretation of it is found in Madhyamakālaṁkāraṁkāraṁkāra. Peking ed. 62, b7-63, a5: gal te bar med par gnas paḥi rdul phra rab kyi ho bo rnam paḥi sthān paḥi rnam paḥ śes paḥ mah po ṇdi dag kyaḥ ḍhyaḥ na, deḥi tshe rdul phra rab la dpyad pa ci ḍrār bas śhar byas pa de ḍrār ba ṇid rnam paḥ śes paḥ rnam la yaḥ bslog par dkaḥ bar ḍhyaḥ te.... Then he gives his criticism of atoms which is very similar to the passage we met in M 67, 7-12. It is quite likely that this portion is a later interpolation. and so I have translated it after the present Skt. sentence is finished.

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For that is not meant merely as a criticism relating to external things but also as applicable to what is not [external].

The objection that a contradiction pertaining to a bodily object (mūrti) is not applicable to a bodiless image consisting of knowledge is also not cogent. For even knowledge, inasmuch as it is maintained to be endowed with a form, has a shape, since this image pervading a certain space is none other than a shape (mūrti).

Here ends the chapter ‘Inference for others’ of the Tarkabhāṣā written by the Buddhist monk Mokṣākaragupta, great doctor of the monastery of Jagaddhala.

By the merit I have gained by writing this Tarkabhāṣā may all people in this world attain Buddhahood!

APPENDIX

Appendix I=n.212. Buddhist logicians set forth various kinds of the classification of negative inference (cf. the diagram). Dharmakirti himself classified it into four kinds with four subordinate forms (PV I, v. 4 and Svaśruti), three kinds (HB), and eleven kinds (NB). The four basic kinds proposed in PV I, v. 4 are: 1) viruddhasiddhi = svabhāvaviruddhāpalabdhi (illustrated by na sītasparśo 'trāgnek'); 2) viruddhakāryasiddhi = svabhāvaviruddhakāryopalabdhi (na sītasparśo 'tra dhūmāt'); 3) hetvasiddhi = kāraṇānapalabdhi (nātra dhūmo 'nagnek'); 4) dṛṣṭamānār asiddhi = svabhāvānapalabdhi (nātra dhūmo 'nupalabdheḥ). However, in his Svaśruti on the same verse Dharmakirti actually enumerated six forms, adding a derivative form to each 1) and 4), viz., 1a) vyāpakaviruddhasiddhi = vyāpakaviruddhāpalabdhi (na tuśārasparśo 'trāgnek'); 4a) vyāpaksavābhāvasiddhi = vyāpakānapalabdhi (nātra śītasparśa vyāsābhāvā). Furthermore, in PV I, v. 5 he adds 3a) tadviruddhanimittasyāpalabdhiḥ = kāraṇāviruddhāpalabdhiḥ (nāsa romaharṣādiviśeṣā gaḥ sani samnihaḍanaviśeṣatvāt), and in the Svaśruti on it he gives 3b) kāraṇaviruddhakāryopalabdhi (6, 15-16: etena tathāryāpi na tadviruddhakāryābhāvagatī uktā vedītavyā yathā na romaharṣādiviśeṣayuktaśapuṣṭāvān

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Thus he concludes that non-cognition is eightfold due to the variety of application or syllogistic argument (6, 18: *iyām prayogabhodād aṣṭadhānupala-labdhīḥ*). These eight formulae correspond in the order of our enumeration to Nos. 5, 9, 3, 1, 8, 4, 7, 11 of Mokṣākara’s classification respectively. It is to be noted that kāryānupalabdhi and its three subordinate forms (Nos. 2, 6, 10, 14 in TBh) are totally missing in PV.

In HB Dharmakirti proposes a classification into three kinds, viz., kāraṇānupalabdhi, vyāpakānupalabdhi and svabhāvānupalabdhi (HBT 202, 15 ff.; HB Reconstruction, 68, 12-13). These three formulae form the principle which underlies the classification in PV, for kāraṇānupalabdhi can subsume Nos. 3, 3a, and 3b in PV, vyāpakānupalabdhi Nos. 4a, 1a, and svabhāvānupalabdhi Nos. 4, 1, and 2. Arcaṭa, when commenting on HB followed Dharmakirti’s classification into three, but at the same time he enumerates at another place (6, 5-6) four kinds of anupalabdhi, viz., the above-named three forms of HB with viruddhavidhi as the fourth.

In NB Dharmakirti gives more derivative forms than in PV, the total amounting to 11. The three new forms added in NB are: No. 6 viruddhavyāptopalabdhi as a subordinate form of svabhāvānupalabdhi, No. 2 kāryānupalabdhi and its derivative No. 7 kāryaviruddhānupalabdhi. Kāryānupalabdhi appears in NB for the first time; adding this to the three forms in HB, we get four forms which seem to offer the basic principle for the classification of negation. In NB, however, Dharmakirti does not explain his principle, nor does Dharmottara in his com. on NB.

What we have referred to just above form Mokṣākara’s principle of classification. He takes up svabhāva-, kārya-, kāraṇa- and vyāpaka-anupalabdhi as the four basic forms. Dharmakirti in NB has already given four forms related to svabhāva (Nos. 1, 4, 5, 6) and this suggests that three subordinate forms may be enumerated under each of the four basic forms, although Dharmakirti himself actually gave only one subordinate form under kāryānupalabdhi, two under kāraṇānupalabdhi and one under vyāpakānupalabdhi. Now Mokṣākara formally gives three subordinate forms to each of the four basic forms, adding as the result five forms which lacked in NB. Thus, the total number becomes 16. TSop followed TBh in classifying anupalabdhi into 16 forms, though the order of enumeration is a little different between the two.

Durvekamśra, the commentator on NBT clearly knew the classification into 16. He says in DP 124, 15 that negation is to be regarded as of 16 kinds (...)śodala-prakārītu draṣṭhavam) and in DP 140, 10 ff. that 11 forms enumerated in NB and NBT are a synodochē (upalakṣaṇa) since more forms may be added. Saying so, he enumerates three more forms: vyāpakaviruddhakāryopalabdhi (No. 12 of TBh), kāryaviruddhakāryopalabdhi (No. 10) and vyāpakaviruddhavyāptopalabdhi (No. 16), illustrating each of them by the same inference as in TBh. And then, he says (DP 141, 1-2) that there are some people who add another two forms, viz. kāryaviruddhavyāptopalabdhi (No. 14 of TBh) and kāraṇaviruddhavyāptopalabdhi (No. 15), giving again the same illustrations as in TBh. Thus, Durveka himself classified negation into 14 forms and at the same time knew that the classification into 16 was made by some people.

The problem is: Who are some people referred to by Durveka? So far as we know, the classification into 16 forms is clearly described only in TBh and TSop, both of which seem to be posterior to DP. According to the editor of DP, Durvekamśra is a pupil of Jitārī, who was a teacher of Atiśa. That is to say, Durveka is a contemporary of Jñānaśīrimitra, who preceded Mokṣākara by more than two generations. Therefore, Durveka cannot refer to Mokṣākara as well as Vidyākaraśānti, the author of TSop. It is most likely, therefore, that the classification of negation into 16 kinds existed before Mokṣākara. Jñānaśīrimitra mentions vyāpakaviruddhakāryopalabdhi, which is admitted by Durveka and
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TBh</th>
<th>PV</th>
<th>HB</th>
<th>NB ; NBT</th>
<th>DP</th>
<th>Tsop</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 svabhāva-anupalabdhi</td>
<td>4 dṛṣṭatmanor asiddhi</td>
<td>3 svabhāva-anup.</td>
<td>1 svabhāva-anup. (s. II, 32)</td>
<td>ibid</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 svabhāva-viruddha-upalabdhi</td>
<td>1 viruddha-siddhi</td>
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<td>4 svabhāva-viruddha-upa. (II, 35)</td>
<td>ibid</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>9 svabhāva-viruddha-kārya-upa.</td>
<td>2 viruddha-kārya-siddhi</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 viruddha-kārya-upa. (II, 36)</td>
<td>ibid</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>13 svabhāva-viruddha-vyāpta-upa.</td>
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<td>6 viruddha-vyāpta-upa. (II, 37)</td>
<td>ibid</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2 kārya-anupalabdhi (II, 33)</td>
<td>ibid</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>7 kārya-viruddha-upa. (II, 38)</td>
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<td>10 kāryaviruddha-kārya-upa</td>
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<td>3 hetv-asiddhi</td>
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<td>9 kāraṇa-anup. (II, 40)</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>7 kāraṇa-viruddha-upa.</td>
<td>3a tad-viruddha-nimittasya-upalabdhi</td>
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<td>10 kāraṇa-viruddha-upa. (II, 41)</td>
<td>ibid</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>3b kāraṇa-viruddha-kārya-upa.</td>
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<td>16 kāraṇaviruddha-vyāpta-upa</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>2 vyāpaka-anup.</td>
<td>3 vyāpaka-anup. (II, 34)</td>
<td>ibid</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3 vyāpaka-viruddha-upa. (II, 39)</td>
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<td>12 vyāpaka-viruddha-kārya-upa.</td>
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<td>16 vyāpaka-viruddha-vyāpta-upa.</td>
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<td>14 vyāpakaviruddha-vyāpta-upa</td>
<td>11</td>
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corresponds to No. 12 of TBh (cf. JN 190, 2), and this suggests that Jñānaśīri knew more forms than PV, NB and NBT and that it is the group of logicians headed by him who first proposed the classification into 16 kinds. But I cannot produce further evidence for it.

Appendix II=n. 418. A similar description of the sākāra- and nirākāra-vijñānavāda of the Yogācārins appears in Bodhībhadra’s commentary on JSS. Peking ed., 51, b3 ff. which is translated into Japanese by Yamaguchi (308) : "ṣadīr mnaḥ ḍhyāṇa spydā pa ni ṛmnā pa gaṇīṣ te, ṛmnā pa daḥ bcaṣ pa daḥ, ṛmnā pa meḍ paṇo. de la ṛmnā pa daḥ bcaṣ pa ni sloḍ ḍonyog phyogs kyi glaṅ po la sogs pa dag gi ḍod pa ste, ṛmnā pa gāṇ gi dbaḥ du ston pas ji skad du : naḥ gi śes byaḥi no bo ni, phyi rol ṛṭar naḥ (snāḥ?) gaḥ yin te, don yin śes bya ba la sogs pa ste ṛmnā par śes paṇi tshogs drug tu smra baḥa. ṛmnā pa de med pa ni sloḍ ḍonyog phyogs pa thogs med la sogs pa ste, de dag ṛmnā pa kun tu bṛtags pa rab riḥ can gyi skra śad la sogs pa ṛṭar smra bas, don ni don tu grub ḍgyur na, mi rtog ye śes med par ḍgyur, de med pas na saḥs rgyas ṛṇid, thob par ḍhyad pa ma yin no. de bāṇ du, mi rtog ye śes rgyu ba la, don kun snaḥ ba med phyir yaḥ, don med khoṅ du chud par bya, de med pas na ṛmnā rig med ces brjod ciḥ, ṛmnā par śes paṇi tshogs brgyad daḥ, kha ciḥ ciḥ pur smra ba ste. gcig paṇi ni ṛmnā pa daḥ bcaṣ pa dag la yaḥ kha ciḥ go.

Tr.: Here the Yogācārins are of two kinds, (those who maintain that knowledge is) always (endowed with images (sākāra) and (those who maintain that knowledge in its absolute state is) without images (nirākāra). Of these, sākāra is propounded by Dignāga and his followers. They teach that the images of cognition belong to the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhāva), as is said (in the Alambanaparikṣā v. 6 as follows) : "The object of cognition is the same as the internal image which appears as if it were externally existent..." They talk only of six kinds of cognitions. Nirākāra is taught by Ācārya Ārya Asāṅga and his followers. They maintain that the images of cognition belong to the represented nature (parikalpitasvabhāva) and are (as much false as) the hair seen by one suffering from partial blindness. It is said (in Mahāyānasamgraha, ed. Lamotte, Chap. II. 14b, c=VIII, 20. c) : "If the object of cognition is established as an external reality there would not be non-conceptual knowledge (nirvikalpajñāna); without it Buddhahood cannot be attained". And again (Mahāyānasamgraha, Chap. II. 14b. f=VIII, 20. f) : "Where non-conceptual knowledge occurs, all objects never appear; therefore one must understand the non-existence of the object. Since it is not existent, the content of cognition is also not existent". They talk of eight kinds of cognition; but some say there is only one kind (of cognition). This theory of one kind (of cognition) is maintained also by some of the Sākāravādins.

In continuation to n. 148 above, I will give here a brief description of the development of the sākāra- and nirākāra-vāda in Mahāyāna Buddhism. According to Ratnākarasānti (see the quotation from his Prajñāpāramitopadesa below), the Mādhyamikas as well as the Yogācārins are each divided into two groups, one maintaining sākāravāda and the other holding nirākāravāda. But the most important development is that among the Yogācārins. The Sautrāntikas thought that what we perceive is not an external reality itself, the existence of which can be known only by inference, but the impress or image which is left by the external reality upon our consciousness. The Yogācārins advanced a step farther and said that the external reality is not existent at all and that the world is none other than our ideas which are the sole reality. Therefore, to the Yogācārins, the image of cognition is the representation of our mind : and this necessarily implies that a cognition is always endowed with an image which is represented by our mind. Thus all the Yogācārins must be sākāravādins so far as the cognition of common people is concerned. A problem, however, appears in regard to an emancipated person, who is supposed to
have acquired nirvākalpakajñāna or non-conceptual, suprmundane knowledge. Some Yogacārins thought that knowledge of an emancipated person is free from the fetter of cognitum and cognizer and accordingly is clear like a pure crystal without specks. And they thought this clear, imageless knowledge is the essence of cognition, regarding images as false, unreal specks born from our vāsanā. This is the essential of the nirākārajñānavāda held by some of the Yogacārins. But others from the same school criticised this theory saying that what is not real can be never manifested, since otherwise a sort of the unfavourable doctrine of asathkyāti would follow. Every cognition, so long as it is knowledge, must have an image, and there is no harm in that an emancipated person's knowledge is with an image, if he is freed from conceptual thinking. This is the essential point of the sākārajñānavāda of the Yogacārins.

What I have depicted above is the fairly later aspect of the controversy regarding sākāra and nirākāra, and must have been developed after Dharmakīrti and reached its final phase at the time of Ratnakāraśānti and Jānaśrimitra. Jānaśrimitra, a sākāra-vāadin, owes much of his theory to Prajñākaragupta and Dharmakīrti, while Ratnakāraśānti, a nirākāra-vāadin, seems to be akin to Śāntiraksīta. We are not sure of characteristics of the controversy before Dharmakīrti. In various places of his books, however, Yamaguchi says that Dignāga, Dharmapāla, Dharmakīrti, etc. represented the sākāra-vāda, and Gupamati, Sthiramati, etc. the nirākāra-vāda. His opinion seems to be mainly based on the above passage of Bodhibhadra's and Hsüan-chuang's description of different theories of the Vijñānavādins in the Vijñaptimitratisiddhi with K'uei-chi's com. As well known, however, the information given by this Chinese source is not always parallel with what we know from Sanskrit and Tibetan sources such as the writings of Sthiramati, and it must be accepted only with reserves. None the less, I think that the controversy ascribed to Dharmapāla and Sthiramati by the Chinese tradition is equivalent in principle to the controversy of sākāra and nirākāra that is known from Sanskrit sources. As for the difference between Dharmapāla and Sthiramati as informed of by Hsüan-chuang and his direct disciple, Frauwallner gives the best survey.


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Frauwallner's opinion that the origin of Dharmapāla's theory is traced back to Asaṅga is different from the description of Bodhibhadra who ascribes the nirākaravāda to the same Asaṅga, if Dharmapāla is accepted as a genuine saṅkaravādin. Apart from the controversy of early Yogācārins, Īnāsṛmitra and Ratnakirti represent the saṅkaravāda while Ratnākarasanti the nirākaravāda in the latest stage of Indian Yogācāra school—in this connection it is interesting to remember that Īnānāśri and Ratnākara held different opinions also on bahir- and antar-vyāpītīvāda, which may suggest opposition in general between these two great scholars. Fortunately, the controversy between Īnānāśri and Ratnākara is attested by rich materials.

PPU, 161. a5-161. b4: de bas na chos thams cad sems tsam daṅ, rnam par śes pa ta sam daṅ, gsal ba tsam yin pas par rig paṅi guṅ ha phyi rol gyi don yod pa ma yin pas, rnam par rig pa raṃs kyang ḍaśin paṅi raṅ bāzin du yod pa ma yin te, ḍi phes ni yid kyi mhan par brjod paṅi phyin chos thams cad kyi kun tu brjods paṅi raṅ bāzin yin no. gaṅ la brjods še na, don med par yah kun tu brjods paṅi ho bo ńiṅ la mhan par żen paṅi bag chags las skyes paṅi don du snaṅ baṅ yah dag pa ma yin paṅi kun tu rtag pa de ni cho rnam kyi gṣan gyi dbaṅ gi no bo ŋiṅ dāṅ ḍkhrul pa daṅ, phyin ci log daṅ, log paṅi śes pa yaṅ yin no. ḍi ḍtar deṅi guṅ ba daṅ ḍaśin paṅi rnam pa ni ḍkhrul pa daṅ bsld paṅi dbaṅ ḍbāṅ žig gis snaṅ bas brdsun paṅi phyir, yaṅ dag pa ma yin paṅi kun tu rtag pa de la de skud ces bya ste, deṅi raṅ bāzin de ni yaṅ dag pa ma yin paṅo. yaṅ dag pa ńiṅ gaṅ yin še na, gsal ba tsam mo. de ńiṅ kyi na rnam pa de ni ḍkhrul paṅi mtshan ma daṅ, spros paṅi mtshan ma ęs bya bar brjod de, ḍkhrul paṅi dmigs pa yin paṅi phyir ro. gniś kyi mtshan ęs kyang bya ste, gniś ḍtar snaṅ baṅ paṅi phyir ro. spros paṅi mtshan med (Read ma) thams cad ḍjīg rtan las ḍdas paṅi ye ęs la ḍgag par ḍgyur la, des na de ni ma ḍkhrul pa daṅ yaṅ dag paṅi ye ęs su yaṅ dag brjod do. de ńiṅ kyi phyir de yaṅ yōṅs su grub paṅi ho bo ńiṅ yin te.

Tr.: Therefore, all things are the mere mind, the mere knowledge and the mere illumination. An external reality which is said to be grasped by cognition is not existent; and accordingly the cognition is also not existent as having the nature of cognizer. These two (i.e. cognitum and cognizer) are the expression (abhiliipa) of the thinking (manas) and as such belong to the represented nature (parikalpitasvabhiiva) of things. Where are they represented? (They are represented in) the wrong representation (abhutaparikalpa) which appears pretending to be external things and which is born from the latent seeds of representation (viśaṇā), which are attached to (constructing) represented images where there are no (external) realities. This abhutaparikalpa is the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhiiva) of things, and is false, perverted and erroneous knowledge. For its aspects of cognitum and cognizer are both unreal, since they appear only because of falsity (bhṛṇti) and confusion (viplaṇa). This is why it is said that (the two are represented) in the wrong representation. Their nature is not real. What then is reality? The pure illumination (prakāśātmarātra) alone is real. Thus, it is said, the images (ākāra)
(of cognition) are marked by falsity (bhrāntinimitta), marked by manifoldness (prapañcanimitta). It is because they are objects of false (cognition). They are also called twofold form, because they appear as two (i.e. cognitum and cognizer). All manifold marks are destroyed when one gets supermundane knowledge (lokottarajñāna). So this is rightly called real knowledge. This is the very reason why it is the accomplished nature (parinīpannasabhāva).

ibid. 167, b8-168, a3: śnon po la sogs pa de gsal bāin pa yin yaṅ gnod pa yod paḥi phyir brdsun pa yaṅ gurḥ po. de brdsun par grub pas na deḥi bdag ŋid de yaṅ brdsun par grub po. yaṅ gsal ba de rigs pa ni ḥkhrul pa ḏaṅ bral bas mḥoṃ sum yin paḥi phyir dḥos po ŋid du grub pa yin te. gaṅ gi phyir gsal ba ni gsal ba ŋid kyis ḡug maḥi raḥ bāin yin te, gaṅ gi myoḥ ba ḥdi ḥkhrul par ḥjog paḥi bslad pas bāzg pa me ḍaṅ phyir ro. yaṅ śhon po la sogs paḥi raḥ bāin yin phyir bslad pas byas par ḡyur la. de ḥtār ḡyur ba na de myoḥ ba yaṅ ḥkhrul par ḡyur ro. de bas na śhon po la sogs pa la ni gnod pa ḡjug paḥi skabs yod kyi gsal ba la ni ma yin no.

Tr.: (Represented images) such as a blue thing etc., though they are being manifested, are proved to be unreal (alika), since they are contradicted (by another cognition). Since they are proved to be unreal, their substratum itself is proved to be unreal. However, the consciousness of illumination (prakāśa) itself is directly intuited as free from falsity, and accordingly is established as real. For illumination has as its inborn nature illuminating function, and cannot be approached by confusion (viplavopanita), so that the consciousness of it might be false. On the other hand, blue is another thing (different from the illumination itself), and can be approached by confusion; therefore, the knowledge of it may be false. Thus, there may be occasions in which (the knowledge of) blue, etc. is (negated) by another contradicting cognition, but it cannot happen in the case of the illumination itself.

This passage of Ratnakara is cited as a purvapakṣa by Jñānaśīrīmitra in JNA 368, 6-10, though the Tib. translation deviates from the Skt. from time to time: bhavatvikiiriit]iim bhidhahii alikatvam, prakiisamiitram tu sat yam]iimniiyalJ, tadiitmavedanasya bhriintatviiyogena pratyak~atviit. prakiisasya prakiisa] eva nijam rupam iti na tat tasya viplavopanitam, yena tadvedanah bhrāntiḥ syāt. nilaṃ tu rūpāntaravint viplavopanitam api syād iti syāt tadvedanaṃ bhrāntiḥ. tato'iti miidāu bādhakasyavātāro na prakāse....

PPU Peking ed., 168, a4ff.: rnal ḡbyor spyod pa pa daṅ. dbu ma pa śes pa rnam pa daṅ beas par smra ba kha cīg na re, śhon po daṅ gsal ba dag brdsun pa daṅ brdsun pa ma yin pa ḡyur na. chos ḡyal ba ŋid kyis na deḥi bdag tu ḥṭhad par mi ḡyur la. deḥi bdag ŋid ma yin na yaṅ śhon po la sogs pa gsal bar mi ḡyur na śhon po la sogs pa ni gsal ba yin te. sgrao (ma) btags paḥi dḥos po ḡyur paḥi gsal ba las gzan ma yin paḥi phyir śhon po la sogs pa ni sgrao ma btags paḥi dḥos po ḡyur ba yin žes zer te. de dag gi iltar na gsal ba thams cad phyin ci ma log paḥi raḥ gi ho bo myoḥ baḥi phyir, thams cad ḥkhrul pa med par ḡyur ro. des na sms can thams cad rtag tu grol bar ḡyur la. rtag tu yaṅ dag pa rdsogs paḥi saḥs rgyas ŋid du ḡyur ro....

Tr.: Some of the sākāraśīnavādins of the Yogācāra and the Madhyamika school say as follows: “If (as the nirākāraśādins maintains, the image of cognition) such as blue is unreal and the illumination (of cognition) is real, they, being incompatible entities, could not be identical; and if (blue) would not be identical with the illumination, blue could not be illuminated (i.e. could not become visible). But it is a fact that blue is seen. Then, [i.e. if they were identical] blue, etc. would not be imagined things, since it is not different from the illumination which is not imaginary.” (Answer) If it is as they say, all cognitions
would know the correct nature (of things); this would result in that there are no false cognitions at all. Thus, all people would be always emancipated, i.e. all would be perfectly enlightened ones....

This discussion continues longer, and the Sanskrit parallel to the portion of the answer is found in JNA 387, 8–23 and RNA 129, 1–12: tathā hi sarvair eva prakāśair avi-paritārthasvarūpasākvedanād bhrānter atyantam abhāvaḥ syāt, tataḥ ca sarvasattvāḥ sadaiva sahyaksambuddhā bhaveyuḥ.... I refrain from quoting farther, though parallels may be increased more, since this is not a place to enter into a detailed account of the controversy.
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ERRATA

Read samyagjñāna instead of samyag- in p. 23, l. 12 ; n. 3, 4, 6, 22, 85.
Read purato' vasthitān instead of 'vasthitān in n. 124 (l. 2).