

Indian Abhidharma Literature in Tibet: A Study of the *Vijñāna* Section of Sthiramati's *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā**

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INTRODUCTION

Most of the Indian Abhidharma texts available in Tibetan translation were produced in the ninth century by the Tibetan translators Ska ba dpal brtsegs, Ye shes sde, and Cog ro klu'i rgyal mtshan in collaboration with the Indian *panditas* Jinamitra, Śilendrabodhi, Prajñāvarman, Dānaśīla, and Viśuddhisimha. They prepared translations of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (P 5550) and its commentaries, the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (P 5554) and the *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* (P 5555), of parts of the *Prajñaptiśāstra* (P 5587-5589), of the *Abhidharmakośa(bhāṣya)* (P 5590 and 5591) and its commentary, the *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* (P 5593), of the *Sārasamuccaya* (P 5598), as well as of the *Pañcaskandhaka* (P 5560) and its three commentaries, namely, Sthiramati's *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* (P 5567), Guṇaprabhā's *Pañcaskandhavivarāṇa* (P 5568) and *Pṛthivibandhu's *Pañcaskandhabhāṣya* (P 5569).¹ The latest translation of an Indian Abhidharma treatise into Tibetan was probably produced by the Tibetan grammarian and translator Chos skyong bzang po (1441-1527/28), also known by his Sanskrit name Dharmapālabhadra, who rendered into Tibetan Sthiramati's extensive commentary on the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyatīkā Tattvārthā* (P 5875).

Despite the existence of a great variety of Abhidharma works in the Tibetan canon, only two of these texts made their way into the general curriculum of

Tibetan monastic education and were transmitted in a continuous lineage: the *Abhidharmakośa* (*bhāṣya*) and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*.² Remarkably, the teaching transmission of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is considered to have continued uninterruptedly from the ninth century, even through the “grey period” of Tibetan history (i.e. through post-imperial times from 842 until the end of the tenth century), while the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* was reintroduced to Tibet by the Indian *paṇḍita* Smṛti in the late tenth century after a gap in the early transmission lineage.³

Besides the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, the Abhidharma of the Yogācāras is also represented in the Tibetan tradition by a collection of indigenous works that deal exclusively with the Yogācāra concepts of the “notion of ‘I’” (*kliṣṭamanas*, *nyon mongs pa can gyi yid*) and the “store mind” (*ālayavijñāna*, *kun gzhi rnam par shes pa*). This literary tradition is based on Indian Yogācāra sources, as, for instance, the *Mahāyānasamgraha* and the *Triṃśikā*. Its starting point goes back to the famous Dge lugs pa scholar Tsong kha pa (1357-1419), who authored a work on this topic entitled *Yid dang kun gzhi’i dka’ ba’i gnas rgya cher ’grel pa* (P 6149). So far, seven commentaries on Tsong kha pa’s treatise have been located, most of them written by Dge lugs pa scholars active in the major monastic centres of Tibet in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.⁴

Although the *Pañcaskandhaka* and its commentaries do not seem to have been major sources for Tibetan scholarship, the works do, nonetheless, mark important steps in the evolution of the Buddhist understanding of the person and are some of the very few texts that present this topic from the viewpoint of the Yogācāra Abhidharma. Thus, they are of crucial importance for understanding the development of the Buddhist view of the person and the Indian influence on related Tibetan literature. This particularly holds true for the study of the Buddhist notion of mind. I, therefore, provide below an analysis of the *vijñāna* section of the *Pañcaskandhaka* and its extensive sixth-century commentary, the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*. Prior to this investigation, I give a description of the Sanskrit manuscript of the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*, which came to light in the collection of microfilm copies kept at the China Tibetology Research Center (CTRC) in Beijing a few years ago,⁵ and I also present some noteworthy scribal peculiarities.

By composing the *Pañcaskandhaka*, Vasubandhu produced a handy manual on the five constituents of a person (*skandha*) as understood from the viewpoint of the Yogācāras. The conciseness of the work, covering seven manuscript folios,⁶ was motivated, according to the commentator Sthiramati, by the intention to meet the needs of its potential readers: the householders who do not have enough time to read extensive treatises because of their various duties and the contemplating monks who should not be distracted by reading lengthy works.⁷

DESCRIPTION OF THE MANUSCRIPT

General Description

The manuscript of the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* is complete, consisting of 73 palm-leaf folios with six lines of writing per folio.⁸ The pagination is written in the centre of the left margin of versos. Remarkably, folio 8 appears twice in the manuscript. The reason for this duplication seems to be the scribe's omission of a part of the folio. As he tried to include the missing section in the additional folio 8, the script of the second version of the folio is more condensed, the recto containing seven instead of six lines. Each leaf has been punched with a single hole on the left. The text is written in an upright and elegant Proto-Bengālī script, very similar to the script of the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* and the *Jñānālokālamkāra*, published by Taisho University.⁹ The very clear and confident script of the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* is different from the script of its root text, the *Pañcaskandhaka*, which is written in the hook-topped Nevārī script of the early twelfth century.¹⁰ The leaves of the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* manuscript are extremely well-preserved, without showing any serious damage. Thus, the physical state of the manuscript is much better than the condition of the other two Yogācāra works kept (as facsimiles) at the CTRC: the *Pañcaskandhaka* and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyaṭīkā Tattvārtha*, which are both incomplete and illegible in several passages.

Scribal Peculiarities

In the following, I describe some of the scribal and palaeographic characteristics of the manuscript, including various ways of erasing wrong *akṣaras*, corrections in the margin, markings of the *daṇḍa*, and peculiarities in the writing of certain *akṣaras*. There are three possibilities of how the space of a deleted *akṣara* may appear in the manuscript. In most cases, the space was simply left blank after the *akṣara* had been erased. In these instances, parts of the *akṣara* may still be visible: . If there is no visible remainder of the deleted *akṣara* – as in the following case:  – it is difficult to decide whether the empty space indicates an erased *akṣara* or a gap in the text inserted for another reason. The second possibility to indicate a deleted *akṣara* is to mark it with one or two small strokes: . Thirdly, the place of the erased *akṣara* can be indicated with a line-filling sign, of which there are three variants:¹¹

1. 
2. 
3. 

It is unclear why three different signs are employed and why the scribe or corrector did not use the line-filling signs regularly. Compared to the mere erasure of *akṣaras*, the usage of the line-filling signs seems more efficient insofar

as they make it very obvious to the reader that the *akṣara* has been removed intentionally and that no *akṣara* is missing in the manuscript. While the most common of all these possibilities of deletion is the erased *akṣara* with some visible parts, the application of two strokes above the deleted *akṣara* is the least frequent alternative. The line-filling signs seem to be employed in two functions: to fill the gap of an erased *akṣara* or to fill a space left empty by the scribe, presumably because he was unsure about the reading of a passage. This difference is obvious because, occasionally, remains of the erased *akṣaras* are visible under the line-filling signs, while, in other cases, the latter seem to be written on an entirely blank surface.

Another striking feature of the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* manuscript exists in corrections to the text written in a different hand in the lower and upper margins by a proof-reader. They are placed above or below the section they refer to and are often followed by a numeral indicating the emended line. In addition, an upward- and/or downward-pointing *kākapada* occasionally marks the place where the corrected *akṣara* has to be inserted. While the erased *akṣaras* and line-filling signs might have been corrected by the scribe of the text himself, the emendations in the margins, written in a script different from that of the main text, are most likely to be later additions, possibly added not only by proof-readers but also by later readers of the manuscript. Thus, the corrections in the margins and the various erasures mentioned above presumably reflect several layers of emendation.

Of interest is, moreover, the marking of the *daṇḍa*, which very often is reduced to the half of a stroke or even to a mere dot. What makes the treatment of the *daṇḍa* even more difficult for the editor is the fact that some of the strokes have obviously been added by a later corrector or reader to indicate phrase- or word-endings, and not to separate sentences. Occasionally, the *daṇḍa* is also employed in order to avoid the application of (difficult) *sandhis*, as for instance in folio 39a2: *sa punaḥ | rāgānukūlah* (with *sandhi*: *sa punā rāgānukūlah*). The heterogeneous employment of the *daṇḍa* suggests – similar to the inconsistent correction of *akṣaras* – different stages of development of the manuscript. The unclear marking of the *daṇḍa* makes it rather difficult to find an efficient system for reproducing the *daṇḍa* in the diplomatic edition of the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*. Is it reasonable to transcribe every dot and fine stroke appearing in the manuscript, even if it obviously is a later addition by a reader, possibly only included as a reading aid?

Other special characters appearing in the manuscript are the line-filling signs used at the end of the line or before a string-hole (𑀓) and the markers of passage endings (𑀕). Remarkable are also the two ways of presenting an *anusvāra*: one is a dot (𑀖) and the other a small circle (𑀗). Whenever this circle is written with a *virāma* (𑀘), it represents a stylised *m* with a *virāma*.¹² Moreover, there are two variant ways of indicating a *visarga*: one is formed in

a figure eight (ॐ) and one is shaped with two circles (ॐ). Notable is also the way in which some of the vowels are marked in the manuscript. This is what an *-ā* usually looks like (here: *kā*): क़ा. But, occasionally, the vowel has the form of a hook and appears on top of the *akṣara* (here: *ṅā*): ङ़. In the case of *-e*, the vowel sign can either have the following shape (here: *ve*): वे or look like this (here: *tme*): त्मे. The vowel signs written on top of the *akṣaras* might, again, be later additions to the manuscript. Furthermore, there is a sign appearing several times in the manuscript which resembles an unfinished *va* or deleted *dha* but does not fit into the text (*vijñaptir dvi*^o): वदुवद. This *akṣara* has not been identified so far.

EXPLANATION OF VIJÑĀNA

In the following, I present an overview of the *vijñāna* section of the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*.¹³ Perception (*vijñāna*) is treated under three aspects in the *Pañcaskandhaka*: “the actual perception” (*pravṛttivijñāna*), “the store mind” (*ālayavijñāna*) and “the notion of ‘I’” (*kliṣṭamanas*). Vasubandhu defines *vijñāna* in his *Pañcaskandhaka* as the “making known of objects” (*ālabhanavijñapti*).¹⁴ “Making known” means, according to Sthiramati, grasping (*grahaṇa*), perceiving (*avabodha*) and seizing (*pratipatti*).¹⁵ Thus, the eye perception is, for instance, defined as “the making known of the visible on the basis of the eye faculty.”¹⁶ As synonyms of *vijñāna*, the *Pañcaskandhaka* mentions *citta* and *manas*.¹⁷ A similar explanation is found in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*,¹⁸ where the *citta* aspect of *vijñāna* is defined as being the *ālayavijñāna*, whereas the *manas* aspect of *vijñāna* is paraphrased as *kliṣṭamanas*.¹⁹ It is notable that the *Pañcaskandhaka* initially gives an alternative interpretation of *manas* explaining that *vijñāna* is to be considered *manas* because it is the basis for the following moment of the mind (*citta*).²⁰ The function of being the mental moment preceding present perception is also ascribed to *manas* in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.²¹ However, Vasubandhu also mentions in the *Pañcaskandhaka* that the main function of *manas* in the context of the *vijñānaskandha* is to be the *vijñāna* that has the *ālayavijñāna* as its object and which is always associated with the contaminations “wrong attitude towards the self” (*ātmanamoha*), “false view of the self” (*ātmadṛṣṭi*), “conceitful conception of the self” (*ātmanamāna*), and “self-love” (*ātmasneha*).²² In his commentary on this passage, Sthiramati specifies this kind of *vijñāna* as the “contaminated notion” (*kliṣṭam manas*) which continuously takes the *ālayavijñāna* in the form of the self (*ātman*) as its object.²³ Sthiramati also points out that there is a difference between the *manas* which is the basis for mental perception (*manovijñāna*) and the *manas* which has the nature of conceit (*manyana*).²⁴ This ambivalent meaning of *manas* and the question of whether there is a direct relation in doctrinal development between the concepts

of *manodbātu* and *kliṣṭamanas* requires further investigation, and will be treated in a separate article which is currently under preparation.²⁵

Vasubandhu continues his explanation of *manas* with the statement that the latter is of only one kind (*ekajātīya*).²⁶ Sthiramati comments that *manas* can only be contaminated (*kliṣṭa*), as it is permanently connected with the four contaminations mentioned above. He adds that *kliṣṭamanas* cannot be beneficial (*kuśala*) or (exclusively) neutral (*avyākṛta*).²⁷ The association of *kliṣṭamanas* with contaminations has also been expressed differently, for example, in the *Mahāyānasamgraha* and in Tsong kha pa's *Yid dang kun gzhi'i dka' 'grel* where it is characterised as *nivṛtāvyaṅkṛta*, i.e. "obstructed [by contaminations but] neutral."²⁸ When stating that *kliṣṭamanas* cannot be neutral, Sthiramati obviously refers to a quality of *avyākṛta* other than the quality of the concept *nivṛtāvyaṅkṛta*. The latter indicates the karmic indefiniteness of a factor which may, at the same time, be spiritually bad. Thus, possessing *kliṣṭamanas* does not necessarily result in karmic disadvantages but it hinders one's path to liberation. In contrast, the term *avyākṛta*, as used in Sthiramati's commentary, indicates the complete neutrality of a factor in the sense of *anivṛtāvyaṅkṛta* (a quality which is ascribed to the *ālayavijñāna*). The explanation of *kliṣṭamanas* ends in the *Pañcaskandhaka* (*vibhāṣā*) with the mentioning of states in which it is not active: arhatship (*arhattva*), the path of the noble ones (*āryamārga*) and the equipoise of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*).²⁹

The *citta* aspect of *vijñāna* is also explained in a twofold way in the *Pañcaskandhaka*. Vasubandhu starts with an "etymological" interpretation, stating that the word *citta* is derived from *citra*, i.e. "[being of] various [kinds]."³⁰ Sthiramati explains in his commentary that actual perception (*pravṛttivijñāna*) can be of manifold kinds depending on its various objects.³¹ However, the main meaning of *citta* is, according to Vasubandhu, being the store mind (*ālayavijñāna*), filled with seeds of all conditioned factors (*samskāra*).³² Sthiramati describes the seeds as imprints (*vāsanā*), which are nourished by the repeated occurrence of impulses (*samskāra*).³³ This means the more often a *samskāra* is active, the fatter its *vāsanā* will get. The process beginning in the moment of perceiving an object and ending in the moment of creating an imprint in the *ālayavijñāna* is described as follows in the *Pañcaskandhaka-vibhāṣā*:³⁴ After the actual perception (*pravṛttivijñāna*) has perceived an object, the investigative (*paryeṣaka*) mental perception (*manovijñāna*) arises. After that, the classifying (*vyavasthāpaka*) *manovijñāna* appears.³⁵ And finally, the imagining (*vikalpaka*) *manovijñāna* arises. This is the moment when contamination (*samkleśa*) and purification (*vyavadāna*) occur (depending on the object), and the moment when meritorious (*puṇya*), non-meritorious (*apuṇya*) or neutral (*aniṅjya*) intention (*cetanā*) is produced. After the intention is completed, it leaves (or "nourishes") an imprint in the *ālayavijñāna* that is either an "imprint of maturation" (*vipākavāsanā*) and is the basis for the arising

of the *ālayavijñāna* in future existences, or an “imprint of outflow” (*niśyandavāsanā*), based on which (future) *saṃskāras* emerge from the *ālayavijñāna*.³⁶

The longest part of the *vijñāna* section of the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* consists of a detailed investigation of the *ālayavijñāna*, in which Sthiramati points out its divergence from the *pravṛttivijñānas* and provides several arguments for the necessity of its existence. The *Pañcaskandhaka* mentions three qualities of the *ālayavijñāna* that are contrary to the characteristics of actual perception:³⁷

1. The object of the *ālayavijñāna* and the mode [in which it is apprehended] is not clearly determined (*aparicchinnālambanākāra*).
2. The *ālayavijñāna* is of one kind (*ekajātīya*).
3. The continuity of the *ālayavijñāna* is not interrupted (*santānānuvṛtti*).

In his commentary, Sthiramati explains that the objects of actual perception are clearly definable as the visible, the sound and so on. In contrast, the mode of apprehension and the objects of the *ālayavijñāna* are not clearly determined. The objects are also described as difficult to understand (*duravadhāra*) due to their subtlety.³⁸ Sthiramati identifies them as the external world (*bhājana*) and the appropriation (*upādāna*), i.e. the [subtle] matter of the [material] sense-faculties (*indriyarūpa*) together with its [gross] basis (*sādhiṣṭhāna*), and the impression (*vāsanā*), which consists in the sticking to the imagined character [of reality] (*parikalpitasvabhāvābhīniveśa*).³⁹

The second quality of the *ālayavijñāna*, which is *ekajātīya*, indicates, according to Sthiramati, that the *ālayavijñāna* is always morally neutral (*avyākṛta*), whereas the actual perception might be classified as neutral, beneficial (*kuśala*) or contaminated (*kliṣṭa*). The moral neutrality of the *ālayavijñāna* is constituted by its being exclusively [the result of] maturation (*vipāka*) of previous karma, which can by no means have a future karmic effect itself.⁴⁰

The last difference between the *ālayavijñāna* and the *pravṛttivijñānas* consists in the uninterrupted homogeneous continuity of the *ālayavijñāna*, on the one hand, and the constant alternation of actual perceptions, on the other. While the continuity of the *ālayavijñāna* is not interrupted from the moment of “linking up” (*pratisandhi*) a new existence (i.e. from the moment of conception) until the moment of death, the quality of actual perception changes in every moment.⁴¹ A beneficial perception can be immediately followed by a non-beneficial *vijñāna* and an eye perception might be succeeded by a perception of smell or taste and so on.

The existence of *ālayavijñāna* can be proved, according to Sthiramati, on the basis of the authoritative scriptures (*āgama*) and of reasoning (*yukti*). In

order to provide evidence from the former, he quotes relevant passages from the *Samḍhinirmocana-sūtra* and the *Abhidharma-sūtra*,⁴² the latter being currently unavailable in Sanskrit or in Tibetan and only accessible through citations in other works. The logical arguments that confirm the necessity of *ālayavijñāna* are indicated in *PSk* 16,11-17,4 and may be paraphrased in the following way:

1. Actual perception reappears after a person has risen from unconscious states, as, for instance, the equipoise of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*).
2. Actual perceptions have different modes [of apprehension] (*prakāra*) depending on different kinds of object conditions (*ālambanapratyaya*).
3. Actual perception reappears after it has been interrupted.
4. An individual arises and ceases in *samsāra*.

Sthiramati comments extensively on the first of the four arguments, explaining that it is impossible for actual perception to reappear after a person's return from unconscious states of mind without a basis having the nature of the *ālayavijñāna*. As the *pravṛttivijñānas* are interrupted during these states, they are not existent in the moment of rising from the unconscious condition and cannot be the basis for the newly-beginning perception.⁴³ In his commentary, Sthiramati also refers to the positions of some opponents as, for instance, the Sarvāstivādins. The first wrong view he argues against is that of the existence of past and future entities (*bhāva*), which the Sarvāstivādins explain by means of their activity (*kāritra*). According to this theory, the entities are existent in all three time periods, being different merely as regards their activity: in the present, they are active; in the past, they are no longer active; and, in the future, they are not yet active.⁴⁴ This argument is important in the context of the *ālayavijñāna* in that the existence of the latter would not be necessary if the continuity of mind could be assured by the permanent existence of past and future phenomena. Sthiramati refutes this model of the Sarvāstivādins by stating that it would have unacceptable consequences. He opens his argument by pointing out that the entities would be constantly existent, whereas the activity would be existent exclusively in the present. Therefore, the entities would be different from their activity. As only the activity would arise and disappear (and not the entities themselves), the *skandhas* (also being *bhāvas*) would not be impermanent and, therefore, would not be part of suffering.⁴⁵ The teaching that the *skandhas* are impermanent and characterised by suffering would be a wrong view (*viparyāsa*). The result of this assumption would be that contaminations (*kleśa*) could not be removed as it is impossible to eliminate them through a wrong view.⁴⁶ What is more, because of the arising and disappearing of the activity one would have to consider the latter as conditioned and, therefore, to be included among the

five *skandhas*. However, as it is not subsumed under these *skandhas*, the only way out of this conflict would be the unacceptable adoption of an additional (sixth) *skandha* consisting of activity.⁴⁷

Sthiramati also argues against the view that activity could be identical to the entities. According to the opponent, activity is defined as “taking hold of the effect” (*phalaparigraha*), which means that one entity, by taking hold of another as its effect, is the cause of this entity. The opponent states that, therefore, the activity is not different from the entity.⁴⁸ In his answer, Sthiramati explains that this position would have the consequence that either the past and future entities would not exist in the same way as their activity, or that the latter would be existent in all three periods of time.⁴⁹ However, these consequences would contradict the Sarvāstivāda view that the entities exist in all three time periods and that the time periods are determined by activity. Sthiramati adds that entities and activity must be different as, otherwise, the effect would be present at the same time as the cause. If all entities would exist at all times, they could not be causes for each other, as the cause must exist before the result arises. This would have the consequence that only activities would be caused by other activities but not the entities themselves.⁵⁰ To those who hold the view that activity and entities are neither identical nor different, Sthiramati responds that this position would also have unacceptable consequences. Activity cannot be identical to entities because it is not the essential nature (*svabhāva*) of a certain entity. It cannot be different either as it is not the *svabhāva* of any other entity.⁵¹ Thus, it must be stated that activity is not the *svabhāva* of anything and is, therefore, not existent in the same manner as a hare’s horn (*śaśaviṣāṇa*). An activity which is characterised in such a way cannot possibly be the factor that determines the three periods of time.⁵²

Another position rejected by Sthiramati is the claim of some opponents that the body (*rūpa*), endowed with material sense faculties, and the mind (*citta*) provide the seeds for each other. In this case, the mind could reappear on the basis of the body when a person arises from unconscious meditative states. This is compared to the way in which the material body of someone leaving the immaterial sphere (*ārūpyadhātu*) reappears on the basis of his mind.⁵³ Thus, the assumption of a continuous mind like the *ālayavijñāna* would not be necessary. Sthiramati’s objection against this position is that it leads to the unacceptable condition that each living being would have two mental continua: one arising from the body and another one emerging from the mind.⁵⁴ Additionally, it would be impossible to explain the arising from unconscious states of someone belonging to the immaterial sphere, as he does not have a material body that could be the basis for the reappearance of his mind.⁵⁵

Vasubandhu's second proof of the existence of the *ālayavijñāna* is explained by Sthiramati as follows: due to the different kinds of object conditions (*ālambanapratyaya*) the actual perceptions appear in various modes. Therefore, a preceding perception usually cannot be the seed of the following one, e.g. a beneficial perception cannot function as the seed of a non-beneficial perception.⁵⁶ Thus, a “store” like the *ālayavijñāna* is needed, containing the seeds from which different perceptions emerge. These seeds, in turn, are produced by previous actual perceptions that leave imprints (*vāsanā*) in the *ālayavijñāna*.⁵⁷

Vasubandhu's third argument pointing at the reappearance of actual perception after it has been interrupted refers, according to Sthiramati, to the arising of the mind after deep sleep (*middha*) or a swoon (*murchā*).⁵⁸ This argument is similar to the first proof of the reappearance of perception after rising from unconscious meditative states.

The last argument for the existence of *ālayavijñāna* offered by Vasubandhu and commented on by Sthiramati is related to the dependent arising (*pratītyasamutpāda*) within *samsāra* and to liberation. Sthiramati explains that the progressing of *samsāra* and the escaping from it would be impossible if there was no *ālayavijñāna*. Progressing of *samsāra*, i.e. rebirth, could not happen because the third member of the twelve-membered *pratītyasamutpāda*, the “linking up *vijñāna*” (*pratisandhivijñāna*), could not arise without *ālayavijñāna*.⁵⁹ According to Sthiramati, this *vijñāna* can neither emerge from the *samskāras* of the previous existence, as these are no longer existent,⁶⁰ nor can it arise from the *pravṛttivijñānas* because – without the *ālayavijñāna* – there would be no possibility for the *pravṛttivijñānas* to leave an imprint (*vāsanā*) anywhere that could give rise to another *vijñāna*. It is neither possible that they produce an imprint in themselves nor that they leave the *vāsanā* in past or future moments of perception, as these are no longer or not yet existent.⁶¹ Thus, the only appropriate way to explain the progressing of *samsāra* is, according to Sthiramati, as follows: the *samskāras* arise due to ignorance and the *vijñāna* that is conditioned by the *samskāras* is the [*ālaya*] *vijñāna* which is impregnated by them. The “linking up” which is conditioned by this *vijñāna*, is the *nāmarūpa* (i.e. the “mind and matter” which constitute the fourth limb of the *pratītyasamutpāda*).⁶²

Escaping from *samsāra* would not be possible without the *ālayavijñāna* because liberation can only take place after the contaminations (*kleśa*) have been removed. If there was no *ālayavijñāna*, the contaminations would have to be eliminated in the moment of their actual appearance. However, this assumption is unacceptable as the actual contaminations cannot be present at the same moment as the path, their antidote which eliminates them. Sthiramati also rejects the possibility that the *bījas* of the *kleśas* could be removed by their antidotes without the *ālayavijñāna* because the *bījas* and

the mental moments which counteract them cannot be existent in one single mind series at the same time.⁶³ Thus, a multi-layered mind stream is needed which allows the parallel existence of seeds and their antidotes.

CONCLUSION

Despite the fact that Vasubandhu's concise treatise on the five constituents of the person (*skandha*), the *Pañcaskandhaka*, and its three extensive commentaries by Sthiramati, Guṇaprabha and *Pṛthivībandhu never achieved the same relevance within the scholarly tradition of Tibet as the *Abhidharmakośa* (*bhāṣya*) and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, their position within Indo-Tibetan scholasticism should not be underestimated. They not only testify to the variety of Abhidharma literature that was transmitted to Tibet but they also represent important constituents in the history of the development of the Buddhist concept of mind, which led to the emergence of a very particular literary collection in the Tibetan tradition dealing with the specific functions of the *ālayavijñāna* (*kun gzhi rnam par shes pa*) and the *kleṣṭamanas* (*nyon mongs pa can gyi yid*).

The main focus of the present paper is to present, on the basis of descriptions in the *Pañcaskandhaka* and comments in the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*, the most important characteristics of *vijñāna*, the fifth *skandha*, which comprises the three functions of being the actual perception (*pravṛttivijñāna*), the "store mind" (*ālayavijñāna*), and the "notion of 'I'" (*kleṣṭamanas*). Of particular interest in this context is the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā's* explanation of the process beginning in the moment of actually perceiving an object until the impressing of an imprint (*vāsanā*) in the *ālayavijñāna* by intention (*cetanā*). However, the greatest part of the *vijñāna* section of the *Pañcaskandhaka* (*vi-bhāṣā*) is devoted to a detailed description of the *ālayavijñāna*, mentioning three characteristics which mark the differences between the latter and the actual perception, and explaining the four arguments which make the existence of a "store mind" besides the mental stream of continuously fluctuating sense perceptions necessary. These four proofs are of particular interest because they differ from the eight proofs presented in the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*, as well as from the arguments provided in the *Mahāyānasamgraha*.

The *kleṣṭamanas* is treated far less exhaustively in the *Pañcaskandhaka* (*vibhāṣā*) than the *ālayavijñāna*. Remarkably, neither Vasubandhu nor Sthiramati considered proving the existence of this aspect of the mind necessary, as can be deduced from the fact that they did not provide any proofs for it comparable to those for the *ālayavijñāna*.⁶⁴ Notable in connection with the definition of *kleṣṭamanas* is the *Pañcaskandhaka's* twofold definition of *manas* as the basis for the following moment of mind, on the one hand, and as the notion of

the *ālayavijñāna* as the self, on the other. This explanation indicates the multi-layered nature of this term, which is common in Yogācāra literature but, nonetheless, requires further investigation.

NOTES

- * I would like to thank Jens-Uwe Hartmann, Kazuo Kano, Ralf Kramer, Helmut Krasser, Lambert Schmithausen and Peter Skilling for helpful comments and corrections. I am also grateful for the support received from the German Research Foundation (DFG) between 2007 and 2011, which enabled me to complete this article.
1. For a detailed list of works translated by Jinamitra, Prajñāvarman, and other Indian *paṇḍitas*, see Skilling, *Mahāsūtras*, pp. 148ff. According to Skilling, *Mahāsūtras*, p. 120, Jinamitra was probably the most important Indian figure in the introduction of Abhidharma in Tibet. The question of whether Jinamitra and the three Tibetan translators were active in the eighth century (under Khri srong lde btsan) or in the ninth century (under Ral pa can) has been discussed in Martin, “Gray Traces,” p. 339. Martin argues in support of the later date.
 2. It should be noted, however, that the most important reference work for the study of Abhidharma among the Tibetans is to be found in the *Mchims mdzod*, a thirteenth-century Tibetan Abhidharma commentary based on Vasubandhu’s *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Yaśomitra’s *Sphuṭārthā*, and on various Yogācāra sources. A brief description of this text is found in Odani, “Study of the *Abhidharmakośa* in Tibet.”
 3. See Martin, “Gray Traces,” p. 337. In the *gsan yig* of the fifth Dalai Lama, Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho (1617-82), several alternative transmission lineages for the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* are listed, including a lineage introduced to Tibet by Jinamitra and continuing uninterruptedly from the imperial period onwards, and lineages entering Tibet through Smṛti and through the Kashmiri *paṇḍita* Śākyasrībhadrā. See *Thob yig*, vol. 1, pp. 47f. However, according to Martin, “Gray Traces,” p. 344, these were originally *Abhidharmasamuccaya* lineages which were later appropriated and renamed as *Abhidharmakośa* lineages. Martin states that by the time of Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho, the *Abhidharmakośa* had replaced the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* in the monastic curriculum to such an extent that it appeared appropriate to replace the incomplete lineage of the *Abhidharmakośa* with the unbroken lineages of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*.
 4. See the *Yid dang kun gzhi’i dka’ gnad rgya cher ’grel pa legs bshad ’bru ’grel gsal sgron* by Dge ’dun bstan pa dar rgyas (1493-1568; mentioned in the collection of the Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center [W12601]), the *Rnal ’byor spyod pa pa’i lugs kyi yid dang kun gzhi’i rtsa ’grel gyi dka’ gnas gsal byed nyi zla zung ’jug* by Blo bzang ’jam dbyangs smon lam (eighteenth century; published in *The Collected Works of Ke’u tshang sprul sku Blo bzang ’jam dbyangs smon lam*, vol. 1, Dharamsala, 1984), the *Yid dang kun gzhi’i dka’ gnas rnam par bshad pa mkhas pa’i ’jug ngogs* by Gung thang dkon mchog bstan pa’i sgron me (1762-1823; published in *The Collected Works of Guni-tha’i dkon-mchog-bstan-pa’i sgron-me*, vol. 2, New Delhi, 1972), the *Yid dang kun gzhi’i dka’ gnad rgya cher ’grel pa legs par bshad pa’i rgya mtsho de’i ’bru ’grel snying po gsal ba’i sgron me* by Blo bzang thugs rje (1770-1835; mentioned in the database of the Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center [W14101]), the *Rnam rig pa’i lugs kyi yid dang kun gzhi’i don cung zad bshad pa ngo mtshar gzugs brgya ’char ba’i me long* by Blo bzang dam chos rgya mtsho (1865-1917; published in *The Collected Works of Blo bzang dam chos rgya mtsho*, vol. 1, New

- Delhi, 1975), the *Kun gzhi'i thal phreng yig cha'i rjes su 'jug pa* by Blo bzang chos dbyings (nineteenth century; xylograph scanned by the Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center [W1CZ899]), and the *Yid dang kun gzhi'i rtsa ba'i mchan 'grel gser gyi lde mig* by Blo bzang 'jigs med (published in *Rje gung thang blo gros rgya mtsho'i drang nges dka' 'grel sogs*, Lanzhou, 2000).
5. The history of the Sanskrit manuscripts in Tibet has been outlined in Steinkellner, *Tale of Leaves*. According to Steinkellner (p. 23), the originals of the copies preserved in the CTRC were photographed in Lhasa in 1987. For an investigation of the *saṃskāra* section of the *Pañcaskandhaka(vibhāṣā)*, see Kramer, "Study of the *saṃskāra* Section." The Tibetan version of the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* has recently been translated into English in Engle, *Inner Science of Buddhist Practice*.
 6. The critical and diplomatic editions of the Sanskrit text of the *Pañcaskandhaka*, facsimiles of which are also kept at the CTRC, have recently been published by Xuezu Li and Ernst Steinkellner.
 7. *PSkV* 1b3f.: *grbāsthānāṃ bahukṛtyavyāpṛtatvād vistaragrantheṣu abhiyogāsambhavaḥ | manasikārābhīyuktānāṃ ca pravrajitānāṃ api vistaragranthābhiyogo vikṣepāyiveti.*
 8. Folio 1a is blank except for the Tibetan title of the text in *dbu med* script: *phung po lnga'i 'grel pa.*
 9. For a table of the script used in these two manuscripts, see Study Group on Buddhist Sanskrit Literature, ed., *Introduction*, pp. 93-112.
 10. See Li and Steinkellner, *Vasubandhu's Pañcaskandhaka*, p. xi.
 11. The first two signs are also used in the manuscript of the *Vimalakīrtinīrdeśa* and the *Jñānālokālamkāra*. See Study Group on Buddhist Sanskrit Literature, *Introduction*, p. 111.
 12. See MacDonald, "Manuscript Description," p. xxii.
 13. A German translation of the Tibetan version of this section is available in Pahlke, "Vijñāna-Abschnitt."
 14. *PSk* 16,7.
 15. *PSkV* 48b4.
 16. *PSkV* 48b5: *caḥsurvijñānaṃ caḥsurindriyāśrayā rūpaprativijñaptiḥ*. A parallel statement is made in *Y* 4,6, *AS* 19,18, and *AKBh* 11,6.
 17. See also *AKBh* 61,20: *cittaṃ mano 'tha vijñānaṃ ekārtham*.
 18. *AS* 19, 12-17.
 19. In *AS* 19,16f., however, *manas* is mentioned as the immediately preceding moment of mind and is distinguished from the *kliṣṭamanas*.
 20. *PSk* 16,8: *manaḥsannīśrayatām*. See also *PSkV* 49a3f.: *ṣaṇṇāṃ caḥsurādivijñānānāṃ yad yan nirudhyate | tat tad anantarasya vijñānasyotpadyamānasyāśrayabhāvena vyavatiṣṭhata ity atah samanantaracittasannīśrayatām upādāya mana ity ucyate.*
 21. *AKBh* 11, 21: *yad yat samanantaraniruddhaṃ vijñānaṃ tan manodhātur ity ucyate.*
 22. *PSk* 17, 7f.: *prādhānyena mana ālayavijñānālambanaṃ sadātmanohātmadṛṣṭy-ātmamānātmāsnehadīsamprayuktaṃ vijñānaṃ*. It is noteworthy that other sources (e.g. *AS* 19,15) mention *asmimāna* in their lists of the four *kleśas* instead of *ātmamāna* and *avidyā* instead of *ātmamoha*. These divergences are discussed in Schmithausen, *Ālayavijñāna*, p. 442, n. 943.
 23. *PSkV* 59a5f.: *kliṣṭaṃ hi mana ālayavijñānaṃ ātmatvena nityam ālambate.*
 24. *PSkV* 59b1: *yat ṣaṇṇāṃ caḥsurādivijñānakāyānāṃ samanantaraniruddhaṃ vijñānaṃ mana ity uktam | tat ṣaṣṭhasya manovijñānasyāśrayaprasiddhyartham | na tu manyanākāratvāt.*
 25. See also Schmithausen, *Ālayavijñāna*, pp. 122ff.

26. *PSk* 17, 8.
27. *PSkV* 59b4f.: *kliṣṭajātīyam | na kuśalam avyākṛtaṃ vā nityam ātmamahādībhiḥ catu<r>-bhiḥ kleśaiḥ samprayuktatvāt.*
28. *MSg* 6, 20f. and *Yid kun* 33a1.
29. *PSk* 17, 9f. and *PSkV* 59b5f.
30. *PSk* 16, 8.
31. *PSkV* 49a1f.: *tatra pravṛttivijñānasyāḷambanaprativijñaptisvarūpatvād āḷambanasya ca prativijñānam anekākāratvāc cakṣurādivijñānam citram utpadyate.*
32. *PSk* 16, 8-10: *prādhānyena punaś cittam ālayavijñānam | tathā hi tac citam sarvasaṃskārābījaiḥ.* Here, Vasubandhu obviously understands *citta* as being related to *cita*, i.e. “filled.”
33. *PSkV* 49b1: *paunaḥpunyena* (read: °*punyena*) *saṃskārānām samudācārād bijapuṣṭir vāsanety ucyate.*
34. *PSkV* 49b4-6: *tadanantaram paryeṣakam manovijñānam | paryeṣakād anantaram yavasthāpakam | evaṃ yavasthāpakānantaram vikalpakam manovijñānam utpadyate | tatra ca viśayāt samkṣīyate yavadāyate vā | tadavasthāś ca puṇyāpuṇyānīñjyān saṃskārānāś* (read: *saṃskārānāś*) *cetanātmakān abhisamskaroti | te °bhisamskṛtā nirudhyamānā ālayavijñāne vipākavāsanām vā puṣṇanti niśyandavāsanām vā.*
35. The “investigative” (*paryeṣaka*) and the “classifying” (referred to as *niścita*) *manovijñāna* is mentioned in the context of an analysis of perception in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. See *Y* 58, 18.
36. *PSkV* 49b6-50a2: *tatra niśyandavāsanām āgamyālayavijñānāt puṇyāpuṇyānīñjyāḥ saṃskārāḥ pravartante | vipākavāsanām āgamyālayavijñānān nikāyasabhāgāntare py* (read: °*āntareṣu*) *ālayavijñānam eva vipākātmakam nirvartate.*
37. *PSk* 16, 9-11.
38. *PSkV* 50a6-50b3: *pravṛttivijñānam hi rūpaśabdādyaḷambanatvāt svasāmānyalakṣaṇākāratvāc ca paricchinṅālambanam paricchinṅākāram ca | ālayavijñānam punar aparicchinṅālambanākāram | na hy aśyāḷambanam paricchettuṃ śakyate nākārah | . . . etac cāḷambanam sūkṣm<atv>āl lokapaṇḍitair api duravadbhāram.*
39. *PSkV* 50b1-3: *ālayavijñānam dvābhyām āḷambanābhyām pravartate | adhyātman upādāya* (read: *upādāna*) *vijñaptito bahirdhāparicchinṅākārabhājanavijñaptitāś ca | tatrādhyātman upādānam parikalpitasvabhāvābhiniveśavāsanā svā* (read: *sā*) *dhiṣṭhānam cendriyarūpam.* See also Schmithausen, *Ālayavijñāna*, pp. 90ff. While Vasubandhu seems to regard the *ālayavijñāna*’s object and way of perceiving to be not definable at all when he uses the term *aparicchinna*, Sthiramati apparently shifts its meaning. According to him the objects of the *ālayavijñāna* are not clearly determined in the sense of being difficult to understand due to their subtle nature. Additionally, Sthiramati applies the characteristic of being *aparicchinna* to the *ālayavijñāna*’s way of perceiving the external world: it is perceived without being clearly discerned. For further remarks on the term *aparicchinnākāra*, see Schmithausen, *Ālayavijñāna*, pp. 389ff., n. 634.
40. *PSkV* 50b4-6: *pravṛttivijñānam kuśalakliṣṭāvyaḥkṛtajātīyam | ālayavijñānam tv ekajātīyam . . . ālayavijñānam sasamprayogaṃ pūrvakarmasaṃskāraheturkatvād ekāntena vipāka evety āvyākṛta* (read: *avyākṛta*) *jātīyam eva.* On the assumption that a *vipāka* cannot have a karmic effect itself, see also Kramer, *Kategorien der Wirklichkeit*, p. 130, n. 155.
41. *PSkV* 50b6f.: *atra hy ālayavijñānam nikāyasabhāgāntareṣu pratisandhim upādāya yāvac cyutiṃ tāvat kṣaṇaprabandhapravāhena vartate | na tv antarāntarā vicchidyate pravṛttivijñānavat.*

42. See PSkV 51a5-51b1.
43. PSkV 51b3: *nirodhāsamjñīsamāpattisamāpannasyāsañjñike ca prādurbbhūte nirodha-viśeṣeṣu* (read: *niravaśeṣeṣu*) *pravṛttivijñāneṣu niruddheṣu punarvyutthānakāla ālayavijñānam antareṇa pravṛttivijñānotpattir na yujyate.*
44. PSkV 51b4f.: *anāgatavartamānātītatvaṃ tu bhāvānām kārītradvāraṅgam | tathā hy akurvan*(read: *akurvāt*)*kārītro 'nāgataḥ | kurva<t>kārītro vartamānaḥ | uparatakārītro 'īta ity ucyate.*
45. PSkV 51b5-52a1: *evaṃ tarhi kārītraṃ bhāvād anyad ity abhyupagantavyam | atītānāga-tāvasthayaḥ kārītre 'saty api bhāvābhyupagamāt | evaṃ ca kārītrasyaivotpādo vyayaś ca na bhāvānām abhūtvā bhāvād bhūtvā cābhāvāt | na ca rūpavedanāsamjñī-saṃskāravijñānānām | sarvadā svarūpādhyāsitavāt | tataś cotpādavyayābhāvān nirodhavan nānītyā rūpādayaḥ skandhāḥ syuḥ | tataś ca duḥkhā api na syuḥ.*
46. PSkV 52a2: *evaṃ ca skandhān anityato duḥkhataś ca cintayato viparyāsa eva syāt | na ca viparyāśāt kleśaprahāṇam yuktam.*
47. PSkV 52a3f.: *kārītrasya cotpādavyayasambhāvāt saṃskṛtatvaṃ | rūpādiṣu ca skandheṣu saṃgrahābbhāvāt śaṣṭhaḥ skandho 'bhyupagantavyaḥ.*
48. PSkV 52a4-6: *kārītraṃ nāma phalaparigrahaḥ | . . . hetubhāvavyavasthānaṃ bhāvānām phalaparigrahaḥ | hetubhāvena ca sa eva dharmo vyavatiṣṭhata iti dharmebhyaḥ kārītraṃ ananyat.*
49. PSkV 52b1f.: *evaṃ cātītānāgatayor adhvānoḥ kārītravad dharmābbhāvāḥ | . . . kārītrasya vā dharmasvarūpavad dharmād ananyatvāt traīyadhvakatvaṃ abhyupagantavyam.*
50. PSkV 52b4-6: *dharmakārītrayoś cānanyatve hetuphalābbhāvaprasaṅgaḥ | tathā hi phalasya kāraṇavat pūrvam eva pariniṣpannatvāt phalasya kiṃ kurvāt kāraṇam bhavaty akurvāt vā kathaṃ kāraṇam | phalam api tenākriyamāṇaṃ kathaṃ tasya kāryaṃ bhavati | kārītrānām eva ca parasparato hetuphalabhāvo na dharmānām.*
51. PSkV 53a2f.: *kārītraṃ dharmasya tattvānyatvenāvācyaṃ ity anye | kimartham tattvenāvācyaṃ | dharmasvabhāvaṃ na bhavati | kimartham anyatvena nocyate | anyasvabhāvaṃ api tan naivety anyatvenāpi nocyate.*
52. PSkV 53a3f.: *evaṃ tarhi yan na tatsvabhāvaṃ nānyasvabhāvaṃ tac chaśaviṣāṇavan niḥsvabhāvatvān nāsty eveti | . . . kārītrāt sarvathāpy adhvavyavasthā na sidhyati.*
53. PSkV 53a5-53b1: *sendriyaṃ rūpaṃ cittaṃ cānyonyabijakam ity ato nirodhāsamjñī-samāpattibhyām asañjñīkāc ca vyutiṣṭhataḥ sendriyarūpāc* (read: *sendriyād rūpāc*) *cittam utpadyate | yathārūpyadhātō cyavamānasya cittād eva ciraniruddham api sendriyaṃ rūpaṃ utpadyata iti.*
54. PSkV 53b1f.: *evaṃ tarhy ekaikasya sattvasya dvau cittasantānu syātām | ekaḥ sendriyād rūpāt | aparāś cittāt.*
55. PSkV 53b2: *ārūpeṣu ca nirodhasamāpannasya rūpābbhāvād vyutthānābbhāvāḥ.*
56. PSkV 55a1f.: *na ca pravṛttivijñānānām parasparabijatvaṃ yujyate | kuśalākuśalāvyaḥkṛtānām hinamadhya-praṇūdabhātinām laukikalokottarānām sāsravānāsravāṇām vijñānānām paryāyenā* (read: *paryāyēna*) *bhāvāt.*
57. PSkV 55a4-6: *taiś ca prakārāntaravṛttibhiḥ pravṛttivijñānair vāsītād vipākavijñānāt punar apy ālambanāpekṣāni kuśalākuśalādiprakārāntaravṛttini pravṛttivijñānāny utpadyante.*
58. PSkV 55b1f.: *acittakamiddhamūrchādyavasthāsu cchinne pravṛttivijñānasantāne punar acittakamiddhamūrchāpagate* (read: *āpagata*) *ālayavijñānam antareṇa pravṛtti-vijñānotpattir na yujyate.*
59. PSkV 55b5: *tatrālayavijñānānābhyupagame saṃskārāpratyayavijñānābbhāvāt saṃsāra-pravṛttir na yujyate.*

60. *PSkV* 55b6f.: *tatra na pratisandhivijñānaṃ pūrvajanmopacitasamṣkārapratyayam | pūrvajanmopacitasamṣkāranāṃ ciraniruddhatvāt | niruddhasya cāsattvāt | asataś ca pratyayābhāvāt.*
61. *PSkV* 56b2f.: *na hi vijñānaṃ vipākavāsanāṃ niṣyandavāsanāṃ vātmany ādhātuṃ samartham | ātmani kārītravirodhāt | nāpy anantare tasya tadānutpannatvād anutpannasya cāsattvāt | nāpy utpanne pūrvakasya (read: pūrvasya) tadā niruddhatvāt.*
62. *PSkV* 56b1: *saṃskārās tv avidyāpratyaḃh | tadadhivāsitaṃ ca vijñānaṃ saṃskārapratyayam | tatpratyaḃh pratisandhau ca nāmarūpam evety eṣaiva nītir niravadyā.*
63. *PSkV* 57a3-6: *na cālayavijñānam antareṇa tatprahāṇaṃ yujyate | saṃmukhībhūto vā kleśaḥ prahīyeta bijāvastho (read: °āvastho) vā | tatra saṃmukhībhūtaḥ prahīyeta ity aniṣṭir eveyaṃ tadā tatprahāṇamārgābhāvāt | bijāvastho 'pi naiva prahīyate | na hi pratipakṣāt tadānīm kimcid anyad abhyupagamyate | yatra kleśabījaṃ vyavasthitaṃ tatpratipakṣeṇa prahīyeta | atha pratipakṣacitta <m> eva kleśabījānuṣaktam iṣyate | na hi kleśabījānuṣaktam eva tatpratipakṣo yujyate.*
64. It seems that the oldest source containing proofs for the existence of the *kliṣṭamanas* is the *Mahāyānasamgraha* in which six arguments are presented to show that their rejection would result in unacceptable consequences (see *MSg* 5, 24-6, 8).

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