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A Direct Path To The Buddha Within - Introduction
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- The doctrine of “buddha nature” (Tib. de bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po), or the teaching that all sentient beings are already buddhas or have the ability to attain buddhahood (depending on which interpretation you prefer), became an important issue in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in Tibet. It was not only much discussed among masters, such as Dölpopa Sherab Gyaltsen (Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan) (1292–1361), who were intimately involved in the practice of the Kālacakratantra, but also came to form an important doctrinal foundation for the dzogchen (rdzogs chen) teachings of Longchen Rabjampa (Klong chen rab ’byams pa) (1308–63) and the mahāmudrā instructions of the Kagyüpas (Bka’ brgyud pa). Thus, Rangjung Dorjé (Rang byung rdo rje) (1284– 1339) equated buddha nature with the central mahāmudrā term natural mind (Tib. tha mal gyi shes pa), and Gö Lotsāwa Zhönu Pal (’Gos Lo tsā ba Gzhon nu dpal) (1392–1481) composed an extensive commentary of the standard Indian work on buddha nature, the Ratnagotravibhāga, from within the mahāmudrā tradition of Maitrīpa (ca. 1007–ca. 1085)and Gampopa (Sgam po pa) (1079–1153). Zhönu Pal and his mahāmudrā interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhāga are the main subject of the present study.
One of the main goals of Zhönu Pal’s Ratnagotravibhāga commentary is to show that the Kagyü path of mahāmudrā is already taught in the Maitreya works and the Laṅkāvatārasūtra. This approach involves resting your mind in a nonconceptual experience of luminosity or the dharmadhātu (the expanse or nature of all phenomena) with the help of special “pith instructions” (Tib. man ngag) on how to become mentally disengaged. A path of directly realizing buddha nature is thus distinguished from a Madhyamaka path of logical inferenceand it is with this in mind that Zhönu Pal’s commentary can be called a “direct path to the buddha within.”
The Ratnagotravibhāga Mahāyānottaratantra belongs, if we follow the Tibetan tradition, to the “five treatises of Maitreya,” though its oldest layers had probably already been composed by Sāramati in the third or fourth century. It was not quoted in India until centuries later, and the only safe terminus ante quem for it is 508 C.E., the year in which Ratnamati, who translated the Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā into Chinese, arrived in China from Madhyadeśa (India).
According to Tibetan tradition, the future Buddha Maitreya taught the Ratnagotravibhāga to Asaṅga in the Tuṣita heaven. Asaṅga is also said to have composed the Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā. This commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga quotes a number of sūtras that teach that all sentient beings possess the nature of a buddha, doubtlessly in the sense that they are already complete buddhas but do not know and actualize their true being because of their adventitious stains or spiritual defilements. But the Ratnagotravibhāga and its vyākhyā also contain passages that try to embed the teaching of buddha nature within mainstream Mahāyāna and relate it, for example, with suchness, and thus only with the cause or seed of buddhahood.
Such a form of the tathāgatagarbha theory can be discerned in the Yogācāra works among the Maitreya texts, and in his Madhyamakāloka, Kamalaśīla (ca. 740–95) brings the tathāgatagarbha theory in line with Madhyamaka thought in order to establish the teaching of a single path (ekayāna). But the Indian reaction on the whole was simply to ignore the Ratnagotravibhāga and its teaching of buddha nature for six centuries.
Their works reflect the latest developments in Indian Buddhism, which may be characterized as a genuine attempt to incorporate certain elements of the originally tantric teachings of the mahāsiddhas into the more traditional mainstream Mahāyāna, though they still maintained the superiority of tantra. In this undertaking, the teaching of buddha nature proved to provide good doctrinal support, and thus, not surprisingly, the Ratnagotravibhāga became a highly esteemed treatise in these circles.
Tradition has it that the Dharmadharmatāvibhāga and the Ratnagotravibhāga were rediscovered and taught by Maitrīpa, but Maitrīpa’s teacher at Vikramaśīla, Jñānaśrīmitra (ca. 980–1040), must have already known these two works when he composed his Sākārasiddhiśāstra and Sākārasamgraha.
Ratnākaraśānti, another teacher of Maitrīpa, also quotes the Ratnagotravibhāga in the Sūtrasamuccayabhāṣya. Maitrīpa passed the Dharmadharmatāvibhāga and the Ratnagotravibhāga on to *Ānandakīrti and Sajjana.
For Loden Sherab (Blo ldan shes rab) buddha nature was a synonym of emptiness, which could be realized by means of nonaffirming negations. He thus founded what is known as the analytical tradition (mtshan nyid lugs) of interpreting the Maitreya works.
The corresponding meditation tradition (sgom lugs) was founded by Tsen Kawoché (Btsan Kha bo che) (b. 1021), who received explanations of the Ratnagotravibhāga from Sajjana with the help of the translator Zu Gawai Dorjé (Gzu Dga’ ba’i rdo rje).
The main issues at stake were whether the teaching that all sentient beings are already buddhas within themselves has a provisional or a definitive meaning—in other words, whether the doctrine of buddha nature was taught with the intention of furthering beings who would otherwise be afraid of the true doctrine of emptiness, or whether the Buddha truly meant that sentient beings are buddhas within.
Among those who accepted the teaching of buddha nature as definitive, it was further discussed whether all or only some qualities already exist in sentient beings, and whether they exist in a fully developed or only a subtle way. Apart from these issues, the Ratnagotravibhāga and its related sūtras were also used in different ways to doctrinally support disputed traditions, such as the zhentong (gzhan stong) (“empty of other”) of the Jonangpas (Jo nang pa) or sūtra-based mahāmudrā.
Delimitation of the Subject and Methods Employed
To determine Gö Lotsāwa Zhönu Pal’s position on buddha nature, which is the main goal of the present study, we are forced to rely completely on his extensive commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā, for the simple reason that it is his only philosophical work available to date. Fortunately, his work is far more than a simple commentary. It not only quotes and discusses nearly all Mahāyāna treatises and a number of sūtras, but also explains a few passages of the Ratnagotravibhāga in the light of the (sūtra-based) mahāmudrā tradition of Maitrīpa and Gampopa. Still, the result of our analysis must remain preliminary, since it is difficult to say whether Zhönu Pal’s commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga reveals his true opinion on the subject of buddha nature. It may well be that, like others, his statements as a commentator merely reflect an ordinary explanation in line with general Mahāyāna, the final view on the buddha qualities and so forth being revealed only in a tantric context. Dölpopa (Dol po pa), for one, refrains as a commentator from presenting his extraordinary zhentong understanding in his Ratnagotravibhāga commentary. If we only had Dölpopa’s Ratnagotravibhāga commentary, then we would have remained ignorant of his full-fledged zhentong interpretation.
Zhönu Pal subdivides his commentary into three explanations for disciples with sharp, average, and inferior faculties. Besides his introductory remarks, it is the explanation for those with average faculties which is of particular interest. Technically, it is a commentary on the first three stanzas of the first chapter of the Ratnagotravibhāga. The mahāmudrā-based explanations Zhönu Pal offers in his commentary on the threefold purification of a vaiḍūrya gem and the three dharmacakras in RGVV I.2 are especially helpful in assessing his hermeneutic strategy of fully endorsing the Samdhinirmocanasūtra, which only assigns definitive meaning to the teachings of the last dharmacakra. The superiority of the last dharmacakra derives, according to Zhönu Pal, from the particularly efficient, direct approach to the natural mind that the mahāmudrā pith instructions allow. An annotated translation of this explanation for disciples with average faculties thus forms, together with the translation of the introduction and the explanation for those with sharp faculties, the basis of our analysis of Zhönu Pal’s Ratnagotravibhāga commentary.
Because Zhönu Pal deals in the main part of his commentary with almost every aspect of the Buddhist doctrine, it is necessary to delimit the scope of our inquiry and define methodological principles that will enable us to structure this vast material and evaluate it in terms of a history of ideas. In other words, it is first necessary to identify and describe the specific points Zhönu Pal makes with regard to buddha nature in order to be able to systematically compare his position with those of other exegetes. An initial study of Zhönu Pal’s Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā commentary suggests three promising lines of inquiry:
What does Zhönu Pal mean by the presence of “subtle” buddha qualities in sentient beings? How does Zhönu Pal tie the teaching of buddha nature in with the prajñāpāramitā literature by distinguishing two types of emptiness? In what way does Zhönu Pal read his mahāmudrā pith instructions into certain passages of the Ratnagotravibhāga, the other Maitreya works, and the Laṅkāvatārasūtra?
Given Zhönu Pal’s broad educational background, a systematic comparison of his views with all other major commentarial traditions of his time would seem called for, but such a wide-ranging study would go beyond the scope of a single monograph. Since it is Zhönu Pal’s main concern to explain the Ratnagotravibhāga and the other Maitreya works from within his mahāmudrā tradition, which is closely related to the meditation tradition of Tsen Kawoché, Zhönu Pal’s position will be mainly evaluated against the background of a carefully chosen selection of interpretations by masters of the Kagyü, Nyingma (Rnying ma), and Jonang (Jo nang) schools who figure within or are close to his tradition. The fourteenth century, which experienced some of the most important developments of the abovementioned traditions, together with the fifteenth century, Zhönu Pal’s own century, will form the time frame for the present study.
The earliest exegete I have chosen is the Third Karmapa Rangjung Dorjé (1284–1339), who not only stands in the tradition of Tsen Kawoché,but also combines mahāmudrā and dzogchen with Asaṅga’s Yogācāra, whose strict distinction between an impure ālayavijñāna (basic consciousness) and the pure dharmadhātu (expanse of phenomena) served as a basis for later zhentong traditions. The next two are Dölpopa (1292–1361) and his disciple Sabzang Mati Panchen (Sa bzang Mati paṇ chen) (1294–1376), both of whom contributed considerably to the spiritual history of Tibet by their extraordinary zhentong interpretation of buddha nature. Since Rangjung Dorjé assimilated dzogchen ideas, it is also of great interest to determine Longchen Rabjampa’s view on buddha nature, which may have influenced Zhönu Pal’s theory of beginningless subtle qualities. In fact, Zhönu Pal’s teacher Lhakhang Tengpa Sangyé Rinchen (Lha khang steng pa Sangs rgyas rin chen) (1339–1434) belonged, together with Longchenpa, to the circle of disciples of the Sakya (Sa skya) master Lama Dampa Sönam Gyaltsen (Bla ma Dam pa Bsod nams rgyal mtshan) (1312–75).Of great interest is also a Ratnagotravibhāga commentary by Sangpupa Lodrö Tsungmé (Gsang phu pa Blo gros mtshungs med) (thirteenth/fourteenth century) who, as an assistant professor under Jamyang Shākzhön (’Jam dbyangs Shāk gzhon),must have had some exchange of views with the Third Karmapa Rangjung Dorjé about the Ratnagotravibhāga. Finally I have selected the Drugpa (’Brug pa) Kagyü master Barawa Gyaltsen Palzang (’Ba’ ra ba Rgyal mtshan dpal bzang) (1310–91), whose mahāmudrā interpretation of buddha nature is nearly identical with that of Zhönu Pal.
The differences between the various Ratnagotravibhāga commentaries, while numerous, are often a matter of minor technical detail, and in order to avoid a mere collection of subsidiary material, we will concentrate in each case on a few major philosophical issues that can be directly compared or related with the three above-mentioned questions regarding Zhönu Pal’s position. Toward this goal it is not enough to simply compare how a few crucial stanzas of the Ratnagotravibhāga are explained. Especially since Ratnagotravibhāga commentaries do not survive for each chosen exegete, and furthermore, in some cases only the independent works of the master clearly reveal his philosophical views. To give an example, when reading Dölpopa’s commentary on RGV I.152–53 (J I.149–50), we could get the impression that the fortified potential, from which the qualities of the form kāyas arise, is something newly acquired by effort, and based on this passage alone we are not able to correctly describe the Jonang position that in reality all buddha qualities exist throughout beginningless time. The explanation of this prima facie contradiction is that the latter is the extraordinary explanation, which is not given in an ordinary commentary. But we only come to know this by consulting Dölpopa’s Ri chos nges don rgya mtsho. Longchenpa, on the other hand, comments on these stanzas (RGV I.152–53) in the non-tantric part of his Grub mtha’ mdzod fully in line with the dzogchen notion that qualities are not produced but spontaneously present. Thus the ascertainment of a given exegete’s philosophical position not only involves a critical assessment of the sources used, be it his Ratnagotravibhāga commentary or any other text, but also requires a thorough knowledge of the hermeneutical principles to which an exegete adheres.
Still, while our limited selection of texts by these fourteenth-century masters does not provide scope for a comprehensive description of the traditions related to Zhönu Pal’s position in this period, it does provide a basis for depicting a few first prominent spots on an otherwise empty map, and so serves as a preliminary guide for understanding the development of ideas during this interesting period. To sum up, my study of Rangjung Dorjé, Longchenpa, Lodrö Tsungmé (Blo gros mtshungs med), Barawa, and the Jonang position remains a first step and is only meant to better contextualize some of Zhönu Pal’s important views on the buddha nature.
The “analytic” interpretations of the Ratnagotravibhāga in the Gelug and Sakya traditions have been accurately dealt with by Seyfort Ruegg. Zhamar Chödrag Yeshé (Zhva dmar Chos grags ye shes) (1453–1524) mentions in his biography of Zhönu Pal the interesting detail that the latter was fond of Tsongkhapa (Tsong kha pa) (1357–1419) for having taught a possible distinction between provisional and definitive meaning according to the Ratnagotravibhāga. On the other hand, Zhönu Pal is reported to have had an argument with Tsongkhapa’s student Gyaltsab Jé (Rgyal tshab rje) (1364–1432) over great bliss in highest yoga tantra (Tib. rnal ’byor bla na med pa’i rgyud). While Gyaltsab Jé explained that such bliss cannot be ascertained as anything, Zhönu Pal insisted that there is a way of ascertaining it in his (Zhönu Pal’s) own tradition. It would thus be interesting to find out if Tsongkhapa really did uphold, contrary to his disciple Gyaltsab Jé, a tradition embracing a positive direct approach to the ultimate—one that met with the approval of Zhönu Pal—but this would go beyond the scope of this study.
The Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā was translated from the Tibetan by Obermiller in 1931. After Johnston (1950) had edited the original Sanskrit on the basis of two manuscripts brought by Sāṅkṛtyāyana from Tibet, the vyākhyā was translated for a second time, from the Sanskrit, by Takasaki (1966). Both Johnston’s edition and Takasaki’s translation are pioneering works,yet they contain a number of serious mistakes, as can be seen from de Jong’s (1979) and Schmithausen’s (1971) extensive reviews. Unfortunately, the latter two did not correct the entire edition and translation, so each time I quote and translate or refer to a passage from the Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā, I have had to check the original manuscript. Even though Seyfort Ruegg’s (1969) French paraphrases of the most important parts of the latter are also very valuable, they are sometimes too influenced by the prevailing Gelug interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhāga. In RGVV I.1, for example, the buddha qualities are characterized, based on a quotation from the Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśa, as being inseparable:
“Śāriputra, the dharmakāya taught by the tathāgata possesses inseparable (avinirbhāga) properties and qualities impossible to recognize as something disconnected (avinirmuktajñāna-), in the form of properties of the tathāgata, which surpass in number the grains of sand of the river Gaṅgā.” Thus the sixth vajra point should be understood according to the Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśa.
Seyfort Ruegg (1969:360) regards the compound members avinirbhāga— and avinirmuktajñāna—as qualifications of the dharmakāya and translates: “…le dharmakāya…a pour qualité d’être inséparable, et il a la propriété du savoir non séparé—[inséparable] des dharma de tathāgata dépassant [en leur nombre] les sables de la Gaṅgā.” In the Śrīmālādevīsūtra, however, both compounds are used to mark the buddha qualities, which is also the most natural grammatical construction here. The difference is significant. If the qualities themselves are inseparable, it is much more difficult to read the Gelug understanding that the qualities are produced by the fortified potential into the Ratnagotravibhāga. Still, Seyfort Ruegg’s work was groundbreaking in having accurately described the Ratnagotravibhāga interpretation of the later dominant school of Tibetan Buddhism, the Gelug, whose lines of scholastic thought sometimes influenced the other schools.
The Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā quotes a group of sūtras which clearly state that all sentient beings possess a buddha nature that is inseparably endowed with innumerable buddha qualities. This doctrine is clearly expounded in the nine examples from the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, which are also presented and discussed in detail in the Ratnagotravibhāga. According to Michael Zimmermann, all nine examples convey the idea of a full-fledged tathāgata in living beings throughout beginningless time. The authors of the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra were obviously somewhat uncautious, attributing as they did substantialist notions to buddha nature and fitting them out with philosophically ambiguous terminology. It could be argued, as Zhönu Pal does, that the examples of a tree grown from a seed and the future monarch (cakravartin) in the womb indicate a growth of the buddha qualities, but in support of the original purport of the sūtra, we can say that the main focus of the example of the tree lies not on the growing tree, but on the imperishability of its seed and that the result (kārya), namely the tree, is already contained in the seed. Again, in the second example adduced, that the cakravartin is still an embryo does not seem crucial for understanding it. His nature of being a cakravartin will not change, for his future role is already preordained, and his poor mother already protected.
The Śrīmālādevīsūtra, too, conveys the idea that the inconceivable buddha qualities are inseparable from buddha nature. In other words, sentient beings already possess the buddha qualities, and only differ from an actual buddha in that they have not yet purified themselves from their adventitious stains. This is also supported by the Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśaparivarta which is quoted in RGVV I.1 as canonical support for the fourth vajra point, namely buddha nature:
“Śāriputra, ultimate is an expression for the (buddha) element in sentient beings. The (buddha) element in sentient beings, Śāriputra, is an expression for buddha nature. Buddha nature, Śāriputra, is an expression for the dharmakāya.” Thus the fourth vajra point should be understood according to the Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśaparivarta.
The crucial stanzas on emptiness in the Ratnagotravibhāga and its vyākhyā (RGV I.157–58, (J I.154–55)) are also clear in this respect: they fully endorse the inseparable connection of the qualities with buddha nature:
There is nothing to be removed from it and nothing to be added. The real should be seen as real, and seeing the real, you become liberated. The (buddha) element is empty of adventitious [stains], which have the defining characteristic of being separable; but it is not empty of unsurpassable qualities, which have the defining characteristic of not being separable.
The vyākhyā is:
What is taught by that? There is no characteristic sign of any of the defilements (samkleśa) whatsoever to be removed from this naturally pure buddha element, because it is naturally devoid of adventitious stains. Nor does anything need to be added to it as the characteristic sign (nimitta) of purification, because its nature is to have pure properties that are inseparable [from it]. Therefore it is said [in the Śrīmālādevīsūtra: “Buddha nature is empty of the sheath of all defilements, which are separable and recognized as something disconnected. It is not empty[, however,] of inconceivable buddha qualities, which are inseparable [in that it is impossible] to recognize [them] as something disconnected, and which surpass in number the grains of sand of the river Gaṅgā.” Thus we truly see that something is empty of that which does not exist in it, and we truly realize that that which remains there is present, [and] hence exists there. Having [thus] abandoned the extremes of [wrong] assertion and denial, these two stanzas correctly elucidate the defining characteristic of emptiness.
This passage clearly states, in the sense of the Śrīmālādevīsūtra, that buddha nature is not empty of inseparable qualities, and the traditional formula on being empty as found in the Cūḷasuññatasutta confirms that these inseparable qualities are left in emptiness. The quotation from the Śrīmālādevīsūtra that immediately follows in the vyākhyā (“The tathāgatas’ wisdom [that knows) emptiness is the wisdom [that knows) the buddha nature”) must be understood in the same context. The sūtra does not simply here equate the buddha nature with Madhyamaka emptiness, but takes emptiness as an aspect of the buddha nature, namely its being empty of adventitious stains. Seyfort Ruegg remarks on this point that the Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā tries to integrate the theory of emptiness into a particular doctrine of an absolute that is inseparable from buddha qualities. Schmithausen here identifies a form of “inclusivism” under which emptiness is understood as buddha nature empty of adventitious stains.
On the other hand, there are some passages in the Ratnagotravibhāga and its vyākhyā that try to avoid a too substantialist notion of buddha nature and its qualities. Thus, RGV I.29 introduces the ten aspects of buddha nature in the first chapter with the remark that the latter are taught with the underlying intention of the ultimate buddha element:
[The ten aspects are:] [its] own-being, cause, fruit, function, connection, manifestation, phases, all-pervasiveness, unchangeability, and inseparable qualities. With regard to them we should know that the intended meaning [is that] of the ultimate (buddha) element.
In other words, RGV I.29 would have us understand the unchangeability of the element and inseparability of its qualities in terms of the ultimate aspect of buddha nature—this, after all, is also implied in the above-quoted passage from the Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśa, which equates buddha nature not only with the dharmakāya, but also with the ultimate. Now two different sets of qualities can be taken as pertaining to the ultimate. First, an ultimate kāya (paramārthakāya) is said to be endowed with the “thirty-two qualities of the dharmakāya”(i.e., the ten strengths, the four fearlessnesses, and the eighteen exclusive features); and secondly, an ultimate aspect is referred to in the introduction of the Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā to the stanzas II.29–37,in the following way:
In RGV II.46c–47d it is further specified how the endowment of immeasurable qualities is to be understood:
The svābhāvikakāya is endowed with qualities that are immeasurable, innumerable, inconceivable, and incomparable, and that have reached the (state of] final purity.
In other words, the svābhāvikakāya is here said to possess largely spacelike qualities, which are not at variance with the concept of emptiness in mainstream Mahāyāna. Various Tibetan exegetes such as Barawa saw in this ultimate aspect of the qualities the inseparable qualities of the Śrīmālādevīsūtra and the Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśa. Following this line of thought, Gö Lotsāwa Zhönu Pal, for example, took the sixth and the eighth examples of the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra as an indication that the qualities exhibit aspects of growth, notwithstanding the clear intention of the sūtra, which becomes evident in its explanation of the fifth example (a treasure buried under a poor man’s house), where buddha nature is fully equated with the thirty-two qualities of the dharmakāya. The Ratnagotravibhāga (I.117 (J I.114)), which otherwise faithfully renders the nine examples of the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, only speaks of the treasure of properties (dharmanidhi).That this is not only an unintentional inaccuracy is clear from RGV I.152–55 (J I.149–52), where the treasure illustrates the naturally present potential, from which the svābhāvikakāya (i.e., the thirty-two qualities of the dharmakāya) is said to be obtained (see below). In other words, the treasure of buddha nature no longer stands for the thirty-two qualities of the dharmakāya, but rather for their cause. Given these somewhat unbalanced strands of the Ratnagotravibhāga, we can either follow the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra and fully equate the qualities of buddha nature with the thirty-two qualities of the dharmakāya, or elaborate on a difference between a buddha nature that consists of merely space-like qualities, on the one hand, and a buddha endowed with all qualities, on the other.
Such a strategy of distinguishing buddha nature from the dharmakāya finds support from one of the oldest building blocks of the Ratnagotravibhāga, stanza I.27, which implies a subtle distinction between buddha nature, or potential, and an actual buddha:
By virtue of the presence of buddha wisdom in [all] kinds of sentient beings, The fact that its (i.e., buddha nature’s) stainlessness is by nature without duality And the fact that its (i.e., buddha nature’s) fruit has been “metaphorically” applied (Skt. upacāra) to the buddha potential, All sentient beings are said to possess the essence of a buddha.
Zhönu Pal here explains upacāra by citing the example of a Brahmin boy who is called a lion because he is a hero and fearless. Whereas a real lion is an animal, the word lion is applied to the brave boy only metaphorically. It may be the case, however, that upacāra simply stands for a “custom or manner of speech,” the buddha potential being vaguely called a buddha, even though the buddha element, which already possesses its inseparable qualities, has not yet been purified from its separable stains. But Dölpopa, for whom the only difference between an actual buddha and buddha nature is whether one has purified all stains or not, ignores this stanza, while his disciple Sabzang Mati Panchen has great difficulty in making it fit the Jonang position.
Further support for a distinction between different sets of qualities is offered in the first three stanzas of the third chapter of the Ratnagotravibhāga, which distinguish between the qualities of the dharmakāya (i.e., the ultimate kāya) and those of the form kāyas:
Benefit for oneself and others is [[[Wikipedia:equivalent|equivalent]] respectively to] the state of having the ultimate kāya and the kāyas of apparent (truth), which are based on it. Representing the state of dissociation and maturation, the fruit possesses a variety of sixty-four qualities.
The body partaking of the ultimate is the support for accomplishing one’s own benefit, while the support for accomplishing the benefit of others is the embodiment (vapuḥ) of the Sage on the level of conventional (truth). The first body is endowed with the qualities of dissociation, such as the [ten] strengths, and the second with those of maturation, the [thirty-two] marks of a great being.
The major (and minor) marks of a buddha, or the thirty-two qualities of the form kāyas, are called qualities of maturation and belong to the conventional level of truth. This distinction between two sets of qualities is also clearly stated in RGV I.152–55 (J I.149–52):
One should know that the potential is twofold in being like a treasure and a tree [grown] from a fruit. It is the primordial naturally present [potential] and the acquired (=fortified) supreme [potential].
It is maintained that the three kāyas of the Buddha are obtained [by starting] from these two potentials: the first kāya from the first, and the latter two from the second. One should know that the beautiful svābhāvikakāya is like a precious image, since it is nonartificial by nature and since it is the source of precious qualities. The saṁbhoga(kāya) is like the cakravartin, since it possesses the great kingdom of Dharma. The nirmāṇa(kāya) is like the golden statue, since its nature is that of being a reflection.
In other words, the form kāyas and thus their qualities are obtained from the acquired or fortified potential, which is normally explained as the accumulation of merit. It should be noted that it is only the svābhāvikakāya that is described as “nonartificial.” Given that in RGV III.3 the ultimate kāya is said to be endowed with the ten strengths, etc. (i.e., the thirty-two qualities of the dharmakāya), the latter cannot be taken as something artificially produced either.
Another important issue among Tibetan scholars was the question whether the Ratnagotravibhāga comments on sūtras that have definitive or provisional meanings, namely whether the teaching of buddha nature is to be taken literally or interpreted in line with the emptiness taught in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras. Immediately after the stanzas on emptiness (RGV I.157–58 (J I.154–55)), the relation between the teachings of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and the tathāgatagarbha sūtras, together with the aim of the latter, is spelled out:
[Somebody] says: If the (buddha) element is thus so difficult to see, given that it is not a fully experiential object for even the highest saints who abide on the final level of nonattachment, what is gained then by teaching it [even] to foolish (i.e., ordinary) people? [Thus] the [following] two stanzas [are dedicated] to a summary of the aim/motive (prayojana) of the teaching. One is the question, and in the second the explanation [is given]:
Why did the buddhas teach here that a buddha element exists in all sentient beings, after they taught everywherethat everything should be known to be empty in every respect, like clouds, (visions in a] dream and illusions.
One may have the five faults of being discouraged, contempt for inferior persons, clinging to the unreal (adventitious stains), denying real (buddha) properties, and excessive self-love. [A buddha element) has been [already] taught [at this stage] in order that those who have these [faults] abandon them.
According to Madhyamaka hermeneutics, you have to fulfill three requirements in order to show that a teaching has a provisional meaning (neyārtha), that is, that it has been given with a hidden intention (Skt. ābhiprāyika, Tib. dgongs pa can).You have to be able to name the basis of such an intention, or the intentional ground (Tib. dgongs gzhi), namely the hidden truth; the motive (Skt. prayojana, Tib. dgos pa) behind the provisional statement; and a contradiction that results from taking the provisional statement literally (Tib. dngos la gnod byed ).Seyfort Ruegg has shown that the exegetical principles of the Madhyamaka school were already applied in Dharmamitra’s subcommentary on Haribhadra’s (ca. 800) Abhisamayālamkāravṛtti, the Prasphuṭapadā, and it is not entirely impossible that early forms of these principles were already being used at the time stanzas I.159–60 (J I.156–57) of the Ratnagotravibhāga were written. Nor is it impossible to see in the Ratnagotravibhāga a formal proof that the teaching of buddha nature has a hidden intention and thus a provisional meaning. The intentional ground would be emptiness as taught in the prajñāpāramitā, and the motive of teaching buddha nature the removal of the five faults; while the contradiction between the teachings of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and the tathāgatagarbha sūtras is clearly formulated in RGV I.159 (J I.156).
The first three introductory stanzas (RGV I.1–3), on the other hand, suggest that the final editor of the Ratnagotravibhāga and its vyākhyā was more familiar with the five principles of Yogācāra hermeneutics. In the Vyākhyāyukti these five principles, which must be addressed when explaining the meaning of a sūtra, are: (1) the aim/motive (prayojana), (2) the concise meaning, (3) the meaning of the words, (4) the connections [between its different topics], and (5) the objections [urged by opponents] together with rebuttals [of them]. It is obvious that the concise meaning of the treatise (point 2) can be presented by listing the seven vajra points (Buddha, Dharma, Saṅgha, buddha nature, enlightenment, buddha qualities, and activity) in RGV I.1, while the connections between them (point 4) are clearly explained in RGV I.3. We could further argue that the meaning of the words (padārtha) buddha, etc. (point 3), is explained by the term vajra point (or -word ) (vajrapada), which conveys the notion that these seven points are difficult to realize by listening and thinking. The seven main topics of the treatise (vajra points) thus hint at a reality that is beyond the reach of the intellect, and the aim (point 1) of the treatise would then be to realize this reality. Whether the aim called for by the Vyākhyāyukti is hinted at in RGV I.1 or not, the way it is described in RGV I.160 (J I.157) accords with Vasubandhu’s list of possible aims in the Vyākhyāyukti. If it is thus the hermeneutics of the Yogācāra school that is being followed in this passage of the Ratnagotravibhāga and its vyākhyā, the mentioning of an aim in the RGV does not imply that the latter is neyārtha. Moreover, stanzas I.159–60 (J I.156–57) would seem to present a contradiction urged by opponents and a rebuttal of it (point no. 5 of the Vyākhyāyukti).
In this case, however, it is the prajñāpāramitā sūtras that are neyārtha and whose intention (abhiprāya) must be clarified in the light of the tathāgatagarbha doctrine, precisely the way it has been done in the preceding stanzas I.157–58 (J I.154–55). This is, at least, the hermeneutic strategy of the Vyākhyāyukti, in which Vasubandhu tries to show that the prajñāpāramitā sūtras can only be protected against criticism on the part of the Hīnayāna schools (which assert that the “nihilistic” teaching of the prajñāpāramitā harms people)by demonstrating that the teaching of emptiness possesses a thought content (ābhiprāyika) of what is really true. Therefore it must be interpreted in the light of this truth, which is the trisvabhāva theory. While Vasubandhu refers to the Samdhinirmocanasūtra, the Ratnagotra-vibhāgavyākhyā adduces the Dhāraṇīśvararājasūtra, in which the three dharmacakras are explained as in the Samdhinirmocanasūtra, except that the second dharmacakra, with the prajñāpāramita sūtras, is not explicitly called neyārtha. Still, the ambiguous term leading principle of the tathāgata (tathāgatanetrī) doubtlessly hints in this direction. To sum up this possible interpretation, for the reasons described in stanza I.160 (J I.157) it is necessary to clarify already at an early stage the provisional teaching of emptiness in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras with the help of the nītārtha teaching of buddha nature, even though the latter is difficult to grasp even for advanced bodhisattvas.
The uncertainty of the Dhāraṇīśvararājasūtra with regard to the status of the second dharmacakra leaves room for a third interpretation, namely that both the second and third dharmacakras are nītārtha. Following this line of thought, we could argue that since buddha nature is taught as being as inconceivable as emptiness, stanza I.159 (J I.156) does not simply express a contradiction between the teachings of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and tathāgatagarbha sūtras, but rather objects that either the two dharmacakras contradict each other or the teaching of an inexpressible buddha nature (third dharmacakra) is a redundant repetition of the teaching of an inexpressible emptiness (second dharmacakra). Stanza I.160 (J I.157) would then explain why the third dharmacakra is not redundant, even though it is in accordance with the second dharmacakra.
What goes against the first possibility, that is, the theory that the author of the final Ratnagotravibhāga views his own treatise as neyārtha, is its entire fifth chapter, which explains the advantages of experiencing faith in buddha nature, enlightenment, the buddha qualities, and activity. In stanza V.5 it is said, for example, that only hearing one word of these teachings on buddha nature yields much more merit then anything else. This reminds us very much of Samdhinirmocanasūtra VII.31–32, which describes in a similar way the advantage of hearing the teachings of definitive meaning (nītārtha), namely those of the third dharmacakra. Stanza RGV V.20, which refers to the means of avoiding becoming deprived of the teaching, also warns against violating the sūtras of definitive meaning:
There is nobody anywhere in this world who is more learned than the Victorious One, No other who is omniscient and knows completely the highest truth in the right way. Therefore, the sūtra[s] of definitive meaning put forth by the Sage (i.e., the Buddha) himself should not be violated; Otherwise the correct doctrine (dharma) will be harmed, since they will fall away from the way of the Buddha.
If this stanza is by the same author as the one who penned stanzas I.159–60 (J I.156–57), it is difficult to see how one and the same person could have composed an extensive treatise on the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra in which he takes the latter to have provisional meaning, and then issue a warning not to violate the sūtras of definitive meaning. It is also not the case that the Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā refers to the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, which explains that the teaching of buddha nature has a provisional meaning. To summarize, the similarities between RGV V.5 and the Samdhinirmocanasūtra do indeed suggest that the latter sūtra is being followed and that the third dharmacakra (and thus the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra) is taken to have definitive meaning.
With regard to the later discussion of the zhentong and mahāmudrā interpretations of the Ratnagotravibhāga, the question whether the latter propounds a form of monism or not remains to be addressed. Whereas the Jonangpas assert a substantial identity between the dharmakāya and buddha nature, in that the true nature is the real dharmakāya of enlightenment, some mahāmudrā traditions identify buddha nature with the natural unfabricated mind, which naturally manifests as dharmakāya after the purification process has been completed. According to Thrangu Rinpoche, a modern proponent of mahāmudrā, every sentient being manifests, then, its own dharmakāya. Lambert Schmithausen has pointed out that the latter explanation is supported by a passage from the Avatamsakasūtra quoted in RGVV I.25. Its teaching that the wisdom of the Buddha is contained in all sentient beings, which is an early stage of the doctrine of buddha nature, does not vindicate monism, since enlightenment is described as being equal to but not identical with the already existing tathāgata. The following statement comes after the example of the huge silk cloth with a painting of the universe inside an atom (which illustrates the immeasurable buddha qualities inside the ordinary mindstream):
I will try to remove in sentient beings all bonds of conceptions, through the teaching of the noble path, so that they themselves cast off by themselves the big knot of conceptions by attaining the strength of the noble path, recognize the wisdom of the tathāgata [within themselves] and become equal to a tathāgata.
The earliest Indian reaction to the theory of buddha nature is found in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, which is of an extremely heterogeneous structure. It is safe to say, though, that it mainly upholds the Yogācāra doctrine of the three natures (trisvabhāva), mind-only, and basic consciousness (ālayavijñāna). In this Yogācāra sūtra buddha nature is said to be the purity of natural luminosity and to abide in the body of all sentient beings as the bearer of the thirty-two marks [of a great being). In reply to Mahāmati’s objection that this comes close to the heretical teaching of a personal self, the Buddha is reported to have said:
Mahāmati, my teaching of buddha nature does not resemble the heretical doctrine of a self (ātman). Rather, O Mahāmati, the tathāgatas teach as buddha nature what [really] is emptiness, the limit of reality, nirvāṇa, nonorigination, signlessness, wishlessness, and similar categories, and then the tathāgatas, the arhats, the perfect buddhas, in order to avoid [giving] fools a reason for becoming afraid of the lack of essence, teach the nonconceptual experiential object without characteristic signs by means of instructions that make use [of the term] buddha nature.
Based on that, we could argue that the notion of buddha nature is simply a provisional teaching (neyārtha) for those who do not grasp emptiness. The Laṅkāvatārasūtra also equates buddha nature with the ālayavijñāna:
The illustrious one then said this to him: “Buddha nature, Mahāmati, which contains the cause of wholesome and unwholesome [factors], and which is the agent of all [re]birth and of [all] going [to this and that state of existence), moves on to the distress of [various] states of existence, like an actor [assuming different roles]. Yet it is devoid of an I and mine. Not understanding [this], (buddha nature, which] is endowed with the impulse of the condition of the three meeting [factors], moves on. But the non-Buddhists who adhere to a persistent belief in (metaphysical) principles do not understand this. Being permeated throughout beginningless time by the various imprints of baseness left by mental fabrication, (buddha nature is also] called ālayavijñāna. Together with [the other] seven forms of consciousness which arise on the level of dwelling in ignorance, it moves on in such a way that its body is never interrupted, just as the ocean and the waves.”
This raises the question whether the Laṅkāvatārasūtra then considers the ālayavijñāna to be a provisional expression for emptiness, too. Based on the Laṅkāvatāra’s equation of buddha nature with emptiness, Candrakīrti (seventh century) in his Madhyamakāvatāra indeed infers that the Yogācāra notions of ālayavijñāna, mind-only, and trisvabhāva are neyārtha:
Having shown with the help of this canonical passage [from the Laṅkāvatārasūtra)that all parts of sūtras with a similar content, of which the Vijñānavādins claim that they are nītārtha, are [really] neyārtha….
That Candrakīrti holds the teaching of an ālayavijñāna to be neyārtha becomes clear in his autocommentary on MA VI.42, which asserts that only emptiness is implied by the term ālayavijñāna. It is doubtful, however, whether we can go as far as to affirm that other parts of the Yogācāra doctrine, such as that everything is only mind (cittamātra), is taken by the Laṅkāvatārasūtra as being neyārtha too. But this is precisely what Candrakīrti does with reference to LAS II.123:
This stanza taken on its own suggests indeed that the cittamātra teaching is of provisional character (neyārtha) in that it is compared to a healing agent for a particular disease. But the following stanza (LAS II.124), which has not been quoted by Candrakīrti, sheds a different light on the issue:
In other words, the Laṅkāvatārasūtra takes the main point of the Yogācāra teaching as something that can be only experienced by the buddhas, being beyond the reach of an analytical intellect. But while most parts of the Yogācāra doctrine (e.g., cittamātra, trisvabhāva) are presented as a definitive teaching in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, it could be argued that the notion of buddha nature (and implicitly that of ālayavijñāna?) is not accepted according to its literal meaning, and is thus neyārtha.
The argument could be given further, however, that this only refers to a too-substantialist definition of buddha nature, namely as possessing the thirty-two marks of a supreme being, and that a more moderate understanding of it (namely as suchness mingled with stains, as in the Ratnagotravibhāga) would be accepted at least by some Yogācāras. This is indeed implied by the equation of buddha nature with suchness in Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra IX.37:
In the Madhyāntavibhāga, too, the influence of buddha nature (taken as suchness) can be noticed. Whereas in the Ratnagotravibhāga suchness can be accompanied by stains (buddha nature) or not (enlightenment), a positively understood emptiness may be taken to be either defiled or not in MAV I.22:
(Emptiness is] neither defiled nor undefiled, neither pure nor impure (MAV I.22ab). How is it that it is neither defiled nor impure? It is because of the natural luminosity of mind (MAV I.22c). How is it that it is neither undefiled nor pure? It is because of the adventitious nature of defilements (MAV I.22d).
In the same way as in the Ratnagotravibhāga, mind’s luminosity is compared to the natural purity of water, gold, and space, which can coexist with adventitious stains. This becomes clear in Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya I.16:
How should the differentiation of emptiness be understood? As being defiled as well as pure (MAV I.16a). Thus is its differentiation. In what state is it defiled and in what is it pure? It is accompanied as well as not accompanied by stains (MAV I.16b). When it occurs together with stains it is defiled, and when its stains are abandoned it is pure. If, after being accompanied by stains it becomes stainless, how is it then not impermanent, given that it has the property of change? This is because its purity is considered to be like that of water, gold, and space (MAV I.16cd). [A change is admitted] in view of the removal of adventitious stains, but there is no change in terms of its own-being.
It should be noted how the terms “defiled” and “pure” of the first section are explicitly equated with the imported terminology “accompanied by stains” and “stainless.” The latter doubtlessly stem from the Ratnagotravibhāga and its vyākhyā, where buddha nature is defined as suchness accompanied by stains (samalā tathatā) and the transformation of the basis as stainless suchness (nirmalā tathatā). Such an understanding of the transformation of basis is also found in the Dharmadharmatāvibhāga.Even though the term tathāgatagarbha is not found in the Dharmadharmatāvibhāga, it is clearly implied by the comparison of natural luminosity with the original purity of space, gold, and water, which can coexist with adventitious stains.To sum up, we can discern an influence of the Ratnagotravibhāga on the Yogācāra texts among the Maitreya works, while the way buddha nature or its equivalent of an original purity is referred to in them, namely as emptiness, suchness, or natural luminosity, accords well with the interpretation of buddha nature as emptiness, etc., in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra.
Judging from his critique of Yogācāra in the Madhyamakāvatāra, it is hard to imagine that Candrakīrti accepted such an interpretation of buddha nature. There must, however, have been some other currents within Madhyamaka that more readily accepted the new developments in Mahāyāna. Thus, the Sūtrasamuccaya (attributed to Nāgārjuna by tradition) quotes and discusses certain Mahāyāna sūtras, such as the Śrīmālādevīsūtra, that restrict the dictum that all phenomena lack an own-being (i.e., their emptiness) to the level of the phenenomenal world. In order to show that there is ultimately only one single yāna, the compilers of the Sūtrasamuccaya even quote from the Dhāraṇīśvararājasūtra the example of the threefold purification of a vaiḍūrya stone, which illustrates the successive teachings of the three dharmacakras. This passage plays an important role in the hermeneutics of the Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā, implying that the second dharmacakra, which teaches the emptiness of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras, is outshone by a final dharmacakra, which describes the ultimate in positive terms. The question thus arises how some Mādhyamikas could selectively pick certain passages from the above-mentioned sūtras instead of endorsing the entire Śrīmālādevīsūtra literally, and thus claim, for example, that buddha nature is empty of all defilements, which are separable, but not of inseparable buddha qualities.